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Abstract
Composition as Identity is the view that an object is identical to its parts
taken collectively. I elaborate and defend a theory based on this idea:
composition is a kind of identity. Since this claim is best presented within
a plural logic, I develop a formal system of plural logic. The principles
of this system differ from the standard views on plural logic because one
of my central claims is that identity is a relation which comes in a variety
of forms and only one of them obeys substitution unrestrictedly. I jus-
tify this departure from orthodoxy by showing some problems which re-
sult from attempts to avoid inconsistencies within plural logic by means
of postulating other non-singular terms besides plural terms. Thereby,
some of the main criticisms raised against Composition as Identity can be
addressed. Further, I argue that the way objects are arranged is relevant
with respect to the question which object they compose, i.e. to which ob-
ject they are identical to. This helps to meet a second group of arguments
against Composition as Identity. These arguments aim to show that iden-
tifying composite objects on the basis of the identity of their parts entails,
contrary to our common sense view, that rearranging the parts of a com-
posite object does not leave us with a different object. Moreover, it allows
us to carve out the intensional aspects of Composition as Identity and
to defend mereological universalism, the claim that any objects compose
some object. Much of the pressure put on the latter view can be avoided
by distinguishing the question whether some objects compose an object
from the question what object they compose. Eventually, I conclude that
Composition as Identity is a coherent and plausible position, as long as
we take identity to be a more complex relation than commonly assumed.

Preface
Our world contains a large number of material objects with parts. I am
typing these lines by hitting some keys, which are part of a keyboard.
The keyboard lies on a tabletop, which is part of a table standing in the
philosophy department. On the shelf beside the table, there are several
books, which have pages as parts. We call such objects ‘composite objects’
and say that they are composed, or made up, of their parts.
The aim of this thesis is to develop and defend an account of com-
position as a kind of identity. Thereby, it connects to the position called
“Composition as Identity”. The two central claims I am arguing for are
that an object is identical to its parts taken collectively and that this iden-
tity relation is sensitive to the way the parts are arranged. I will present
a formal system for these claims, which avoids some major problems of
Composition as Identity discussed in the literature and brings out the
intensional character of Composition as Identity. My aim is to give a de-
tailed presentation of this view, with its costs and benefits singled out,
and indicate open problems, which are still to be faced.
Talk about identity and parthood is ubiquitous, which may suggest
that we have a good understanding of these two notions. However,
philosophers are still baffled by ancient puzzles such as the “the Statue
and the Piece of Clay” or “the Ship of Theseus”. The fact that we are
still troubled with these paradoxes shows that they are more than just
means to puzzle first year philosophy students or unusual – and as I can
tell from my own experience, rarely successful – icebreakers at parties.
They show that this oversimplified picture of identity and parthood is
mistaken and in need of clarification.
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Composition is what brings the notions of identity and parthood to-
gether, and hence, the key to shed light on these puzzles is to find out
what composition is. The recent development of plural logic promises to
give us the adequate logical tools to analyze composition with the help
of formal methods. It allows us to finally use logical methods in order to
tackle the ancient metaphysical problems. Since it is only fair to say that
the development of plural logic is still in its initial phase, there are many
open questions and problems to be explored.
Part I, “Composition as Identity”, is a discussion of the motivations
for and criticisms of the claim that a composite object is identical to its
parts, as well as an analysis of different ways this assumption is spelled
out in the literature. Eventually, I suggest elaborating on the point that
composition is a kind of identity. This hypothesis hinges on understand-
ing identity as a relation, which comes in different kinds.
The idea of the varieties of identity is argued for in Part II, “From Plu-
rals to Identities”. There, I will develop a formal system, which makes
use of well-established principles and concepts of plural logic, i.e. a logic
that allows the use of singular and plural terms. I show then that the tra-
ditional strategy to avoid certain inconsistencies, which follow from the
basic principles of plural logic and innocuous empirical assumptions, has
serious difficulties. An examination of these derivations and some com-
monly upheld principles on identity will lead me then to a denial of the
thought that there is only one kind of identity. This makes it at least pos-
sible to hold on to a restricted version of “substitution” – the inference
rule that allows substituting co-referring terms – such that it is still appli-
cable within some contexts. By reflecting upon the lessons, which have
been drawn from substitution failures in singular contexts, I conclude
that some plural terms are non-rigid designators. Further, I suggest that
predicates which are collective in an argument place are non-extensional
in that argument place. Thus, substituting non-rigid designators in these
argument places should not be considered as a reliable inference: In the
case of predicates which are intensional in an argument place, only rigid
designators can be substituted. On the basis of the theory of “Articulated
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Reference”, I propose that only terms, whose reference is articulated in
the same way, can be substituted when we encounter predicates that are
hyperintensional in an argument place. This allows us to reply to one of
the criticisms raised against Composition as Identity, namely that objects
necessarily have the parts they actually have.
With the aim to overcome the shortcomings of the conventional sys-
tems of plural logic, some of its doctrines are dismissed, while additional
principles as well as further concepts will be introduced instead. These
are then used to promote a formal system, which allows to define a gen-
eral identity relation and its nine kinds. The different kinds of identity
relations are distinguished syntactically and semantically, based on the
kinds of terms they take as arguments and on the number of objects these
refer to. After presenting some theorems of this formalism, two further
objections to Composition as Identity can be met. The assumption that
there are different kinds of identity relations might appear to be a high
price to pay for a defense of Composition as Identity, yet the benefits out-
weigh the costs.
Eventually, we see in Part III, “Arrangement Matters”, that the pre-
viously developed view cannot deal with examples where the parts of a
composite object are rearranged in such a way that they compose a differ-
ent object. In order to meet this criticism put forward against Composi-
tion as Identity, I propose to modify the system from Part II. By taking the
way objects are arranged as a condition for which object they compose
these difficulties can be overcome. Thereby, the idea that Composition as
Identity is built upon an intensional view gets further support and criti-
cisms of it that are implicitly asking it to be extensional dissolve. All that
remains is the questions of arrangement. Moreover, this account of com-
position provides us with reasons to embrace the view that any objects
compose some object.1 The final chapter concludes with some remarks
on why the account of composition I develop does not turn out to be
1. In certain places, I will simply say that objects compose. This should be understood as
short for some objects compose some object.
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a disguised form of mereological nihilism, which claims that no objects
compose.
Much of what I say about some objects composing an object applies
mutatis mutandis to some objects composing some objects. However, I will
not provide a complete account of composition, which can handle these
cases due to its complexity and the space available. The analysis of com-
position given here is incomplete in a further respect by considering ma-
terial objects only. Whether there are composite non-material objects, and
how or under what conditions they compose are interesting questions
but will be ignored in what follows. Some of the examples I provide may
suggest the contrary, but they are intended to be read from a materialist
standpoint. I shamelessly assume that composition is an irreflexive rela-
tion, i.e. no object composes itself. In my opinion, we cannot make sense
of “self-composition”, which is why I am happy to exclude it from my
analysis. Further, although plural logic will be introduced in Part II, we
will rely on some of its resources already in Part I, where we will occa-
sionally use plural variables ‘uu’, ‘vv’, ‘ww’, ranging over plural terms,
such as ‘Anna and Frege’ or ‘the authors of Principia Mathematica’,2 refer-
ring to more than one object at once.
I would like to give some final remarks concerning a methodologi-
cal issue. Discussions of metaphysical theories are often confronted with
the question how to evaluate the different positions. For instance, on the
basis of what are we to decide whether it counts in favor of a metaphys-
ical theory that it entails a certain other metaphysical view? Or, on the
basis of what do we judge one metaphysical view to be better or more
appropriate than another? As a quick look at the references I used al-
ready might suggest, my views are heavily influenced by the works of
David Lewis and Willard Van Orman Quine. I take myself to be working
broadly in the tradition of Lewis and Quine, where considerations of par-
simony are lent considerable, though not exclusive, value. Yet, I should
2. For the ease of exposition, I will use the abbreviations ‘PM’ for ‘Principia Mathematica’,
‘OD’ for ‘On Denoting’, and ‘Grundgesetze’ for ‘Grundgesetze der Arithmetik’.
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emphasize that there are ample points of disagreement, so that it would
be unfair to these philosophers to say that they would agree with all the
claims I am arguing for. Nevertheless, some of their views should be seen
as a starting point of my investigation, in particular, the appreciation of
the principle of parsimony, and so I hope to make a contribution to this
bigger project with the theory we are about to develop.
Additionally, I should mentioned that, from a historical point of view,
mereology and plural logic have been within a nominalistic framework.
Since the principle of parsimony is a key point of nominalism, the follow-
ing discussion is intended to contribute to the work that has been in this
tradition. In order to avoid the impression that we are making arbitrary
decisions at certain points in the following discussion, I think it is crucial
to stress that considerations of parsimony will play an important role and
that it will be one of the basic principles I shall use to evaluate different
positions along the way we are about to go.
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The Road to Composition as Identity
A material object and its parts stand in a very special relation to each
other. Take for instance, a broom and two of its parts, the stick and the
brush. Whenever we move, burn, buy, or color the broom, we move,
burn, buy, or color the stick and the brush, and vice versa. The broom is
located wherever the stick or the brush is located, and vice versa. But how
can we explain this “Intimacy of Parthood” (Sider 2007: 54)?
One way to understand the intimate relation that holds between a
composite object and its parts is to take the object as being “nothing over
and above” its parts. Here is where Composition as Identity has its start-
ing point. At first sight, the idea of an object being nothing over and
above its parts is as natural as it is puzzling. What does it mean for an
object to be nothing over and above its parts? A plausible line of thought
is, as Cotnoir (2014: 4) suggests, to take Composition as Identity to be an
attempt to clarify this intuition: A composite object is identical to its parts
taken collectively. This position stands in direct opposition to a long tra-
dition, called “hylomorphism”. Most recently, hylomorphism is put for-
ward by Fine (1999) and Koslicki (2008), and it appeals to the following
view of Aristotle:
[T]he whole is not the same as the sum of its parts [. . . ] [Y]ou
may have the parts and yet not have the whole, so that parts
and whole cannot be the same.
(Aristotle 1963b: 150a,16-22)
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Based on this thought of Aristotle, the slogan “the whole is more than
the sum of its parts” became popular.3 Although I think that the reasons
which led Aristotle and others to this claim are justified, I disagree with
their conclusion. How can an object be anything more than its parts?
After all, if I move the parts of a table from the corner to the center of the
room, I move the table. Nothing is left in the corner. To say that an object
is greater than its parts strikes me as subscribing to a sort of mysticism.
By the desire to avoid this enigmatic view on the relation between an
object and its parts, Composition as Identity forces itself upon us. The de-
nial of the above view is the claim that a composite object is nothing over
and above its parts, which in turn is best explained by Composition as
Identity. So let’s see in more detail what considerations speak for taking
an object as being nothing over and above its parts and the interpretation
Composition as Identity offers for this view.
1.1 From Parthood to Identity
Composition as Identity is the thesis that an object is identical to its parts,
taken collectively.4 Much of the motivation for this claim comes from
intuition. This might look suspicious. People have different intuitions
when it comes to metaphysical theories. Sometimes, and I think that is
3. As Harte (2002: 9, fn.2) notes, tracing back the history of this slogan is not an easy
task. It is discussed explicitly, for instance, in (Nagel 1952), as well as in (Rescher
and Oppenheim 1955: 94). For an overview on Aristotle’s hylomorphism, (see Cohen
2009: 202-7, Fine 1992, Koslicki 2006; 2008: §6, and Studtmann 2012: 71-4). Disagree-
ments with Aristotle, and hence a tendency towards Composition as Identity, can be
found in the writings of Plato (1892c: 204a; see also Harte 2002), Abaelardus (1970: 343-
5), Hobbes (1839: 96-7), Leibniz (1902: 251), Locke (1952: ii. 284), Kant (1924: III.7), and
Frege (1884: §46). For an overview on the discussion of Composition as Identity in me-
dieval and early modern philosophy, (see Normore and Brown 2014).
4. To spell out what this claim actually means, is one the main tasks of our overall
discussion here. Yet, to avoid confusion, let me point out that Composition as Identity,
as it is usually understood, does not claim that an object is identical to each one of its
parts individually. Further, we might think of this relation to be similar to the identity
relation that holds between any object and itself. Although these remarks may seem a
bit vague, I hope they give an initial hint about where we are about to go.
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the case with Composition as Identity, the very same person might have
opposing intuitions with respect to a metaphysical theory. However, one
may ask What else do we have to rely on when it comes to metaphysical theories?
We do not have many principles which can help us to resolve a dis-
pute in metaphysics, once we find out that a metaphysical dispute is the
result of incompatible intuitions. In my view, ontological parsimony is,
other things being equal, a suitable candidate. When we reach a stale-
mate in a metaphysical discussion and the only thing that seems to be
left is to rely on diverging intuitions, I think, we should prefer the theory
that comes with fewer ontological commitments. Why and under what
conditions, ontological parsimony is a desirable feature of a theory is on
its own a question which goes beyond the space I have available here.
Yet, I should highlight now that it is one of my basic guidelines and it
will influence some of the decisions which I will make in what is about to
come. Although not everybody will agree that the principle of parsimony
should enjoy such a status, it might at least help to see that I am not only
relying on intuitions, but it will be possible to trace back on why I sug-
gest to go one way, rather than another. It seems only appropriate that the
principle of parsimony should play an important role, when dealing with
Composition as Identity, since it allows us, as we will see soon, to keep
down the ontological commitments of our theory of composite objects.
Although central for my belief in Composition as Identity, intuition
cannot be the ultimate reason on which I wish to motivate my thesis.
Hence, after identifying its intuitive motivations, I will present further
reasons which aim to show why Composition as Identity deserves to be
taken seriously.
1.1.1 Nothing Over and Above
One intuitive explanation for why material objects and their parts are
so closely related to each other is to think that an object is nothing over
and above its parts taken collectively. The broom is not an additional
object besides the stick and the brush. It is not anything beyond them.
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Recently, Baxter (1988a; 1988b; 2014), Bricker (2016), Bohn (2014), Cot-
noir (2013a), Varzi (2000; 2014), and Wallace (2011a; 2011b; 2014) have,
arguably, shown a sympathy for some kind of Composition as Identity.
Two examples, inspired from Baxter (1988a: 579 and 1988b: 197, 200),
will help to see the line of thought underlying the idea of an object being
nothing over and above its parts.
The piece of land and the six parcels
A farmer owns a piece of land, which he divides into six parcels. He
finds six buyers and offers to each a different parcel. After selling the six
parcels, the farmer starts planting trees on the piece of land. Seeing this,
the buyers confront him and ask what he is doing. The farmer tells them
he is planting trees on his piece of land and goes on to argue that he only
sold the six parcels, not the piece of land. Hence, he still has the right
to plant trees on the piece of land. The buyers tell the farmer that he is
wrong. He does not own the piece of land anymore, because he sold the
six parcels to them. He does not own the piece of land anymore, since
the six buyers are now the owners of the piece of land.
The buyers’ argument strikes us as sound. The farmer is wrong in
thinking that he still owns the piece of land. By selling the six parcels,
he sold the piece of land. The piece of land is not a seventh plot of land
besides the six parcels. It is nothing over and above the six parcels.
Since each one of the buyers owns now a piece of land, they own it now
together, just as if each one of them eats a sixth of a cake, then they have
eaten the cake together.
The six-pack and the six cans
Anne waits in the six items or less line in a grocery store. She has a
six-pack of orange juice in her basket and reflects whether she can take
a chocolate bar without having to change line. Anne is not sure. Is there
only one object, the six-pack, in her basket? Or does the basket contain
six objects, the six cans of orange juice? She decides not to buy the
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chocolate bar and stays in the six items or less line. Anne is sure that she
is buying less than six items. However, a shop assistant tells Anne that
she has to go to a different check-out, since she is buying more than six
items, the six-pack and the six cans of orange juice.
Although we may not be sure whether Anne is buying one object
or six objects, we are inclined to disagree with the shop assistant. Anne
is surely not buying more than six items. She is buying either one item,
or six items.5 We do not consider the six-pack to be something she is
buying in addition to the six cans, as it would be the case, if Anne decided
to buy the chocolate bar. The reason for this is that the six-pack does not
count as something over and above the six cans. After all, Anne does not
pay for the six cans first, and then for the six-pack later. By paying for the
six cans, the six-pack is already paid, and vice versa.
1.1.2 The No Double-Counting Policy
The two examples help us to see an important point of the idea that an
object is nothing over and above its parts. Why are the piece of land and
the six-pack not a seventh object besides the six parcels and the six cans,
respectively? In both cases, a mistake in counting the objects which are
present happens: In the first example, we want to tell the farmer that he
has to consider the plot of land either as one piece of land, or as six parcels.
When he counts the piece of land as a seventh object, then he makes a
mistake. In the second example, the shop assistant miscounts the objects
when she thinks that the six-pack is a seventh object besides the six cans
of orange juice. It would be different, if Anne were queuing in the five
items or less line. Then, we can at least understand why the shop assistant
tells Anne to go to a different cash-out, though we need not necessarily
agree with the shop assistant about that: The shop assistant thinks that
5. One could argue, I think correctly, that Anne is buying three items, three pairs of
cans. For the sake of the argument, we shall assume that there are no such intermediary
cases and that the above question comes down to whether Anne buys one or six objects.
8 THE ROAD TO COMPOSITION AS IDENTITY §1.1
Anne has to go to a different cash-out. In her view, Anne is buying more
than five objects because her basket contains six objects, the six cans. But,
counting the six-pack as a seventh object is a mistake.
This is reflected in what is sometimes called the “no double-counting
policy” (Cotnoir 2014: 5). The idea behind this policy is that the question
How many objects are there? has several correct answers because there are
different, equally legitimate ways to count objects.6
A similar line of thought is put forward by Ryle (1950: 22-3): If some-
one tells us she bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove and a pair
of gloves, we naturally assume she got four gloves. If she were to reply
that she bought only two gloves, then we would tell her that she “either
[. . . ] bought a left-hand and a right-hand glove or she bought a pair of
gloves (but not both)” (Ryle 1950: 23). To count the two gloves and the
pair as separate items appears as a category mistake. The two gloves and
the pair of gloves are different kinds of things, similarly to the six-pack
and the six cans. To include them in the same count is a mistake.
Yet, the no double-counting policy does not deny the existence of the
piece of land or the six parcels. It only says that it is a mistake to count
both, the piece of land and the six parcels, or more generally, an object
and its parts as distinct objects – in the sense of being disjoint, or non-
overlapping, (see Lewis 1999: 177-9). This counting policy has an impor-
tant consequence when we examine the ontological presuppositions of a
theory, which we will see next.
1.1.3 Ontological Free Lunches
If it is correct that there are different ways to count the objects there are,
as has just been suggested, then there are different ways to “[. . . ] draw up
6. We can ignore the limiting case of counting an atom. The above discussed idea does
not work when we have only an atom in front of us. If that is the case, then there is only
one correct answer. However, that there are different ways to count objects is thought
to be valid on a global scale, i.e. there are different legitimate ways to count the objects
in our actual world. We could reformulate our counting policy more carefully as There
are different ways to count non-atomic objects.
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an inventory of Reality [. . . ]” (Lewis 1991: 81; see also Varzi 2000; 2014),
i.e. to spell out the ontological commitments of a theory – assuming we
are not dealing with theories talking about lonely objects.7 Let’s get clear
about what the ontological commitments of a theory are first, before we
see how the no double-counting policy relates to it.
The commonly accepted view of what the ontological commitments
of a theory are goes back to Quine:
A theory is committed to those and only those entities to
which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of
referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be
true. (Quine 1948: 33)
The ontological commitments of a theory consist in a list of those objects
which must exist, if the theory is true. For instance, take the following
example of a theory, t, which is the result of adding the following two
sentences to classical first-order logic with identity:
(1) Anne is smaller than Ben
(2) If x is smaller than y, then y is not smaller than x
From (1) and (2) we can deduce with a few logical inferences that Anne is
not identical to Ben. Hence, two objects – Anne and Ben – have to exist,
in order for t to be true; t is committed to the existence of Anne and Ben.
If they do not exist, t is false.
If we agree that we have several correct ways to count the objects a
theory is dealing with, although that might still seem a bit counterin-
tuitive, then there are different, correct ontologies for that theory corre-
sponding to the different ways of counting. Take for instance our theory
t. We have not specified what objects Anne and Ben are. Assume, they
are two pieces of wood, depicted in figure 1.1.
7. Lewis (1983a) introduces the concept of a lonely object as an object that is the only
object existing in a possible world. Discussions of lonely objects and lonely worlds, i.e.
worlds where a lonely object exists, can be found in (Haufe and Slater 2009) and (French
and McKenzie 2012).
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Figure 1.1: Counting and Ontological Commitment
The question How many objects are depicted in figure 1.1?, can then be
answered with Two, Anne and Ben, or One, the L-shaped piece of wood. Both
ways of counting match up with different ways to capture the ontological
commitment of t. According to the first, t is committed to the existence of
Anne and Ben. However, claiming that t is committed to the existence of
the L-shaped piece of wood strikes us as equally correct. We intuitively
tend to agree with Armstrong (1997: 13) that given the ontological com-
mitment to the parts of an object, the object itself is an “[. . . ] ontological
free lunch”. Or to use another picture, once we paid our ontological taxes
for the parts of an object, the ontological taxman cannot demand a pay-
ment for the composite object.8 If a theory t is committed to the existence
of, say, Anne and Ben, there is no additional commitment to the L-shaped
object, since it is already accounted for it in virtue of the commitment to
Anne and the commitment to Ben. But we do not double count them.
This line of reasoning becomes even more plausible when we com-
pare it with the following scenario: Assume, we were to extend t to t′ by
adding to the former the following two sentences:
(3) Claire is smaller than Ben
(4) Anne is identical to Claire
8. Zach Weber suggested this analogy to me in conversation. Tichý (1995: 175) uses
a similar analogy. Weber and Tichý use this analogy to warn against blind faith in
ontological parsimony.
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An overzealous understanding of Quine’s idea of ontological commit-
ment will suggest that t and t′ have different ontological commitments:
While t is committed to the existence of Anne and Ben, t′ is committed
to Anne, Ben and Claire. But Anne is identical to Claire, so any ontologi-
cal commitment to Anne is an ontological commitment to Claire, and vice
versa. If Anne were not to exist, neither would Claire; if Claire were not
to exist, Anne would not exist. The objects which have to exist for t′ to be
true are the same objects which have to exist for t to be true.
Taking the thesis that there are different ways to count the objects
there are seriously, an analogous situation arises in connection with the
commitment to objects and their parts. Being committed to the existence
of the parts is being committed to the existence of the object they are parts
of; and less controversially, pace Schaffer (2007; 2010), being committed to
the existence of an object is being committed to the existence of its parts.9
Friends of Composition as Identity offer an explanation for why either
an object or its parts are an ontological free lunch, which revolves around
the belief that in the case of objects and their parts, things stand similar
as with Anne and Claire. An object does not come with any additional
ontological commitment simply because the object is identical to its parts:
Surely I am nothing over and above my particles: I am them,
they are me. The ‘are’ of composition is just the plural of the
‘is’ of identity. [. . . ] You might as well say: I know all about
the life of Cicero, now what about Tully? (Lewis 1988: 71)
For the whole is all its parts taken together [. . . ] stating an
identity. (Baxter 1988b: 197)
An object being identical to its parts explains why there is no additional
ontological commitment to the composite object, given a commitment to
its parts. “It just is them. They just are it.” (Lewis 1991: 81). If an object
9. The second claim above is important for theories which allow for gunky objects, i.e.
objects whose parts all have at least one proper part. The term ‘gunk’ is introduced in
Lewis (1991: 20). Gunk and gunky objects are discussed in more detail by Arntzenius
(2012: §4), Forrest (1996; 2004), Hazen (2004), Nolan (2004), and Zimmerman (1996a;
1996b).
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is identical to its parts, then the former does not come with an additional
ontological commitment, given a commitment to the latter, since things
stand similar as with the example of Anne and Claire and the theories
t and t′: Being committed to the existence of the former simply is being
committed to the latter, and vice versa.
We started this chapter with the intuition that an object is nothing
over and above its parts. Composition as Identity offers us an interpre-
tation of this idea. The no double-counting policy suggests that there are
different ways to count objects and that it is a mistake to count an object
and its parts. Composition as Identity tells us that given the ontological
commitment to a composite object there is no further commitment to its
parts, and vice versa. This entailment relation between Composition as
Identity and a composite object being an ontological free lunch, given the
ontological commitment to its parts, follows from the no-double count-
ing policy and the fact that the ontological commitment of a theory is a
list of those objects which have to exits in order for the theory to be true.
This may sound intuitive. Yet, we cannot but wonder how an object
can be identical to its parts. After all, the parts are many and the object
is one. What is this so-called “many-one identity”? It seems very unlike
the cases of identity we encounter usually, where we have one object be-
ing identical to one object. What are we to make out of this many-one
identity the friend of Composition as Identity is talking about? This and
similar problems, which some authors take to arise from the concept of
the identity at work within Composition as Identity, will be spelled out
in detail in the next chapter. Meeting these criticisms of Composition as
Identity will then be one of our major tasks in the next two parts.
1.2 The Overdetermination Argument
Composition as Identity is a way to take seriously the motivations of Mer-
ricks’ “Overdetermination Argument” (2001: §3). Also, Composition as
Identity is a more commonsensical conclusion to draw from the Overde-
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termination Argument. I argue that contrary to the intention on which
the argument is built, it motivates Composition as Identity.
Merricks present the Overdetermination Argument in order to de-
fend “[. . . ] some sort of ‘biological anti-reductionism’ [. . . ]” (Merricks
2001: 114).10 According to this theory, there are no objects with parts, due
to our decision to deal with material objects only. According to Merricks,
there are no macroscopic inanimate objects:
[T]here are no books. Nor are there statues, rocks, tables, stars,
or chairs. (Merricks 2001: 1)
The only existing things are humans, conscious animals – like dogs and
dolphins – perhaps, other organisms, like trees and ants, and mereolog-
ical atoms, i.e. objects with no proper parts, (see Merricks 2001: 114-5).
The major step for Merricks to deny the existence of inanimate composite
objects is a generalization of his Overdetermination Argument,11 which
concludes that if inanimate composites exist, then they do not cause any
events. But there are no objects which do not cause any events. Hence,
inanimate composite objects do not exist.12
This flies in the face of our ordinary conception of reality. The ex-
istence of books, statues and rocks is, from the standpoint of common
sense, beyond dispute. It would be preferable to avoid Merricks’ conclu-
sion. We shall see next that there is indeed a problem with the Overdeter-
mination Argument. After presenting Merricks’ argument and its gener-
alization, I will discuss this problem and suggest that the reasons Mer-
ricks presents to embrace his view lead us to Composition as Identity.
10. This position is for us equivalent to mereological nihilism. Mereological nihilism
is a theory to which we have to pay particular attention, and we will come across it in
several places. For a list of authors who show sympathy to this view, see section 1.4.1.
In section 10.6, I will address the worry that the account of composition we are about to
develop coincides with mereological nihilism.
11. The Overdetermination Argument follows the pattern of Kim’s “Supervenience Ar-
gument” against non-reductive physicalism, (see Kim 1993; 1999: 38-56; 2005: 13-22,
32-69).
12. Korman (2015: §10) and Thomasson (2007: §1) present a more detailed discussion of
Merricks’ Overdetermination Argument than the one we are about to see.
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1.2.1 Merricks’ Overdetermination Argument
Merricks’ Overdetermination Argument concludes that if baseballs exist,
then they do not cause the shattering of a particular window. The argu-
ment goes as follows (Merricks 2001: 56):
1. The baseball–if it exists–is causally irrelevant to whether its con-
stituent atoms, acting in concert, cause the shattering of the win-
dow.13
2. The shattering of the window is caused by those atoms, acting in
concert.
3. The shattering of the window is not overdetermined. Therefore,
4. If the baseball exists, it does not cause the shattering of the win-
dow.14
13. The fact that Merricks’ biological anti-reductionism denies the existence of windows
is not a problem for the above argument. There is a way to formulate the argument
such that an ontological commitment to the existence of windows is avoided. Merricks
suggests that ‘the shattering of the window’ is an abbreviation for many scatterings,
which he does not identify with the event of the shattering of the window, (Merricks
2001: 56, fn.1). I am not sure what Merricks’ “scatterings” are. However, Merricks can
avoid being committed to the existence of windows in the context of the above argument
without having to rely on an explanation of scatterings by talking about the shattering
of window-wise arranged atoms instead of the shattering of the window.
14. Contrary to what one might expect at first, we cannot use a similar line of argument
in order to exclude the existence of atoms. Such an argument comes with highly prob-
lematic consequences. Since the Overdetermination Argument presupposes the truth
of mereological atomism, as we will see in section 1.2.3, arguing against the existence
of the baseball’s atoms entails the claim that the baseball is an atom: If the baseball has
no atoms as parts, then the baseball itself is an atom. Pace Contessa (2014), this claim
is even more counterintuitive than Merricks’ conclusion, which “[. . . ] goes down like
draught Guinness compared to the claim that baseballs are [atoms]” (Merricks 2001: 63).
Moreover, eliminating alleged atoms in favor of “ordinary objects” ultimately forces an
arbitrary decision upon us. For instance, we cannot hold on to the existence of a door
and its handle. Either the door is an atom, then the handle does not exist, or the handle
is an atom, but then the door does not exist. I cannot think of any way which helps us
to make a plausible decision here. We can only make an arbitrary decision in this and
similar cases, where the common sense view is that an inanimate macroscopic object is
a proper part of an inanimate macroscopic object.
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In order to evaluate the above argument, we have to clarify two central
concepts, ‘being causally irrelevant’ and ‘being overdetermined’.
Intuitively, an object x is causally irrelevant to whether some objects
uu cause an event e, if the uu are causing e independently from x, i.e. x
does not do any causal work for the uu in order to cause e. Here is an
example to explain this thought:
Anne, Bill, and Chris form a Philosophy Club. In order to register
their club, they have to name a president. They decide to choose the
club’s president in a democratic way and Anne gets elected unanimously.
They cause Anne to be elected president with three to zero votes.15 Each
one of them, Anne, Bill, and Chris, is a partial cause for Anne being
elected with three to zero votes. All three are causally relevant for the
event of Anne being elected president with three to zero votes. On the
other hand, Dan, who joins the Philosophy Club only after the election, is
causally irrelevant for that event: He did not vote in the election; neither
did he participate in any other way, for instance, by counting the votes, in
the election; nor did he have any other causal connection to the election.
It was not Dan who made them think about forming a Philosophy Club,
or told them that they have to name a president in order to register the
club.
In light of the above example, and analogous to the definition of Mer-
ricks (2001: 57-8), we define ‘being causally irrelevant’ as follows:
15. It is a central feature of the Overdetermination Argument that objects are taken to
be causes of events. This diverges from the currently most popular views on causation
which take the relata of the causation relation to be events, (see Davidson 1980: 693-5,
Kim 1973: 222, Lewis 1986a: 216; 1986b: 558, Paul and Hall 2013: 7), or facts, ( see Bennett
1988; 1995: 40-2, Mellor 1995: 156). Merricks tries to avoid this line of criticism by taking
an object x being the cause of an event e simply to mean that x participates in an event e′
which causes e. Yet, this only leads to further problems. In most cases, where an event
e′ causes an event e there are objects participating in e′ which appear to be irrelevant
for the causation of e. For instance, in the voting of the club’s president e, the shoes of
Anne, the spot on Bill’s glasses, and the sun shining through the window participated
in the election event. Yet, it is counterintuitive to take them as being causes for Anne
being elected president. Not all objects which participate in an event causing another
event qualify as causes for the latter. We shall flag this concern here and assume that
the idea of objects being causes of events is feasible.
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Def. An object x is causally irrelevant to whether some objects uu cause
an event e iff
(i) x is not among the uu, and
(ii) x is not a partial cause of e alongside uu, and
(iii) no one of the uu causes x to cause e, and
(iv) x does not cause any of the uu to cause e
Next comes the definition of ‘being overdetermined’. An event is said
to be overdetermined iff it is caused by two events whereby either one
of the two causes is irrelevant for the other to cause the event, (Paul and
Hall 2013: 143). Applied to Merricks’ talk of objects as causes for events
this amounts roughly to the claim that an event is overdetermined iff it is
independently caused by distinct objects. Suppose, Anne throws a base-
ball towards the window. At the same time, Bill throws another baseball
at the window. Both baseballs hit the window at the same time and the
window shatters. Each one of the two baseballs causes the shattering
of the window. Moreover, Anne and Bill acted independently, i.e. it is
not the case that Anne saw Bill throwing the baseball and that led her
to throw hers. Nor was it the other way round, that Anne’s behavior
was in some way a reason for Bill to throw his baseball. For the sake of
the example, we may imagine that they did not see or hear each other,
or were connected in any other way. Then, each one of the baseballs is
causally irrelevant for the other baseball to cause the shattering of the win-
dow. Hence, the shattering of the window is overdetermined by the two
baseballs.
Since the Overdetermination Argument deals with the overdeter-
mination of an event by an object, the baseball, and some objects, the
baseball-wise arranged atoms, the following definition suffices for us:16
16. A complete definition of overdetermination would have to take into account that an
object and another object, as well as some objects and some other objects may overdetermine
an event. There is no need for us to develop such a sophisticated definition.
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Def. An event e is overdetermined by some objects uu and an object x iff
(i) the uu cause e, and
(ii) x causes e, and
(iii) the uu are causally irrelevant for x to cause e, and
(iv) x is causally irrelevant for uu to cause e.
Having explained these two concepts, we can go on to examine the gen-
eralized version of the argument.
1.2.2 The Generalized Overdetermination Argument
There is nothing special about baseballs and window-shatterings. The
Overdetermination Argument might as well deal with books, statues, or
chairs, and book-wise, statue-wise, or chair-wise arranged atoms caus-
ing a revolution, a car to be dented, or a person to be injured. Hence, to
think that the Overdetermination Argument generalizes is a consequen-
tial thought and gives us the following argument (Merricks 2001: 79-80):
1. An inanimate composite object x–if x exists–is causally irrelevant to
whether its parts uu, cause an event e.
2. Any event e is caused by an atom y, or by some atoms uu.
3. No event e is overdetermined. Therefore,
4. If an inanimate composite object x exists, then x does not cause any
event e.
With the last line of the above argument, Merricks goes on to argue that
there are no inanimate composite objects. This claim can be reached with
the help of the following assumption:
5. There is no object x which does not cause any event e
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This premise is inspired by what Kim calls “Alexander’s Dictum”:
To be real is to have causal powers.
(Kim 1993: 202, [italics in original])
It might appear to be a leap from Kim’s principle to premise 5., but they
are based on similar ideas. Nevertheless, 5. can be motivated indepen-
dently: Assume, I were to tell you some things about my sister. Her name
is Anne. She is twenty years old. Her birthday is in May; and so on. But
then, I tell you that she has never caused any event. She did not cause my
father to celebrate on the day she was born, nor my mother to celebrate
her third birthday. She never caused my father to make her breakfast, nor
has she ever caused my mother to be worried because she did not come
home before midnight. There is absolutely no event caused by Anne. You
should take this to be sufficient evidence to assume that Anne does not
exist. “Ockham’s Razor” demands not to assume the existence of more
individuals than necessary. Therefore, it is only consistent to think that
Anne does not exist. There is no need to postulate her existence in order
to explain any event.17
The motivations behind Merricks’ argument, and more generally be-
hind the arguments others present for mereological nihilism, deserve to
be taken seriously. However, as I will argue next, these reasons do not
lead us to deny the existence of composite objects, but rather that a com-
posite object is nothing over and above its parts.
17. I flag three concerns about the above argument. First, Alexander’s Dictum excludes
lonely worlds, see fn.7 in section 1.1.3. In such a world, there is prima facie no event
caused by the lonely object. But, if we take conceivability as a condition for the existence
of a possible world, the principle turns out to be false. Second, premise 2. presupposes
the existence of atoms and excludes gunky objects, see fn.9 in section 1.1.3. Merricks’
attempt to allow for gunky objects fails. If there is a gunky object x, then its parts y1 and
y2 must cause an event e which is not caused by x. This follows from Alexander’s Dic-
tum. But, y1 is a gunky object, since every part of a gunky object is itself a gunky object.
Hence, y1 has parts, which in turn must cause some event e′ not caused by y1; and so on.
Hence, if only one gunky object exists, Alexander’s Dictum works against the parsimony
assumption which motivates it. Third, premise 3. is false. In section 1.2.1, we saw that
there are overdetermined events. Hence, the premise must be that overdetermination is
a non-abundant phenomenon; it happens only rarely.
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1.2.3 An Alternative Conclusion
Others, for instance, Baker (2003: 598) and Lowe (2003: 706), have al-
ready challenged the Overdetermination Argument. The conclusion I
draw from Merricks’ argument begins with ideas presented by Sider
(2003b: 772-3) and Thomasson (2006), but elaborates on their diagnosis
of the argument. My claim is that the Overdetermination Argument is
not sound because premise 1. is false: A composite object is causally rel-
evant for whether its parts cause some event because the composite ob-
ject just is its parts taken collectively. This is the conclusion I draw from
comparing Merricks’ example with examples of overdetermination dis-
cussed in the literature, (see, for example, McDermott 1995, Paul and Hall
2013: §3.5, and Schaffer 2003).
When we observe Anne and Bill throwing baseballs at the window,
we want to say Such a coincidence, both baseballs caused the shattering of the
window! We are surprised by the fact that two objects cause an event and
each one of them is causally irrelevant for the other to cause it. That is
a strange coincidence, and very unlikely to happen. However, assum-
ing that there is part-whole overdetermination, there is nothing that sur-
prises us or is a coincidence. On the contrary, we are inclined to say that
an object can only cause events which are caused by its parts. How could
the baseball break the window without the atoms arranged baseball-wise
breaking the window, or vice versa? If the baseball causes the window to
shatter, its atoms cause it; if the atoms cause the window to shatter, then
the baseball causes the shattering as well. But how is this close connec-
tion between the baseball and the atoms arranged baseball-wise possible?
And is the shattering really overdetermined, if it is caused by the baseball
and its atoms? The asymmetry between the two examples suggests that
it is not overdetermined.
It is important to stress that I do not reject premise 3. of the Overdeter-
mination Argument. I agree with Merricks on this. The reason for why
the shattering of the window is not overdetermined by the baseball and
its atoms is not that the baseball does not exist, but that the baseball is
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causally relevant for whether its atoms cause the shattering: It is identical
to them. Hence, premise 1. is the weak link in the Overdetermination
Argument. Likewise, we can show that this applies to the generalized
Overdetermination Argument: Composite objects exist, because they are
causally relevant for whether their parts cause an event. The compos-
ite object is identical to its parts. This suggests the conclusion that al-
though there is no part-whole overdetermination, composite objects exist
because they are identical to their parts.
Hence, we see that the Overdetermination Argument puts a spoke
into the eliminativist’s wheel. The lesson we learn from a closer inspec-
tion of the argument is not that composite objects do not exists, but that
they are identical to their parts. Rejecting one of the claims on which the
Overdetermination Argument is based, i.e. that Composition as Identity
is false, (see Merricks 2001: 31), is a more reasonable conclusion to draw
from Merricks’ reflections on overdetermination. Thereby, the argument
turns out to support Composition as Identity, rather than mereological ni-
hilism or biological anti-reductionism.
1.3 The Uniqueness of Composition
A further reason to embrace Composition as Identity is that it guaran-
tees that composition is unique. In other words, Composition as Identity
entails that if some objects compose an object, then they compose at most
that object. This is the principle of the Uniqueness of Composition (UNI):
UNI Any uu compose at most one object x
Taking an example from van Inwagen (1990: 39), let’s suppose we build a
house with some bricks. Then, the bricks compose the house. Intuitively,
we think that they compose only the house. But, “[w]hat makes us think
that we haven’t built several things, each of them composed of all the
bricks?” (van Inwagen 1990: 39). The assumption that the bricks compose
a house does not entail that they compose the house only. This intuition
is based on UNI.
§1.4 COMPOSITION AS IDENTITY’S PIONEERING ROLE 21
The basic idea of UNI is captured in Classical Extensional Mereology
by the extensionality principle: if x and y are composite objects, then
they share all their parts iff x is identical to y, (Casati and Varzi 1999: 40).
UNI and the extensionality principle are both under dispute, and we will
eventually challenge them as well. For now, it suffices to note that a de-
nial of UNI, together with the assumption that each one of the objects
which compose an object is a part of that composite object, entails prima
facie a denial of the extensionality principle.18 Take again van Inwagen’s
example and suppose UNI fails in that case. Then, there are some objects,
the bricks, which compose two distinct objects. Let’s say they compose
Anne’s house and Bill’s house. Hence, although the two houses are not
identical, they have the same parts. The extensionality principle excludes
this, and we see that denying UNI entails a denial of the extensionality
principle. Moreover, a denial of the extensionality principle does not only
allow for distinct objects to share all their parts, but also for a composite
object to not share parts with itself. On the basis of this rather worrisome
outcome – How can an object not have the parts it has? – embracing UNI,
in some form or other, should be one of our ultimate goals.
Setting the worries about UNI discussed in the literature aside, it ap-
pears an intuitive assumption. That its denial forces us to deny the ex-
tensionality principle from Classical Extensional Mereology gives plausi-
bility to UNI. So, we can conclude for now, with the caveat that the wor-
ries about UNI and the extensionality principle will be met eventually,
that Composition as Identity entailing the principle of the uniqueness of
composition motivates having a closer look at that theory.
1.4 Composition as Identity’s Pioneering Role
I conclude this chapter with presenting further motivations for Compo-
sition as Identity. I will discuss two theories, mereological universalism
18. We will come back to criticisms of UNI in section 2.3. Cotnoir (2013b) challenges the
extensionality principle.
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and four-dimensionalism, and point out that they are best defended on
the basis of Composition as Identity. However, I do not want to argue
for mereological universalism or four-dimensionalism here. It suffices to
highlight that a denial of Composition as Identity makes a defense of the
two theories difficult, though not impossible. Since there are, arguably,
plausible reasons to embrace either mereological universalism or four-
dimensionalism, their dependence on Composition as Identity gives us
good evidence to take the view seriously.
1.4.1 Mereological Universalism
According to “mereological universalism”, henceforth simply universal-
ism, or the theory of unrestricted composition, any objects compose some
object. Universalism is an answer to van Inwagen’s Special Composition
Question (SCQ), which asks under what conditions some objects compose
an object, or
SCQ Under what conditions is it true that ∃x the uu compose x?19
In search for a solution to the puzzles of material objects, van Inwagen
suggests that we have to find an answer to the SCQ first, then “[. . . ]
the various components of the theory [of material objects] arise and fall
into place quiet naturally [. . . ]” (van Inwagen 1990: 20). Many agree
on the central role of the SCQ, for instance the authors listed in the
next paragraph, as well as Carmichael (2015), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz
(1997: 179-87), Korman (2015), Markosian (2015), and Merricks (2001).
The two most popular answers to the SCQ are rather extreme. Mereo-
logical nihilism claims that under no condition some objects compose an
object. Cameron (2010), Hestevolt (1981), Hossack (2000), Rosen and Dorr
(2002), Schaffer (2007; 2010), and Sider (2013) show a tendency to embrace
19. Van Inwagen’s formulation of the SCQ is “[w]hen is it true that ∃y the xs compose
y? (van Inwagen 1990: 30). The difference between his formulation and the one above
is merely a notational one, being a result of the differing uses of plural terms.
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this view in various degrees. The other popular answer to the SCQ is uni-
versalism, which is arguably upheld by Armstrong (1989: 92), Bigelow
and Pargetter (2006), Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2006), Bricker (2016),
Cartwright (1975), van Cleve (1986; 2008), Heller (1990), Hudson (2000;
2001), Lewis (1986c: 212; 1991: 7-10, 75-87, Quine (1981: 10), Rea (1998),
Sider (2001), Thomson (1983: 216-7), and Varzi (2005; 2014). Its answer to
the SCQ is that any objects whatsoever compose.
In the literature on composition, universalism and Composition as
Identity are often found as a combined view. On the one side, peo-
ple show sympathy for both views, for instance, Armstrong (1989: 92;
1997: 14-8), Bohn (2014), Bricker (2016), Lewis (1986c: §4; 1991: §3), or
Varzi (2000; 2006; 2008; 2014). On the other side, some reject both views,
for instance, Koslicki (2008), Merricks (2001), Simons (2006; 2016: 60), or
van Inwagen (1990). This is not merely a coincidence. Bohn (2014), Harte
(2002: 114), Merricks (2005: 629-30), and Sider (2007: 59-62) suggest that
Composition as Identity entails universalism. Others have denied this
link between the two positions, for instance, Cameron (2012) and Mc-
Daniel (2010). Whether there is indeed such a logical connection or not
depends, I think, on the specific formulation of the two theories in ques-
tion: Some versions of Composition as Identity entail a particular ver-
sion of mereological universalism, but there are ways to spell out either
one of the two theories such that universalism is not a consequence of
Composition as Identity. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that assum-
ing Composition as Identity is a benefit for the universalist: If she denies
Composition as Identity her theory creates an ontological explosion, forc-
ing an enormous number of ontological commitments upon her.
We cannot yet give a fully satisfactory defense of universalism; that
has to wait until chapter 10. But let me briefly outline an argument
that aims to motivate universalism, the argument from vagueness. This
argument is due to Lewis (1986c: 211-3)20 and is elaborated by Sider
20. Heller (1990: 47-51) and van Cleve (2008: 328-31) follow the lines of thought of Lewis
and Sider respectively.
24 THE ROAD TO COMPOSITION AS IDENTITY §1.4
(1997: 214-22; 2001: 120-32; 2003a). The argument aims to undermine the
assumption that composition is a restricted relation, i.e. that some objects
compose, and some objects do not.
The argument goes as follows: Suppose for reductio, composition is
a restricted, non-empty relation,21 i.e. there is a condition C, such that
the following holds: the uu fulfill C iff the uu compose some x.22 The
only plausible suggestions for a restriction on composition are vague. If
the restriction on composition is vague, then it is vague how many ob-
jects exist. It is not vague how many objects exist. Therefore, the initial
assumption must be false and composition is unrestricted.
Let’s have a look at each premise one by one. The first premise is
the reductio-assumption, composition is restricted. The second premise
claims that the only plausible suggestions for a restriction on composition
are vague. Lewis discusses restrictions such as “[. . . ] being in contrast
with their surroundings more than they do with one another [and being]
adjacent, stick together, and act jointly” (Lewis 1986c: 211). Surely, these
conditions are all vague. Some objects are clearly in contrast with their
surroundings more than they are with one another in some cases, and
in some cases they are not. But there are situations where it is vague
whether some objects are more in contrast with their surroundings than
they are with one another. Suppose you have four navy blue colored
pieces of confetti on a table. When the confetti are on the left end of
the table, which is colored in sky blue, they are in clear contrast with the
table. However, when they are on the right end of the table, which is navy
blue, then they are not in clear contrast with the table. Further, think of
the table as colored in such a way that it gradually turns from sky blue to
21. I added the clause that composition is a non-empty relation. This is an important
piece for the argument to lead us to universalism. If we had not added it, the conclu-
sion would leave us with a choice between universalism and nihilism. Lewis and Sider
seem to take it for granted that composition occurs at least sometimes. However, this
is disputed in the literature, as we have seen. We will come back to discuss nihilism in
chapter 10.
22. In other words, the uu fulfilling C is a sufficient and necessary condition for them to
compose some object.
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navy blue. Then, there are certain parts of the table where it is not clear if
the confetti are in clear contrast with its surface when placed there.
Other conditions for composition, which are discussed in the litera-
ture, lead to the same result. Take for instance the condition being in con-
tact. Apart from contradicting common sense by denying the existence
of scattered objects, for instance, suits, and galaxies, it is also a source for
vagueness. There are cases where, say, two hydrogen atoms, are clearly
in contact with each other; and there are cases where they clearly are not.
Nevertheless, there are instances where it is vague whether they are in
contact or not. Are the two hydrogen atoms in contact when they are
one millimeter apart from each other? Or when they are one nanometer
apart from each other? Van Inwagen’s suggestion (1990: 82) that some
objects compose iff their “activity [. . . ] constitutes a life” is also a source
of vagueness, as he concedes, (van Inwagen 1990: §17-19). Hence, his
account confirms the above premise as well.
The third premise states that if the restriction on composition is vague,
then it is vague how many objects exist. This is pretty straightforward. If
it is vague whether some objects uu compose an object x, then it is vague
whether the composite object x exists. Assume, it is vague whether two
hydrogen atoms, and an oxygen atom compose a water molecule. Then,
it is vague whether the water molecule exists. Hence, even if it were
absolutely clear for all other objects whether they exist or not, it would
still remain vague how many objects there are, since it is vague whether
the water molecule exists.
Finally, we come to the fourth premise. It says that the number of
objects is not vague. The number of objects cannot be vague, since the
concept ‘number of objects’ can be formulated in a precise formal lan-
guage, pure first-order logic with identity. This language does not allow
for vagueness. The concept of number cannot be a source of vagueness. It
does not make sense to say The number five is a vague number, or The num-
ber of dogs in the park is vague. In the latter case, it is not the number that
might be vague, but the concept dogs being in the park. I think we can see
that there is not much room for disagreement with the above premises.
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However, if we grant the truth of the last three premises, then we have to
reject the initial assumption that composition is restricted.
The argument from vagueness, though disputed, for instance by Kor-
man (2010; 2015: §9), Koslicki (2003), Markosian (1998: 237-40) and Mer-
ricks (2007), is a good starting point to motivate universalism. Although I
will ultimately present a more sophisticated version of universalism than
the one we discussed here, I think the motivation for universalism carries
over to Composition as Identity. Therefore, I will conclude our initial dis-
cussion of universalism with a brief examination of the relation between
Composition as Identity and universalism.
The straightforward way to argue that any reason to embrace univer-
salism is a reason to embrace Composition as Identity is by pointing out
that the latter avoids a lot of the counter-intuitiveness which is put for-
ward against the former. Universalism entails the existence of all kinds
of objects, for instance, the object which consists of “[. . . ] the front half
of a trout plus the back half of a turkey [. . . ]” (Lewis 1991: 7), “[. . . ] an
object whose parts are [Michael Rea’s] left tennis shoe, W. V. Quine and
the Taj Mahal” (Rea 1998: 348), or “[. . . ] the object composed of the moon
and [. . . ] six pennies” (van Cleve 2008: 321). When confronted with these
objects, most people react not like van Cleve, whose “[. . . ] reaction was
not “How crazy!” but “Why not?” ” (van Cleve 2008: 5). Although we
might not yet have an independent reason to think that these objects ex-
ist, we will now see why accepting their existence is not troublesome, if
we assume Composition as Identity.
Since an object does not come with any additional ontological com-
mitment over and above the commitment to its parts, our believe in the
existence of, say, Lewis’ trout-turkey does not commit us to anything else
than the existence of the front half of the trout and the back half of the
turkey. We get, so to speak, the existence of the trout-turkey for free.
On the other hand, if we were to reject Composition as Identity, we had
to concede that the trout-turkey comes with an additional commitment
and that looks like a bad outcome for the universalist. Composition as
Identity takes away a lot of the pressure from universalism. In addi-
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tion, because universalism is well motivated, given the argument from
vagueness, holding on to Composition as Identity is a plausible option.
For now we shall ignore that one might think of this close connection as
speaking against Composition as Identity because universalism is trou-
blesome. We will come back to address this worry in chapter 10.
1.4.2 Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalism is the view that material objects do not only have
parts which exist in different places, but are temporally extended, i.e.
have parts which exist at different times. These parts are called temporal
parts, or time-slices. Hence, so the analogy goes, as there are different
spatial parts of a composite object at different places, so there are temporal
parts of an object at different times, (Sider 2001: §1). For instance, assume
you are holding a broom out of your office window. The broom is at the
same time inside and outside of your office. One of its parts, the brush,
is outside of your office. Another part of the broom, the top third of the
stick, is located inside of your office. This is no surprise. We find the parts
of a material object in different places because it is spatially extended.
Similarly, we appear to encounter one and the same object at differ-
ent times. Assume, that before noon, the broom was in one of the cor-
ners of your office. At noon, you held it out of the window. It was par-
tially inside and partially outside the office. A few minutes after noon,
you threw the broom on the street in front of your office window. Then,
the broom is outside the office shortly after noon. However, so the four-
dimensionalist’s thought, it is not the broom which is first inside, then par-
tially inside and partially outside, and finally wholly outside your office,
but different temporal parts of the broom. The broom is a four-dimensional
object which has these time-slices as parts. This line of thought helps
us to explain how objects can exist at different times and have different
properties at different times. Let me illustrate this line of thought with
the help of the paradox of the statue and the piece of clay.23
23. Aristotle (1963a: 1028b,32-1029a,7) already discusses issues which are related to the
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The Paradox of the Statue and the Piece of Clay:
You buy a piece of clay. The next day, you form a statue out of the piece
of clay. Let’s call the statue ‘David’ and the piece of clay ‘Clay’. We are
inclined to identify David and Clay. The atoms which compose David
are the same atoms which compose Clay. David and Clay occupy the
same regions of space. Yet, David did not come into existence until the
second day. Clay already existed before David did. Suppose you decided
to form a ball out of the statue one day after you formed David. David
will not survive this process; It goes out of existence. Nevertheless, Clay
still exists after this deformation. How can David and Clay be identical,
if Clay existed before David and still exists even when David does not
exist anymore?
The four-dimensionalist solution to this paradox is straightforward.24
David and Clay are objects with temporal parts, sharing some of these
temporal parts, namely the ones on the second day. Clay has a temporal
part which exists on the day of your purchase while David does not. On
the second day, the day when David comes into existence, David has a
temporal part, and so does Clay. They have the same temporal part. This
is the reason why we, mistakenly, identify David and Clay. It is not them,
who are identical to each other, but their temporal parts which exist on the
second day. Finally, on the third day when the remodeling is happening,
David goes out of existence. Clay, who survives the deformation, does
not share any temporal parts with David anymore since there is no
following with an example of a statue and a piece of bronze. According to Stobaeus,
(see Long and Sedley 1988: 170) the paradoxical character of the above line of reasoning
was already known towards the end of the second century BCE. For a contemporary
discussion of the paradox and possible solutions, consult some of the contributions in
(Rea 1997b).
24. The most popular answer to the above paradox is to deny that David is identical
to Clay and to allow for distinct object to be located at exactly the same place. Baker
(1997), Doepke (1997), Fine (2003), Johnston (1992), Kripke (1971), Lowe (1995), Shoe-
maker (2003), and Thomson (1983) defend this as the solution to the paradox, (see also
Wasserman 2015 for a more comprehensive list of defenders of the “standard account”
(Burke 1992: 12), and a discussion of other possible replies, as well as Conee and Sider
2005: §7).
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temporal part of David on the third day. However, some temporal parts
of Clay exist on that day which is why Clay still exists.
Four-dimensionalism is not universally accepted, to put it mildly.
The most widely held rival theory to four-dimensionalism, defended by
Baker (2009), Fine (2006), Johnston (1992), and Merricks (1999b), is “three-
dimensionalism”,25 which assumes that material objects do not have
temporal parts but are “wholly present” at each moment in time they
exist. The details of the dispute between three- and four-dimensionalists
are a subsidiary question for us. However, four-dimensionalism offers
an – at least prima facie – attractive theory about change over time, and
thereby presents us with solutions not only to the paradox of the Statue
and the Piece of Clay, but also with a solution to the paradox of the Ship
of Theseus, which makes it an attractive position. Moreover, there is a
version of the argument from vagueness which can be modified in such
a way as to argue for four-dimensionalism, (see Sider 2001: §4.9).
It is interesting that defenses of four-dimensionalism are sometimes
paired with the assumption of Composition as Identity, (see Lewis 1986c,
Sider 2001, Varzi 2006). As it is with universalism and Composition as
Identity, this is not really a surprise. Composition as Identity takes away
a lot of the ontological worries one might have with respect to four-
dimensionalism. One of the difficulties in accepting four-dimensionalism
is the claim that material objects are spread out in time. Yet, there appears
little disagreement about the existence of what the four-dimensionalist
calls “temporal parts”. The dispute looks rather – I think only almost –
like a verbal one:26 The three-dimensionalist just uses a different term,
‘material object’, for what the four-dimensionalist calls a ‘temporal part
of a material object’.
But then, if the four-dimensionalist underpins her theory with Com-
position as Identity, not much work is left to convince the three-
25. Sider (2001: 3, fn.3) presents a more comprehensive list of supporters of three-
dimensionalism.
26. McCall and Lowe (2003; 2006) and Miller (2005) take the two theories to be equiva-
lent.
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dimensionalist. If a four-dimensional object is identical to its times slices,
then the three-dimensionalist has nothing to worry about accepting the
claim that objects are spread out in time since she believes already in
the existence of time slices, though she calls them by a different name.
She already believes in the existence of four-dimensional objects. This
line of thought should not be taken as a knock-down argument for three-
dimensionalism, or suggest that the dispute is only a verbal one. All I
want to say is that four-dimensionalism becomes more attractive if Com-
position as Identity is assumed. Since four-dimensionalism is an elegant
way to explain how change over time is possible and solves some of the
paradoxes of material objects, it gives us good reasons to have a closer
look at Composition as Identity.
The aim of this chapter was to determine what motivates Composi-
tion as Identity. Composition as Identity is a way to help us understand
the idea that a composite object is nothing over and above its parts. More-
over, the lesson to be learned from the Overdetermination Argument is
that objects are identical to their parts. The uniqueness of composition is
one of the consequences of Composition as Identity which makes it an at-
tractive view. Finally, Composition as Identity takes a lot of the pressure
from mereological universalism and four-dimensionalism. Since these
are fruitful theories, further investigations into Composition as Identity
are well motivated.
CHAPTER TWO
Criticisms of Composition as Identity
In this chapter, we will discuss four lines of argument directed against
Composition as Identity. These are serious threats for our theory. How-
ever, we will see in the next chapter that different versions of Composi-
tion as Identity can meet some of these criticisms. Eventually, it will be
our aim to develop a theory of Composition as Identity which can meet
all of the reservations we are about to see.
We begin with a paradox, which results from the claim that a compos-
ite object is identical to its parts. Briefly put, the “Paradox for Composi-
tion as Identity” goes as follows: A composite object being identical to
its parts contradicts the assumptions that any object is one, the parts of a
composite object are many, and being one and being many are opposites of
each other.
The second line of critique is due to Sider (2007: 56-9; 2014), who ar-
gues that Composition as Identity entails the so-called “principle of Col-
lapse” (Sider 2014: 211). This is derivable from assumptions the friend of
Composition is commonly thought to accept. Yet, it contradicts the com-
prehension axiom from plural logic and since Composition as Identity is
best formulated within plural logic, this is worrisome.
A third criticism put forward against Composition as Identity is mo-
tivated by our intuition that the arrangement of objects is relevant for
what object they compose. Since Composition as Identity reduces the
identity of composite objects to the identity of their parts, it excludes the
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possibility that the rearrangement of the parts of an object results in them
composing a different object.
Eventually, I will conclude the chapter with an argument which aims
to show that Composition as Identity entails mereological essentialism,
(Merricks 1999a). According to mereological essentialism, objects could
not be composed by different objects, nor can they be composed out of
more or fewer objects than the objects they are actually composed of. It
will be important for us to keep these four lines of attack against Com-
position as Identity in mind, when we are developing our account of the
thesis in the following chapters.
2.1 The Paradox for Composition as Identity
We begin our examination with the question which, I think, comes im-
mediately to one’s mind when meeting Composition as Identity for the
first time. It is related to the concept of many-one identity, i.e. an identity
relation that holds between many objects and one object. This is one of the
central notions of Composition as Identity, since it holds that the parts of
a composite object are identical to the object they are parts of. We already
encountered it at the end of section 1.1.3. However, this concept leads
us immediately to the following question: How can an object be identical
to its parts, if it is one and they are many? Although opponents as well as
defenders rarely spell out this worry in detail, their reflections upon it
show striking similarities:
One good reason to reject composition as identity is that it
implies, obviously enough, that one thing (e.g. a whole) can
be identical with many things (e.g. the whole’s parts). But I
think that one of the most obvious facts about identity is that
while it holds both one-one (John is identical with Mr Smith)
and perhaps even many-many (John and Mary are identical
to Mr Smith and Ms Jones), it never holds one-many. [. . . ]
Identity cannot hold one-many. So composition as identity is
false. (Merricks 2001: 21, [italics in original])
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What’s true of the many is not exactly what’s true of the one.
After all they are many while it is one. The number of the
many is six, as it might be, whereas the number of the fusion
is one. (Lewis 1991: 87)
The parts are six in number for example, while the whole is one.
(Wallace 2011a: 808, [italics in original])
One is inclined to regard this as a knock-down argument against Com-
position as Identity. Let me explain with our example of the six-pack and
the six cans from section 1.1.1 the rough line of thought behind a rejection
of Composition as Identity based on this worry: According to Composi-
tion as Identity, the six-pack is identical to the six cans. Further, any object
is one. Suppose an object were not one, but say, two. Then it would not
be an object, but two objects, which is absurd because ‘1 = 2’ is absurd.
Therefore, the six-pack is one. Moreover, the six cans are six; hence they
are many in the sense of more than one. This leads to two problematic
conclusions: The six cans are one, and the six-pack is many. Each one of
these conclusion is, together with the premises, in contradiction with the
truism that ‘being one’ is the opposite of ‘being many’.27
Let’s spell out the general version of the paradox more carefully. The
first premise is the claim of Composition as Identity: a composite object
is identical to its parts. Next, we have the claim that a composite object
is one. As we have just seen, any object is one. Hence, any composite
object is one. The third premise says that the proper parts of an object
are many. Our ordinary understanding of composite objects entails that
a composite object has at least two proper parts.28 This is due the “Sup-
27. A similar line of reasoning applies to examples where we have many objects com-
posing many objects, e.g. twelve cans composing two six-packs, or four oxygen atoms
composing two oxygen molecules: The two six-packs are identical to the twelve cans.
The two six-packs are two. The twelve cans are twelve. Nothing is two and twelve.
By substitution, the two six-packs are two and twelve, and the twelve cans are two and
twelve.
28. Trivially, a composite object has many improper parts. By definition, a composite
object is an improper part of itself, since x is an improper part of y iff x is a proper part
of y or x is identical to y. Moreover, since it is a composite object, i.e. an object with at
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plementation Principle”, which we generally assume29 for the parthood
relation, “whenever an object has a proper part, it has more than one [. . . ]”
(Casati and Varzi 1999: 38). It is a truism that ‘being one’ is the oppo-
site of ‘being many’: Something is one iff it is not many. However, from
the previously said it follows, by substitution, that a composite object is
many, and the parts of the composite object are one. Yet, the composite
object being one and being many stands in contradiction with the claim
that nothing is one and many. Similarly, the composite object’s parts be-
ing many and being one contradicts the assumption that nothing is one
and many. Hence, we get the following argument:
1. A composite object is identical to its parts
2. A composite object is one
3. A composite object’s parts are many
4. Something is one iff it is not many
5.a A composite object is many
5.b A composite object’s parts are one
The above argument is formally valid: 5.a follows from the first and the
third premise; together with 2., it contradicts the fourth premise. 5.b can
be derived from 1. and 2.; with 3., it contradicts again the fourth premise.
Hence, we have a paradox: From apparently true premises, we reached
apparently false conclusions, contradicting the premises, by the use of
apparently valid logical inferences. What options do we have?
We can reject either one of the premises 1. to 4., accept the conclusions,
or reject one of the inference rules used in the derivation. Since the only
least one proper part, it has an improper part which is not identical to the composite
object. Nothing is a proper part of itself. Hence, it has at least two improper parts.
29. Cotnoir (2013b) and Varzi (2016) discuss different ways of spelling out the thought
that underlies the supplementation principle.
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inference rule used besides “modus ponens”30 is substitution, i.e. the rule
that validates inferences of the form a = b, F(a) ` F(b) – or an extended
version of this inference rule which one may adopt, if plural terms and
variables are added to first-order logic with identity, see section 5.2. that
amounts to rejecting substitution. Accepting either one of the conclusions
is not possible, if we wish to hold on to all the premises and substitution,
since that leads to inconsistencies. Hence, we can only reject one of the
premises or substitution. But neither option is an easy route to go.
The opponent of Composition as Identity will not see a problem with
the above argument. She will simply reject the first premise. However,
this is not an option for us since it is the central claim of the theory we
want to defend. Hence, the above argument is only a paradox under the
assumption of Composition as Identity, which is why I call it “the Para-
dox for Composition as Identity”. If we assume Composition as Identity
at the outset, then we cannot reject the first premise. Therefore, we are
left with four options: Reject one of the premises 2., 3., or 4., or reject
substitution. We shall have a look at each of the options in turn.
Rejecting premise 4. is the least plausible option we might choose. It
means to deny that ‘being one’ is the opposite of ‘being many’. If we
choose this strategy to solve the paradox, we have to find a definition
of ‘being one’ which allows for an object, or some objects, to be one and
many at the same time. However, that is an impossible task to set for
ourselves. If someone tells us ‘being one’ is not the opposite of ‘being
many’, we are likely to think the person does not understand the words
she is using and we will correct her by pointing out that by definition, (see
Yi 2014: 175), nothing can be one and many. Since I cannot see how we
can give an account of ‘being one’ in a way that it is not the opposite of
‘being many’, holding on to premise 4. seems unavoidable.
Premise 2. states that a composite object is one. As we have seen with
the example of the six-pack and the six cans above, this follows from the
30. Pace Beall (2009), Lycan (1993), and McGee (1985), I do not consider rejecting modus
ponens as an option.
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assumption that any object is one. Hence, if we want to reject premise
2., we have to accept that there is at least one object which is not one,
but many. Supposing that we can make any sense of this claim – which
I doubt – it is impossible to hold on to it, since it is contradictory. There
cannot be at least one object that is not one. Let me add two remarks here.
Such an object is not what Yi (2014: 169) calls a “plural object” since a
“[. . . ] plural object is a single object, some one thing, that is also many”.
A plural object, if there is any, is one and many. However, the object we
have to accept, if we deny that every object is one, is not one. Secondly,
the most likely candidates one may take to be objects which are not one
seem to be sets. Some sets, e.g. the set of logicians, have many members.
Given the close relation that holds between a set and its members, we
may mistakenly identify sets with their members, and think of some sets
as not being one but many. However, this is a fundamental mistake. A
set has to be distinguished from its members. It has them as its members,
but it is not identical to them, (see Potter 2004: §2 or Suppes 1957: 179-80).
Hence, we are well advised to hold on to the claim that every object is
one, i.e. the second premise.
According to premise 3., the parts of a composite object are many.
Given Composition as Identity, denying this premise amounts to a de-
nial of the irreflexivity of the parthood relation, which says that no object
is a proper part of itself. Here is how the friend of Composition as Iden-
tity ends up denying the irreflexivity of the parthood relation by deny-
ing premise 3.: Assume an object x is identical to its parts, and x does
not have many parts, i.e. x has at most one part. It follows, by sub-
stitution, that x is a proper part of itself. Hence, the parthood relation
cannot be irreflexive. The irreflexivity of the parthood relation is rarely
disputed and attempts to undermine it, such as by Cotnoir and Bacon
(2012), Kearns (2011), or Kleinschmidt (2011), rely on the use of scenar-
ios which are themselves highly controversial. Therefore, I assume that
denying premise 3. is not an easy way to solve the paradox.
Finally, the last option to consider is rejecting substitution which al-
lows the inference from premise 1. and 3. to 5.a, and from 1. and 2. to
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5.b. I will consider this in section 6.2, and a restriction on substitution
will allow us to solve the paradox in chapter 8.31 However, at this point,
rejecting substitution would raise suspicion and we are very likely to be
accused of making an ad hoc move. In chapter 6, we will see that sub-
stitution, or its second-order counterpart “Leibniz’s Law”, is ordinarily
considered to be one of the defining features of the identity relation:
If x = y, then whatever is true of x is also true of y, and what-
ever is true of y is also true of x. (Suppes 1957: 102)
One is not prepared to abandon this basic logical principle easily. Hence,
a rejection of or restriction on substitution cannot only be based on the
desire of saving Composition as Identity. Since we have not yet met any
additional reasons speaking against substitution, and no further options
to avoid the derivation of the two contradictions from above, we have
no plausible strategy to resolve the Paradox for Composition as Identity.
In the next chapter, where different versions of Composition as Identity
will be discussed, we will see that some of them, for instance the weak
interpretation, (Lewis 1991: §3.6), or its stronger counterpart, (Wallace
2011a; 2011b), offer us ways to avoid the paradox. Yet for now, we have
to acknowledge that the opponent of Composition as Identity will take
this paradox as counting against our thesis.
2.2 The Principle of Collapse
Sider (2007: 56-9; 2014) argues that Composition as Identity leads to a
collapse of the inclusion relation from plural logic and the parthood rela-
tion,32 i.e. it entails “the principle of Collapse” (Sider 2014: 211):
31. This move is also a solution the following “modalized version” of the paradox: x
is identical to the uu. x is necessarily one and the uu are possibly many. Hence, x is
necessarily one and possibly many, and the uu are possibly many and necessarily one.
But, being necessarily one is the opposite of being possibly many.
32. For the sake of exposition, we shall adopt here, and in section 8.6.2, where I will
address this criticism against Composition as Identity, Sider’s framework, in particular
the mereological notions of parthood, fusion and overlap.
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An object is improperly among some objects iff it is an improper
part of the fusion of these objects
This is worrisome for us because Collapse brings Composition as Identity
in conflict with the principles of plural logic. Let me illustrate the prob-
lem with an example. The comprehension axiom from plural logic states,
that if there is at least one object that has a property Φ, then there are
some objects such that each object which is Φ is one of them, and nothing
else is. Now, there is at least one object which has the property being a
logic book. Therefore, there are some objects, the logic books, such that each
one of them is a logic book, and nothing else is among them. It follows
from Collapse, that anything that is among the logic books is a part of
the fusion of the logic books. However, that is false since the fusion of
the logic books has objects as parts which are not books, for instance, the
first page of Prior’s Formal Logic, or the fusion of Frege’s Begriffsschrift
and Leśniewski’s Lecture Notes in Logic. Hence, Composition as Identity
cannot hold on to all of the above assumptions. Thus, since plural logic is
a necessary means to formalize the claim that an object is identical to its
parts, it appears that Composition as Identity cannot hold on to the stan-
dard view on plural logic and Classical Extensional Mereology which is
assumed to be the natural framework for Composition as Identity.
Sider (2014: 212-4) presents his argument that Composition as Iden-
tity entails Collapse within a first-order logic, supplemented with plu-
ral variables, uu, an identity predicate, =, which reflects this extension
of the language by being able to take singular and plural terms as ar-
guments in each argument place, the improper inclusion predicate, ,
(read here as ‘being one of/being among or being identical to’)33 a prin-
ciple he calls “Plural Covering”, and the improper parthood predicate,
≤, together with the principles of Classical Extensional Mereology.
Due to the use of the non-standard identity predicate, Sider suggests
a generalized version of substitution, α = β, Ψ(α) ` Ψ(β), whereby ‘α’
and ‘β’ stand for singular as well as plural terms, (Sider 2014: 212). Thus,
33. We will formally introduce the improper inclusion relation in section 5.3.2.
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the suggestion is that if α is or are identical to β and, α is or are Φ, then
we can conclude that β is or are Φ.
Plural Covering is a principle which “[. . . ] can be derived from the
principles of mereology plus a plural comprehension principle [. . . ]”
(Sider 2014: 213) in the standard systems of mereology and plural logic.
The idea of this principle is that if x is an improper part of y, then y is the
fusion of some objects and x is one of these objects:
∀x∀y(x ≤ y→ ∃uu(y = FU(uu) ∧ x  uu))
The overlap relation is defined in a standard way, as sharing at least one
improper part:
x ◦ y =d f ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y)
Sider’s definition of a mereological fusion is non-standard, insofar as he
uses plural variables and the inclusion relation in the definition, while
standard accounts of mereology34 are given in a singular language where
these resources are not available, (see Casati and Varzi 1999: §3, Eberle
1970, Hovda 2009, Simons 2003: §1&2). However, this should not be a
reason to worry for us. Since it is the common view that plural logic is
the adequate framework to deal with plural terms from natural language,
as we will see in chapter 4, and the central claim of Composition as Iden-
tity is that an object is identical to its parts collectively, Composition as
Identity is in need of a plural language anyways. So, this deviation is not
problematic.
x = FU(uu) =d f ∀y(y  uu → y ≤ x) ∧ ∀y(y ≤ x → ∃z(z 
uu ∧ z ◦ y))
The above definition captures the idea that the fusion of some objects
is that object which contains each one of the objects as a part, and each
part of the fusion overlaps at least one of the objects it is the fusion of.
34. An exception is Lewis (see his 1991; 1993), who presents Classical Extensional Mere-
ology within a plural language.
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Consider again our example of the piece of land and the six parcels from
section 1.1.1: The piece of land is the fusion of the six parcels because
the following two things hold: Anything that is among or identical to the
six parcels is an improper part of the piece of land. Any object that is
an improper part of the piece of land, e.g. one of the six parcels, or the
northern half of the piece of land, overlaps at least one of the parcels.
With the definition of ‘fusion’ at hand, we can state the fusion prin-
ciple from Classical Extensional Mereology, again in a slightly modified
way because of the extended language we are dealing with, as follows:
∀uu∃x(x = FU(uu))
The fusion principle tells us that for any objects uu, there is some object
x which is their fusion. This ultimately amounts to the principle of unre-
stricted composition, i.e. universalism.
The central thesis of Composition as Identity, is then:
∀x∀uu(x = FU(uu)→ x = uu)
This claim, if an object is the fusion of some objects, then it is identical
to them, captures the idea of Composition as Identity thus: Any object is
the fusion of its parts, so any object is identical to its parts. That is the
core claim of Composition as Identity.
These definitions and principles entail Collapse:
∀uu∀x(x = FU(uu)→ ∀y(y  uu↔ y ≤ x))
Here is a sketch of the derivation: Suppose, x is the fusion of the uu. It
follows then from the definition of ‘fusion’ that any y which is among
the uu is an improper part of x. Next, assume y is an improper part of x.
From Plural Covering, we can deduce that there are some vv such that x
is the fusion of the vv and y is one of the vv. With Composition as Identity,
we get from this and the initial assumption that x is identical to the uu
and x is identical to the vv. Substitution allows us then to conclude that
the uu are identical to the vv, and since y is one of the vv, y is one of the
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uu, by substitution, (Sider 2014: 213). Hence, we have Collapse: If x is the
fusion of the uu, then for any y, y is improperly among the uu iff y is an
improper part of x.
As our example above indicated, Collapse causes trouble for Compo-
sition as Identity since it does not allow us to hold on to the definitions
and axioms we have just spelled out together with the comprehension
axiom from plural logic:
∃xF(x)→ ∃uu∀y(y  uu↔ F(y))
Confronted with the tension between the comprehension axiom and
Composition as Identity, Sider (2014: 214-5) suggest the latter has to settle
for a weaker form of the comprehension axiom and goes on to point out
that this comes with further problems for Composition as Identity, (Sider
2014: 219-21). There is no need for us to go into the details about the
consequences Collapse has, according to Sider, for Composition as Iden-
tity. It suffices to note that Composition as Identity, in conjunction with
the unrestricted fusion principle, is not compatible with the standard pic-
ture of plural logic. Since we will develop an account of Composition as
Identity which does not allow for the above derivation of the principle by
restricting substitution, this will help us to avoid the Collapse principle.
However, as I mentioned in the previous section, restricting substitution
for the sake of saving Composition as Identity is a dodgy move. Hence,
until we find independent reasons which motivate such a restriction, we
have to acknowledge that because Composition as Identity violates cer-
tain principles of plural logic, this undermines the thesis that an object is
identical to its parts.
2.3 Rearranging Parts
Let’s turn to an objection against Composition as Identity which is as ob-
vious as it is difficult to overcome. Indeed, I think it cannot be overcome
by the standard accounts of Composition as Identity. The problem is re-
lated to the fact that Composition as Identity entails the uniqueness of
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composition, see section 1.3. This principle leads to problems by con-
sidering that the arrangement of the composing objects is relevant with
respect to the identity of the object they compose, and the fact that we
can rearrange the parts of a composite object.35 However, Composition
as Identity reduces the identity of composite objects to the identity of
their parts: A composite object x is identical to a composite object y iff x
and y have the same parts. This means in turn, two objects x and y are
not identical to each other iff there is at least one object z such that z is a
part of x and z is not a part of y, or z is a part of y and z is not a part of
x. In other words, distinct objects cannot be composed out of the same
parts. This goes against our everyday experience. Intuitively, we take
some objects to be distinct from each other even if they are composed out
of the same parts. The following two passages give us a hint at why we
may not always identify objects with the same parts:
It is completely obvious to those not in the grip of a philo-
sophical theory that there is a vast and important difference
between a heap of disassembled motorcycle parts, piled up,
as they might be, at the Honda factory or in someone’s garage,
and the motorcycle in running condition that results from as-
sembling these parts in a particular, fairly constrained, way.
(Koslicki 2008: 3)
If I am simply identical to my parts then I am them no matter
how they are, or how they are arranged.
(Cameron 2014: 103)
Koslicki and Cameron reject Composition as Identity because it does not
take into account that whether some objects uu compose an object x de-
pends upon the way they are arranged. In other words, Composition as
35. The concept of rearrangement is notoriously vague. I do not intend to clarify this
concept, but will rely on our intuitive grasp of it. Surely, what re-arrangement is will
first and foremost depend upon what arrangement is. Although we will try to shed some
light on the notion of arrangement in chapter 9, I will resist to take what might seem
to be the next step, i.e. to spell out what rearrangement is. After all, it seems that is
the task of the opponent of Composition as Identity, who aims to undermine the theory
with the help of the counterexamples based on rearrangement, and not of the defenders
of Composition as Identity.
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Identity does not allow for some objects uu to compose distinct objects,
x and y, if the uu are arranged in a different way. The standard accounts
of Composition as Identity are, so to speak, “blind” with respect to the
arrangement of the parts. I will explain this shortcoming of Composition
as Identity with the help of a thought experiment:
Take a completed one thousand piece jigsaw puzzle of a picture of the
Eiffel Tower and a heap of jigsaw puzzle pieces of the very same picture.
Let’s call the former ‘Jig’ and the latter ‘Saw’. Jig is not identical to Saw.
The two objects have different properties: Jig has a rectangular surface,
while Saw has not. The parts of Jig are spatially connected, according
to one way we may define ‘being disconnected’, while the parts of Saw
are not spatially connected following the same definition. Jig depicts the
Eiffel Tower, Saw does not. Now, if Jig is not identical to Saw, the unique-
ness of composition tells us that they cannot have the same parts; if they
had, they would be identical. Hence, the parts of Jig, uu, are not identical
to the parts of Saw, vv. On the one hand, this is a desirable outcome. If Jig
and Saw had the same parts but different properties, which means that
Jig is not identical to Saw, then we cannot have both Jig and Saw. There
is either the completed puzzle with one thousand pieces or the heap of
one thousand pieces. In order for both to exist, we would need two thou-
sand puzzle pieces – one thousand for the completed puzzle, and one
thousand for the heap. But something is going wrong here.
For each puzzle piece x of Jig, there is a puzzle piece y of Saw which
is almost indistinguishable from x, and vice versa. Take for instance the
piece of Jig which is placed in the top left corner. There is a piece of Saw
which has exactly the same shape, color, weight, and so forth. The only
way to distinguish x from y appears to be their location. Now assume, for
the sake of the argument, that we were not able to distinguish the puzzle
pieces of Jig from their Saw-counterparts, i.e. those parts of Saw which
are almost indistinguishable from them. Then, given the uniqueness of
composition, Jig and Saw are identical, since they have the same parts.
However, because Jig and Saw have differing properties, they cannot be
identical.
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The example helps to see the idea behind the above criticism. It
would be easier to illustrate the problem, which the rearrangement of
parts poses for the uniqueness of composition, with the help of the phe-
nomenon of time – how can the puzzle pieces compose Jig now and
Saw later? However, we decided to set questions that arise in connec-
tion with temporal considerations aside and they would lead us here too
far astray.36 However, we might as well use modal notions to clarify the
above line of attack.
Consider this time Jig, the completed puzzle, only. Jig’s parts could be
piled up as a heap. There is a possible world w, where the puzzle pieces
uu, which compose Jig in the actual world, are arranged in a different
way than they are arranged in the actual world. Given the uniqueness
of composition, the object the uu compose in w, say Saw, is identical to
Jig. However, if Jig is a completed puzzle, then the uu cannot be arranged
differently from how they are arranged in the actual world. Puzzle pieces
compose a completed puzzle, only if they are arranged in the right way.
If the puzzle pieces uu are just piled up as a heap in w and Saw is the
object which the uu compose in w, then Jig cannot be identical to Saw in
w, since they have different properties. Jig is a completed puzzle, while
Saw is a heap of puzzle pieces.
36. A four-dimensionalist who endorses Composition as Identity can reply to the above
question how the puzzle pieces can compose Jig now and Saw later, simply with They do
not. According to four-dimensionalism, the puzzle pieces which are involved in the two
cases of composition are not the same, but temporal parts of the same four-dimensional
puzzle pieces. Thereby, one may think that four-dimensionalism is not in need to take
the rearrangement of parts seriously. Yet, that is misleading. It only shows that four-
dimensionalists can handle cases where we have an apparent rearrangement of parts
of three-dimensional objects, (see Lewis 1988). The problem for four-dimensionalism
returns in another form: If a four-dimensional object, for instance you, is identical to
its temporal parts, and the arrangement of the parts does not matter to whether they
compose you, then you are identical to the object which has all your temporal parts
arranged in the opposite order, i.e. the object which “lives your life backwards”, and to
the object which has all the temporal parts in the order you have, with the exception
that the temporal part of your tenth birthday and the temporal part of your eleventh
birthday switch places. Although our intuitions might get a bit lost here, that is a strange
result. Intuitively, we are not inclined to identify you with these objects. You celebrate
your tenth birthday before your eleventh, these objects do not.
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With the help of modal notions, we can see that Composition as Iden-
tity entails, with the uniqueness of composition, that objects necessarily
compose the objects they compose. Koslicki (2008: 113) calls this “Re-
verse Mereological Essentialism” and describes it as follows:
Reverse mereological essentialism [. . . ] asserts that one and
the same part cannot survive gaining or losing its whole, so
to speak, i.e., the whole of which it is part. In other words,
according to this thesis, no single object could survive, for ex-
ample, becoming a part of a whole of which it is not already
part or ceasing to be part of a whole of which it is part [.]
(Koslicki 2008: 114)
Reverse mereological essentialism goes against the way we ordinarily
think about composition. It is obvious that the table in front of you can
be cut into five pieces and each of its parts sent to a different country.
Indeed, there is a possible world where it is the case that the three parts,
x1, x2 are in London, Paris, and New York. UNI forces us to identify the
object y which has x1, x2, and x3 as parts in w with the table which is
actually in front of you. However, the table in front of you and y have
different properties: they are located in different places, the parts of the
table are spatially connected, according to a certain way we may define
spatial connection, the parts of y are not spatially connected, and so on.
To sum up, UNI entails a form of essentialism. This disagrees with
our picture of reality. In order to overcome this shortcoming , we have
to acknowledge that arrangement matters with respect to composition.
Under the assumption that composition is identity, this amounts to the
claim that arrangement matters with respect to identity. Taking identity
to be sensitive to arrangement might come as a surprise, since it appears
to add a condition to the identity relation where there is none needed.
Many think of identity as a concept which “[. . . ] is such a simple and
fundamental idea that it is hard to explain otherwise than through mere
synonyms” (Quine 1852: 208). Yet, this is an oversimplified picture of
identity and I think we can defend the idea that the identity of composite
objects also depends upon the arrangement of their parts.
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2.4 Mereological Essentialism
The last objection we will discuss follows the critique against Composi-
tion as Identity of Merricks (1999a), who aims to show that it is commit-
ted to mereological essentialism. Mereological essentialism claims that
objects have their parts essentially, i.e. could not have parts other than the
ones they actually have. I shall first present the argument and illustrate
its underlying thought with an example. In a second step, I will point out
how mereological essentialism is in conflict with common sense. Eventu-
ally, I will conclude with a hint at how we shall counter Merricks’ argu-
ment and thereby avoid being committed to mereological essentialism.
The main idea of the argument is the following. If a composite object
is identical to its parts, and the parts are necessarily identical to them-
selves, i.e. they are identical to themselves in any possible world,37 then
the composite object necessarily has the parts it actually has, since they
compose it in any possible world:
Now suppose that O, the object composed of O1 . . . On, is
identical with O1 . . . On. From this, the fact that O1 . . . On are
identical with O1 . . . On in every possible world, and the in-
discernibility of identicals it follows that O is identical with
O1 . . . On in every possible world. (Merricks 1999a: 192-3)
An example might be helpful here. Take again the one thousand puz-
zle pieces, and Jig, the completed puzzle, from the previous section. The
puzzle pieces compose Jig in the actual world. Each one of them is an ac-
tual part of Jig. The puzzle pieces are necessarily identical to themselves,
i.e. the puzzle pieces are identical to the puzzle pieces in any possible
world w. By substitution, we infer that the puzzle pieces are identical
to Jig in any possible world w, since they are identical to it in the ac-
37. One way to avoid the conclusion that Composition as Identity entails mereological
essentialism is to take the above identity to be a contingent identity. However, merely
assuming this to be the case cannot be satisfactory, but is in need of an explanation: Why
is it necessarily the case that x is identical to x, while x is only contingently identical to
the uu? I cannot see how the standard account of Composition as Identity can explain
this asymmetry in a non-question-begging way.
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tual world, and they are identical to themselves in any possible world
w. Since objects which compose an object are parts of that object, each
puzzle piece is a part of Jig in any possible world. The puzzle pieces are
essentially parts of Jig. It could not be composed out of other objects, i.e.
Jig could not have other parts than the ones it actually has.
However, mereological essentialism is not without supporters. While
Abaelardus (1970: 423) and Leibniz (1981: 247) are among the earlier sup-
porters, Chisholm (1973; 1875) and van Cleve (1986) belong to the more
recent defenders of the theory. Nevertheless, “[mereological essential-
ism] is prima facie outrageous” (Wallace 2014: 111). It claims, for in-
stance, that if one of the molecules which compose your copy of Principia
Mathematica were different, you had a different book; if I removed a tire
from my car, I had a different car; adding a grain to a heap of grains,
gives us a new heap of grains. This is clearly at odds with the way we
ordinarily identify objects. We regard the book that has all the molecules
which compose your copy of Principia apart from one as the same as your
copy; the vehicle that has all the parts my car has, except one of the tires
as my car; the heap of grains that results by adding one grain to a heap of
grains as the original heap. Surely, one may think that it is this ordinary
way of thinking that leads us into trouble in the first place: If we were not
to allow for objects to “survive” the change, addition or removal of parts,
then we can avoid, for instance, the paradox of the Ship of Theseus:38 The
ship which results from substituting one old plank by a new plank is not
the Ship of Theseus, but a different ship.
Yet, it would be desirable to have an account of composition which
comes closer to our ordinary understanding of the identity conditions of
composite objects. If we bite the bullet and accept mereological essential-
ism, then we have to explain how I can still be the owner of a car, if the
38. The Ship of Theseus already puzzled the ancient Greeks, (see Plutarch 1914: §23
and Plato 1892a: 58a-c). It was famously discussed and modified by Hobbes (1839: 136-
7). Carmichael (2015: 486-9), Chisholm (1997), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997: 163-5),
Jansen (2011), Scaltas (1980), Sider (2001: 6-10), and Smart (1972) provide a more recent
discussion of the paradox.
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front left tire of my car gets removed. Since the two cars are not identical
to each other, there appears to be no reason why I should still hold own-
ership of the car that has only three tires. After all, I own only one car
before the tire is removed, so to claim that I own the other car after the
tire is removed entails that I own two cars, one before and one after the
removal.
Having said this, attempts to avoid mereological essentialism while
holding on to Composition as Identity have already been made – most fa-
mously with Lewis’ theory of counterparts (Lewis 1968; 1971; 1986c: §4).
Contrary to this strategy, Wallace defends mereological essentialism with
the assumption that objects have modal parts,39 i.e. “[. . . ] are stretched
out across possible worlds” (Wallace 2014: 112). Although these theo-
ries are interesting ways to defend Composition as Identity, I will leave
these strategies to others and aim for a version of Composition as Identity
which avoids mereological essentialism while not being committed to the
existence of counterparts. Which one of these modal theories would suit
best for our account of composition is an interesting question, but we
cannot deal with it here.
We have seen that the main claim of Composition as Identity has to
meet serious criticisms. The Paradox for Composition as Identity and the
derivation of Collapse put pressure on this view. Composition as Iden-
tity appears to commit us to reverse mereological essentialism and mere-
ological essentialism. These criticisms make a defense of Composition as
Identity not an easy business. Although we already encountered some
ways of replying to them, we shall now move on to see how defenders
of Composition as Identity elaborated on the main claim of the view in
order to refine the theory under consideration.
39. The theory of modal parts is also called “five-dimensionalism”, (Evnine 2016: 40;
Garrett 2006: 47; Rini and Cresswell 2012: 167). Graham (2015: 15, fn.5) observes cor-
rectly that ‘five-dimensionalism’ is a misnomer since it suggests that the belief in modal
parts has to be held together with the belief in temporal parts. Yet, the two views are
independent from each other.
CHAPTER THREE
The Varieties of Composition as
Identity
’Composition as Identity’ is a term used to refer to a group of theo-
ries which agree on a core claim, yet disagree on other claims. Lewis
(1991: §3.6) introduces the term for the view that an object is identical
to its parts and the positions defended by Armstrong (1978: 37-8) and
Baxter (1988a; 1988b). Since then, different accounts of how to elaborate
Composition as Identity’s core claim have been developed. I follow the
terminology of Cotnoir (2014: 9-11) and distinguish between weak, mod-
erate and strong Composition as Identity.40 The difference between these
versions of the theory can be explained by taking them to be different in-
terpretations of the slogan Composition is identity. Weak Composition as
Identity interprets the ‘is’ in the slogan as expressing a similarity between
the composition and the identity relation, while the other two versions
assume that an identity holds between them. The disagreement between
moderate and strong Composition as Identity rests on a different inter-
pretation of ‘identity’. According to strong Composition as Identity, there
is only one identity relation and it is identical to the composition relation.
Moderate Composition as Identity assumes that there are different kinds
of identity relations and composition is one of them.
40. Wallace (2011a: 807) calls moderate Composition as Identity the “Stronger Compo-
sition Thesis”.
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We begin with a brief examination of weak and strong Composition
as Identity and analyze the reasons which motivate the different elabo-
rations of the core claim of Composition as Identity. Eventually, we will
have a closer look at some of the moderate versions of the thesis. This
latter group of theories will be especially important for us because the
theory I defend belongs to this category of Composition as Identity the-
ories and it will therefore be useful to see how it relates to its closest
relatives within the family of accounts of Composition as Identity.
The aim of this chapter is not to present arguments which suggest that
all of these theories are false. Rather, I would like to offer an overview on
various, in particular moderate, interpretations of Composition as Iden-
tity41 in order to facilitate a comparison between them and the account
I develop here. Having said that, we will also see that due to the dif-
ferent difficulties the positions we are about to discuss have to face, it is
worthwhile to consider an alternative interpretation of Composition as
Identity, in particular one which can avoid these problems.
3.1 Weak Composition as Identity
The weak version of Composition as Identity is already disputed at
length in the literature and there is a general agreement that it is too weak
to be considered a serious alternative to the two stronger versions, (see
Baxter 2014: 251-2, Cameron 2014: 93, Varzi 2014: 50-9, Wallace 2011a: 806,
and Yi 1999a: 149-53). I agree with the received view on this point.
Weak Composition as Identity differs from the other interpretations
by taking identity and composition to be very much alike or analogous
but not identical relations. This view is commonly associated with Lewis
(1991: §3.6),42 and Sider (2007).
41. One of the interpretations of Composition as Identity, which would be interesting
to discuss as well but for which I do regrettably not have the needed space available, is
the one developed by Bohn (2009; 2014).
42. Authors argue about whether Lewis indeed defends weak Composition as Identity,
(see Bricker 2016: 281-2). I think Lewis held different views at different times. In some
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Taking composition and identity to be similar relations has some plau-
sibility. One reason to resist identifying the two relations and to take, so
to speak, “a step back” from the claim that composition is identity to
composition is only similar to identity, comes from the problems arising
in connection with substitution. Lewis expresses worries which are in
line with our Paradox for Composition as Identity from section 2.1:
What’s true of the many is not exactly what’s true of the one.
After all they are many while it is one. (Lewis 1991: 87)
Sider discusses similar substitution-related problems for Composition as
Identity and claims that a rejection of substitution would “[. . . ] arouse
suspicion that their use of ‘is identical to’ does not really express iden-
tity” (Sider 2007: 57). Following Lewis and Sider, one may think weak
Composition as Identity should be preferred over its alternatives, since it
can avoid the paradox: A composite object is not identical to its parts, but
stands in a relation which is similar to identity. Therefore, weak Compo-
sition as Identity can dismiss the first premise of the Paradox for Com-
position as Identity and avoid one of the criticisms put forward against
it.
However, weak Composition as Identity does not come without any
shortcomings. By taking composition to be only similar to identity, we do
not gain much because similarity is a relative phenomenon. In a sense,
being a brother is similar to being a step-brother, and being taller than is sim-
ilar to being identical to – both relations are two-place relations. Yet, these
similarity claims are not very useful or informative, since they do not
have any explanatory power. This is why weak Composition as Iden-
tity comes only at a high price: The explanatory power of the core claim
of Composition as Identity, a composite object is identical to its parts, is
put on the line for the sake of avoiding problems which I take to arise in
connection with substitution.
places, (1988: 71-2), a moderate view is defended, while in (1991: §3.6), it seems a weak
version of Composition as Identity evolves from a moderate account. We shall leave
this question to the Lewis-scholars and focus on his weak interpretation.
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We motivated Composition as Identity as an interpretation of the intu-
ition that a composite object is nothing over and above its parts, the way it
relates to the no double-counting policy and the thought that there is no
additional ontological commitment to a composite object, given a com-
mitment to its parts in chapter 1. However, its weak version cannot fol-
low this line of thought. If composition is only similar to identity, how can
a composite object come without any additional commitment besides the
commitment to its parts? That a composite object comes without any fur-
ther additional ontological commitment, given a commitment to its parts,
and vice versa, can only be true, if the parts are identical to the whole. Why
should there be no such additional commitment if an object and its parts
stand only in a relation which is similar to identity? Hence, the weak ver-
sion of Composition as Identity loses much of the theory’s explanatory
power. Since that is one of the main reasons to consider Composition as
Identity as an interesting theory in the first place, the weak version turns
out to undermine the core claim of the position.
3.2 Strong Composition as Identity
Strong Composition as Identity is the theory according to which compo-
sition is identical to the identity relation, whereby the latter behaves clas-
sically, i.e. “it is transitive, reflexive, symmetric, unambiguous, intuitive
and obeys Leibniz’s Law” (Wallace 2011a: 807). This version of the thesis
is sometimes mistakenly associated with Baxter, (see, for instance, Lewis
1991: 83-4 and Sider 2007: 55, fn.12). As already noted by Baxter (2014),
Cotnoir (2014: 10), and Yi (1999b: 149, fn.13), Baxter defends a moderate
version of Composition as Identity. The only defender of strong Compo-
sition as Identity appears to be Wallace (2011a; 2011b; 2014).43
In comparison to its weak counterpart, strong Composition as Iden-
tity is able to preserve the explanatory power of the theory’s core claim
43. Cotnoir (2014: 10) mentions Bohn (2009) as a further supporter of strong Composi-
tion as Identity.
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by stating that a composite object is identical to its parts taken together in
the same way that the composite object is identical to itself: The six-pack is
nothing over and above the six cans because it is identical to them in the
same sense as the six-pack is identical to itself. Hence, being committed
to the six-pack amounts to being committed to the six cans, and vice versa.
Being able to maintain this explanatory power makes it a more attractive
theory than weak Composition as Identity.
Prima facie, strong Composition as Identity presents itself as a simpler
theory than the moderate version. The latter argues that there are sev-
eral kinds of identity relations and the composition relation is identical
to one, or some, of them. The picture of the strong version is much sim-
pler: There is one identity relation and it is the composition relation. By
identifying composition with the identity relation, strong Composition as
Identity gives us a much simpler account of composition, due to the fact
that its account of identity is simple. However, I think this simplicity
comes with serious difficulties.
There are two closely related points, which are difficult to overcome
once composition is identified with what is commonly seen as the identity
relation. Firstly, identity is a symmetric while composition is an asym-
metric relation. Hence, composition cannot be identity understood clas-
sically. If composition is a symmetrical relation it does not only entail the
reflexivity of composition, for which, I think, one could make a case, but
it leads to the further claim that if some objects uu compose some object
x, then x composes the uu. For instance, if some atoms compose a statue,
then the statue composes the atoms. This is an absurd consequence. No
object composes the objects which compose it.
The second problem also relates to the asymmetry of the composi-
tion relation and connects to the substitution problems discussed in the
sections 2.1 and 2.2. Strong Composition as Identity cannot reply to these
arguments that substitution is only valid if we have a certain kind of iden-
tity. Hence, substitution has to be restricted in some other way. Wallace
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(2011a: 807-14) makes a strong case for such a restriction of substitution.44
We do not have the space to investigate the details of the argument she
offers, but we can summarize it briefly with the help of Wallace’s descrip-
tion of what a counterexample to her account would have to look like:
Showing that there is a property, F, that the whole has that the
parts (collectively) do not, or that there is a property, F, that
the parts (collectively) have that the whole does not, would
be in effect to fill in particular details of an [argument against
strong Composition as Identity.] (Wallace 2011a: 812)
The restriction on substitution amounts then to the following, described
in the second part of the above quote: Given x = uu, ‘x’ can be substi-
tuted for ‘uu’ in ‘F(uu)’ iff the uu have the property represented by ‘F’
collectively, i.e. the uu taken together are F.
Here is an example which matches the above description for a coun-
terexample to strong Composition as Identity: Take a pile of cards which
consists of two suits of cards. Each suit is composed of thirteen cards.
Moreover, the twenty-six cards compose the pile, hence, they are iden-
tical to the pile. Yet, the pile does not compose the two suits, while the
twenty-six cards do.
Let me clarify the example. According to strong Composition as Iden-
tity, given a pile of cards which consists of two suits of cards, the two suits
of cards compose, hence are identical to, the pile of cards. Moreover, the
twenty-six cards compose, hence are identical to, the two suits of cards.
Since identity is a transitive relation, the twenty-six cards are identical to
the pile of cards. But since the twenty-six cards compose the two suits,
it follows with the above restricted version of substitution, that the pile
of cards composes the two suits. Additionally, we can show that the two
suits of cards compose the twenty-six cards, since the two suits compose
the pile of cards, and the latter is identical to the twenty-six cards.
44. This goes clearly against the intention of Wallace and the initial idea of strong Com-
position as Identity, since the classical identity relation obeys substitution unrestricedly.
The restriction of substitution suggests that the composition relation cannot be identi-
fied with the classical identity relation.
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However, that the pile of cards composes the two suits, and that the
two suits of cards compose the twenty-six cards flies in the face of com-
mon sense, since these claims obviously violate our intuition of composi-
tion being an asymmetric relation. Although this line of critique against
strong Composition as Identity might look like simply rehearsing the pre-
vious point, it has its origin in the idea that composite objects do not
decompose uniquely. The pile of cards is composed of the two suits on
the one hand, and it is composed of the twenty-six cards on the other
hand. This leads to problems for strong Composition as Identity, since
the twenty-six cards are collectively identical to the pile of cards, and they
collectively compose the two suits of cards. Therefore, substitution is al-
lowed and we can infer the false conclusions that the pile of cards com-
poses the two suits of cards. Similarly, because the two suits of cards are
collectively identical to the pile of cards, we can infer that they collectively
compose the twenty-six cards. Hence, we can see that even a restriction
of substitution which is formulated with such an utmost care as the one
elaborated by Wallace is not able to help strong Composition as Identity
to succeed. On the contrary, I think, it only shows that strong Compo-
sition as Identity is too strong and we should aim for a more moderate
view.
3.3 Moderate Composition as Identity
Moderate Composition as Identity agrees with the strong interpretation
of Composition as Identity on one point: composition is identical to iden-
tity. Yet, the moderate view assumes that there is only one identity rela-
tion, while the strong view claims that there are several identity relations.
Adapting a more fine-grained view on the identity relation puts quite
some pressure on moderate Composition as Identity. It stands squarely
to how we think ordinarily about identity, because it contradicts the re-
ceived view, (see, for example, McGinn 2000: 1), on identity, which says
that there is only one identity relation:
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Identity is a relation that is determined in such a specific way
that it is impossible to see how different kinds of it may occur.
(Frege 1903: 253 [my translation])
We will come back to this idea in section 6.1.4, where I argue against it.
For now, I would like to outline some moderate accounts of Composi-
tion as Identity. This will help us to locate our account within the bigger
discussion and to compare it to the views already defended. We begin
our analysis with “[t]he progenitor of the modern version of the thesis”
(Noonan and Curtis 2014: §8),45 before turning to Bricker’s and Cotnoir’s
views.
3.3.1 Baxter: Composition as Cross-Count Identity
Baxter’s theory of Composition as Identity rests on three central concepts:
counts, aspects and location. With these, he argues for the claims that
what exists is relative to a count and that there are three kinds of identity.
We have already encountered the concept of counts in section 1.1. Recall,
it is one of the central ideas of Composition as Identity that we can count
objects in different ways. In our example of the piece of land and the six
parcels, when we are asked How many objects?, we can either count the
piece of land and reply One, or we can count the parcels and reply Six.
The two different answers rely on different ways of counting, and the
different ways of counting, in turn, rely on different ways to divide up
the property of the farmer.
However, the farmer might have decided to divide up his property in
a different way, as figure 3.1 depicts. Instead of dividing it into six parcels
(top right), and selling each one of them to a different buyer, he could
have sold the Northern and the Southern (bottom left), or the Western
and the Eastern half to two buyers (bottom center). Moreover, he could
have sold one of the six parcels to one buyer and the other five parcels
45. I will primarily focus on the views expressed in (Baxter 1988a; 1988b; 2014), as well
as their excellent discussion in (Turner 2014).
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Figure 3.1: The Piece of Land and the Six Parcels I
to another buyer, dividing the piece of land in two parcels with different
sizes, and so forth (bottom right).
The fact that there are different ways of counting objects leads Baxter
to the claim that existence has to be relativized to counts:
[I]dentity (in the familiar sense), number, and existence are
relative to what I call ‘counts’. (Baxter 1988b: 193)
So what exists is relative to count. (Baxter 1988b: 201)
Although one might be skeptical about this claim, we can see what leads
Baxter to this conclusion. Let me try to follow his line of thought by
reconsidering our previous example: When the farmer divides up and
sells his property, he has to settle for one way of counting. Although
he can divide his property in different ways, he cannot hold on to two
different ways of dividing it up at the same time. He has to sell either the
piece of land as a whole, or the six parcels, or the North and the South
half, and so on. He cannot sell the piece of land to one buyer and the
six parcels to six buyers. Hence, what properties exist depends on the
way the farmer divides up the piece of land. If he leaves it in one piece,
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only the piece of land exists. If he divides it into six parcels, only the six
parcels exist, and so on.
Baxter’s “familiar identity” is – in a sense – the classical identity rela-
tion from first-order logic with identity. It is reflexive, symmetric, tran-
sitive and allows for substitution. However, it holds only within a cer-
tain count: “The familiar version of identity rules within counts” (Baxter
1988a: 193). In the count, where the farmer divides the piece of land in a
North and a South half, the North half is identical to the North half, or
the North half is identical to, say, the piece of land which is bought by
the farmer’s neighbor. Apart from the relativization to counts, familiar
identity is classical identity.
To understand intra- and cross-count identity, we need the notion of
aspects. They enter the stage when we encounter cases of self-differing.
Suppose, Ben is the coach of his daughter’s football team. Like any fa-
ther, he wants to see his daughter in the starting line-up. However, he
knows that his daughter is one of the weakest players and, like any other
coach, he wants only the best players to start. Therefore, Ben differs from
himself. He wants his daughter to be in the starting line-up and he does
not want her to be in the starting line-up.
Baxter (1988b: 203-6; 1999) explains self-difference with the help of
aspects: Ben-as-father wants his daughter to be in the starting line-up.
Ben-as-coach does not want his daughter to be in the starting line-up.
Ben-as-father and Ben-as-coach are identical to Ben insofar as they are
aspects of him. Ben differs from himself because he has aspects, which
differ from each other, by having properties which are not compatible
with each other.46 However, the identity relation holding between Ben
and each one of his aspects cannot be the familiar identity relation on pain
of contradiction. Baxter needs to assume that we have here another kind
of identity relation at work, one not obeying substitution. It is “intra-
count identity” (Baxter 1988a: 214, Turner 2014: 232-3). It becomes an
46. Ben does not have different properties at different times. He wants and does not want
his daughter to be in the starting line-up at the same time, say, five minutes before the
game starts.
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Figure 3.2: The Piece of Land and the Six Parcels II
important relation because Baxter takes a part to be an aspect of the object
it is a part of. Hence, a composite object is intra-count identical to each one
of its parts.
With the help of the concept of location, Baxter argues that an object’s
parts are aspects of it: An object’s part is the object-as-located-in-the-parts-
place. Add to our example of the farmer’s piece of land that the equator
divides the piece of land in a Northern and a Southern half, see figure
3.2. Then, the Northern half is identical to the piece-of-land-as-located-
North-of-the-equator, and the Southern half is identical to the piece-of-
land-as-located-South-of-the-equator.
This allows holding on to the claim that the piece of land is located
North of the equator as well as South of the equator: The piece-of-
land-as-located-North-of-the-equator is located North of the equator, and
the piece-of-land-as-located-South-of-the-equator is located South of the
equator. The contradiction – the piece of land is located North of the
equator and it is located South of the equator, i.e. not located North of
the equator – does not follow, since existence is relative to a count. We
have to decide between two ways of counting: Either we count the two
halves, then the piece of land does not exist, or we count the piece of
land, then the two halves do not exist. In the first case, no contradic-
tion can be derived: The Northern half is in the North, the Southern half
is not, and the piece of land does not exist in this count. In the second
count, the piece of land is in the North only insofar as it is intra-count
identical to the Northern half, and it is not in the North only insofar as
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it is intra-count identical to the Southern half. Intra-count identity does
not allow for substitution, so no contradiction can be derived (see Baxter
1988a: 206-7).
Cross-count identity is an identity relation working across different
counts. It comes in two forms. There is one-one cross-count identity
holding between one object and one object; and there is many-one cross
count identity holding between many objects and one object. The former
is the kind of identity that holds between an object in one count and the
same object in another count. Loosely speaking, one-one cross-count iden-
tity is the identification of an object across different counts and it behaves
like the familiar identity relation.
Many-one cross-count identity is then the identity relation which
holds between many objects from one count, and one object from an-
other count, (Baxter 1988a: 193). It holds between an object and all its
parts taken collectively, i.e. between an object from one count and all
the objects which are intra-count identical to it in another count, (Bax-
ter 1988a: 209). Many-one cross-count identity is what (Baxter 2014: 253)
takes to be composition.
Because cross-count identity does not obey substitution, or only in a
very restricted form, (see Baxter 1988a: 194, Turner 2014: 236), Baxter can
meet the criticisms we discussed in the sections 2.1 and 2.2, the Paradox
for Composition as Identity and the derivation of Collapse. However,
there are some points in this account of Composition as Identity which
are problematic.
Relativizing existence to counts strikes me as a mistake, or at least as
misleading. When Composition as Identity claims that a composite ob-
ject’s being nothing over and above its parts amounts to there being no
additional commitment to the object given the commitment to the parts,
then there is no need for a relativization of existence. On the contrary,
the fact that the parts exist gets identified with the fact that the composite
object exists. What is relativized is the way we can spell out the ontologi-
cal commitment: Either we are committed to the existence of the parts, in
which case we get the composite object for free, or we are committed to
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the existence of the composite object, in which case we get the parts for
free.
Further, taking a part of a composite object as the object-as-located-
at-the-parts-place “smuggles in” the parthood relation. The location of a
part is a subregion of the location of its whole. The region a part occupies
is a part of the region the whole occupies. Although the parthood rela-
tion holding between regions and the parthood relation holding between
material objects must not necessarily be the same relation, (see McDaniel
2004; 2009), the important role played by regions within Baxter’s theory
leads to the impression that the parthood relation holding between re-
gions works as a surrogate for the parthood relation of material objects.
Finally, aspects are a mysterious concept. On the one hand, they can
be understood as material objects, (Turner 2014: 226). However, if aspects
are taken to be objects, their introduction does not bring us any step for-
ward, since any explanatory work aspects do, can be done by objects in
the ordinary sense. On the other hand, aspects might be understood as a
result of our conceptualization of reality: Ben, insofar as I conceptualize
him as a father, wants his daughter to be in the starting line-up; and in-
sofar as I conceptualize him as a coach, Ben does not want his daughter
to be in the starting line-up. But if aspects are an artifact of our con-
ceptualization, then it is impossible for an object to be identical to one
of its aspects or all its aspects taken together. Ben, the person, is surely
not identical to my conceptualization of him. In lack of further ways to
make sense of aspects, Baxter’s theory, especially when spelled out with
aspects as a key notion, is difficult to maintain.
3.3.2 Bricker: Composition as a Kind of Identity
Bricker motivates mereological universalism, which he takes to be a triv-
ial truth, on the basis of Composition as Identity:
The situation is untenable. Something that I take to be abso-
lutely obvious is rejected by many, if not the majority, of my
philosophical peers. [. . . ] For any things whatsoever, there is
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something that those things compose: a fusion of those things.
Unrestricted Composition follows with perfect clarity from
my understanding of the notion of composition.
(Bricker 2016: 264-5)
I will discuss three points of Bricker’s account: his general identity rela-
tion, the key element for the derivation of Classical Extensional Mereol-
ogy from the account of composition he holds, and the remarks on sub-
stitution.
Bricker’s position is formulated within a plural logic containing a
predicate for the general identity relation, ‘ .=’, as a primitive. He takes it
that we already have an intuitive understanding of what relation general
identity is, (Bricker 2016: 269). This relation is taken to be an equiva-
lence relation, i.e. it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. The standard
identity predicate, ‘=’, is understood to express those identity relations
that can be expressed with the use of singular terms only, i.e. one-one
identities. For instance, if we translate the predicate ‘=’ with ‘is one-one
identical to’, the sentences
(1) Anne is generally identical to the daughter of Bill
(2) Anne is one-one identical to the daughter of Bill
are logically equivalent. Besides one-one identities, there are three other
kinds of identity relations, many-one, one-many, and many-many. Many-
one identities are those identities where the general identity predicate
takes a plural term on the left and a singular term on the right, ‘uu .= x’.
One-many identities differ from many-one identities simply by the argu-
ment places singular and plural terms occupy, ‘x .= uu’. Finally, many-
many identities are those identity relations, which are expressed with
formulas where the identity predicate is flanked by two plural terms,
‘uu .= vv’, (Bricker 2016: 269).
Composition is then taken to be a kind of the general identity relation.
With the general identity relation and composition thus characterized, fu-
sions and improper parthood can be defined. The fusion of an object x or
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some objects uu is the object y that is generally identical to x or the uu, re-
spectively; and x is an improper part of y iff there are some uu such that y
is many-one identical to the uu, and x is one of the uu, (Bricker 2016: 270).
The general identity relation and the mereological notions of fusion and
improper parthood make an introduction of further principles, which al-
low the deduction of mereological universalism, possible. We can spare a
closer examination of these principles one by one. However, it is interest-
ing to note that the key axiom in the derivation of universalism, called “E
Pluribus Unum” (Bricker 2016: 271), ‘∀uu∃y(uu .= y)’, gets introduced
without much argument:
To derive Unrestricted Composition, we need the fundamen-
tal underlying idea that every many is also a one: every plu-
rality of things coincides with some single thing.
(Bricker 2016: 271)
Here lies one of the few shortcomings of Bricker’s account. Surely,
Bricker’s opponent will put her foot down at this point and insist that
Bricker begs the question in favor of universalism here. The complaint is
not unwarranted and Bricker (2016: 274-5) anticipates this line of critique.
It would be desirable to have some more reasons for why one should
think that every many is also a one, i.e. why any objects whatsoever are
many-one identical to some object besides taking it as “[. . . ] natural ways
of generalizing the plural framework” (Bricker 2016: 275). To put it in his
own terminology, why is there for any plural term a singular term, such
that both refer to the same portion of reality? This will be one of our tasks
to accomplish in chapter 10 – to make sure that we have sufficient reason
to hold on to E Pluribus Unum.
Since Bricker’s theory is a moderate version of Composition as Iden-
tity, it is not surprising that he takes substitution not to be generally valid,
(Bricker 2016: 275-6). However, he is aware that restricting substitution
is not a move that can be endorsed easily. Bricker shows that without a
restriction of substitution “[. . . ] composition as identity is dead” (Bricker
2016: 279). The attempt to do without a restriction he discusses tries to
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relativize the properties expressed by predicates which are used in coun-
terexamples to substitution, such as ‘are 52 in number’. Because Bricker
notes further that such a relativization would be needed for the inclusion
predicate from plural logic as well, since it has the defining feature on
which such a relativization is based – according to his view – he takes it
that we cannot escape the restriction of substitution.
In summary, Bricker takes the general identity relation to be a prim-
itive concept coming in four different kinds. The derivation of Classi-
cal Extensional Mereology stands and falls with his axiom E Pluribus
Unum. This will be one of the key elements we will rely on in chapter
10. Bricker’s theory is prone to the counterexamples of rearrangement
we discussed in the previous chapter,47 which marks an important dif-
ference to the account we will develop.
3.3.3 Cotnoir: Composition as General Identity
Cotnoir’s account of moderate Composition as Identity recognizes four
kinds of identity: one-one, many-one, one-many, and many-many iden-
tity, (Cotnoir 2013a: 303). In parts, it shows close similarities to Baxter’s
account by taking counts to play a central role within the theory and by
taking the different kinds of identity to hold if two terms carve up, or
refer to the same portion of reality in different ways:
In order to take many-one identity seriously, we need to sup-
pose that we can refer to a portion of the world singularly or
plurally [. . . ] But no matter whether we carve a portion of it
as one individual or many, it is still the same bit of reality.
(Cotnoir 2013a: 302)
The characteristic difference between Cotnoir’s position and other mod-
erate views is that he aims to hold on to an unrestricted version of sub-
stitution. As one of the central parts of Cotnoir’s presentation is to give
47. In email-correspondence, Bricker told me that he is not troubled by the counterex-
amples based on rearrangement, since he is a four-dimensionalist. However, see my
remarks in fn.36 on the problem of rearrangement for four-dimensionalism.
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a formal semantics for Composition as Identity and we do not have the
formal means to capture that here, we have to content ourselves with
examining the philosophical claims of his theory.
Cotnoir presents his theory as a way for Composition as Identity to
meet three challenges, the syntactical, the semantical, and the discerni-
bility challenge.48 They are the following:
How can many-one identities be grammatically expressed in En-
glish?
How can we make sense of many-one identities?
How can many-one identity be an identity relation, yet not obey
substitution?
The first challenge goes back to van Inwagen (1994: 210-1), who exposes
the core claim of Composition as Identity as being a grammatical mistake.
From the standpoint of grammar, there is a mismatch in the claim ‘A
composite object is identical to its parts’ between the verb ‘is identical
to’, and the object ‘its parts’; the former is singular while the latter is
plural. So, Composition as Identity cannot even be formulated correctly!
How can it then be true?
I would like to highlight the final reply49 Cotnoir offers for the syn-
tactical challenge. He claims that the English language allows us “to sin-
gularize syntactically plural terms while maintaining plural reference”
(Cotnoir 2013a: 299). In other words, for any plural term ‘uu’ there is a
48. All three challenges apply equally to one-many identities. However, there is no need
to spell them out separately, since they stand or fall in each case together. Therefore, we
can ignore one-many identity for the remainder of this section.
49. The easiest way to reply to the syntactical challenges is to move to a formal language
where the singular-plural distinction can be avoided. This is what Sider (2007) does
and the same strategy can be applied by Bricker (2016: 268). Another reply offered
by Cotnoir is that we should take other languages into account as well, and not be
biased by the constraints of the grammar of a particular language. The grammar of
other languages, for instance of Nordic languages, allow for an acceptable formulation
of many-one identities. Hence, we should not be misled by our prejudices based on
English grammar or the grammar of any other language (Cotnoir 2013a: 296).
66 THE VARIETIES OF COMPOSITION AS IDENTITY §3.3
singular term ‘x’ such that the two terms are co-referring. So-called what-
descriptions motivate this claim, (Cotnoir 2013a: 299):
I bought some things. The things I bought *was/were expensive
I bought some things. What I bought *was/were expensive
These two sentences show that the what-description, ‘what I bought’, al-
lows us to refer to several objects, the things I bought, with the means
of a grammatically singular term, ‘what I bought’. The latter is, from the
standpoint of grammar, a singular term asking for the singular, ‘was ex-
pensive’, but referring to many objects. Although the singularization of
plural terms is a linguistic observation, I would like to flag it here, since
it is the syntactical counterpart to Bricker’s E Pluribus Unum. But we must
keep in mind that if Cotnoir is right, and grammar allows us to formulate
many-one identities, this does by not guarantee that they are true.
Cotnoir addresses the semantical challenge by providing a formal se-
mantics. This is done with the use of set theory. Cotnoir (2013a: 31) calms
the reader by pointing out that he is not endorsing the ontology of the
semantics and that a semantics could be given with the means of super-
plural terms, i.e. terms that stand to plural terms as plural terms stand to
singular terms. I do not intend to question whether it is possible for him
to give a set theoretic semantics for his theory without taking on board
its ontology. Rather, I should point out that giving a semantics with the
help of superplural terms is, in my view, not less worrisome than giv-
ing it in set theoretic terms because the concept of superplural terms is
highly problematic, as we will see in section 5.6. However, let’s set this
issue aside and see how the general identity relation is described.
Cotnoir then introduces the concept of ‘being a partition’:
Partitions are essentially ways of counting a domain. [. . . ] A
partition carves up reality into chunks or portions. It treats all
the atoms in the same portion as a single thing.
(Cotnoir 2013a: 302)
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Figure 3.3: The Piece of Land and the Six Parcels III
With this concept, Cotnoir is eventually in a position to take counts as a
means to refer to the same portion of reality in different ways.
General identity amounts then to referring to the same portion of re-
ality, and a many-one identity holds iff a plural and a singular term refer
to the same portion of reality in different counts, (Cotnoir 2013a: 303-5).
Apart from the technical details provided, the philosophical point which is
made here is much in line with Baxter’s theory. However, when it comes
to the discernibility challenge a quite different route is taken:
There are no failures of Leibniz’s Law provided we do not
switch our way of counting ‘mid-sentence’, as it were.
(Cotnoir 2013a: 322)
Hence, Cotnoir claims that his theory is able to work with an unrestricted
version of substitution while holding on to Composition as Identity. He
offers two different ways a semantics for such a theory can be provided.
One of them relativizes truth to counts. For instance, relative to the
“rectangle-count” on the left in figure 3.3, it is true that the piece of land
is one object. Further, according to the same count, the six parcels are one
object. They are identical to it because the term ‘the six parcels’ refers to
the same portion of reality as ‘the piece of land’. On the other hand, ac-
cording to the “square-count” on the right in figure 3.3, it is true that the
six parcels are six objects, and the piece of land is six objects. It is identical
to them because ‘the piece of land’ refers to the same portion of reality as
‘the six parcels’, (Cotnoir 2013a: 309-10; see also, Hawley 2013: 325).
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The problem then is that we have to accept the relativity of truth to
counts. Bricker (2016: 277-9) has already raised concerns about this idea.
It strikes me as a strange outcome that the piece of land and the six(!)
parcels can be one object according to a certain count, and six objects
according to another. It seems to me rather that the piece of land is always
one object, and the six parcels are always six, independently from how we
count them.
Cotnoir’s account marks an important exception within the interpre-
tations of Composition as Identity. He aims for an unrestricted version
substitution, while holding on to the claim that there are several kinds of
identity relations. His answer to the syntactical challenge deserves to get
more attention than he paid to it. It strikes me that we may use our abil-
ity to singularize plural terms as a door-opener for Bricker’s E Pluribus
Unum. However, we cannot yet answer the question whether this is a le-
gitimate move, and will have to wait until chapter 10 before we can come
back to it.
3.4 Summary
We have now reached the end of Part I, so let’s take stock and look
ahead what comes next. We have seen that Composition as Identity
gives us a reasonable interpretation for the intuition that an object is
nothing over and above its parts. Further, it can be motivated with the
help of the Overdetermination Argument and due to the fact that it en-
tails the uniqueness of composition. Finally, it allows us to avoid diffi-
culties for such fruitful theories as mereological universalism and four-
dimensionalism. Yet, Composition as Identity is itself under pressure
since it runs into to the Paradox for Composition as Identity and allows
for the derivation of Collapse. Moreover, it is prone to the counterex-
amples from arrangement and comes dangerously close to mereological
essentialism. Different versions of Composition as Identity aim to over-
come these problems by elaborating on the theory’s main claim. Weak
versions of Composition as Identity lose the explanatory power of the
§3.4 SUMMARY 69
theory’s core claim, while strong versions are in trouble due to the differ-
ing logical properties of the composition and the identity relation. Mod-
erate accounts of Composition as Identity appear to be better suited to
meet the criticisms since they are based on a more fine-grained notion of
identity.
In the next chapters, we will spell out the ground for the theory
of Composition as Identity which I claim can overcome the criticisms
against Composition as Identity. Since plural logic is a necessary means
to formulate such a theory, we will begin with an informal introduction
of the basic concepts of plural logic in chapter 4. I will then present a for-
mal theory which captures the standard conceptions of plural logic, only
to show that they are mistaken and lead us to a revision of our concep-
tion of identity: Identity is not a unitary relation, but comes in a variety
of ways. We will discuss some principles that are generally assumed to
hold for the identity relation and show how we can hold on to some of
them, while the idea that there is only one kind of identity relation is
abandoned. Chapter 7 consists in spelling out some basic principles and
making some decisions for a revision of the standard accounts of plural
logic, before we will then finally present a plural logic that provides us
with the means to capture the variety of identity in chapter 8.
One of the problems we have to resolve in these chapters is the tension
between allowing for many-one identity and the claim that being one is the
opposite of being many. These two views appear to be inconsistent with
each other. Yet, we will be able to see that they can live in harmony with
each other. The solution I will suggest hinges on the distinction between
extensional and intensional contexts. I think that a many-one identity
tells us two things. On the one hand, a composite object and its parts are
extensionally the same. For instance, the six-pack of orange juice and the
six cans of orange juice are the same piece of reality, or the same amount
of matter. On the other hand, it makes a difference whether we refer to
this piece of reality with ‘the six-pack of orange juice’ or with ‘the six cans
of orange juice’ because they are intensionally not the same.

Part II




In the previous chapters, for instance, when we discussed the Overdeter-
mination Argument, reverse mereological essentialism, or the different
forms of Composition as Identity, we occasionally relied on the resources
of plural logic. We are now at a point where a more careful discussion
of plural logic and its underlying principles is necessary. We could sim-
ply move on with the presentation of a formal system of plural logic and
assume the truth of its underlying principles. However, a more careful
examination of the basic ideas of plural logic not only does justice to the
discussions in the literature, it also leads us to a revision of our ordinary
views about identity. This revision of our initial view on identity leads us
ultimately, or so I argue, to the view that composition is a kind of iden-
tity. Therefore, plural logic is not only a necessary means which we need
to formulate the claim that a composite object is identical to its parts, but
it gives us also evidence for the truth of this claim. Given this important
role that plural logic plays for Composition as Identity, we will have to
make sure that the basic principles and notions are spelled out with great
care and its legitimacy is well-founded. Hence, I will give an informal
introduction to plural logic, before a formal system of plural logic will be
presented and discussed in the next chapter. We shall begin with some
clarifications on what plural logic is and consider what motivations there
are to use plural logic, even for someone not interested in Composition
as Identity. As this is done, we will see why Composition as Identity is
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in need of plural logic: Any theory about composition worth its salt is
couched in plural logic, since composition is a phenomenon which can
only be adequately captured with the resources of plural logic. Eventu-
ally, we conclude this chapter with the crucial distinction between singu-
lar and plural terms and some remarks on plural reference.
Plural logic is an extension of classical first-order logic (FOL=), as de-
veloped by Frege (1879), and presented, for instance, by Priest (2008: §12),
Sider (2010: §4-5.3), and Smith (2003). Within FOL=, the only terms we
are allowed to use are terms which refer to exactly one individual. How-
ever, natural language contains so called “empty terms”, which do not
refer to at least one object, e.g. ‘Pegasus’, as well as terms which do not
refer to at most one object, e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell’.
Several strategies for dealing with terms that do not refer to exactly
one object have been developed. Some of these strategies are based on the
idea that although natural language contains sentences with such terms,
these sentences can be formalized within classical FOL=, (for an excel-
lent overview of such strategies, see Oliver and Smiley 2001; 2013: §3&4).
However, there is the view that FOL= cannot do justice to these terms
and that an alternative logical system has to be developed. The systems
which allow the use of empty terms are “free logics” (see Lambert 1997;
2003, or Morscher and Hieke 2001). While these allow the use of terms
which fail to refer to an object, plural logics allow the use of terms which
refer to several objects.50
Another way to avoid the step to plural logic is to consider pred-
icates to be sensitive to number. This view denies, for instance, that
there is one predicate ‘being British’ which takes singular terms, ‘Rus-
sell’, ‘Whitehead’, and plural terms , ‘Russell and Whitehead’, ‘Russell,
Whitehead, and Moore’, as arguments. Instead there are many predi-
cates ‘being British1’, ‘being British2’, ‘being British3’, . . . , which differ
50. The distinction between free and plural logics is not exclusive. A logic can allow for
both, the use of terms which fail to refer to any object and of terms which refer to more
than one object. The systems developed by Oliver and Smiley (2013), and by Simons
(2016) are such systems.
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from each other depending upon the number of objects the terms which
enter their argument place refer to. I agree with Oliver and Smiley that
[. . . ] marking predicates for number is like marking them
for person. We would never regard ‘I am F’, ‘you are F’,
‘he/she/it is F’ as featuring three different predicates[.]
(Oliver and Smiley 2013: 2)
Hence, I think that this way of undermining the legitimacy of plural logic
should be dismissed, and we can move on to see how we to motivate the
use of plural logic.
4.1 Two Kinds of Arguments for Plural Logic
Plural Logic is motivated by a dissatisfaction with formalizing natural
language sentences containing plural terms within FOL=.51 The common
means to paraphrase sentences containing plural terms within FOL= is
to use set theory, (see Black 1971, Hazen 1993, Levin 1992, and Quine
1973: 110-1), or mereology, (see Leonard and Goodman 1940, Link 1998,
and Massey 1976). The idea of these two strategies is to paraphrase plu-
ral terms from natural language with the help of sets or mereological
sums. Since this ultimately boils down to paraphrasing away plural terms
by using singular terms, these strategies are often summarized under the
header “singularism” (see Florio 2014, Hossack 2000, McKay 2006: §2,
Oliver and Smiley 2013, and Rayo 2006).52
Within the literature, several arguments against the use of set theory
and mereology as means to formalize sentences containing plural terms
are presented. I group these arguments roughly in two categories: the
non-substantial and the substantial arguments.
51. In the second half of the last century, the idea of a plural logic was taken up by Black
(1971) and Simons (1982b) with the aim to spell out set theory in terms of plural logic.
Boolos’ discussions of plural logic (1984; 1985a; 1985b) as an interpretation of monadic
second-order logic is often regarded as the locus classicus of twentieth century plural
logic. For an overview on the history of plural logic, (see Oliver and Smiley 2013: §2).
52. Calling this view ‘singularist’ goes back to Lewis (1991: 65).
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Non-substantial arguments claim that by using set theory and mere-
ology we cannot adequately represent sentences containing plural terms.
The general line of thought, (see also Cameron 1999: 133-4 and McKay
2006: 22-4), can be seen from the following two passages:
It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios, you
are eating a set–what you’re doing is: eating THE CHEERIOS.
(Boolos 1984: 448)
Sets are abstract and so cannot win things. And since, in
general, a mereological sum has various decompositions, we
would get the silly result that if Anthony and Bill won, so did
their molecules (the sum of Anthony and Bill is the sum of
their molecules). (Oliver and Smiley 2001: 299)
This sounds convincing: We do not eat sets, and molecules do not win
races. A set is ordinarily considered to be an abstract object and we can-
not eat abstract objects. Molecules are not the kinds of objects which
participate in, let alone win, races. However, the arguments based on
these lines of thought are merely polemics against the singularist posi-
tion. They are not substantive criticisms because there are better ways to
formalize sentences containing plural terms with the help of set theory
and mereology.
The singularist’s reply to the criticism that set theory or mereology
are not suitable for formalizing sentences containing plural terms leads
us to what I take to be the real motivation for plural logic. But let’s have
a closer look at the above criticism, before we come to the singularist’s
defense of her strategy. Boolos53 protests that the sentence
(1) I had some Cheerios for breakfast
cannot be adequately formalized by set theory or mereology. It seems
Boolos is suggesting that the paraphrases we have to use when we want
to formalize (1) by the means of set theory or mereology are
53. Oliver and Smiley’s criticism in their (2001) is similar to the one suggested Boolos
and uses the example of Andy and Bill winning a race. It can be countered by the same
reply I suggest singularists will give to the counterexample of Boolos.
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(2) I had a set of Cheerios for breakfast
(3) I had a mereological sum of Cheerios for breakfast
which are inadequate, due to the reasons mentioned earlier: (2) implies
that somebody was eating a set, and it follows from (3) that somebody
had some molecules for breakfast. However, we can paraphrase (1) and
(2) by
(4) I had some elements of a set of Cheerios for breakfast
(5) I had some parts of a mereological sum of Cheerios for breakfast
which do not, at least prima facie, seem inadequate. These paraphrases do
not imply that someone had a set, or a mereological sum, or molecules
for breakfast. But although singularism does not entail the implausible
sentences (2) and (3), it is in trouble. The problems for the singularist
result from the defense we have just seen.
Opponents of singularism, for instance Boolos (1984: 447) and McKay
(2006: §2), argue that (2) and (3) come with ontological commitments
which do not match with the ontological commitments of (1).54 I consider
these arguments to belong to the substantial arguments against singular-
ism. They share the idea that set theory and mereology are not appro-
priate means to formalize sentences containing plural terms, because the
resulting paraphrases carry ontological commitments to sets and mereo-
logical sums. But, so the arguments go, the truth of (1) neither depends
on the question whether there is a set which has Anthony and Bill as
its only elements, nor whether there is a mereological sum that has them
54. It might be argued that (2) and (3) are not adequate paraphrases because they come
with additional ontological commitments when compared with (1). I can see that this
point has a certain degree of plausibility. Nevertheless, I think the two points should
be kept apart because it makes a difference whether we say that the paraphrases are
not able to capture the meaning of the sentences simpliciter, or that they do not capture
the meaning because they carry ontological commitments which do not correspond with
the commitments of the original sentences. Anyway, both interpretations show that
the singularist position is in trouble. Hence, the weaker position suffices to undermine
singularism.
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as parts. However, the truth of the set theoretic paraphrase, i.e. (2), de-
pends on the existence of such a set, and the truth of the mereology-based
paraphrase, i.e. (3), depends on the existence of such a mereological sum.
Therefore, set theory and mereology are not appropriate means to for-
malize sentences containing plural terms. Because (1) carries ontological
commitment only to cereals, which are material objects, we need a frame-
work which allows us to come up with a formalization of (1) which does
not bring any additional ontological commitments besides the commit-
ments to material objects.55 Plural logic is supposed to be such a frame-
work. We will have a closer look at how plural logic manages to avoid
these additional ontological commitments. Before we come to that, we
shall elaborate the motivation for the use of plural logic a bit more.
4.2 Distributivity and Collectivity
In the first hours of elementary logic classes, we are trained to paraphrase
away the plural terms of natural language by singular terms. We are told,
for instance, that (6) is an adequate paraphrase of (7):
(6) Russell and Whitehead are British
(7) Russell is British and Whitehead is British
By being told to paraphrase away plural terms, we are taught to follow
the singularist strategy. The shortcoming of this strategy remains mostly
55. We are here relying on an adequacy principle for logical paraphrases which follows
the thought that “[t]o paraphrase a sentence [. . . ] is, first and foremost, to make its
ontic content explicit [. . . ]” (Quine 1960: 242; see also Alston 1958 and Rayo 2007: 434-
6). This is a compelling principle, given the definition of ontological commitment, see
section 1.1.3: A difference with respect to ontological commitment results in a difference
with respect to truth conditions. Since an adequate paraphrase of a sentence should
have the same truth conditions as the sentence it is a paraphrase of, their ontological
commitments should match. Given that paraphrases may not be able to fully capture
the ontological commitments of a sentence, we could make our case for plural logic in a
relativized form: A paraphrase of a sentence is more adequate than another paraphrase,
if the former captures the ontological commitments of the paraphrased better than the
latter.
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unnoticed because the sentences used to convey the underlying idea of
the strategy are well-chosen. The predicates used in these examples are
all distributive in their argument places. The failure of this strategy, and
ultimately of the singularist program, becomes obvious when we con-
sider predicates which are collective in some of their argument places, as
for instance ‘baking a cake together’, or ‘surrounding’.
Before we give the general definitions of ‘being distributive in an ar-
gument place’ and ‘being collective in an argument place’, let’s consider
the simple cases of one-place predicates. A one-place predicate ‘Φ’ is dis-
tributive in its argument place iff it is analytically true that some objects
uu are Φ iff each one of the uu is Φ. A one-place predicate ‘Φ’ is collective
in its argument place iff it is not distributive in its argument place.
As we have seen, ‘being British’ is distributive in its only argument
place, since (6) is true iff (7) is true. Similarly, ‘being a student’ and ‘being
blue’ are distributive in their argument places. However, ‘baking a cake
together’ is collective in its only argument place, because it meaningless,
or at least not true, that some objects uu bake a cake together iff each one
of the uu bakes a cake together. We shall come back to this example in a
moment after spelling out our general definitions:56
D1 An n-place predicate P is distributive in its i-th argument place iff,
it is analytically true that a sentence S where uu occupies the i-th
argument place of P is true iff the conjunction consisting of all the
sentences where a name of each one of the uu occupies the i-th ar-
gument place of P is true.
D2 An n-place predicate P is collective in its i-th argument place iff P
is not distributive in its i-th argument place.
56. Since predicates with more than one argument place can be collective in one, but
distributive in another, as for instance ‘surrounding’, we cannot define distributivity
and collectivity for predicates simpliciter. Ben-Yami (2004: 21), Bohn (2012: 218, fn.18),
McKay (2006: 5-6), Oliver and Smiley (2013: 3), and Rayo (2002: 439) use definitions
which are similar to D1 and D2.
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When dealing with predicates which are collective in some of their argu-
ment places, singularism leads us to false sentences:
(8) Andy and Ben bake a cake together
(9) Andy bakes a cake together and Ben bakes a cake together
In analogy to the above instructions to paraphrase (6) by (7), we might
paraphrase (8) by (9). However, (9) is not an adequate paraphrase of (8)
because it does not make any sense.
Sometimes we encounter sentences where we have no clear way to
decide whether a predicate is distributive or collective in a certain argu-
ment place.57 Instead of (8) and (9), we could have
(10) Andy and Ben bake a cake
(11) Andy bakes a cake and Ben bakes a cake
Although (11) makes sense, it can be interpreted in a way that is incom-
patible with an interpretation of (10). We might understand (11) as telling
us that Andy bakes one cake, and Ben bakes another cake. Hence, Andy
and Ben bake two cakes. But that contradicts one of the possible inter-
pretations of (10), according to which Andy and Ben bake one cake. In
order to get hold of those incomplete ways of talking, illustrated by (10),
we might talk about predicates as being able to be interpreted distributively
or collectively in an argument place. Hence, ‘baking a cake’ can be inter-
preted as being distributive or as being collective in its only argument
place. Yet, ‘baking a cake together’ can only be interpreted as being col-
lective in its only argument place. Here are two further examples illus-
trating the inadequacy of the singularist strategy:
(12) Andy, Ben, and Chris surround Dan
(13) Andy surrounds Dan
57. Examples such as the ones above are also discussed by Díez (2010: 152, fn.5), McKay
(2006: 11-2), and Yi (2005: 481).
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(14) Eva and Fran are classmates
(15) Eva is/are classmates
Since paraphrases of (12) and (14), according to singularism, entail (13)
and (15), we can see that this strategy ultimately fails.
There are good reasons to abandon singularism and to consider plu-
ral logic as a serious option. Moreover, the notion of predicates being
collective in argument places helps us to understand why all answers to
the composition questions use plural logic. This will be discussed in the
next section.
4.3 No Plurals, No Theory of Composition
That Composition as Identity, or other theories about composition, rely
on the use of plural logic is not a coincidence. The first argument place of
‘composing’ cannot be interpreted distributively: Some objects uu com-
posing an object x does not entail that each one of the uu composes x.
Suppose ‘composing’ could be interpreted distributively. Then, we
could deduce (17) and (18) from (16):
(16) The brush and the stick compose the broom
(17) The brush composes the broom
(18) The stick composes the broom
However, (17) and (18) are false. Assuming that the predicate ‘compos-
ing’ is distributive in its first argument place does not conform with our
understanding of the predicate. It does, like the predicates used in (12)
and (14), not allow for an interpretation where it is distributive in its first
argument place. Hence, given that the composition relation is essentially
collective in its first argument place, and plural logic is the right means
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to deal with predicates which are collective in some of their argument
places, any constructive58 theory of composition is in need of plural logic.
This is not intended as an argument against singularism. The observa-
tion is that if plural logic is the correct framework to deal with predicates
which have collective argument places, then any theory about composi-
tion has to rely on plural logic, since ‘composing’ is collective in its first
argument place. I argued previously that plural logic is the correct frame-
work to deal with predicates which have collective argument places.59
4.4 Plural Terms
We introduced plural logic as a logic which allows the use of plural terms.
It is now time to spell out in more detail what plural terms are and how
they are distinguished from singular terms. Intuitively, there are two
ways to make this distinction: based on grammatical form, or on the ac-
tual number of referents. In agreement with Oliver and Smiley (2013: 74-
5), I will briefly point out the shortcomings of these distinctions and de-
fine ‘is a singular term’ and ‘is a plural term’ based on “[. . . ] the number
58. Interestingly, even the non-constructive account of composition, i.e. mereological
nihilism, at least in its most competitive form, makes use of plural logic. “‘[S]tandard’
nihilism” (Tallant 2014: 1513, fn.1), uses the so-called “Paraphrase Strategy”. It is de-
fended, e.g., by Merricks (2001: 2-20, 162-85), Rosen and Dorr (2002: 157), Schaffer
(2007: 176), Sider (2013: 237-8), and van Inwagen (1990: 98-114). The Paraphrase Strategy
is critically discussed, e.g., by O’Leary-Hawthorne and Michael (1996), Mackie (1993),
Markosian (1998: 220-1), Sider (1993), Tallant (2014: 1512-3), Thomasson (2007: 160-1),
Uzquiano (2004) and Wilkins (2016). The strategy claims that sentences which appar-
ently commit to the existence of composite objects, for instance a chair, can be ade-
quately paraphrased by sentences which do not come with such a commitment – by us-
ing the phrase ‘atoms arranged chair-wise’. Since these paraphrases are best formalized
within plural logic because ‘being arranged chair-wise’ is collective in its only argument
place, even nihilists need plural logic.
59. Although the predicate ‘composing’ can be used as an example to show that sin-
gularism fails, any other predicate that is not distributive in some argument place does
the same work. Since there are such predicates, and using the composition predicate to
argue for the adequacy of plural logic might raise the suspicion that we are arguing in
circles, we are well advised to base our arguments for plural logic on predicates other
than ‘composing’.
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of things they are capable of [referring to]” (Oliver and Smiley 2013: 74).60
One might think that singular and plural terms differ due to their
grammatical form. Singular terms have a singular grammatical form,
while plural terms have a plural grammatical form. As natural as this dis-
tinction seems, it leads to problems because of “pluralia tantum nouns”
and “singularia tantum nouns”. The former appear only in the plural
grammatical form, e.g. ‘trousers’, ‘scissors’, or ‘clothes’. The latter have
only a singular grammatical form, e.g. ‘dust’, ‘fruit’, or ‘milk’.61 If we dis-
tinguish singular from plural terms on the basis of grammar, this leads to
two counterintuitive results. Pluralia tantum nouns refer, in certain con-
texts, to one object only, although they are grammatically plural, while
singularia tantum nouns refer in some cases to many objects although
they are singular:
(21) The scissors Andy buys are blue
(22) Ben eats all the fruit Chris gave to him
Considering (21) and that Andy might buy only one cutting instrument,
shows that a classification of plural terms based on their grammatical
form is inadequate. A similar inadequacy arises, if we examine (22) and
assume that Chris gave an apple and an orange to Ben. A distinction
between singular and plural terms on the basis of their grammatical form
excludes these possibilities.
60. Oliver and Smiley talk about plural denotation. Yet, they might be happy to talk
about plural reference instead, adopting the terminology which is used, for instance,
by Ben-Yami (2004), Cameron (1999), Carrara and Martino (2015), Linnebo and Nicolas
(2008), McKay (1994), Moltmann (2016), and Simons (1997), as this passage suggests:
“Various authors say denotes, refers to, designates; we shall use ‘denotes’” (Oliver and
Smiley 2008: 22).
61. It seems that singularia tantum nouns are what are sometimes called “mass-
expressions”. According to the dominating view in the literature on mass-expressions,
(see Gillon 1992, Krifka 1991, Nicolas 2016, and Weinreich 1966), terms can, exclusively
and exhaustively, be distinguished into mass- and count-expressions, whereby the for-
mer have only one grammatical form, the singular. Although the apparent collapse of
the two concepts is interesting, it is a subsidiary question for us.
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Moreover, a grammatical distinction leads to another more pressing
issue because we “[. . . ] get misled by grammar” (Russell 1919b: 221).
Whether we formalize an English sentence or its German translation
should not make a difference to the logical form of the sentence. How-
ever, there are English pluralia tantum nouns whose German transla-
tions are not pluralia tantum nouns. The German translation of ‘scissors’,
‘Schere’ or ‘Scheren’, is not a plurale tantum noun62 since it has a singular
grammatical form as well. This means a distinction based on their gram-
matical form may lead to different formalizations of an English sentence
and its adequate German translation. But if the German sentence is an
adequate translation of the English, then they must have the same logical
form. This suffices to dismiss a distinction between singular and plural
terms on the basis of their grammatical form.
Another way to distinguish singular from plural terms is to take the
number of objects they actually refer to. Such a distinction gives us three
different categories of terms: empty terms, referring to no object; singu-
lar terms, referring to exactly one object; and plural terms, referring to
more than one object. However, this distinction strikes me not as being
satisfactory because we might question whether it is the logicians job to
find out how many objects a term actually refers to: “Logicians deal with
forms, not current affairs” (Oliver and Smiley 2013: 74). Hence, distin-
guishing terms on the basis of the number of objects they actually refer
to does not seem the right way to do it either.
Finally, we come to what I take to be the most plausible way to draw
the distinction between singular and plural terms. In agreement with
Oliver and Smiley (2013: 74), we shall make a semantical and modal dis-
tinction as follows:
62. I could not find an example of a term which is a singulare tantum noun in one lan-
guage but can be translated into another language by a term which is not a singulare
tantum noun. This might be due to the above-mentioned similarity between singu-
laria tantum nouns and mass-expressions. A discussion on the similarity between plu-
ral terms and mass-expressions can be found in (Cocchiarella 2009) and (Nicolas 2008;
2016: §9).
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D3 A term n is singular iff n cannot refer to more than one object x at
once
D4 A term n is plural iff n can refer to more than one object x at once63
Singular terms cannot refer to more than one object at once, and plural
terms can refer to more than one object once.64
Hence, ‘Zeus’, ‘Frege’, and ‘the men who are identical to Frege’ are
singular terms, while ‘Zeus and Pan’, ‘the wives of Frege’, and ‘Frege
and his wife’ are plural.
The categorization of terms following the above definitions seems un-
usual at first. According to this distinction, some terms end up in a group
where one might not suspect them to be. Usually, ‘Zeus’ and ‘Zeus and
Pan’ are taken to be empty terms. However, following our definitions,
the former is a singular and the latter a plural term. ‘Zeus’ is not capa-
ble of referring to more than one object at once, while ‘Zeus and Pan’ is.
The fact that both terms actually fail to refer to any object does not matter.
Figure 4.1 shows a singular term referring to an object (top left), and fail-
ing to refer to an object (middle left), as well as a plural term referring to
more than one object (top right) and a plural term failing to refer to any
object (middle right).
The term ‘the men who are identical to Frege’ is not capable of referring to
more than one object. There can only be one man identical to Frege. It is
63. Although our overall aim is to give an account of composition as a kind of identity,
and one may think that the question when an object is one and when an object is many
cannot be answered before this account is given, the above definitions are not circular.
We are, and will be throughout what follows, holding on to the claim that every object is
one, and no object is many.
64. We used the phrase ‘at once’ in the definitions because terms might be used in
different contexts and/or at different times to refer to different objects: If I use the term
‘Socrates’ when talking to my office mate, the term refers to the Greek philosopher; If I
use it in a conversation with my father, it refers to the Brazilian football player. Further,
we could relativize the definitions to a language, such that a term n cannot refer to more
than one object in one language, but it can so in another language. This helps us to get
a better understanding of the modalities that are in play and explains how it is possible
that in the language used by philosophers ‘Plato’ is a singular term, while it is plural –
referring to programs for electronic structure calculations – in the language of chemists.
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‘the wives of Frege’
Anna
Figure 4.1: Singular and Plural Reference
logically impossible that Frege is identical to more than one man. There-
fore, the term cannot refer to more than one object. Finally, ‘the wives
of Frege’ is a plural term, although there is actually only one woman,
Margarete Katharina Sophia Anna Lieseberg65 who was ever married to
Frege. But again, that the term actually refers to only one person does
not affect our categorization of terms. It is logically possible that Frege had
been married to more than one person, not only to Anna. Therefore, the
term ‘the wives of Frege’ is capable of referring to more than one object.
An illustration of the way these two terms refer is given in figure 4.1.
65. Please allow me to give her the nickname ‘Anna’.
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Empty Referring
Singular
the golden mountain the author of OD
Zeus Frege
the Queen of the US the men identical to Frege
Plural
the golden mountains Frege and his wife
Zeus and Pan the authors of PM
the Queens of the US Russell and the authors of OD
Table 4.1: Categorization of terms
Using this definition, it is possible for us to distinguish proper from
improper singular terms, and proper from improper plural terms:
D5 A term n is a proper singular term iff n is a singular term and n actu-
ally refers to exactly one object x
D6 A term n is an improper singular term iff n is a singular term and n
actually refers to no object x
D7 A term n is a proper plural term iff n is a plural term and n actually
refers to more than one object
D8 A term n is an improper plural term iff n is a plural term and n does
not actually refer to more than one object x
Table 4.1 illustrates how we can categorize terms following the defini-
tions just given.
We have seen that some intuitions about how to distinguish between
singular and plural terms are either misleading or not successful. Since
the singularist strategy, which claims that the term ‘Frege and his wife’
refers to exactly one object, cannot deal with collective argument places
of predicates, distinguishing singular from plural terms according to the
number of objects they are able to refer to is the best way we can choose.
Keeping this modal-semantical distinction in mind, let’s see how plural
reference works.
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4.5 Plural Reference
Plural logic manages to formalize sentences containing plural terms
without bringing in additional ontological commitments because of the
way plural terms refer, i.e. plural reference. Plural reference is different
from singular reference: Singular reference is, if successful, a relation be-
tween a term and one object. Naming with plural terms works differently.
If a term is a proper plural term, i.e. it in fact refers to more than one ob-
ject, then it is not a relation between a term and one object, but between
a term and many objects.
A slightly modified analogy from Mill (1846: 23-4) might help to get
a better understanding of this idea: Think of terms as labels for objects.
Singular terms are labels with one adhesive area only. Each one of them
can be used to label only one object at a time: ‘Pegasus’, ‘Russell’, and
‘the men who are identical to Russell’ cannot be stuck to more than one
object. ‘Pegasus’ is a label where there is no suitable object to stick to in
our actual world, though there is one in other possible worlds. Similarly,
‘the men who are identical to Russell’ cannot be stuck to more than one
object because it has, due to logical reasons, only one adhesive area. ‘Rus-
sell’ can also be stuck to only one object at a time and our world is such
that there is an object where it can be stuck to, although there are worlds




‘Frege and his wife’
Frege Anna
Figure 4.2: Plural Reference
Plural terms have more than one adhesive area and can be stuck to
several objects at once: ‘Zeus and Pan’, ‘the wives of Frege’, and ‘the
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authors of PM’ can be used to label more than one object. Although ‘Zeus
and Pan’ and ‘the wives of Frege’ do not actually stick to more than one
object, they are capable of doing so. The former does actually not stick to
any object, due to the same reason that ‘Zeus’ fails to stick to anything.
The latter sticks actually to exactly one object because there is only one
object in our world it sticks to. Nevertheless, both terms can be used to
label several objects at once, and there are possible worlds where they
stick to more than one object. On the other hand, our world is such that
‘the authors of PM’ actually sticks to more than one object, although it
fails to do so in other worlds.
This analogy suggests that singular and plural reference work differ-
ently, yet the difference is small enough to consider them as different
kinds of reference. Here is Black’s view on the similarity between singu-
lar and plural reference:
The notion of “plural” or simultaneous reference to several
things at once is really not at all mysterious. Just as I can point
to a single thing, I can point to two things at once–using two
hands, if necessary; pointing to two things at once need be no
more perplexing than touching two things at once.
(Black 1971: 629)
This brings us back to the motivation for plural logic. Because plural
reference works in the way we have just hinted at, using plural logic to
paraphrase sentences from natural language which contain plural terms
does not result in paraphrases which come with any additional ontolog-
ical commitments. A plural term simply refers to many objects at once,
and not to anything over and above these objects, as figures 4.1 and 4.2
illustrate.
Since plural logic contains plural terms, there is no need to paraphrase
a sentence from natural language which contains a plural term. It can di-
rectly be formalized in the language of the logical system. This makes
plural logic a more desirable choice than set theory or mereology for a
framework of paraphrasing those sentences. If we use one of the latter
two as our framework, we need to paraphrase away the plural terms in
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the sentences of natural language. The problem with these paraphrases
is then, however, that they commit us to the existence of sets or mere-
ological sums, which may not match up with the ontological commit-
ments of the original sentence we started with. Therefore, plural logic is
considered to be an adequate framework to deal with natural language
sentences containing plural terms.
With our distinction of predicates being distributive and collective in
argument places at hand, we might now wonder whether the predicate
‘refers to’ is distributive or collective in its second arguments place, i.e.
is it analytically true that a term refers to some objects uu iff it refers to
each one of them? Three positions emerge from the literature. On the
one hand, we have the two exclusive views which claim that ‘refers to’ is
distributive or collective, respectively, in its second argument place, and
on the other hand, it is thought that it is indeterminate.
Simons defends the first view, i.e. that if a term ‘uu’ refers to some
objects uu, then it refers also to each one of the objects which are among
the uu:
[W]hen an expression designates A and B and C . . . , where
these are individuals, this is to say no more than that it desig-
nates A and designates B and designates C[.]
(Simons 1982a: 166)
Several authors oppose Simons’ view:66
[F]rom the premiss that ‘Bill and Ben’ refers to Bill and Ben,
we may not deduce that ‘Bill and Ben’ refers to Bill.
(Hossack 2000: 416)
The list ‘John, Mary, John, Alice’ has the same semantic
value as the list ‘John, Mary, Alice’. Each list refers non-
distributively to them, John, Mary and Alice.
(McKay 2006: 68)
66. Further disagreement with Simons’ position can be found in (Higginbotham
2004: 271) and (Rumfitt 2005: 92-4).
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According to this view, if a term ‘uu’ refers to some objects uu, then it
does not follow that it refers also to each one of the objects which are
among the uu. Finally, we have a position which allows for both phenom-
ena, distributive and collective plural reference. This view is defended by
Oliver and Smiley:
So the extension of plain ‘denotes’ is indeterminate, and there
is no fact of the matter whether ‘Anne, Charlotte, and Emily’
just denotes the three of them together, or also any things
among them. (Oliver and Smiley 2013: 103)
The view of Simons strikes me as the correct one. If a plural term were
to refer to some objects uu, yet not to each one of the objects which are
among the uu, then I cannot see how the term can refer to them. For in-
stance, if the term ‘Russell and Whitehead’, refers to Russell and White-
head, how can it fail to refer to Russell, or fail to refer to Whitehead? It
rather looks to be the opposite way. Because the term ‘Russell and White-
head’ refers to Russell, and refers to Whitehead, it refers to Russell and
Whitehead. In other words, plural terms are able to refer to many objects
uu because they refer to each one of the objects among uu. Hence, I sug-
gest to take the predicate ‘referring to’ as being distributive in its second
argument place.
Before we come to the presentation of our system of plural logic, let
me point out a pitfall which lies ahead of us. In what follows, we will
sometimes use the term ‘plurality’ and say things like ‘The term ‘the blue
objects’ refers to the plurality of blue objects’. This claim is misleading.
The term ‘plurality’ suggests that a proper plural term refers to exactly
one object, a plurality. As we have seen, proper plural terms do not refer
to one object but many objects. The term ‘plurality’ is used as a technical
term for the ease of exposition and it should not be understood to refer
to an object, but to many objects. Although the use of the term ‘plurality’
is misleading, it allows us to say things shorter. Instead of ‘those objects
which are all my logic books and no other object’, we can simply use
‘the plurality of my logic books’. However, any sentence containing the
term ‘plurality’ can be rephrased by a sentence which does not contain
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it. Highlighting this possible source for a misunderstanding marks the
end of our informal introduction to plural logic. We are now prepared
to go on with the construction of the logical system for our theory of
composition, but let me first briefly summarize the main points of this
chapter.
In this chapter, I introduced the basic ideas and motivations for plural
logic. Plural logic is an extension of FOL=, allowing the use of plural
terms. Thereby, it is able to formalize sentences with predicates which
are collective in some of their argument places. We defined plural terms
as those terms, which are able to refer to more than one object. Eventually,
I concluded with some remarks on plural reference.
CHAPTER FIVE
The System FOP
The aim of this chapter is to argue that the principles of plural logic are
not consistent with the common views on plural logic, as for instance
suggested by Linnebo (2014), McKay (2006), Oliver and Smiley (2013),
and Yi (1999b). It will become apparent that the traditional view on iden-
tity cannot be defended within the context of a plural language and the
principles of plural logic. The argument for this claim will be indirect: I
will introduce a system of first-order plural logic, called the “logic of first-
order plurals” (FOP), which follows the spirit of the traditional view on
plural logic and systems built on these ideas, such as the ones that can be
found in the works of the authors just mentioned. Then, I will go on to
show that FOP leads to inconsistencies, if we assume certain, generally
accepted, empirical truths. The lessons we can draw from the problems
of FOP will then be explored in the next chapter.
The presentation of FOP will be done in the standard way: First, the
vocabulary and the grammar of FOP will be given. Next, I will present
the inference rules of the system and elaborate it by adding step-by-step
definitions and axioms. Additionally, we will have a look at some theo-
rems of FOP. The formal proofs for these can be found in the appendix
to this chapter. Definitions and Axioms of FOP will be presented with
the help of a metalanguage.
The object language of FOP is a fragment of its metalanguage. There
is one key difference between the two languages: The metalanguage
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of FOP contains a third kind of individual variable ‘α’, ‘β’, ‘γ’, . . . ,
ranging over singular and plural terms of the object language.67 The
use of this variable in the metalanguage is merely a means to keep
things short. For instance, the formula ‘∀α(Φ(α))’ can be replaced by
‘∀x(Φ(x)) ∧ ∀uu(Φ(uu))’ in the metalanguage, and vice versa. Hence, the
former formula is intended to represent the claim ‘Every object is Φ and
all objects are Φ’. Since we will consider the two formulas we have just
seen as equivalent in the metalanguage, we have two additional infer-
ence rules within the metalanguage:
α-IN ∀x(Φ(x)) ∧ ∀uu(Φ(uu)) ` ∀α(Φ(α))
α-EX ∀α(Φ(α)) ` ∀x(Φ(x)) ∧ ∀uu(Φ(uu))
Moreover, the metalanguage contains variables, ‘Φ’, ‘Ψ’, ‘Σ’, . . . which
represent well-formed formulas of the object language.
5.1 The Language of FOP
The language of FOP consists in the primitive vocabulary of FOP and the
grammar of FOP. The major difference in comparison to the languages
of FOL= is the use of plural constants, plural variables and the inclu-
sion predicate in the primitive vocabulary. We discussed plural terms
already at some length in the previous chapter and have already a ba-
sic understanding of plural constants and variables. The presentation of
the primitive vocabulary will be followed by an informal introduction of
the (proper)68 inclusion predicate. A formal introduction of the predicate
will be given in the next section. This section ends with the presentation
of the grammar of FOP.
67. Bricker (2016) and Sider (2007; 2014) make also use of an “additional kind” of vari-
able ranging over singular and plural variables.
68. We already encountered the improper inclusion predicate in our discussion of Sider’s
Collapse principle. The proper and the improper inclusion predicate are, with the iden-
tity predicate, interdefinable, see section 5.3.2.
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5.1.1 The Primitive Vocabulary of FOP
The basis for the language of FOP is the language of FOL=, as presented
by Priest (2008: §2), Sider (2010: §4-5.3), and Smith (2003). We extend the
primitive vocabulary by adding plural individual constants, plural vari-
ables, and the proper inclusion predicate. Thus, the primitive vocabulary
of FOP is the following:
i. individual constants:
a. singular: a, b, c, . . .
b. plural: dd, ee, f f , . . .
ii. individual variables:
a. singular: x, y, z, . . .
b. plural: uu, vv, ww, . . .
iii. predicates:
a. identity (dyadic): =
b. inclusion (dyadic): ≺
c. further predicates (n-ary): F, G, H, . . .
iv. sentential connectives:
a. negation (monadic): ¬
b. implication (dyadic): →
v. universal quantifier: ∀
vi. punctuation marks: (, )69
69. As usual, outermost brackets are omitted for the ease of exposition, so that we may
write, for instance, ‘Φ→ Ψ’ instead of ‘(Φ→ Ψ)’.
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A few remarks on the inclusion relation seem appropriate at this point.
Inclusion is the idiosyncratic relation of plural logic, as parthood and
membership are for mereology and set theory, respectively. We may read
‘≺’ as ‘is or are among’, or ‘is one or are some of’. Here are a few exam-
ples to give us an initial intuition for how to translate ‘≺’ into English:
(1) Russell≺ Russell and Whitehead (the authors of philosophy books)
(2) Russell is one of/is among Russell and Whitehead (the authors of
philosophy books)
(3) Russell and Whitehead ≺ Russell, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein
(the authors of logic books)
(4) Russell and Whitehead are some of/are among Russell, Whitehead,
and Wittgenstein (the authors of logic books)
It cannot be overemphasized that inclusion shall by no means be read as
parthood or membership. This will become apparent when we come to
the axioms of the system and consider some of its theorems in section 5.3.
It should be highlighted that FOP has a typed language, i.e. it con-
tains two types of individual constants and variables, singular and plu-
ral. Not all plural logics are based on a typed language. Oliver and Smi-
ley (2013: 209, 212-3) avoid the use of a typed language by introducing
the predicates ‘being at most one thing’ and ‘being many’, which does in
principle the same work for them as a typed language. Furthermore, the
typing here differs from the typing in other typed languages where it is
used to make an ontological distinction, as for instance in (Russell 1908),
while we have here a linguistic distinction.
5.1.2 Grammar of FOP
We can now go on to define the terms of FOP. The definition that follows
resembles the standard definition of terms in FOL=. However, we have
to keep in mind that the language of FOP contains beside singular indi-
vidual constants and variables, plural individual constants and variables.
§5.2 INFERENCE RULES FOR FOP 97
Therefore, we have here a definition of terms which is different from the
standard definition in FOL=:
(a) Every individual constant of FOP is a term of FOP.
(b) Every individual variable of FOP is a term of FOP.
(c) Nothing else is a term of FOP.
Next comes the definition of FOP’s well-formed formulas (wff):
(a) If F is an n-place FOP-predicate, and α1, . . . , αn are FOP-terms, then
F(α1, . . . , αn) is a well-formed formula of FOP.
(b) If Φ is a well-formed formula of FOP, ¬Φ is a well-formed formula
of FOP.
(c) If Φ and Ψ are well-formed formulas of FOP, then Φ→ Ψ is a well-
formed formula of FOP.
(d) If α is a FOP-variable and Φ is a well-formed formula of FOP, then
∀αΦ is a well-formed formula of FOP.
(e) Nothing else is a well-formed formula of FOP.
Based on this language, we can now go on to elaborate the logic FOP.
5.2 Inference Rules for FOP
As inference rules we assume
(MP) If ` Φ , and ` Φ→ Ψ, then ` Ψ
(UG) If ` Φ, then ` ∀α(Φ(α))
(SI) If ` α = β and ` Φ(α), then ` Φ(β)
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whereby ‘`’ should be read as is derivable. The inference rule (MP) is
modus ponens which is simply adopted from FOL=. The rule (UG) can
only be applied in cases where the variable ‘α’ does not appear as a free
variable in ‘Φ’. Please note that, although (UG) shows a close similar-
ity to the inference rule called “universal generalization” from FOL=,
they come apart. Universal generalization tells us that if a sentence ‘Φ’ is
derivable, then ‘∀x(Φ(x))’ is derivable as well. (UG) tells us more: The
derivability of ‘Φ’ does not only imply the derivability of ‘∀x(Φ(x))’, but
also of ‘∀uu(Φ(uu))’. It seems a natural thought to expand universal gen-
eralization to (UG) due to the extension of the language. From here on, I
will use the term ‘universal generalization’ to refer to (UG).
(SI) resembles substitution from FOL=, though the two come apart
for similar reasons (UG) and its counterpart from FOL= have to be dis-
tinguished from each other. FOL= does not contain any plural terms, so
it only allows to substitute singular terms. The extension of the vocabu-
lary of FOP makes an extension of substitution natural, in order to allow
for the following inference:
1. Russell and Whitehead are identical to the authors of PM
2. Russell and Whitehead are British
3. The authors of PM are British
As we will see in sections 5.5 and 6.2, this extension of the inference rule
is problematic. Yet, since nothing speaks against (SI) and it is a natural
thought to adopt it as an inference rule once plural terms are added to
the language, we hold on to it for now. From here on, I will use the term
‘substitution’ or ‘generalized substitution’ for (SI).
5.3 Concepts and Principles of FOP
We can now provide the first definitions for FOP. We begin with some
logical concepts: the sentential connectives, the existential quantifier and
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the unique description operator. This will be followed by a first group
of axioms, which allow us to derive the theorems from FOL= and their
plural extensions.
5.3.1 Pluralized FOL=
The definitions and axioms below are the result of taking the extension
of FOP’s language into account. There is no need to spend too much
time with these, since most of them are simply carried over from FOL=.
However, some differ from their FOL= counterparts due to the extended
language of FOP. Those cases will be highlighted.
We define the non-primitive sentential connectives conjunction, ‘∧’,
disjunction, ‘∨’, and equivalence, ‘↔’, as usual:70
(D1) Φ ∧Ψ =d f ¬(Φ→ ¬Ψ)
(D2) Φ ∨Ψ =d f ¬(¬Φ ∧ ¬Ψ)
(D3) Φ↔ Ψ =d f (Φ→ Ψ) ∧ (Ψ→ Φ)
Furthermore, we define the existential quantifier in the traditional way:
(D4) ∃αΦ =d f ¬∀α¬Φ
‘∃’, like ‘∀’, connects with singular and plural variables. Here we have
a first difference to FOL= with respect to introducing new notation. If
‘∃’ is defined in FOL=, then it is introduced as connecting with singular
variables only. Since the language of FOP contains plural variables as
well, we might want to formalize sentences, as for instance
(5) Some students surround the library
70. In order to keep the use of punctuation marks manageable, we introduce the fol-
lowing conventions with respect to the binding strength of our logical connectives: ‘¬’
binds stronger than ‘∧’; ‘∧’ binds stronger than ‘∨’; ‘∨’ binds stronger than ‘→’; ‘→’
binds stronger than ‘↔’. Hence, ‘Φ → Ψ ∧ Σ’ can be written instead of ‘Φ → (Ψ ∧ Σ)’,
but not instead of ‘(Φ→ Ψ) ∧ Σ’.
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which is why we need an existential quantifier that is able to connect with
plural variables as well.
Moreover, (D4) illustrates that the use of three individual variables in
the metalanguage is dispensable and only a way to keep things shorter.
We could define our existential quantifier with the singular and plural
variables only, by replacing (D4) with the following two formulas:
(D4a) ∃xΦ =d f ¬∀x¬Φ
(D4b) ∃uuΦ =d f ¬∀uu¬Φ
Due to the stylistic habit of writing the identity- and the inclusion-
predicate between the terms which enter their argument places, we in-
troduce the following two definitions:71
(D5) α = β =d f = (α, β)
(D6) α ≺ β =d f ≺ (α, β)
With these definitions at hand, we add the following axioms to FOP:
(A1) Φ→ (Ψ→ Φ)
(A2) (Φ→ (Ψ→ Σ))→ ((Φ→ Ψ)→ (Φ→ Σ))
(A3) (¬Φ→ ¬Ψ)→ ((¬Φ→ Ψ)→ Φ)
These three axioms allow us to derive the tautologies from the classical
propositional calculus, (see Mendelson 1987: 29). In order to derive all
tautologies from the predicate calculus as well, adding the following two
axioms suffices, (see Mendelson 1987: 55-6):
(A4) ∀xΦ→ Φ(a/x)
(A5) ∀x(Φ→ Ψ)→ (Φ→ ∀xΨ)
71. I will further simplify the notation from here on by dropping most of the initial
universal quantifiers. (D5) and formulas thereafter should be understood as universally
closed formulas.
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where ‘Φ(a/x)’ is the result of substituting any occurrence of ‘x’ in ‘Φ’
by a’, and in (A5), ‘Φ’ does not contain any free occurrence of ‘x’. Since
our variable ‘x’ stands for singular variables of the object language only,
(A4) and (A5) do not allow the derivations of the following formulas
∀uuΦ(uu)→ Φ(dd)
∀uu(Φ→ Ψ)→ (Φ→ ∀uuΨ(uu))
Since it seems only natural that the derivation of these formulas should
be validated by the axioms of FOP, we add the plural counterparts of
(A4) and (A5) to our set of axioms:
(A6) ∀uuΦ→ Φ(dd/uu)
(A7) ∀uu(Φ→ Ψ)→ (Φ→ ∀uuΨ)
These have similar restrictions as we have on (A4) and (A5): ‘Φ(dd/uu)’
is the result of substituting any occurrence of ‘uu’ in ‘Φ’ by ‘dd’, and in
(A7), ‘Φ’ does not contain any free occurrence of ‘uu’.
In order to derive all theorems of FOL=, we have to add one more
axiom to the axioms of FOP. This is the law of identity:
(A8) x = x
There is no need to assume a general or pluralized version of (A8), ‘α = α’
or ‘uu = uu’, to our axioms, since the plural counterpart of (A8) will be a
theorem of FOP.
Finally, we define a unique description operator, ‘ ι’. This operator is
used to formulate definite descriptions, such as ‘the author of OD’. We
shall follow orthodoxy, (see Copi 1967: 166, Sider 2010: 117-8, and Smith
2003: 345-6), which is based on (Russell 1905), and define ‘ ι’ contextually:
(D7) Ψ( ιαΦ(α)) =d f ∃α(Φ(α) ∧ ∀β(Φ(β)→ β = α) ∧Ψ(α))
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Hence, the expression ‘ ιxΦ(x)’ should be read as ‘the object which is
Φ’, and we shall say that the object which is Φ has a certain property
Ψ iff there is at least one and at most one object, i.e. exactly one object,
which has the property Φ and it has the property Ψ. Similarly, ‘ ιuuΦ(uu)’
should be read as ‘the objects which are Φ’, or ‘the Φs’. Since pluralities
will turn out to be unique, see (T13) below, we have the trivial claim that
the objects which are Φ are Ψ iff the objects which are Φ are Ψ.
These definitions and axioms are the basis for FOP. They diverge
from the definitions and axioms of FOL= only insofar, as they take the
extension of the language of FOP into account. What follows is a more
obvious departure from FOL=.
5.3.2 Inclusion and Improper Inclusion
We begin our departure from FOL= by fixing the behavior of the proper
inclusion predicate, ‘≺’. It is commonly taken to be a strict partial or-
der, i.e. it is asymmetric, transitive and irreflexive, (Oliver and Smiley
2013: 109). The first axiom we choose for FOP, the asymmetry of inclu-
sion, is a lexical principle. Violations of the asymmetry of inclusion give
rise to the suspicion of meaningless or a lack of correct understanding of
the relation. According to the natural understanding of the predicates ‘is
one/are some of’ and ‘is/are among’ the following sentences are analyt-
ically true:
(6) If Russell is among the logicians (the British), then the logicians (the
British) are not among Russell
(7) If Principia and Grundgesetze are among my (logic) books, then my
(logic) books are not among Principia and Grundgesetze
I take it that denying the truth of the above sentences is untenable, and
hence suggest adopting the following axiom:
(A9) α ≺ β→ ¬(β ≺ α)
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I ask the skeptic of (A9) to be patient. Presumably, the predicate she has in
mind when putting (A9) into question is the improper inclusion predicate
introduced below.
A further reason to accept (A9) is the fact that it entails the irreflexivity
of the inclusion relation: No object is among itself and no objects are
among themselves. Denying this principle contradicts our ordinary use
of the predicate ‘being among’. Take for instance the following sentences:
(8) Russell is among Russell
(9) My logic books are among my logic books
We do not want to accept the above sentences to be true, due to our or-
dinary use of the inclusion predicate. Naturally, the skeptic about the
asymmetry of ‘≺’ will disagree with me about this. However, I will here
again ask her to be patient. I think this disagreement is based on the same
misunderstanding as the disagreement about (A9).72 Hence, we derive
(T1) ¬(α ≺ α)
which in turn speaks for accepting (A9). The derivation of (T1) from (A9)
is straightforward: According to (A9), if a is among a, then a is not among
a, for arbitrary a. Hence, no x is not among x. Similarly for arbitrary dd,
if dd is among dd, then dd is not among dd. Therefore, no uu is among uu.
These two claims entail (T1): No α is among α.
The last logical property of ‘≺’ to discuss is transitivity. It is common
practice to stipulate that the inclusion relation is transitive. I disagree.
We will come back to the issues of the transitivity of inclusion in section
7.5, because we will then be in a position to see the problem with the
following axiom. For now, we shall follow the standard view and adopt
72. With respect to the dispute about the reflexivity of inclusion, I think things stand
similar as it is the case with the reflexivity of parthood. As Casati and Varzi (1999) and
Lejewski (1957) show, the disagreement on the reflexivity of the parthood relation, (see
Leonard and Goodman 1940, Rescher 1955: 9-10, Leśniewski 1992, Simons 2003: 25-41
and Tarski 1937) disappears, once we distinguish between the proper and the improper
parthood relation. Presumably, things stand similar with the discussion about the re-
flexivity of inclusion.
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(A10) α ≺ β ∧ β ≺ γ→ α ≺ γ
as an axiom. It can be motivated by the truth of the following examples:
(10) If Russell is among the logicians and the logicians are among the
philosophers, then Russell is among the philosophers
(11) If Principia and Grundgesetze are among my logic books and my
logic books are among my philosophy books, then Principia and
Grundgesetze are among my philosophy books
Finally, we introduce the technical predicate, ‘’, representing the im-
proper inclusion relation, which is defined disjunctively:
(D8) α  β =d f α ≺ β ∨ α = β
Some authors use ‘’ as their primitive predicate, for instance Oliver and
Smiley (2013: 211, 235), and Yi (1999b: 177-8), instead of ‘≺’. The differ-
ence does not matter here, since they are, together with ‘=’ interdefinable
and one may choose either one of them.73 (D8) shows us why some peo-
ple might be skeptic about the asymmetry or irreflexivity of inclusion. I
assume two parties can only disagree about these properties of inclusion,
if one of them interprets it as ‘≺’ and the other as ‘’ .
Improper inclusion is a non-strict partial order (Oliver and Smiley
2013: 109), i.e. it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. We can de-
rive these properties from (T1), (A9) and (A10), once we have shown that
identity is an equivalence relation. This will be done after the introduc-
tion of three further axioms.
5.3.3 Extensionality and Comprehension
Although proper inclusion74 differs from proper parthood and member-
ship, we have two axioms in FOP which resemble axioms from mereol-
73. Proper inclusion can be defined with ‘α ≺ β =d f α  β ∧ ¬(α = β)’.
74. Henceforth, I will drop the qualification ‘proper’ for the sake of easier readability.
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ogy and set theory. Those two axioms tell us a bit more about the behav-
ior of plural terms and their relation to singular terms. First, we have the
comprehension axiom, (see Linnebo 2014, McKay 2006: 129, Oliver and
Smiley 2013: 242, and Yi 1999b: 180):
(A11) ∃xΦ(x)→ ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x))
According to this axiom, whenever there is some object (note the singular
variable) having a certain property Φ, then there are some objects (note
the plural variable) such that each one of them has Φ, and any object
having Φ is among them. At first sight, this axiom seems implausible:
The existence of one object having a property Φ appears not to guarantee
that there are some objects which are Φ. This initial skepticism against
(A12) is understandable, but can be dismissed. If we keep in mind that
our distinction between singular and plural terms is made according to
the number of objects they can refer to, then it is clear that we want to
hold on to the above axiom, since we may not know how many objects a
plural term ‘uu’ refers to. For instance, if we claim
(12) The guests at the party will get pizza and ice cream
then we want this sentence to be true even if only one person comes to
the party.
Note that (A11) is not prone to a Russell-like paradox, (see Russell
1903: Appendix B, as well as Irvine and Deutsch 2016, Link 2004, and
Russell 1987), i.e. it does not allow to derive the existence of a plurality
among which there are all pluralities which do not contain themselves.
The reason for this is that in formulating the above comprehension ax-
iom we made use of the two different kinds of variables of our language.
(A11) says, whenever there is an object x which has a property Φ, then
there are some objects uu such that for every object x: x is among the uu
iff x is Φ. The twofold use of the singular variable x is crucial. (A11)
does not tell us anything about what follows from some objects vv hav-
ing a property Φ. In particular, it does not tell us that if some objects vv
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have a property Φ, then there are some objects uu such that for all objects
vv: the vv are among the uu iff the vv are Φ.75 Since we have spelled
out the comprehension axiom by using singular and plural variables, the
paradox can be avoided.76
Another axiom which shows a close similarity to axioms form mere-
ology and set theory is the extensionality axiom:77
(A12) ∀x(x ≺ uu↔ x ≺ vv)→ uu = vv
Assuming this axiom is pretty plausible. Loosely speaking, it says that
for any objects uu and vv, if it holds for every object x that if x is among
the uu, then x is among the vv, and vice versa, then the uu and the vv are
identical. Here is an example to illustrate the idea behind this axiom: If
it is true for every object x that x is among the blue objects iff x is among
the round objects, then the blue objects are identical to the round objects.
The comprehension and the extensionality axiom are powerful prin-
ciples. Their introduction allows us to derive some important and inter-
esting theorems of FOP as we will see next. Before we come to that, let’s
introduce the axiom of non-emptiness:
(A13) ∀uu∃x(x ≺ uu)
This axiom reflects our stipulation to use only referring and no empty
terms. It reassures that none of our plural terms turns out to be an empty
75. If we had this as an axiom, i.e. ‘∃vvΦ(vv) → ∃uu∀vv(vv ≺ uu ↔ Φ(vv))’, then a
Russell-like paradox for plural logic could be derived in a few steps: From the irreflex-
ivity of inclusion, it follows that there are some vv which are not among themselves.
The supposed axiom entails then that there is a plurality of objects uu such that for all
objects vv: the vv are among the uu iff the vv are not among themselves. Let this plu-
rality be the dd. With (A6), we can then show that the dd are among the dd, i.e. the dd
are among themselves iff the dd are not among themselves. This is then the Russell-like
paradox for plural logic.
76. In so far as the distinction between singular and plural terms is a distinction between
different types of terms, the solution to the paradox is, in spirit, similar to Russell’s own
solution (see Russell 1903: Appendix B; 1908, and Whitehead and Russell 1963: §2).
77. For Hossack (2014: 523), Linnebo (2014), McKay (2006: 125), Oliver and Smiley
(2013: 110) and Yi (1999b: 180), (A12) is a theorem.
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term. In other words, it helps us to make sure that there are no “empty
pluralities”.
Before moving on to have a look at some of the theorems of FOP, we
should have a look at a worry that might arise from the use of the proper
inclusion predicate in the above three axioms. One might ask why we
made the choice to use this predicate, and not the improper inclusion
predicate. Or what might seem even more worrisome for us, someone
might claim that the above axioms are false, if we formulate them with
the proper inclusion predicate. This would be a serious problem, in par-
ticular with respect to the conclusions I will draw in section 5.6. Hence,
let me anticipate some of the criticisms that might be raised at this point.
To begin with, it should be clear that the use of proper inclusion in the
axioms above is, though initially motivated, not solely motivated on how
we use the predicate ‘being among’ in natural language. Even if it turned
out that this predicate is used in natural language either in the sense of
the proper or the improper inclusion relation, this does not mean that
we should use that predicate to axiomatize our logic. Hence, the choice
for which inclusion predicate to use in the above axioms must be based
ultimately on formal considerations.
The problem with rejecting the above axiomatization and replacing it
with one that is based on the improper inclusion relation is that such an
axiomatization entails, together with the negation of the axiomatization I
suggest, “mixed identities”. These are sentences where the identity pred-
icate is flanked by a singular term and a plural term. We will turn back to
these kinds of identities in section 5.5.1. For now, it suffices to point out
that the suggestion to use the improper inclusion predicate is very likely
based on the intention to avoid mixed identities.
Alternatively, I think, someone might suggest that we should use the
improper inclusion relation in the axioms, but that mixed identities are
not well-formed expressions. This strikes me as an odd line of thought.
Firstly, I cannot see what could be the motivation to build the axioms
of our logic on the use of the improper inclusion predicate, and not the
proper inclusion predicate, if the former is defined disjunctively with
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the proper inclusion and the identity predicate, and then to claim that
mixed identity statements are not well-formed. Secondly, we can see that
the suggestion to use the improper inclusion predicate in the axioms be-
comes obscure, if it is claimed that mixed identities are not well-formed.
Someone might suggest, in a similar vein, that a set theory with urele-
ments should be axiomatized with the predicate ‘being an improper ele-
ment of’, but add then next, that sentences that claim that an urelement
is identical to a set are not well-formed expressions. This strikes me as an
odd view and, in my opinion, things stand similar with the claim that the
axiomatization of plural logic should be based on the use of the improper
instead of the proper inclusion predicate.
Having said this, I should again highlight that there is, prima facie,
nothing that prohibits the use of the improper inclusion predicate in the
above three axioms. We have to make a choice here. Nevertheless, I
think that we have seen that the use of the proper inclusion predicate is a
rational option, and that an axiomatization based on the proper inclusion
predicate may run into certain difficulties.
5.3.4 Some Basic Theorems of FOP
Our logical framework allows us to derive some interesting theorems.
With the extensionality axiom, we can show that identity is an equiv-
alence relation. This in turn makes it possible to show the above-
mentioned properties of improper inclusion. Eventually, we can prove
that there is a universal plurality, i.e. some objects such that every object
is among them. The extensionality axiom guarantees that this plurality is
unique, hence there is “the universal plurality”.
To prove the logical properties of ‘=’, we show first the plural coun-
terpart of (A8), the law of identity. This gives us the generalized version
of (A8) in our metalanguage. The pluralized version of (A8), uu = uu,
follows from the extensionality axiom (A12), since it holds for any x that
x is among the uu iff x is among the uu. Hence, ‘=’ is reflexive:
(T2) α = α
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This theorem gives us with (SI) the symmetry and transitivity of ‘=’:
(T3) α = β→ β = α
(T4) α = β ∧ β = γ→ α = γ
The proofs in the appendix to this chapter exhibit that the derivations
of (T3) and (T4) follow the basic strategy one uses when proving these
properties for the identity predicate in FOL=.78
These three theorems allow us then to derive the logical properties of
‘’ from the definition (D8) together with (T1), (A9) and (A10):
(T5) α  α
(T6) α  β ∧ β  α→ α = β
(T7) α  β ∧ β  γ→ α  γ
Finally, we have a last group of theorems and a further definition to add
to FOP, before we come to the semantics and the problems of FOP. The
comprehension axiom allows us to derive from (A8), the existence of a
plurality among which there are all objects:
(T8) ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu)
(A8) entails that there is some object x which is identical to itself. From
that we can infer with the comprehension axiom, that there is some plu-
rality uu such that for every object x, x is among uu iff x is identical to
78. It should be noted that the proofs for (T3) and (T4) are more complex than the
proofs of their FOL= counterparts due to the different kinds of variables we have.
For instance, to proof (T3) we use α-EX, the derivable inference rule conjunction-
elimination, (T2) and (A4) to get ‘a = a’. With (SI) we get ‘b = a’ by assuming
‘a = b’, and conclude with the derivable inference rule conditional introduction and
(UG) ‘∀y(a = y → y = a)’. We repeat this step with the assumption ‘a = dd’ accord-
ingly and conclude ‘∀vv(a = vv → vv = a)’. These two conclusions allow us to derive
‘∀x∀β(x = β → β = x)’with α-IN and (UG). The above steps are repeated in a similar
manner, by deriving dd = dd from (T2), together with the assumptions ‘dd = b’ and
‘dd = ee’ in order to conclude ‘∀uu∀β(uu = β → β = u)’. We conclude from this, with
the previous and α-IN, ‘∀α∀β(α = β→ β = α)’.
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itself. Since every object is identical to itself, we conclude that there is
some plurality such that every object is among it.
But (T8) might seem odd: How can it be that it follows from FOP that
there are some objects? Should the theorems of FOP not hold indepen-
dently of whether there is any object at all? That is a reasonable worry to
have here. Yet, the only move in the above sketch of the derivation which
might seem contentious is the first one, from Every object is identical to it-
self to There is an object which is identical to itself. This inference, which
actually divides up into two inferences, universal instantiation and ex-
istential generalization, does not involve any characteristic feature from
FOP. It seems rather that FOP inherits the problem of existential import
via the universal quantifier from FOL=, which was already identified as
an unwelcome result by Russell:
The primitive propositions of Principia Mathematica are such
as to allow the inference that at least one individual exists.
But I now view this as a defect in logical purity.
(Russell 1919a: 203)
The standard semantics of FOL= assumes that there is at least one object,
i.e. the domain is not empty, (see Kleene 1967: 84, Mendelson 1987: 46,
Priest 2008: 264, and Sider 2010: 92). Hence, the axioms of FOL=, to be
precise the law of identity, ‘∀x(x = x)’, imply the existence of at least one
object. FOP is an extension of FOL=, so it is not a surprise that the axioms
of FOP entail the proposition that there are at least some objects. Rather, it
would be surprising if FOP did not entail this proposition. The problem
of existential import is not a homemade problem of FOP, but an oddity
FOP inherits from FOL=.
Now that we have concluded that there is at least one universal plu-
rality, we can use the extensionality axiom to prove that the universal
plurality is, like any plurality as we will see soon, unique.
Assume, there are some uu and some vv such that it holds for all ob-
jects x, x is among uu and x is among vv. From this, it follows that for
any object x, x is among uu iff x is among vv. With the extensionality
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axiom, we can then show that uu and vv are identical, or in other words,
the universal plurality is unique:
(T9) ∀x(x ≺ uu)→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = uu)
Since (T8) tells us that there is at least one universal plurality and (T9) that
there is at most one universal plurality, we can show that there is exactly
one universal plurality. Together with the definition of ‘ ι’ this allows us
to derive:
(T10) ∃uu(uu = ιvv(∀x(x ≺ vv)))
The universal plurality is a noteworthy plurality, so that we might want
to define a constant79 for it:
(D9) ωω =d f
ιuu∀x(x ≺ uu)
This definition gives us eventually the following corollary to (T10):
(T11) ∃uu(uu = ωω)
As hinted at above, not only the universal plurality but any plurality is
unique. Following the above sketch of the proof for the uniqueness of
the universal plurality, the proof for the uniqueness of all pluralities can
be reconstructed easily and we can hold on to the following:
(T12) ∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x))→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→ vv = uu)
(T12) and the comprehension axiom give us the interesting insight that if
there is some object having a property Φ, then there is exactly one plural-
ity which contains all the objects which are Φ:
(T13) ∃xΦ(x)→ ∃uu(uu = ιvv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))))
79. I choose the two omegas, ‘ωω’, because ‘ω’ is the last letter of the Greek alphabet.
In a sense, the universal plurality marks an end, since it contains all objects there are; it
leaves out no object. The constant consists of two omegas to indicate that it is a plural
constant.
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We may use this theorem to introduce one more concept for FOP. Since
we have shown that the existence of a plurality guarantees its unique-
ness, it will be convenient to have some notational abbreviation for speci-
fied pluralities. That is the intention behind the following definition:
(D10) ∃xΦ(x)→ JΦ(x)K =d f ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x)))
We may read ‘JΦ(x)K’ as ‘the plurality of Φs’, ‘the objects which are Φ’,
or just ‘the Φs’. Since the existence of the plurality of Φs depends upon
the existence of at least one object that has the property Φ, (D10) has to
be a partial definition,80 i.e. a conditional, in order to not be creative in
the sense that the existence of an arbitrary plurality would follow from
the definition alone.
Finally, (D10) allows us to derive the following plausible theorem:
(T14) ∃xΦ(x)→ ∀y(Φ(y)↔ y ≺ JΦ(x)K)
This theorem validates the intuition that if there is at least one object
which is Φ, then it holds for any object y that y is Φ iff y is among the
Φs. (T14) will turn out to be crucial for our two arguments against FOP,
though the two arguments rely on different directions of the entailment.
5.4 Semantics for FOP
In this section, I will set out a semantics for the system FOP. Although
we will not make use of the semantics of FOP, it might be useful to have
a semantics in terms of getting a better understanding of the formalism.
Standardly, semantics for a logic are provided with the means of set the-
ory. This will not do for plural logic, since we do not want to take the
ontological baggage of set theory on board and follow what “[. . . ] many
philosophers now regard as its canonical semantics [. . . ]” (Florio and Lin-
nebo 2015: 1). Hence, we shall use the resources of plural logic when we
80. More on partial definitions can be found, for instance, in (Carnap 1936) and (Soames
2010).
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give a semantics for plural logic. I am aware that it is circular to use the
logic for providing a semantics for that very logic. However, when logi-
cians spell out the semantics for FOL=, then this is done with the help of
FOL=. So, tu quoque. I think the circularity which is involved here is not
vicious, but virtuous. It is only consistent to work all the way with plural
logic, even when we give the semantics for plural logic itself.
Standard semantics for logical theories take as the domain-of-
discourse a non-empty set. Since we do not want to build our logic upon
set theory, we take the domain to consist of some objects uu, whereby we
postulate that there is at least one object x in the domain uu. This postu-
late is the effect of not allowing for empty terms within our logic, which
resulted in the axiom of non-emptiness, saying that for any plurality of
objects there is at least one object which is among them.81
Besides the domain, I specify a valuation function v which assigns ob-
jects from the domain to terms, and relations on the objects from the do-
main to predicates. Each singular variable x and each singular constant
a gets assigned one object from the domain. The assignment of plural
variables and constants are objects from the domain, whereby v may as-
sign more than one as well as only one object to a plural term. The value
of an n-place predicate is an n-place relation, whereby the value of = is
the identity relation and the value of ≺ is the proper inclusion relation.
Satisfaction is defined standardly – a negation of a formula is satisfied
by a valuation iff the valuation does not satisfy the unnegated formula,
and a valuation satisfies an implication of a formula Ψ by a formula Φ
iff it does not satisfy Φ or it satisfies Ψ – whereby it is worth noting that
the valuation v satisfies F(α1, . . . , αn) iff the relation which v assigns to F
holds of the objects v assigns to α1, . . . , αn.
The logical truth of a formula Φ is defined as Φ being satisfied by any
valuation, and a formula Φ following from some formulas Ψ1, . . . , Ψn is
defined as Φ is satisfied, if Ψ, . . . , Ψn, for any valuation. Below follows a
81. Plural logics which allow for the use of empty terms are not in need of such a postu-
late and can allow for an empty domain-of-discourse, (see Oliver and Smiley 2013: 194-5
and Simons 2016: 65).
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more formal summary of the semantics, given with the means of plural
logic itself, of our logical system FOP:
(i) Domain: The domain are some objects
(ii) Valuation v
(a) For each singular variable x, v(x) is an object from the domain.
(b) For each plural variable uu, v(uu) is an object, or some objects
from the domain.
(c) For each singular constant a, v(a) is an object from the domain.
(d) For each plural constant dd, v(dd) is an object, or some objects
from the domain.
(e) For each n-place predicate F, v(F) is an n-place relation on the
objects from the domain; in particular,
(I) v(=) is the identity relation.
(II) v(≺) is the inclusion relation.
(iii) Satisfaction:
(a) v satisfies F(α1, . . . , αn) iff v(F) holds of α1, . . . , αn.
(b) v satisfies ¬Φ iff v does not satisfy Φ.
(c) v satisfies Φ→ Ψ iff v does not satisfies Φ, or v satisfies Ψ.
(d) v satisfies ∀xF(x) iff v satisfies F[a/x] for every a, whereby
F[a/x] is the result of substituting a for any occurrence of x in
F(x).
(e) v satisfies ∀uuF(uu) iff v satisfies F[dd/uu] for every dd,
whereby F[dd/uu] is the result of substituting dd for any oc-
currence of uu in F(uu).
(iv) Logical truth and consequence:
(a)  Φ iff all valuations v satisfy Φ
(b) Ψ1, . . . , Ψn  Φ iff for all valuations v, if v satisfies Ψ1, . . . , Ψn,
then v satisfies Φ.
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5.5 Two Identity-Problems in FOP
The system FOP, based on the views of Linnebo (2014), McKay (2006),
Oliver and Smiley (2013), and Yi (1999b), allows us to show that the tradi-
tional views on plural logic run into trouble. In particular, the principles
of FOP are not compatible with the traditional views on identity. In or-
der to show that, I will present two arguments which give us convincing
evidence that substitution is causing problems. The plural logician has
to make a decision: Either substitution is abandoned altogether, or the
idea that identity is unitary is dismissed, whereby a restricted version of
substitution can be saved. I will take the second route and argue that this
is the most plausible option we can choose in the next chapters.
Here is a sketch of the argument that follows: First, I will deduce
two contradictions within FOP which follow from plausible empirical
assumptions. Then I will discuss a possible attempt to avoid the deriva-
tion of these contradiction within FOP. This solution to the challenge I
pose for FOP is based on two tightly connected ideas which are problem-
atic: an infinite hierarchy of terms and the concept of superplural terms.
Roughly speaking, the idea of this “conservative strategy” is to mimic
the strategy presented by Tarski (1935; 1944), i.e. to avoid the derivation
of contradictions by stipulating a hierarchy of terms. However, as we will
see, this strategy cannot be applied within plural logic, since the concept
of “superplural terms” cannot be defended in a convincing way and the
move to a hierarchy of terms does not solve all the issues which arise for
FOP.
5.5.1 The Problem of Mixed Pluralities
The first problem for FOP are what I call “mixed identities“. A mixed
identity is a sentence which is adequately formalized by a formula where
the identity predicate is flanked by a singular term on one side, and by a
plural term on the other. Thus, the following sentences are mixed identi-
ties:
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(13) Russell is identical to the authors of OD
(14) Anna is identical to the wives of Frege
(15) The Queen of Spades is identical to the cards I memorized
These sentences surely sound odd, but that is no argument against their
truth.82 Nonetheless, one might think that we can reject these with the
help of considerations about possible worlds. Take for instance (13). An
attempt to argue against the truth of this sentence might be to claim that
although there could be more than one author of OD, this only shows that
at possible worlds where Russell co-authored this essay, Russell is among
the authors of OD, while he is identical to the author at the actual world.
Yet, this way of arguing against (13) misses the point. From the fact that
Russell wrote, i.e. is an author of, OD at the actual world, the existence of
the authors of OD at the actual world is entailed by the relevant instance
of the comprehension axiom, which states that if there is an author of
OD, then there are some authors of OD. Moreover, this instance of the
comprehension axiom does not tell us whether there are other possible
worlds where the authors of OD exist, though there surely are, since it
is concerned with the the actual world only. Finally, although the plural
term ‘the authors of OD’ might occasionally be used to suggest – for in-
stance in everyday conversations – that there is more than one author of
OD, it does not mean that there is more than one author of OD, since our
account of plural terms allows for them to refer to exactly one object, see
again section 4.4.
In contrast to the mixed identities above, let me point out that
(16) Russell is identical to the men identical to Russell
is not a mixed identity, but an “ordinary’ identity claim, because ‘=’ is
flanked by two singular terms, see section 4.4.
82. See also, the remarks at the end of section 5.3.3, where we have already addressed
the objection that mixed identities are artifacts, which result from using the proper in-
clusion predicate in the axioms of plural logic.
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Mixed identities lead to contradictions within FOP by taking (13) and
(17) Russell is an author of OD
as empirical truths. (17) follows trivially from Russell being the author of
OD. Hence, we can construct the following argument:
1. Russell is identical to the authors of OD
2. Russell is an author of OD
3. Russell is among the authors of OD
4.a Russell is among Russell
4.b The authors of OD are among the authors of OD
5.a Russell is not among Russell
5.b The authors of OD are not among the authors of OD
1. and 2. are given assumptions. Since there is an author of OD, 3. follows
from 2. and (T14). We derive the problematic lines 4.a and 4.b from 1.
and 3. with substitution. Each one of them contradicts an instance of the
irreflexivity of ‘≺’ which we have in the lines 5.a and 5.b.
What possibilities do we have to avoid the derivation of the above
contradictions and to save FOP? There are not a lot of options here: The
assumptions in the lines 1. and 2. are empirical truths. The theorems
involved in the derivation, (T1) and (T14), follow from the principles of
FOP. Modus ponens, which is also used in the above derivation, has to
remain untouched. This leaves us with only two more options: Either we
reject substitution and avoid thereby the derivation of the lines 4.a and
4.b, or we reject line 1., i.e. deny (13). My suggestion is to opt for the first
option. However, what might speak for the second?
Supporters of FOP will try to hold on to (SI) by rejecting the first line
of the above proof. This defense might be justified by the thought that
mixed identities are not well-formed expressions, i.e. that the identity
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predicate cannot be flanked by a singular and a plural term. However,
this goes against one of the fundamental ideas of plural logic which we
encountered at the very beginning of this chapter: Any predicate, which
can take singular terms as arguments in a certain argument place, can
take plural terms as arguments in that argument place as well.
However, there is another, more general line of response which may
be entertained in order to avoid the derivation of the above contradic-
tions while leaving (SI) untouched in FOP. This strategy, I will call it
“the conservative strategy”, aims to avoid contradictions which do not
only follow from mixed identities, but from plural identities in FOP as
well. We shall turn back to it after considering the problem of plural
identities for FOP.
5.5.2 The Problem of Plural Identities
A plural identity is a sentence which is adequately formalized by a for-
mula where the identity sign connects two plural terms. Contrary to
mixed identities, not all plural identities are problematic for FOP. For
instance
(18) Russell and Whitehead are identical to Russell and Whitehead
(19) The books on my shelf are identical to my logic books
do not raise any challenges. The difficulties for FOP arise from claims
like the following:
(20) The 26 cards are identical to the two suits of cards
(21) The five companies are identical to the three battalions
(22) The 12 cans of orange juice are identical to the two six-packs of or-
ange juice
§5.5 TWO IDENTITY-PROBLEMS IN FOP 119
These three sentences are, given the right context, true.83 However, with
the principles of FOP, they lead to a violation of the irreflexivity of ‘≺’.
Consider (20) uttered in the following situation: (a) There are exactly 26
cards on the table in front of me. (b) There are exactly two suits of cards
on the table in front of me. (c) The term ‘the 26 cards‘ refers to the 26
cards which are on the table. (d) The term ‘the two suits of cards‘ refers
to the two suits of cards which are on the table in front of me.
In this context we can derive a contradiction from (2) within FOP, if
we make the (plausible) assumption that no card is a suit:84
(23) If something is a card, then it is not a suit of cards
1. The 26 cards are identical to the two suits of cards
2. If something is a card, then it is not a suit of cards
3. Something is among the 26 cards iff it is a card
4. Something is among the two suits of cards iff it is a suit of cards
5. Something is among the two suits of cards iff it is a card
6. Something is a card iff it is a suit of cards
7. There is a card a
8. a is a card and a is not a card
83. One might be tempted to reject, say, (20) by claiming that cards are different kinds
of objects than suits of cards. However, it is hard for me to make sense of such a line
of thought. Surely, cards and suits are different kinds of objects. But, it strikes me that
there is no relevant ontological difference, in order to claim that they belong to different
ontological categories, as it is sometimes claimed in set theory about urelements and sets.
Thus, there is no reason to think of suits of cards as in some sense “second-order objects”
in contrast to cards. Moreover, claiming that cards and suits of cards, or companies and
battalions, belong to different kinds of objects, goes against considerations of parsimony.
84. It appears even to be an analytical truth that no a card is a suit of cards. Imagine you
teach someone a game of cards and you tell her It’s your turn. Throw a card! But then
the rookie throws a suit of cards. What do you think? Either she wants to pull my leg,
or she does not understand the meaning of ‘being a card’. Hence, assuming the above
claim seems uncontentious to me.
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The first two lines are our assumptions (22) and (23). The lines 3. and
4. follow from (D10). The problematic line 5. is derivable from 1. and 4.
with (SI), which is then used to get line 6. from 4. and the transitivity of
the biconditional. 7. is an instance of the axiom of non-emptiness and is
needed in order to conclude the contradiction in the final line.
We have again two ways to avoid the above conclusion: either we
deny line 1. or we limit the use of substitution in order to avoid the
derivation of the sixth line. I will suggest the latter, but what speaks
for the first option? In the case of plural identities, the friend of substitu-
tion cannot claim that the identity in 1. is not a well-formed expression,
since the predicate is flanked by two plural terms. Therefore, a similar
line of response as in the previous subsection is not possible. Yet, there
appears to be another line of response available. I call it the “conservative
strategy”, and we will discuss it next.
5.6 The Conservative Strategy
The conservative strategy may look familiar. We can find a similar strat-
egy applied in an attempt to solve the Liar Paradox, famously elaborated
in (Tarski 1935; 1944). The idea behind the conservative strategy coin-
cides with the motivation suggested there: We can outrun the problems.
Leaving aside the doubts about the strategy of invoking a hierarchy of
languages to solve the Liar Paradox, the shortcomings of the conserva-
tive strategy become apparent. Its major problem is the concept of super-
plural terms, which is a worrisome concept for me, and even postulating
superplural terms is not sufficient in order to avoid a restriction of sub-
stitution or to explain why we should restrict this inference rule. Further,
the conservative strategy leads us to embrace certain implausibilities. But
let’s first have a look at what the idea of this strategy is.
The strategy relies on two steps: First, the above derivations are taken
to be evidence for the existence of another kind of term, beside singular
and plural terms: superplural terms. These are also called “superplurals”
(Linnebo and Nicolas 2008, Rayo 2006), “higher-level plurals” (Ben-Yami
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2013, Oliver and Smiley 2013), “plurally plural” (Hossack 2000, McKay
2006: 46), “pluplurals” (Rosen and Dorr 2002), or “perplurals” (Hazen
1997). The just listed authors motivate the introduction of this concept
due to similar problems as the one we have encountered above. The basic
idea is that terms come in a hierarchy: At the bottom of the hierarchy, we
have singular terms. One level up, there are the plural terms. On the
third level, we have the superplural terms. As I argue below, this leads
to an infinite hierarchy, with superduperplural terms on the fourth level,
and so on. Postulating the existence of this hierarchy is the first step.
The second step is then to stipulate that any sentence which is formal-
ized by a formula where the identity sign connects a term from the nth
level with a term from the level n + 1 will always be false. Similarly, only
sentences formalized by a formula where the inclusion predicate takes
in its first argument place a term from the nth level and a term from the
level n + 1 in its second argument place can be true. All other sentences
containing the inclusion predicate are false.
This strategy has the apparently nice side effect, that it allows to avoid
deriving the contradiction from mixed and plural identities. It simply
prohibits the first line of the proofs, i.e. the sentences
(13) Russell is identical to the authors of OD
(20) The 26 cards are identical to the two suits of cards
This makes it impossible to derive the problematic lines 5.a and 5.b, and
8., respectively, because the identity predicate connects two terms, ‘Rus-
sell’ and ‘the authors of OD’, and ‘the 26 cards’ and ‘the two suits’, from
different levels on the hierarchy. So we can kill two birds with one stone:
By invoking a hierarchy of terms, where the identity and the inclusion
predicate operate along this hierarchy, the above two derivations can be
avoided.
Alternatively, one could, as I have already briefly mentioned in sec-
tion 5.5.2, assume a hierarchy of kinds of objects. However, beside the
fact that it is difficult to make sense of such a claim, the ontological costs
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which come with such a view speak against it. Hence, until there is no
other way to clarify this view, or a way to argue that it comes without
these ontologically worrisome consequences, I think we should reject this
solution.
But things look worse for the conservative strategy than it appears.
We shall take the opportunity to have a closer look at its basic concept
of superplural terms by following the lines of thought of Linnebo and
Nicolas (2008), and Oliver and Smiley (2005; 2013: 119-28, 273-9).
5.6.1 Motivating Superplural Terms
Before we investigate the reasons which are used to postulate superplural
terms, here are some first attempts to explain the concept of superplural
terms. They are thought to be . . .
[. . . ] related to plurals as plurals are related to singulars.
(Hazen 1997: 247)
[. . . ] terms that stand to ordinary plural terms the way ordi-
nary plural terms stand to singular terms.
(Linnebo and Nicolas 2008: 186)
[. . . ] a product of iteration of the step from singular to plural.
(Ben-Yami 2013: 84)
With these initial approximations to the concept at hand, let me flag some
problems which come with superplural terms for FOP right from the
start.
The axioms we presented above are not sufficient for FOP, if the sys-
tem contains superplural terms. If superplural terms stand in the same
relation to plural terms, as plural terms stand to singular terms, then
we have to adopt a superplural comprehension, extensionality, and non-
emptiness axiom accordingly. Second, a further primitive inclusion re-
lation ‘≺2’, (see Oliver and Smiley 2013: 275-9 and Rayo 2006), which
takes plural terms in its first and superplural terms in its second argu-
ment place has to be added to the vocabulary. Finally, we end up with an
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infinite hierarchy of terms: If we assume that there are superplural terms,
then there is no reason to deny that there is a next level on the hierarchy
containing “super-duper plural terms” (Rayo 2006: 228), i.e. terms which
stand to superplural terms as superplural terms stand to plural terms.
But then again, why should there not be a fifth level, and a sixth? Why
should there be a final level at all? This means we have not only to pos-
tulate infinitely many comprehension, extensionality, and non-emptiness
axioms – for each level one from each – but also infinitely many primitive
inclusion relations together with their appropriate asymmetry and tran-
sitivity axioms, due to the assumption of the infinite hierarchy of terms.
A problem for this strategy is its lack of parsimony: The use of in-
finitely many axioms and infinitely many primitive relations flies in the
face of Occam’s Razor. However, other features of the resulting logic, e.g.
theoretical fruitfulness or the gain of expressive power, might override
considerations of parsimony. Yet, I will argue to the contrary that intro-
ducing superplural terms has several shortcomings and that abandoning
the idea of a unitary identity relation is a better alternative.
The friend of superplural terms is not necessarily a friend of the con-
servative strategy. One can believe that there are superplural terms and
reject the conservative strategy. Yet, from our point of view, i.e. looking
for a way to resolve the above inconsistencies, there is no point in holding
on to superplural terms, if the conservative strategy is rejected.85
5.6.1.1 Superplural Terms and Predicates
Linnebo and Nicolas ask
[. . . ] whether the step from the singular to the plural can be
iterated. Are there terms that stand to ordinary plural terms
the way ordinary plural terms stand to singular terms?
(Linnebo and Nicolas 2008: 186)
85. Linnebo and Nicolas mentioned in email correspondence that their observation
in (Linnebo and Nicolas 2008) is that substitution fails in some contexts where non-
singular terms appear, for instance in the sentences (28a) and (28b) below.
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Following Rayo (2006), they call these terms “superplural” and go on to
introduce the concept of “superplural predicates”, namely as those pred-
icates which “[. . . ] can be predicated of superplural terms” (Linnebo and
Nicolas 2008: 186). They present two principles to search for plural and
superplural predicates:86
(P) Multigrade predicates are plural predicates
(Linnebo and Nicolas 2008: 188)
(SP) [. . . ] [S]pecial multigrade predicates that can take differ-
ent numbers of plural arguments at the same argument place
[. . . ] are superplural predicates
(Linnebo and Nicolas 2008: 193)
Both principles are based on the concept of multigrade predicates. Multi-
grade predicates are predicates which “[. . . ] can take different num-
bers of arguments at the same argument place” (Linnebo and Nicolas
2008: 188). Multigrade predicates are for instance, ‘cooperating’ and ‘be-
ing French’:
(25a) Anne and Bob cooperate
(25b) Anne, Bob and Charlie cooperate
(26a) Chirac and Sarkozy are French
Taking the above two principles literarily is misleading. Given the sec-
ond principle, (P) is best understood as the idea that predicates which can
take different numbers of singular terms as arguments at the same place
are plural predicates. If we read (P) as all multigrade predicates are plural
predicates, we cannot hold on to the distinction between plural and su-
perplural predicates because the special multigrade predicates which are
allegedly superplural predicates are after all multigrade, hence, plural
predicates. Yet, the distinction between plural and superplural predicates
86. Linnebo and Nicolas introduce the first principle as principle (P), but provide us not
with a label for the second principle. I labeled it (SP), short for ‘superplural’, since it
will be useful to have a way to refer to it.
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is crucial for the overall argument of Linnebo and Nicolas. Second, what
Linnebo and Nicolas say about multigrade predicates suggests that being
a multigrade predicate excludes being a plural or superplural predicate:
Multigrade predicates can take different numbers of terms as arguments
at the same place, while plural and superplural predicates cannot. For
instance, if ‘cooperating’ is a plural predicate, then it does not take differ-
ent numbers of singular terms as arguments at the same argument place
in each of the above sentences, but different terms as arguments in its only
argument place. Hence, I suggest interpreting (P) and (SP) as follows:87
(P’) Predicates which appear to be able to take different numbers of sin-
gular terms as arguments at the same argument place are plural
predicates.
(SP’) Predicates which appear to be able to take different numbers of plu-
ral terms as arguments at the same argument place are superplural
predicates.
(P’) and (SP’) give us strategies to look for plural and superplural predi-
cates, but they do not suffice to detect plural and superplural terms. Al-
though one might guess plural terms can simply be defined as those
terms which are the arguments of plural predicates, and superplural
terms as those terms which are the arguments of superplural predicates,
these definitions are inappropriate: According to (P’), ‘being French’ is a
plural predicate, since (26a) is analytically equivalent to
(26b) Chirac is French and Sarkozy is French
Since ‘Chirac’ is a prime example of a singular term – if it is not a singu-
lar term, I do not know what else it is – defining plural terms as those
terms which enter the argument place of plural predicates, results in the
claim that ‘Chirac’ is a plural term because it can be an argument of the
predicate ‘being French’:
87. In email correspondence, Linnebo and Nicolas confirmed that these interpretations
of their principles are legitimate.
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(26c) Chirac is French
Linnebo and Nicolas (2008: 188) need a further distinction, the one be-
tween distributive and collective predicates.88 Plural terms can then be
defined as those terms which enter the argument place of collective plural
predicates, and superplural terms are those terms which enter the argu-
ment place of collective superplural predicates.
In order to legitimize the introduction of superplural terms as a logi-
cally relevant category, Linnebo and Nicolas (2008: 193) present then two
examples of collective superplural predicates:
(27a) These people, those people and these other people play against each
other
(28a) The square things, the blue things and the wooden things overlap
where (27a) should be understood as involving “[. . . ] a video game in
which any finite number n of teams can play against each other in an
n-way competition” (Linnebo and Nicolas 2008: 193).
What makes the above two predicates superplural? First, ‘playing
against each other’ and ‘overlapping’ appear to be able to take different
numbers of terms as arguments at the same argument place
(27b) These people, those people, these other people and those other peo-
ple play against each other
(28b) The square things, the blue things, the wooden things and the
heavy things overlap
and are collective predicates. Second, ‘these people’, ‘those people’, and
‘these other people’, as well as ‘the square things’, ‘the blue things’, and
‘the wooden things’ are plural terms, since they can enter the argument
place of collective plural predicates:
88. In section 4.2, we saw that predicates are distributive or collective in their argument
places and not simpliciter. Linnebo and Nicolas may, using our definition, define a pred-
icate as ‘being collective’ iff it has at least one collective argument place.
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(25e) These people (those people, those other people) cooperate
(29a) The square things (the blue things, the wooden things) form a circle
However, if the above line of reasoning is correct, we end up with a
strange result: If ‘playing against each other’ and ‘overlapping’ are su-
perplural predicates, and superplural terms are terms which enter the
argument place of superplural predicates, then ‘these people and those
people’ as well as ‘the square things and the blue things’ turn out to be
superplural terms, because they can be arguments of these predicates as
well. Linnebo and Nicolas seem to anticipate this worry, and try to make
sure that it cannot be used to undermine their position:
Note that we do not claim that the English predicates ‘play
against each other’ and ‘overlap’ are always superplural:
clearly, they often function as ordinary plural predicates. Our
claim is just that these predicates can also function superplu-
rally. (Linnebo and Nicolas 2008: 193)
This restricted claim allows Linnebo and Nicolas to avoid the just men-
tioned critique against their argument, which appears to be prima facie
the only serious worry they have to face. Before we move on to discuss
Oliver and Smiley’s argument for superplural terms, let’s have a look at
an point that follows from the above view.
It is interesting to note that one can easily develop a principle, anal-
ogous to (P’) and (SP’), to look for other higher-level plural predicates
which take “super-duper-plural terms ” (Rayo 2006: 228) as their argu-
ments:
(SDP) Predicates which appear to be able to take different numbers of su-
perplural terms as arguments at the same argument place are super-
duper-plural predicates.
As one might see, we can then go on to look for predicates which ap-
pear to be able of taking different numbers of super-duper-plural terms as
arguments at the same argument place, and the terms which are the ar-
gument of these predicates are one level further up the hierarchy than
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super-duper-plural terms are. And we can then go on to look for other
predicates which appear to be able of taking different numbers of those
terms as arguments at the same argument place, and so on. In a nut-
shell, once we introduce plural and superplural terms on the basis of (P’)
and (SP’), we are committed to the existence of an infinite hierarchy of
terms. Yet, it should be noted that the principles Nicholas and Linnebo
suggest are thought to be a means to look for certain kinds of predicates
and terms. Whether the search for these is, or can be, successful is a dif-
ferent question. Yet, prima facie, it seems that we should always be able
to create a certain kind of predicate or term, if we use the predicates and
terms from a lower level of the hierarchy.
5.6.1.2 Plurally Exhaustive Descriptions
It is common practice to distinguish between proper names, ‘Anne’, and
‘Russell’, and definite descriptions, ‘the neighbor of Bob’, and ‘the author
of OD’. Once plural terms are introduced, it is only natural to assume
that there are not only plural proper names, ‘Russell and Whitehead’ and
‘Russell and Frege’ but also plural definite descriptions, e.g. ‘the authors
of PM’ and ‘my children’.
Oliver and Smiley (2013: 119-28) distinguish between three kinds of
plural descriptions: exhaustive, plurally unique, and plurally exhaustive:
A description ‘the Fs’ is exhaustive iff it refers to “[. . . ] the things, how-
ever many, that individually F.” (Oliver and Smiley 2013: 121). ‘The stu-
dents who passed the exam‘ is an exhaustive description, since it refers
to the people that individually passed the exam. In some contexts, an ex-
haustive reading of a plural description is not appropriate. For instance,
‘the men who wrote PM’ does not refer to the men who individually, but
collectively wrote PM. Hence, it is a plurally unique description, whereby
a plurally unique description ‘the Fs’ is understood as referring to those
things which are the only things that collectively F. Finally, there are plu-
rally exhaustive descriptions. Some collective predicates can be instanti-
ated by more than one plural term. ‘Being neighbors’ is such a predicate.
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It is satisfied not only by ‘Anne and Bob’, but by other plural terms as
well. Anne and Bob are not the only neighbors there are. Hence, the de-
scription ‘the people who are neighbors’ refers not only to Anne and Bob
but also to, say, Claire and Dan. Therefore, Oliver and Smiley suggest
that a plurally exhaustive description, ‘the Fs’, refers to all the objects
which collectively are F.
Since plurally exhaustive descriptions are the reason which leads us
into “[. . . ] the murky waters of higher-level plural logic” (Oliver and Smi-
ley 2005: 1062), let’s compare them with exhaustive and plurally unique
descriptions: On the one hand, an exhaustive description refers to indi-
viduals which individually satisfy a predicate ‘F’, while plurally exhaus-
tive descriptions refer to individuals which collectively satisfy ‘F’. On the
other hand, a plurally unique descriptions refers to some objects which
are the only objects that satisfy collectively a predicate ‘F’, while a plurally
exhaustive description refers to some objects which collectively satisfy ‘F’.
Consider the following example to see why Oliver and Smiley think
that plurally exhaustive descriptions are superplural terms: ‘The twin
primes’ refers to some numbers which collectively satisfy the predicate
‘being a twin prime’. A twin prime is a prime number that is either two
less or two more than a prime number. Hence ‘the twin primes’ refers to
3 and 5, 5 and 7, 11 and 13, 17 and 19, . . . , but not to 7 and 9, or 9 and
11. If we were to analyze the term ‘the twin primes’ as a plural term, two
difficulties would arise. The first problem is related to the transitivity of
the relation ‘being properly among’:
1. 3 is among 3 and 5
2. 3 and 5 are among the twin primes
3. Therefore, 3 is among the twin primes.
The above inference is problematic because the conclusion is false: ‘Being
a twin prime’ is a predicate that can only be satisfied by two numbers
collectively, not an individual number alone. Hence, the transitivity of
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‘being properly among’ has to be restricted in a way to invalidate the
above inference.
Secondly, we can reach false conclusions when the order of expres-
sions within non-singular terms is changed:89
1. 3 and 5, and 11 and 13 are among the twin primes
2. 3 and 5, and 11 and 13 are identical to 3 and 13, and 5 and 11
3. 3 and 13, and 5 and 11 are among the twin primes.
3 and 13 are not among the twin primes because they do not satisfy the
predicate ‘being a twin prime’. The conclusion can be avoided if the term
‘the twin primes’ is taken to be a superplural term. Moreover, it gives
Oliver and Smiley a way to restrict the transitivity of ‘being properly
among’: It can not be applied when singular and superplural terms, or
more generally terms, which belong to levels whose difference is bigger
than one, are involved. This avoids the inference which leads to the con-
clusion that 3 is among the twin primes, because ‘3’ is a singular term,
while ‘the twin primes’ is a superplural term.
Finally, does this account of superplural terms imply an infinite hier-
archy of terms? Oliver and Smiley (2013: 276) give us only a hint: “Once
one goes beyond the first level, there is no natural stopping place at any
higher finite level”. Given their introduction of superplural terms, this is
only consistent. If their introduction of superplural terms is successful, it
is easy to get to superduperplural terms via superplurally exhaustive de-
scriptions, whereby a superplurally exhaustive description is an exhaus-
tive description that takes superplural terms as arguments. However, to
find an example for a superplurally exhaustive description is a different
task, and it seems that our intuitions are reaching their limits here.
With these accounts of superplural terms at hand, we will now see
what speaks against them. The problems that arise with superplural
89. Florio and Nicolas (2015) discuss issues of the sensitivity to order for plural logic in
more detail and present a different attempt to resolve these.
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terms are worrisome for the friends of the conservative strategy, since
their position stands and falls with them. Without superplural terms,
there is no conservative solution to the problems with mixed and plural
identities.
5.6.2 Against Superplural Terms
Many people have expressed worry over the idea of superplural terms.
The main problems I will consider here are similar to observations made
by Ben-Yami (2013) and McKay (2006: 46-53). One reason to reject super-
plural terms is that the idea of an iteration from singular to plural terms
is incoherent. Start with our distinction of singular and plural terms from
section 4.4:90
A singular term cannot denote more than one thing on any
occasion, a plural term may denote several.
(Oliver and Smiley 2013: 74-5)
From this definition, it follows that there cannot be any superplural
terms: If singular terms can refer to at most one object, and plural terms
can refer to more than one object, then there is nothing left for superplu-
ral terms to refer to. This is due to the fact that the distinction is “[. . . ]
exclusive and exhaustive: plural is the opposite of singular” (Oliver and
Smiley 2013: 75). The distinction does not allow for another category of
non-singular terms besides plural terms. Superplural terms are just plu-
ral terms.
Distinguishing singular and plural terms with respect to the number
of objects they actually refer to, does not help here. If we were to define
singular terms as those terms that refer to one object, and plural terms as
those terms that refer to more than one object, then we cannot allow for
superplural terms either:
90. The distinction above, which is Oliver and Smiley’s allows for empty plural terms,
like ‘the kings of Australia’. Together with their account of superplural terms, it seems
that this implies that there are empty superplural terms. I wonder whether this is prob-
lematic and what an example for an empty superplural term might be.
132 THE SYSTEM FOP §5.6
[A] superplural expression should refer to more than more than
a single individual. But what could that mean? [. . . ] ‘more
than more than a single individual’ is either meaningless or
at best synonymous with more than two individuals [. . . ] Yet if
the latter is the case, then our superplural expression is still
a plural expression, referring to a plurality of at least three
individuals. (Ben-Yami 2013: 82-3)
If we distinguish between singular and plural terms as suggested, this
criticism is devastating, here. Neither one of the two ways of defining
singular and plural terms escapes the above line of attack and allows
introducing superplural terms. Yet, a third possibility seems available.
If my analysis of Linnebo and Nicolas’ view is correct, they can
counter these criticisms by embracing neither one of the two definitions
above, but the following: Plural terms are those terms which can enter
the argument place of collective plural predicates. This understanding
of their position is suggested by what Ben-Yami (2013: 82, fn.2) points
out in connection with the above quoted passage: “In conversation, Lin-
nebo said that he wouldn’t like to gloss ‘iteration’ this way [. . . ]”. Hence,
Linnebo and Nicolas should prefer the just suggested definition of plural
terms instead.
But further problems arise with their claim that predicates can func-
tion plurally as well as superplurally. It is difficult to see how the ability
of predicates to function plurally in some and superplurally in other con-
texts works. Even if it could be explained, it is problematic, since the
introduction of plural terms relies on the assumption that we can decide
for any predicate whether it is a plural predicate or not. Yet, if we find
out that one and the same predicate can function plurally in some con-
text while superplurally in others, the definition of plural terms becomes
sensitive to context as well. But, a context sensitive definition of terms
is highly implausible: A term is singular, plural or, superplural indepen-
dently of the context within which appears. It either is singular, plural,
or superplural. If we define plural and superplural terms as those terms
which are arguments of plural and superplural predicates, respectively,
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then we cannot claim that a predicate can play the role of a plural and a
superplural predicate, depending on the context within which it appears:
Why does this flexibility not apply to terms as well? Why can terms not
function as plural terms in one context and as superplural terms in an-
other?
In absence of a different way to demarcate singular from plural terms,
we have to conclude that an adequate definition of superplural terms
cannot be provided. Since the conservative strategy essentially relies on
the concept of superplural terms, the strategy is inadequate. Turning
back to the problems from FOP, this means that we have no good ev-
idence to reject the first lines of the arguments from sections 5.5.1 and
5.5.2, and a restriction of substitution seems to be the only alternative left
to avoid the contradictions. Hence, the standard views on plural logic,
incorporated in FOP, lead us to a restriction of substitution, since relying
on the conservative strategy ends up in difficulties. We shall now move
and assume for the sake of the argument, that the concept of superplu-
ral terms can be explicated in an adequate way in order to see that the
conservative strategy runs into further problems.
5.6.3 Limited Applicability
A second problem for the conservative strategy is that even if there were
superplural terms, the strategy is not always applicable. There are still
plural identities causing trouble. Here is an example: Six children Anne,
Ben, Carla, Dino, Erika and Fritz are playing a game. They play in two
teams. The boys are in one team and the girls in the other. Furthermore,
Anne and Ben are English, Carla and Dino are Italian, and Erika and
Fritz are German. Given this scenario, which is a modification of the
example used by Ben-Yami (2013), the boys and the girls are identical to
the English, the Italian, and the German children.91
91. The two terms, ‘the boys and the girls’ and ‘the English, the Italian and the German
children’, should be understood as abbreviations for more complex terms referring to
the six people above, not to all the boys and girls, or all the English, Italian and Ger-
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Here again, the conservative strategy gets into trouble due to substi-
tution, since the unrestricted rule validates the derivation of a false con-
clusion:
1. The boys and the girls are identical to the English, the Italian and
the German children
2. The boys and the girls play against each other
3. The English, the Italian and the German children play against each
other
The move to superplural terms and the use of a hierarchy of terms is of
no help here. If it were correct, one of the terms ‘the boys and the girls’
or ‘the English, the Italian and the German children’ would have to be on
a higher level than the other. But any decision we can make is arbitrary.
There simply is no evidence that allows us to make an objective deci-
sion either way. The conservative strategy seems to work only in cases
where we can suspect something like a structure of reality, as it might be
assumed in the case of cards and suits of cards, or companies and bat-
talions, so that it may be able to avoid problems arising from inferences
involving sentences, such as
(20) The 26 cards are identical to the two suits of cards
(21) The five companies are identical to the three battalions
by arguing that the terms ‘the 26 cards’ and ‘the two suits of cards’, be-
long to different levels of the hierarchy. Similarly, the terms ‘the five com-
panies’ and ‘the three battalions’, are on different levels of the hierarchy
because companies make up battalions. Yet, we do not have any way to
decide which one of the terms used in line 1. of the above argument is
man children there are. We may suppose the six children are the only children in a
scout camp and add read both terms as containing the further qualification ‘in the scout
camp’.
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on a higher level: What is more “basic”, gender or nationality? Do En-
glish, German and Italian children make up boys and girls, or do boys
and girls make up English, German and Italian children? These do not
sound like sensible questions to ask, let alone questions that are capable
of being answered in a sensible way. Therefore, the conservative strategy
cannot give us any good explanation why we should not accept the above
identity claim and it ultimately ends up with a contradiction, if we keep
(SI). Although this incompleteness of the conservative strategy may not
mean that it fails, it forces arbitrary decisions upon us. With the desire to
avoid this arbitrariness, we may want to see what other options we have.
5.6.4 Accepting Implausible Identities
Finally, the conservative strategy leads to a denial of certain intuitively
true identity claims. We have already seen that according to the conser-
vative strategy, sentences as for instance the above (20) and (21) are false.
Moreover, we have previously seen that we cannot accept
(13) Russell is identical to the authors of OD
as true, if we adhere to the conservative strategy. The problem for the
conservative strategy is not only that these intuitively true sentences have
to be rejected, but also that
(30) Russell and the author of OD are identical to the authors of OD
turns out to be true. How does this sentence follow from the conservative
strategy? A few steps suffice to show that it is a consequence of the above
strategy: First, we know that Russell is the only author of OD. Hence,
anyone who is among the authors of OD is identical to Russell. Second,
anyone who is among the objects identical to Russell or the author of OD
is identical to Russell, because Russell is identical to the author of OD.
Therefore, it holds for any object that it is among the authors of OD iff
it is among Russell and the author of OD. By use of the extensionality
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axiom, we can conclude that Russell and the author of OD are identical
to the authors of OD:
1. Russell is the author of OD
2. Russell is among the authors of OD
3. Russell is among Russell and the author of OD
4. Russell and the author of OD are identical to the authors of OD
The above derivation can be avoided by invalidating the substitution in-
ference with the means of superplural terms. ‘Russell’ and ‘the author of
On Denoting’ are singular terms. The term ‘Russell and the author of On
Denoting’ is a plural term. It is not a superplural term because it is the
result of the step from singular to plural; no iteration of the step from sin-
gular to plural is present. Finally, the term ‘the authors of On Denoting’
is a plural term, due to the same reasons. But, given that (13) is sup-
posed not to hold, it is more than puzzling to me that (30) should be true.
This seems to be a further indication that the conservative strategy is in
trouble and the evidence against it is piling up. Hence, I suggest that we
should consider alternatives to the conservative strategy, i.e. accept the
first lines of the above arguments and look for a solution which tackles
the problems right at the bottom of the alleged hierarchy.
5.6.5 Looking for Alternative Solutions
To sum up, we see that the conservative strategy avoids the contradic-
tions only by denying intuitively true sentences such as (13), or even
more worryingly, (20) and (21). This makes it hard to defend it. However,
intuitions are not always a warrant for correctness and the conservative
plural logician might argue that these intuitions are false. Nevertheless,
there are more serious challenges for the conservative strategy: The con-
cept of superplural terms is not able to do the work it was intended to do
because the distinction between singular and plural terms does not al-
low for a third category of terms beside them. The conservative strategy
§5.6 THE CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY 137
cannot always be applied. Certain pairs of terms cannot be located in the
alleged hierarchy since there is no objective way to answer the question
which one of the terms stands on a higher level in the hierarchy. Finally,
the need to accept counterintuitive identity claims and to deny intuitively
true identity claims, together with the loss of parsimony, which has to
be accepted when we follow this strategy, make this strategy a rather
unattractive alternative. These difficulties for the conservative strategy
suggest that it might be reasonable to consider other solutions to these
problems, and that rejecting substitution is a viable option after all. This
will strike as a radical step to take, but we will make sure that it is well
reflected in the next chapter.
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5.7 Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
The following proofs of the theorems of FOP will be presented in the
metalanguage of FOP as outlined at the beginning of the chapter. We will
justify an instantiation of the axioms and definitions which contain the
schematic predicate symbol ‘Φ’ with IN. The assumption of a tautology
from propositional logic, which can be deduced from the axioms (A1) to
(A3), will be justified by LT. Besides modus ponens we will make use of
the derivable inference rule
If Φ ` Ψ, then ` Φ→ Ψ
which will be justified with CI – for “conditional introduction” – whereby
we may use CI1, CI2, . . . , if more than one conditional introduction is
made in a proof. SC, SC1, SC2, . . . indicate that a supposition for a condi-
tional introduction is made. Further, we will use the derivable inference
rules “universal elimination” (UE), “existential elimination” (EE), and
“existential generalization” (EG) with the usual restrictions. The use of
other derivable inference rules from FOL=, such as modus tollens or quan-
tifier negation, will be justified with PL, standing for “primitive logic”.
√
is used to indicate that the variable which has been universally general-
ized or existentially eliminated is arbitrary. The proofs will make use of
the equivalence forms of the definitions and the universally closed ver-
sions of the formulas from the object language.
The metalanguage of FOP has two additional inference rules, α-IN
and α-EX, specified at the beginning of this chapter. I will abbreviate
some proofs by leaving out steps, which simply follow a repetitive pat-
tern and indicate this by pointing out which inference steps are made.
The left out inferences can be reconstructed easily by following the pre-
vious steps mutatis mutandis – reconsider the sketch of the derivation for
the symmetry of = in section 5.3.4, fn.78.
§5.7 APPENDIX: PROOFS OF THEOREMS 139
(T1) ∀α¬(α ≺ α)
1. ∀α∀β(α ≺ β→ ¬(β ≺ α)) [A9]
2. ∀β(a ≺ β→ ¬(β ≺ a)) ∧ ∀β(dd ≺ β→ ¬(β ≺ dd))
[1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
3. ¬(a ≺ a) [2.; PL, α-EX, UE]
4. ∀x¬(x ≺ x) [3.; UG
√
]
5. ¬(dd ≺ dd) [2.; PL, α-EX, UE]
6. ∀uu¬(uu ≺ uu) [5.; UG
√
]
7. ∀α¬(α ≺ α) [4., 6.; PL, α-IN ]
(T2) ∀α(α = α)
1. ∀x(x = x) [A8]
2. ∀uu∀vv(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ x ≺ vv)→ uu = vv) [A12]
3. a ≺ dd↔ a ≺ dd [LT]
4. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ dd) [3.; UG
√
]
5. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ dd)→ dd = dd [2.; UE]
6. ∀uu(uu = uu) [4., 5.; MP, UG
√
]
7. ∀α(α = α) [1., 6.; PL, α-IN]
(T3) ∀α∀β(α = β→ β = α)
1. ∀α(α = α) [T2]
2. b = a [SC1]
3. b = dd [SC2]
4. ee = a [SC3]
5. ee = dd [SC4]
6. a = a [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
7. a = b [2., 6.; SI]
8. ∀x(b = x → x = b) [2.-7.; CI1, UG
√
]
9. dd = dd [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
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10. dd = b [3., 9.; SI]
11. ∀uu(b = uu→ uu = b) [3.-10.; CI2, UG
√
]
12. ∀y∀β(y = β→ β = y) [8., 11.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
13. a = ee [4., 6.; SI]
14. ∀y(ee = y→ y = ee) [4.-13.; CI3, UG
√
]
15. dd = ee [5., 9.; CI3, UG
√
]
16. ∀uu(ee = uu→ uu = ee) [9.-15.; CI4, UG
√
]
17. ∀vv∀β(β = vv→ vv = β) [14., 16.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
18. ∀α∀β(α = β→ β = α) [12., 17.; PL, α-IN]
(T4) ∀α∀β∀γ(α = β ∧ β = γ→ α = γ)
1. a = b ∧ b = c [SC1]
2. a = b ∧ b = f f [SC2]
3. a = ee ∧ ee = c [SC3]
4. a = ee ∧ ee = f f [SC4]
5. dd = b ∧ b = c [SC5]
6. dd = b ∧ b = f f [SC6]
7. dd = ee ∧ ee = c [SC7]
8. dd = ee ∧ ee = f f [SC8]
9. a = c [1.; SI]
10. ∀z(a = b ∧ b = z→ a = z) [1.-9.; CI1, UG
√
]
11. a = f f [2.; SI]
12. ∀ww(a = b ∧ b = ww→ a = ww) [2.-11.; CI2, UG
√
]
13. ∀y∀γ(a = y ∧ y = γ→ a = γ) [10.,12.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
14. ∀z(a = ee ∧ ee = z→ a = z) [3.; SI, CI3, UG
√
]
15. ∀ww(a = ee ∧ ee = ww→ a = ww) [4.; SI, CI4, UG
√
]
16. ∀vv∀γ(a = vv ∧ vv = γ→ a = γ) [14.,15.; PL, α-IN]
17. ∀x∀β∀γ(x = β ∧ β = γ→ x = γ) [13.,16.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
18.-23.: Mimic the inferences in 9.-16. by beginning with
5., 6., 7. and 8. to infer:
24. ∀uu∀β∀γ(dd = β ∧ β = γ→ dd = γ) [20., 23.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
25. ∀α∀β∀γ(α = β ∧ β = γ→ α = γ) [17., 24.; PL, α-IN]
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(T5) ∀α(α  α)
1. ∀α(α = α) [T2]
2. ∀α∀β(α  β↔ α ≺ β ∨ α = β) [D8]
3. a = a [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
4. a  a↔ a ≺ a ∨ a = a [2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
5. ∀x(x  x) [3., 4.; PL, UG
√
]
6. dd = dd [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
7. dd  dd↔ dd ≺ dd ∨ dd = dd [2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
8. ∀uu(uu  uu) [6., 7.; PL, UG
√
]
9. ∀α(α = α) [5., 8.; PL, α-IN]
(T6) ∀α∀β(α  β ∧ β  α→ α = β)
1. ∀α∀β(α ≺ β→ ¬(β ≺ α)) [A9]
2. ∀α∀β(α = β→ β = α) [T3]
3. ∀α∀β(α  β↔ α ≺ β ∨ α = β) [D8]
4. a  b↔ a ≺ b ∨ a = b [3.; α-EX, PL, UE]
5. b  a↔ b ≺ a ∨ b = a [3.; α-EX, PL, UE]
6. a ≺ b→ ¬(b ≺ a) [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
7. b = a→ a = b [2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
8. a ≺ b ∧ b ≺ a→ a = b [4.-7.; PL]
9. ∀y(a ≺ y ∧ y ≺ a→ a = y) [8.; UG
√
]
10.-14.: Mimic the inferences in 4.-8. by introducing
‘ee’ for ‘β’ to infer:
15. ∀vv(a ≺ vv ∧ vv ≺ a→ a = vv) [14.; UG
√
]
16. ∀x∀β(x ≺ β ∧ β ≺ x → x = β) [9., 15.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
17.-28.: Mimic the inferences in 4.-15. by introducing
‘dd’ for ‘α’ to infer:
29. ∀uu∀β(uu ≺ β ∧ β ≺ uu→ uu = β) [21., 27.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
30. ∀α∀β(α ≺ β ∧ β ≺ α→ α = β) [17., 29.; PL, α-IN]
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(T7) ∀α∀β∀γ(α  β ∧ β  γ→ α  γ)
1. ∀α∀β∀γ(α ≺ β ∧ β ≺ γ→ α ≺ γ) [A8]
2. ∀α∀β∀γ(α = β ∧ β = γ→ α = γ) [T4]
3. ∀α∀β(α  β↔ α ≺ β ∨ α = β) [D8]
4. a ≺ b ∧ b = c [SC1]
5. a = b ∧ b ≺ c [SC2]
6. a ≺ b ∧ b = f f [SC3]
7. a = b ∧ b ≺ f f [SC4]
8. a ≺ ee ∧ ee = c [SC5]
9. a = ee ∧ ee ≺ c [SC6]
10. a ≺ ee ∧ ee = f f [SC7]
11. a = ee ∧ ee ≺ f f [SC8]
12. dd ≺ b ∧ b = c [SC9]
13. dd = b ∧ b ≺ c [SC10]
14. dd ≺ b ∧ b = f f [SC11]
15. dd = b ∧ b ≺ f f [SC12]
16. dd ≺ ee ∧ ee = c [SC13]
17. dd = ee ∧ ee ≺ c [SC14]
18. dd ≺ ee ∧ ee = f f [SC15]
19. dd = ee ∧ ee ≺ f f [SC16]
20. a ≺ b ∧ b = c→ a ≺ c [SI, CI1]
21. a = b ∧ b ≺ c→ a ≺ c [SI, CI2]
22. a ≺ b ∧ b ≺ c→ a ≺ c [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
23. a = b ∧ b = c→ a = c [2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
24. a  b ∧ b  c→ a  c [3., 20., 21., 22., 23.; α-EX, PL, UE]
25. ∀z(a  b ∧ b  z→ a  z) [24.; UG
√
]
26.-30.: Mimic the inferences in 20.-24. by beginning with
6. and 7. to infer:
31. ∀ww(a  b ∧ b  ww→ a  ww) [30.; UG
√
]
32. ∀y∀γ(a  y ∧ y  γ→ a  γ) [25., 31.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
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33.-44.: Mimic the inferences in 20.-32. by beginning with
8., 9., 10. and 11. to infer:
45. ∀vv∀γ(a  vv ∧ vv  γ→ a  γ) [44.; UG
√
]
46. ∀x∀β∀γ(a  β ∧ β  γ→ a  γ) [32., 45.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
47.-73.: Mimic the inferences in 20.-46. by beginning with
12., 13., 14., 15., 16., 17., 18. and 19. to infer:
74. ∀uu∀β∀γ(uu  β ∧ β  γ→ uu  γ) [45.; PL, α-IN, UG
√
]
75. ∀α∀β∀γ(α  β ∧ β  γ→ α  γ) [46., 74.; PL, α-IN]
(T8) ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu)
1. ∀x(x = x) [A8]
2. ∃xΦ(x)→ ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x)) [A11]
3. ∃x(x = x) [1.; UE, EG]
4. ∃x(x = x)→ ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu↔ x = x) [2.; IN]
5. a ≺ dd↔ a = a [3., 4.; MP, EE
√
, UE]
6. a = a [1.; UE]
7. ∀x(x ≺ dd) [5., 6.; PL, UG
√
]
8. ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu) [7.; EG]
(T9) ∀uu(∀x(x ≺ uu)→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = uu))
1. ∀uu∀vv(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ x ≺ vv)→ uu = vv) [A12]
2. ∀x(x ≺ ee) [SC1]
3. ∀x(x ≺ dd) [SC2]
4. ∀x(x ≺ ee↔ x ≺ dd) [2., 3.; 2×UE, PL, UG
√
]
5. ∀x(x ≺ ee↔ x ≺ dd)→ ee = dd [1.; 2×(UE)]
6. ee = dd [4., 5.; MP]
7. ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = dd) [2.-6.; CI1, UG
√
]
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(T10) ∃vv(vv = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu)))
1. ∀α(α = α) [T2]
2. ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu) [T8]
3. ∀uu(∀x(x ≺ uu)→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = uu)) [T9]
4. Ψ( ιαΦ(α))↔ ∃α(Φ(α) ∧ ∀β(Φ(β)→ β = α) ∧Ψ(α)) [D7]
5. ∀x(x ≺ dd) [2.; EE
√
]
6. ∀x(x ≺ dd)→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = dd) [3.; UE]
7. ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = dd) [5., 6.; MP]
8. dd = dd [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
9. ∀x(x ≺ dd) ∧ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = dd)∧
∧dd = dd [5., 7., 8.; PL]
10. ∃uu(∀x(x ≺ uu) ∧ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = uu)∧
∧dd = uu) [9.; EG]
11. dd = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu))↔ ∃uu(∀x(x ≺ uu)∧
∧∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv)→ vv = uu) ∧ dd = uu) [4.; IN, α-EX, PL, UE]
12. dd = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu)) [10., 11.; MP]
13. ∃vv(vv = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu))) [12.; EG]
(T11) ∃uu(uu = ωω)
1. ∀α∀β(α = β→ β = α) [T3]
2. ∀α∀β∀γ(α = β ∧ β = γ→ α = γ) [T4]
3. ∃vv(vv = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu))) [T10]
4. ωω = ιuu∀x(x ≺ uu) [D9]
5. dd = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu)) [3.; EE
√
]
6. dd = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu))→ ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu)) = dd [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
7. ωω = ιuu∀x(x ≺ uu) ∧ ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu)) = dd [4., 5., 6.; PL]
8. ωω = ιuu∀x(x ≺ uu) ∧ ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu)) = dd→
ωω = dd [2.; α-EX, PL]
9. ωω = dd [7., 8.; MP]
10. ωω = dd→ dd = ωω [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
11. ∃uu(uu = ωω) [9., 10.; MP, EG]
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(T12) ∀uu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x))→
→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→ vv = uu))
1. ∀uu∀vv(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ x ≺ vv)→ uu = vv) [A12]
2. ∀x(x ≺ ee↔ Φ(x)) [SC1]
3. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ Φ(x)) [SC2]
4. ∀x(x ≺ ee↔ x ≺ dd) [2., 3.; UE, PL, UG
√
]
5. ∀x(x ≺ ee↔ x ≺ dd)→ ee = dd [1.; UE]
6. ee = dd [4., 5.; MP]
7. ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→ vv = dd) [3.-6.; CI1, UG
√
]
8. ∀uu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x))→
→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→ vv = uu)) [2.-7.; CI2, UG
√
]
(T13) ∃xΦ(x)→ ∃uu(uu = ιvv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))))
1. ∃xΦ(x)→ ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x)) [A11]
2. ∀α(α = α) [T2]
3. ∀uu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x))→
→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→ vv = uu)) [T12]
4. Ψ( ιαΦ(α))↔ ∃α(Φ(α) ∧ ∀β(Φ(β)→ β = α) ∧Ψ(α)) [D7]
5. ∃xΦ(x) [SC]
6. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ Φ(x)) [1., 5.; MP, EE
√
]
7. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ Φ(x))→ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→ vv = dd)
[3.; UE]
8. ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→ vv = dd) [6., 7.; MP]
9. dd = dd [2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
10. ∃uu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(uu)) ∧ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔
↔ Φ(x))→ vv = uu) ∧ dd = uu) [6., 8., 9.; PL, EG]
11. dd = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x)))↔ ∃uu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x))∧
∧∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→ vv = uu) ∧ dd = uu)
[4.; IN, α-EX, PL, UE]
12. ∃vv(vv = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x)))) [10., 11.; MP, EG]
13. ∃xΦ(x)→ ∃vv(vv = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x)))) [5.-12.; CI]
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(T14) ∀y(∃xΦ(x)→ (Φ(y)↔ y ≺ JΦ(x)K))
1. ∀α∀β(α = β→ β = α) [T3]
2. Ψ( ιαΦ(α))↔ ∃α(Φ(α) ∧ ∀β(Φ(β)→ β = α) ∧Ψ(α)) [D7]
3. ∃xΦ(x)→ JΦ(x)K = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x))) [D10]
4. ∃xΦ(x)K [SC]
5. JΦ(x)K = ιuu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x))) [3., 4.; MP]
6. ∃uu(∀x(x ≺ uu↔ Φ(x)) ∧ ∀vv(∀x(x ≺ vv↔ Φ(x))→
→ vv = uu) ∧ JΦ(x)K = uu) [2., 5.; IN, PL]
7. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ Φ(x)) ∧ JΦ(x)K = dd [6.; EE
√
], PL
8. JΦ(x)K = dd→ dd = JΦ(x)K [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
9. (a ≺ dd↔ Φ(a)) ∧ dd = JΦ(x)K [7., 8.; UE, PL]




The Varieties of Identity
The previous chapter shows that within FOP a tension between the prin-
ciples of plural logic and the principles regarding identity emerges: The
assumption of certain empirical truths allows us to derive contradictions
from the basic principles of plural logic. As we have seen, the standard
hierarchical strategy cannot block these derivations and rejecting substi-
tution is the only alternative we have left. In this chapter, we will reassess
these arguments and have a closer look at those principles which are in-
volved in the derivations of the above contradictions. Since the inconsis-
tencies are obviously related to the identity relation, we shall begin with
spelling out some basic, commonly assumed principles of the identity re-
lation. It will turn out that substitution is only insofar responsible for the
contradiction as another identity principle is – I will argue wrongly – as-
sumed. This principle is the idea that identity is unitary, i.e. that there is
only one kind of identity relation. We will examine the derivations of the
contradictions from section 5.5 with the help of the six identity principles
spelled out at the beginning of this chapter and see that the problematic
steps in the derivations are the substitution inferences. Hence, we have a
case of substitution failure in these derivations.
On the basis of this, I will argue against the idea of a unitary identity
relation in order to guarantee that substitution does not universally fail.
The extension of our language gives us good reason to assume that iden-
tity behaves in a different way than usually assumed, since it can appear
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in contexts where we have plural terms. This leads to the idea that there
are several kinds of identity relations. By considering other, e.g. modal
or epistemic, contexts where substitution fails, I will draw the conclu-
sion that the reason for the failure of substitution within plural contexts
can be explained in a similar way as within modal and epistemic con-
text: First, a predicate that is collective in one of its argument places is
non-extensional in that argument place. Second, some plural terms are
non-rigid designators. Hence, substituting plural non-rigid designators
in argument places of predicates which are non-extensional in that argu-
ment place is not a reliable inference.
This helps us to show why Composition as Identity does not lead to
mereological essentialism. Identity is collective, hence, non-extensional,
in both of its argument places. The term ‘the parts of x’ is a non-rigid des-
ignator which may refer to different objects in different possible worlds.
Therefore, substituting a term for ‘the parts of x’ in a sentence which says
that x is identical to its parts is not legitimate, or in other words, we can
show that although x is identical to its parts, this identity is not necessary.
In a second step, we shall turn to the phenomenon of hyperinten-
sionality in plural logic. I will suggest that some predicates are hyperin-
tensional in their argument places, i.e. substitution may fail, even if we
are dealing with rigid designators. Although it would be an option to
ban substitution tout court in these cases, I will present a more moder-
ate solution on the basis of Ben-Yami’s theory of “Articulated Reference”
(Ben-Yami 2013).
We will then turn back to the different kinds of identity and give a
clear way to distinguish between them. Additionally, I shall present some
examples of the various identity relations. Eventually, we shall address
two objections that might be raised against my suggestion of defining the
general identity relation with these different kinds of identity relations.
First, one might think identity is a concept that is too basic to be defined.
Hence, the aim of defining identity cannot be accomplished. Second,
it might be objected that the relations which we discuss and present as
kinds of identity relations are not genuine identity relations.
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6.1 Six Identity Principles
Identity is often regarded as a well understood, easy to grasp concept:
Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is
identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything else
except itself. (Lewis 1986c: 192)
However, we have good reasons to think that this suggestion is highly
deceptive. Identity may seem to be a clear and fully understood relation,
but only if we stay within the limited framework of singular languages.
We have seen in sections 4.1 and 4.2 that this framework has to be ex-
tended. Thus, I think it is no surprise that not all judgements, which we
have formed within this framework, will be confirmed outside of it. Sim-
ilarly to fishermen, who decide to use more closely meshed nets, only
to find out that there are fish who are smaller than any fish they caught
before and are smaller than any fish they have ever imagined, we have
to consider the possibility that some of our previously formed prejudices
about identity may turn out to be false. However, the view I defend here
is conservative with respect to identity when it is restricted to singular
contexts. In that case, it is indeed simple and unproblematic as Lewis
tells us.92
In this section, I will list and discuss six principles that we generally
assume, based on what we have learned from the behavior of the iden-
tity relation in singular contexts. One might expect that these general
conditions for being an identity relation should apply in plural contexts
as well. As we will see, we have to abandon at least one of these prin-
ciples. I will argue that the idea of a unitary identity relation is the one
we should dismiss. Alternatively, we could reject two other principles in
order to avoid the derivation of the two contradictions from the last chap-
ter. However, those alternatives cannot be motivated sufficiently, which
is why I decide to discard the thought of a unitary identity relation.
92. Though, as we will see in section 6.3.1, even in singular contexts, identity is not
really as simple and unproblematic as it is often presented.
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6.1.1 Reference and Identity
Let me begin with a principle which is usually not spelled out when peo-
ple talk about identity, (see, for instance, Griffin 1977: 1-2). It seems to be
so basic that one might think it is not worth spelling out. However, it is
important for us to have it laid out, simply to understand which princi-
ples are responsible for the problems of FOP.
(=1) If two terms ‘α’ and ‘β’ refer to the same object, then ‘α is/are identical
to β’ is true
One reason why we cannot find the above principle in other discussions
on identity is the fact that those discussions are usually conducted within
a singularist language. However, even the singular version of =1
If two terms ‘x’ and ‘y’ refer to the same object(s), then ‘x is identical
to y’ is true
is not as ubiquitous as its plausibility might suggest. While it is missing
within most metaphysical discussions about identity,93 we find it in some
logic textbooks:
[. . . ] α = β is true iff the terms α and β refer to the same
object.94 (Sider 2010: 108)
Two designators ‘a’ and ‘b’ are co-referential if they actually
refer to the same thing: in that case, the identity claim ‘a = b’
will be true. (Smith 2003: 306-7)
If we were attaching meanings to our statements, the meaning
of x = y would be that x and y are two names of the same
identical object. (Rosser 1978: 163)
93. The above principle might be missing in the discussions on the principles of identity
because of its triviality. I cannot see another explanation for that. The principle sounds
circular. Whoever denies it ends up in a contradiction. This is why it is difficult to reject
the principle, and may explain its absence in most metaphysical discussions.
94. Sider is here working in a language that contains singular terms only. Therefore, his
claim translates into the language of FOP with ‘x = y is true iff the terms ρ and σ refer
to the same object’. Similar, translations apply to the other two quotes above.
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Yet, it is absolutely uncontentious: If two terms refer to the same object,
then the sentence where the identity sign connects those two terms is,
trivially, true. For instance,
(1) Russell is identical to the author of OD
is true because ‘Russell’ and ‘the author of OD’, refer to the same object.
When we extend our language with plural terms, we might want to em-
brace not only the above singularist principle, but the more general (=1),
in order to conclude, for instance
(2) Russell and Whitehead are identical to the authors of PM
from the assumption that the two plural terms ‘Russell and Whitehead’
and ‘the authors of PM’ refer to the same objects. Singularists will deny
the above principle because according to their view any plural term refers
to at most one object. However, as we have seen in chapter 4, singularism is
not a viable option.95 Therefore, (=1) is more than just natural to assume.
I think it is one of the most important criteria a relation has to meet in
order to be an identity relation.
6.1.2 The Logical Properties of the Identity Relation
Identity is considered to be a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation,
(see McGinn 2000: 6, Smith 2003: 305, and Williamson 1990: 1). Thus, it
is an equivalence relation. We have seen that the identity relation in FOP
has these three properties:
(=2) α is/are identical to α
(=3) If α is/are identical to β, then β is/are identical to α
(=4) If α is/are identical to β and β is/are identical to γ, then α is/are
identical to γ
95. Thanks to Prof. Bricker for pointing out in an email-correspondence that a singular-
ist might disagree with a pluralized version of the above principle.
152 THE VARIETIES OF IDENTITY §6.1
The above three principles seem to be, more or less, on a par with our first
identity principle with respect to their plausibility, or to put it differently:
It is intuitively obvious that the relation of identity is transi-
tive, symmetrical, and totally reflexive. (Copi 1967: 159)
However, not all of the above three principles enjoy the same status in the
literature, or so it seems. While I do not know of any arguments against
(=2)96 and (=3), there are some reservations with respect to (=4). We will
have a quick look at (=2), since it is an axiom of FPO and the system we
will develop in chapter 8, and (=4), because it is the only one of the above
three principles which has been challenged in the literature.
According to (=2), every object is identical to itself. The roots of this
principle extend back to Plato and Aristotle:
[. . . ] either of them is different from the other, and the same
with itself. (Plato 1892c: 185a)
Now ‘why a thing is itself’ is a meaningless inquiry (for < to
give meaning to the question ‘why’>) the fact or the existence
of the thing must already be evident [. . . ] but the fact that a
thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause to be
given in answer to all such questions [. . . ]
(Aristotle 1963a: 1041a,14-20)
Similar views about the law of identity are still widely upheld:
[T]here is the indisputable fact that everything is identical
with itself [. . . ] (Lowe 2002: 23)
96. Geldsetzer (2013: xxvii-xxviii, 73-76) seems to be the exception to the rule. Wittgen-
stein might be considered to reject the reflexivity of identity as well, when he says “[t]hat
identity is not a relation between objects is obvious” (Wittgenstein 1922: 5.5301), and
“to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is
identical with itself is to say nothing” (Wittgenstein 1922: 5.5303). However, this view of
Wittgenstein seems to be a consequence of his, I think mistaken, thought that tautolo-
gies and contradictions are meaningless, (see Wittgenstein 1922: 4.462), which makes
the law of identity meaningless. See also, (Wehmeier 2012) for an argument against
identity being a relation.
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[I]dentity is a very special relation. It is a relation that every
object bears to itself and to nothing else. (Priest 2000: 64)
Everything is identical to itself [. . . ] There is never any prob-
lem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing
can ever fail to be. (Lewis 1986c: 192-3)
I suppose there is no need to discuss this principle any further. It just
seems to be such a basic truism which we cannot explain any further and
which cannot be justified in a non-question begging way.
Things stand different with (=4), the transitivity of identity. As the
puzzles about composition and parthood show – in particular the Sorites
paradox and the puzzle of the Ship of Theseus – doubts about the transi-
tivity of identity have a long tradition.
Interestingly, dismissals of (=4) are often accompanied by a dismissal
of the idea of a unitary identity relation: Geach (1972: §7) works with
the concept of “relative identity”; Locke (1952: i. 439-70) uses “personal
identity”; Priest allows for a transitive identity relation only under cer-
tain conditions, namely when “[. . . ] the “middle” object is consistent”
(Priest 2014: 20), which gives rise to the suspicion that there is one iden-
tity relation for ordinary objects, and another one for inconsistent objects.97
We shall discuss these positions in more detail soon.
6.1.3 Substitution
We have already encountered substitution as an inference rule of FOP.
Informally, we can state it as follows:
(=5) If it is derivable that α is/are identical to β and α has/have the prop-
erly Φ, then it is derivable that β has/have Φ
(=5), or its singularized version, is commonly assumed in logics with an
identity predicate, (see Priest 2008: 272, Smith 2003: 326, and Zalabardo
2000: 134). Although substitution is closely related to “Leibniz’s Law”
97. See (Priest 1995: 365-6 and Priest 2014: §2, §5), for details about Priest’s views on
identity.
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(LL) α is/are identical to β iff α has/have any property Φ which β
has/have, and vice versa
the two have to be kept apart. (LL) is a biconditional, which consists
of the conjunction of the “Indiscernibility of Identicals” (INID) and the
“Identity of Indiscernibles” (IDIN):98
(INID) If α is/are identical to β, then α has/have any property Φ which β
has/have, and vice versa
(IDIN) If α has/have any property Φ which β has/have, and vice versa, then
α is/are identical to β
(IDIN) is famously criticized by Black (1952), as well as by Moore
(1948: 307) and Peirce (1933: 4.311). More recent doubts about this princi-
ple are expressed by Cortes (1976) and Zimmerman (1997). Our principle
(=5) relates to (INID) and it is easy to mistake one for the other. How-
ever, there is an important difference. (INID) is a second-order principle:
In the consequent of (INID), there is a second-order quantifier that cannot
be eliminated. (=5), on the other hand, is an inference rule that contains
an eliminable schematic variable. Therefore, we can use the latter and
not the former within a first-order logic.
Nevertheless, arguments for or against substitution or (INID) apply
in most cases, mutatis mutandis, to the other principle as well. It is well-
known that both principles run into trouble in contexts of modality, in-
tentionality and time, (see, for instance, Frege 1892, Kripke 1980, Priest
2014: 60-6, Quine 1955, van Inwagen 1981, and the references in section
6.3.1). These discussion about the failure of substitution, in particular dis-
cussions about the substitution failure in modal contexts, are important
for our overall concerns. The lessons we can learn from these discussions
are similar to the ones we can learn from the failure of substitution within
98. Sometimes either one of these principles is called ‘Leibniz’s Law’, (see for instance
Akiba 2000: 3, Prior 1965: 186, or Smith 2003: 306). The above terminology is also used
by Griffin (1977: 2) and Sider (2010: 124).
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plural contexts. However, I would like to set this discussion aside for
now. We will come back to it in section 6.3. For now, I would like to focus
on elaborating the point that substitution causes the problems for plural
logic, before we consider what to learn from the failure of substitution.
6.1.4 Unitary Identity
A further common assumption on identity is that it is unitary, i.e. it is
denied that there are different kinds of identity:
Identity is a relation that is determined in such a specific way
that it is impossible to see how different kinds of it may occur.
(Frege 1903: 254 [my translation])
My first thesis is that identity is unitary [. . . ] There is no equiv-
ocation or vagueness in the notion of identity, and it operates
as a determinate property not a determinable one.
(McGinn 2000: 1)
Although this view is questioned, for instance by Alston and Bennet
(1984), Blanchette (1999), Geach (1972: 238-49), and Lowe (1989), the fol-
lowing principle is still commonly accepted:
(=6) There is only one kind of identity relation
The views of the critics of this principle divide roughly into four groups,
which suggest different ways to distinguish the kinds of identity rela-
tions from each other. For now, we will discuss two of these. We will
return to the remaining in section 6.4.
Numerical vs. Qualitative Identity: Numerical identity is under-
stood to be the dyadic relation that is instantiated by an object and
itself, and nothing else. However, this relation has to be distinguished
from qualitative identity. Qualitative identity is based on the idea of
discrimination. Two objects are said to be qualitatively identical iff they
cannot be distinguished from each other, i.e. share all their properties
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with each other. Take for instance the suit that is now in my closet. It
is numerically identical to the suit I bought a year ago; it is the same
suit. However, the suit in my closet is not qualitatively identical to the
suit I bought. They have different properties. The former has a slightly
different shade of black than the latter. The former is used, the latter is
not. On the contrary, we may take two new copies of the same book
to be (loosely speaking) qualitatively identical, yet not numerically
identical. Two new copies of PM are (almost, apart from a few differing
properties, as for instance with respect to location, or numerical identity)
indistinguishable. They share all their properties, such as color, number
of pages, or letters on the blurb. Yet, they are not numerically identical.
They are not the same copy of the book, but two copies of the same book.
This distinction is based on a denial of the ordinary interpretation of
Leibniz’s Law, which says that numerical identity is equivalent to qual-
itative identity, or substitution. Although I am sympathetic to the idea
of restricting substitution, I think the distinction between numerical and
qualitative identity is misleading. There is only one way I can make sense
of the notion of qualitative identity, namely the identity of properties.
Qualitative identity ultimately comes down to the identity of properties,
(see McGinn 2000: 2-3). Two copies of the same book may share (almost)
all their properties, but that only means that the properties they instantiate
are identical: For each property which is instantiated by one copy, there
is a property identical to that and it instantiated by the other copy,
and vice versa. But that does not make the copies identical. They are
merely similar to each other. Although the degree of their similarity
is very high, this does not imply the identity of the two books in any way.
Absolute vs. Relative Identity:
Some authors, for instance Alston and Bennet (1984), Blanchette (1999),
Geach (1972: 238-49), Griffin (1977), and Lowe (1989), defend the view
that identity is not an absolute, but a relative relation. According to this
position, it does not make sense to say that x and y are identical. This is
regarded as an incomplete statement. What we should say instead is that
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‘x is the same Φ as y’, where Φ is a count-expression, “[. . . ] or else it is
just a vague expression of a half-formed thought” (Geach 1972: 238).
We already encountered the count-/mass-expression distinction en
passant in section 4.4. The idea behind the distinction between count- and
mass-expressions is that the former can be used to count objects, while
the latter cannot. For instance, the terms ‘chair’, ‘book’, and ‘window’
are count-expressions, since we can count chairs, books, and windows.
It makes sense to say that there are two windows, four chairs, and fif-
teen books in my office. On the other hand, mass-expressions cannot be
used to count objects. The terms ‘furniture’, ‘butter’, and ‘rain’ are mass-
expressions. It does not make sense to speak of “three furnitures”, “five
butters” or “ten rains”. However, we can talk about three pieces of furni-
ture, five spoons of butter, or ten raindrops. Mass-expressions can function
as count-nouns only if they appear in connection with certain expressions
as the previous examples suggest.
One of the motivations behind the idea of a relativized identity re-
lation is to solve the paradox of the Statue and the Clay, which we en-
countered in section 1.4.2. Relativizing the identity relation makes it, in
general, possible that x and y are the same Φ, but not the same Ψ. This
gives the following straightforward solution to the paradox of the Statue
and the Clay: The statue x and the piece of clay y are the same piece of
clay, but they are only the same statue until the squeezing happens. After
the squeezing the relative identity relation being the same statue does not
hold anymore between x and y.
Yet, this account of identity is shown to be flawed as well, (see Perry
1970; 1978, and Wiggins 1980: 15-44). Under the assumption of an ade-
quate counterpart to (INID) with a relativized identity relation, we can-
not hold on to the idea that identity is relative. If x and y are the same Φ,
but not the same Ψ, then x has a property which y lacks, namely being
the same Ψ as x. But the relativized counterpart of (INID) tells us that if x
and y are the same Φ, then they share all their properties, which includes
being the same Ψ. Hence, x and y must be the same Ψ. However, that is
inconsistent with the basic assumption of a relativized identity relation
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in the spirit of the above-mentioned authors. Second, it was suggested
that the incompleteness in a statement as for instance
(3) What I bathed in yesterday and what I bathed in today are
the same (Perry 1970: 182)
is not to be located with the identity relation, but with the singular terms
‘what I bathed in yesterday‘ and ‘what I bathed in today’ used in the sen-
tence. The problem then with the above sentence is that these terms do
not completely determinate which object is identified here. If this inde-
terminacy of reference is removed, we can make sense of the sentence
and there is no need to introduce a relativized identity relation.
Although we shall eventually dismiss the principle of a unitary iden-
tity relation, there is no need for us to get caught up in the above dis-
cussions. The problem arising in the context we are concerned with, i.e.
avoiding the derivation of the contradictions from the previous chapter,
is related to the phenomenon of plural terms and how they interact with
the identity predicate. So let’s turn back to these derivations and examine
them in the light of the six identity principles just discussed.
6.2 Reassessing the Contradictions
With these principles spelled out, we can now better understand what
views on identity are at work in the derivations of the contradictions from
section 5.5. Three of our identity principles, (=2), (=3), and (=4), are not
immediately related to the derivation of the contradictions. However,
(=1), (=5), and (=6) are relevant. Let’s see what role they play in the
derivations.
First, (=1) is the claim that the referents of co-referring terms are iden-
tical to each other. It is the principle which gives us the first lines of the
arguments, claiming that Russell is identical to the authors of OD, and
that the 26 cards are identical to the two suits of cards. It emerges from
the discussion of (=1) in the previous that the principle is harmless. If
two terms ‘α’ and ‘β’ refer to the same object, or objects, then α is/are
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identical to β. Note, that the derivation of the two contradictions does
not rely on one of the two “mixed” versions of (=1) where we have one
term referring to one object and one term referring to many objects. In
the first argument, we have two terms referring to the same object, Russell,
and in the second argument, two terms referring to the same objects, the 26
cards. Thereby, I think that in the light of (=1), we get even further con-
firmation to accept these claims and to reject the conservative strategy.
Second, we have used substitution, relying on (=5), in both argu-
ments: In the first argument, to infer the lines 4.a and 4.b, and in the sec-
ond argument, to infer line 5. Those are the places in the proof where we
notice that something is going wrong. The previous lines do not seem to
be worrisome. Therefore, one might think that (=5) is responsible for the
derivation of the contradictions and should be abandoned. However, I
think rejecting substitution altogether would mean to throw out the baby
with the bathwater. If we take this route, then we lose the possibility
to derive the symmetry and transitivity from the reflexivity of identity,
i.e. (=3) and (=4) from (=2). I reckon, we want to hold onto at least a
restricted version of substitution, if possible. We have the possibility of
revising (=5), if we change our minds about (=6), the claim that iden-
tity is unitary. So, let’s see how that principle is involved in the above
derivation of the contradictions and explore the possibility of rejecting it.
Principle (=6), is not used explicitly in any one of the lines of the above
arguments individually. But we can see that it is relevant when we take a
step back and look at the reasoning underlying the argument as a whole.
For instance, consider line 1. in the first argument from section 5.5.1. It
claims that Russell is identical to the authors of OD. We said this sentence
follows trivially from the assumption that Russell is the author of OD, i.e.
Russell is identical to the author of OD. As we see, there are two identities
involved: one holding between Russell and the author of OD, and one
holding between Russell and the authors of OD. We have then used sub-
stitution to infer the problematic lines 4.a and 4.b. This inference is only
possible because we assumed that the two identities are the same kind of
identity, i.e. we tacitly assumed (=6). For consider, that identity is a rela-
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tion which comes in different kinds, such that some of them obey substi-
tution unrestrictedly, and some of them do not. Then, we have to make
sure every time we make a substitution inference whether the necessary
conditions for a valid substitution inference are given. With respect to the
derivation in section 5.5.1, this means that we have to consider whether
the identity relation in line 1. allows for substitution.
This is the solution I suggest in order to avoid the derivation of incon-
sistencies from the principles of plural logic. It has the advantage that
we do not have to abandon (=5) altogether. We can still allow for sub-
stitution inferences in certain contexts, whereby we save FOL= as a frag-
ment of our logic. At the same time, we can avoid the derivation of the
above contradictions by not allowing the use of substitution, as we will
see. Moreover, that plural terms and their behavior in connection with
the identity relation are responsible for the derivation of the contradic-
tion is a reasonable explanation: If we were to eliminate all plural terms
from FOP, then we could use substitution unrestrictedly – though see the
remarks in section 6.3.1 – without being able to derive a contradiction.
However, rejecting (=6) has several consequences. First, we have to
get clear about the general identity relation, i.e. that relation which the dif-
ferent kinds of identity relations are kinds of, and whether it follows the
above-suggested identity principles. Principle (=5) will not hold for the
general identity relation. If it were to allow for substitution unrestrict-
edly, then we would again be in a position to derive the above contra-
dictions. But, what about the principles (=1) to (=4)? We will see that
those principles hold for the general identity relation in the system we
will spell out in chapter 8. The logical properties of the general identity
relation are reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity, and that they can be
shown to be theorems of the system presented there. Second, we have
to get clear about the different kinds of identity relations: How many of
them are there? How do they come apart? What makes them identity
relations? We will answer the first two questions after discussing other
contexts where substitution fails and considering that similar lessons can
be drawn in the case of substitution failures in plural contexts.
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6.3 The Non-Extensionality of Plural Logic
In section 6.1.3, I briefly hinted at the discussion about substitution fail-
ures in other contexts. Now that we have established that it is indeed a
failure of substitution which led us to the contradictory conclusions in
section 5.5, let’s take a step back and reflect on this. We shall briefly have
a look at the discussion on substitution failures in other contexts and the
lessons that have been learned from them. I will then suggest that we
can learn a similar lesson in the case of the failure of substitution within
plural contexts. In a first step, this allows us to address the criticism from
section 2.4 and we can show that Composition as Identity does not en-
tail mereological essentialism. In a second step, I suggest to restrict the
substitution of plural terms when dealing with predicates that are hyper-
intensional in an argument place with the help of Ben-Yami’s theory of
“Articulated Reference” (Ben-Yami 2013).
6.3.1 Substitution Failures in Other Contexts
It is well-known that substitution fails in certain contexts,99 (see Frege
1892, Kripke 1980, Griffin 1977: 2-9, Priest 2014: §5, Quine 1955, Rea
1997a: xv-xxiii, and van Inwagen 1981). For instance, when we encounter
modal notions, substitution can lead us to false conclusions:100
1. Necessarily, eight is identical to eight
2. The number of planets is eight
3. Necessarily, the number of planets is eight
The first two lines of the above argument are true and the conclusion,
which follows by substitution, is false: The number eight is necessarily
identical to itself and the number of planets (in our solar system) is eight.
99. Quine calls these contexts “[. . . ] referentially opaque” (Quine 1955: 142-3) [italics in
original].
100. The argument below is inspired by an example of Quine (1955: 146-7).
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Yet, the number of planets is not necessarily eight. There is a possible
world where our solar system contains only seven planets. Hence, some-
thing must have gone wrong in the above argument. The problems which
come with arguments of this kind are already discussed at length in the
literature, for instance by Hintikka (1961: 127-8), Kripke (1980), Prior and
Kenny (1963), and Quine (1947), and one of the suggestions to deal with
them is to restrict substitution in modal contexts.
Moreover, substitution can a problem in epistemic contexts:101
1. Your brother is identical to the hooded man
2. You do not know who the hooded man is
3. You do not know who your brother is
The problem with the above argument is the following: Assume that the
hooded man, who has covered his head, is your brother and he stands in
front of you. You have no idea who the person standing in front of you
is, i.e. you do not know who the hooded man is. Yet, you know who your
brother is. Hence, the above two premises are true, although the conclu-
sion is false, because you know your brother. But the conclusion follows
from the first two premises by substitution. Issues with arguments of this
kind are discussed by Eberle (1974), Priest (2002) and Quine (1956), and a
restriction of the use of substitution has been suggested as one plausible
way to avoid the derivation of the above conclusion. Since restrictions of
substitution are already accepted in modal and doxastic contexts, a fur-
ther restriction within plural contexts should be considered as an option.
One of the lessons that has been drawn from the substitution failure in
modal contexts, famously advocated by Kripke (1980), is not to substitute
non-rigid designators102 in certain contexts. Hewitt (2012) suggests that
101. The above argument was already known to Eubulides, (see Priest 2002: 445 and the
references there).
102. Rigid designators are terms referring to the same object in all possible worlds where
that object exists. ‘Russell’, refers to Russell in all possible worlds where Russell exists.
Non-rigid designators may refer to an object x in a world w1 and to a different object y
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the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators should be made
for plural terms as well. Given what we have seen, this is a sensible dis-
tinction to draw: Some plural terms are rigid, ‘Russell and Whitehead’,
while others are non-rigid designators, ‘the authors of PM’. Yet, before
we turn back to plural logic, let’s see in more detail what are the lessons
that have been drawn from substitution failures in singular contexts.103
The substitution failures in the above presented contexts have led
to the distinction between extensionality, intensionality and hyperinten-
sionality. Some predicates104 are such that the substitution of any co-
referring terms in a particular argument place preserves truth.105 These
predicates are extensional in that argument place. Thus, ‘being British’ is
extensional in its only argument place in
(4) Bill is British
since we can substitute any co-referring terms, for instance ‘your brother’,
for ‘Bill’.
Contrary to that, we encounter predicates that are non-extensional,
i.e. not extensional, in an argument place in a sentence. When dealing
with these predicates, substitution is not always reliable inference. The
predicates that are non-extensional in an argument place divide into two
groups, predicates which are intensional and predicates which are hyper-
intensional in an argument place. We will come back to the phenomenon
in a world w2, even if x exists in w2. ‘The author of OD’ is such a term, since there is a
possible world where Russell exists, yet somebody else wrote OD.
103. The following paragraphs are mainly slight modifications or elaborations of the
remarks given by Nolan (2014: 151-2).
104. It will be convenient for our purposes to make the distinction we are about to
see for predicates and their argument places in a particular sentence. Commonly, this
distinction is drawn for contexts or positions in sentences, (see Nolan 2014: 151). Our
distinction can be easily related back to these ways of drawing the distinction. First,
it can be understood as a shorthand for contexts which contain predicates that have the
relevant property in an argument place. Second, predicates and their argument places
are positions in a sentence.
105. I use the phrase ‘preserves truth’ here as a shorthand for ‘the truth values of the
two sentences which differ from each other only with respect to which one of the two
co-referring terms they contain’ for the ease of better readability.
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of predicates being hyperintensional in an argument place soon. First,
what it means for a predicate to belong to the former group.
A predicate is intensional in an argument place iff it is not extensional,
i.e. the substitution of co-referring terms may not preserve truth, and sub-
stituting rigid designators preserves truth. For instance, ‘being identical to’
is intensional in its first argument place106 in
(5) Necessarily, eight is identical to eight
Substituting the non-rigid designator ‘the number of planets’ for one of
the occurrences of the term eight above is, as we have seen above, not
a legitimate inference. More generally, and we will come back to that
point later, it has been noted that expressing modal phenomena can only
be achieved with the means of sentences that – using the terminology I
suggest here – contain predicates which are intensional in an argument
place, (see Nolan 2014: 152).
Finally, a predicate is said to be hyperintensional in an argument place
in a sentence iff it is neither extensional nor intensional in that argument
place. Hence, if a predicate is hyperintensional, then even substituting
rigid designators may not preserve truth. To illustrate this phenomenon,
suppose Bill is your brother and unbeknownst to you, his friends nick-
named him ‘B’. This helps us to see that the predicate ‘being identical to’
is hyperintensional in its argument place in
(6) You believe Bill is your brother
because substituting rigid designators may not preserve truth, since you
presumably do not believe that B is your brother.
If we now turn back to our definitions of plural terms and predicates
being collective in an argument place from section 4.4, we will see that
there is a reasonable explanation for the substitution failures in plural
logic at hand.
106. To be precise, the predicate is intensional in both of its argument places in (5). But
to illustrate the idea, it suffices to focus on one of the argument places.
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6.3.2 Intensionality in Plural Logic
Recall our distinction between singular and plural terms. We defined
singular terms as not being able, and plural terms as being able to refer
to more than one object. With this modal distinction, we put a modal
notion at the heart of our theory. Therefore, it is no surprise that since
substitution fails in modal contexts, it may fail in some plural contexts as
well. But, let me put the point a bit more carefully.
The claim I want to defend here is not that all plural terms are non-
rigid designators. The plural term ‘Whitehead and Russell’ is a rigid
designator. In every world w1 where Whitehead and Russell exist, the
term refers to Whitehead and Russell. In a world w2 where Whitehead
does not exist, but Russell exists, it refers only to Russell; in a world w3,
where Russell does not exist, but Whitehead exists, the term refers only to
Whitehead; and in a world w4 where neither Whitehead nor Russell exist,
it does not refer to any object. But more importantly, there is no possible
world w1 where Whitehead and Russell exist, and the term ‘Whitehead
and Russell’ refers to an object which is not either one of them, say Frege.
In any possible world, where Whitehead exists, the term ‘Whitehead and
Russell’ refers also to Whitehead; and in any possible world, where Rus-
sell exists, the term ‘Whitehead and Russell’ refers also to Russell.
Yet, this does not hold for all plural terms. Some plural terms are
non-rigid designators. We already encountered ‘the authors of PM’ as a
non-rigid designator, but there are many more. Take for instance, ‘the
books on my table’, ‘the bins in front of Anne’s house’, or ‘the siblings of
Ben’. There are two books on my shelf right now, a copy of Lewis’ Parts
of Classes and a copy of Quine’s Methods of Logic. Yet, although ‘the books
on my shelf’ actually refers to those two copies, there is a world, where
these books exist but there are three, or two other books on my desk.
Similarly, the four bins in front of Anne’s house might be somewhere
else, and some other bins might stand in front of her house. There is a
possible world where Ben has other siblings than the ones he actually
has, and the people who are actually his siblings exist in that world.
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These examples show that some plural terms are non-rigid designa-
tors. The reason for this is that we have defined plural terms modally as
terms that are able to refer to more than one object. Some plural terms
refer to the same objects in all possible worlds where these objects exist.
These are not problematic. However, some refer to different objects in
different possible worlds. Since we have allowed that there can be dif-
ferent referents of a term in different possible worlds, substitution has to
be expected to fail when we encounter predicates that are intensional in
an argument place: If the referents of the term can differ from each other,
then substitution inferences are not legitimate. Hence, we can summa-
rize our observation in a slightly more formal way: Because some plural
terms can refer to different objects uu and vv in different possible worlds
w1 and w2, even if each one of the objects among uu and vv exists in
w1 and w2, some plural terms are non-rigid designators. Since we know
non-rigid designators cannot be substituted, if a predicate is intensional
in the argument place occupied by one of the terms, substitution has to
be restricted in such cases to rigid designators only.
In singular contexts, substituting non-rigid designators may only be
troublesome if we have a predicate that is intensional in the relevant ar-
gument place. Now, the question arises why we should consider the
predicates involved in the plural substitution failures to be intensional
in the relevant argument place. If they are not, it is irrelevant whether
the substituted terms are rigid designators or not, since then substitution
is legitimate anyways.
We can observe with respect to failures of plural substitution that they
occur only in cases where we have predicates that are collective in an
argument place. The substitution failures discussed in chapter 5 arise
from substituting terms in the argument places of the improper inclusion
predicate. Improper inclusion is collective in both of its argument places.
Firstly, it is collective in its first argument place because there are some
objects uu which are properly among some objects vv, yet not every object
properly among the uu is properly among the vv. This is a consequence
which, although it may seem a bit counterintuitive at first, follows from
§6.3 THE NON-EXTENSIONALITY OF PLURAL LOGIC 167
plural logic’s comprehension axiom: If some uu are properly among the
vv and the vv are the plurality of objects which collectively F, then there
might be some x properly among the uu which is not F, and hence is
not properly among the vv.107 We will come back to this issue in section
7.5, where we will discuss the partial transitivity of the proper inclusion
predicate.
Further, proper inclusion is collective in its second argument place.
This is pretty straightforward, as the following line of thought shows:
Russell and Whitehead are properly among the logicians. Yet, they are
not properly among each one of the logicians, since Russell and White-
head are not properly among Frege.108 Since Frege is properly among
the logicians this shows that proper inclusion must be collective in its
second argument place because it does not hold that for any uu, if the uu
are among the vv, then the uu are among each one of the vv.
Secondly, I think we have good reasons to assume that predicates
which are collective in an argument place are non-extensional in that ar-
gument place. The definition of ‘being collective in an argument place‘
in section 4.2 relies in an important way on the notion of plural terms,
as we can see from the fact that in FOL=, any predicate is by default
distributive: Without plural terms, there are no predicates that are collec-
tive in an argument place. Moreover, plural terms are defined modally:
They are able to refer to more than one object. Hence, since modality is
essentially an intensional phenomena, I think it is no surprise that the
non-extensionality of modality carries over to predicates that are collec-
107. To illustrate the above thought, consider the following example. Suppose, two
objects x and y weigh together more than a pound. Hence, they are properly among the
objects that weigh more than a pound. Yet, if proper inclusion were distributive in its
first argument place, then it would follow that each one of the two objects weighs more
than a pound, which might not be the case.
108. The above sentence may sound ill-formed at first sight: How can some objects be
properly among an object? Setting worries with respect to grammar aside, I think, this
only highlights the point that it follows from the definition of predicates being collective
in an argument place that the proper inclusion predicate cannot be distributive in its
second argument place. Yet, we will turn back to the question whether singular terms
can enter the second argument place of the inclusion predicate in section 7.2.
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tive in their argument places. Thus, we might want to hold on to the
conclusion that predicates which are collective in an argument place are
non-extensional in that argument place.109
Finally, this shows why we encountered the failures of substitution
in chapter 5: At least one of the substituted terms there is a non-rigid
designator. The predicates involved in the substitution inferences are
non-extensional in the relevant argument places. Hence, failures of sub-
stitution are to be expected. On the basis of these observations, we shall
eventually only legitimize the substitution of rigid designator when we
are dealing with predicates that are intensional in the relevant argument
place. Yet, since not every predicate that is non-extensional in an argu-
ment place is also intensional in that argument place, we have now to
turn to the phenomenon of hyperintensionality.
6.3.3 Hyperintensionality in Plural Logic
It does not suffice to restrict the use substitution to rigid designators only,
since even the substitution of these terms may not preserve truth, as the
following example shows:
1. Whitehead and Russell were born in that order
2. Whitehead and Russell are identical to Russell and Whitehead
3. Russell and Whitehead were born in that order
The predicate ‘being born in that order’ is collective, which is why I take
it to be non-extensional, in its only argument place. However, the two
terms ‘Whitehead and Russell’ and ‘Russell and Whitehead’ are both rigid
designators, as we have seen in section 6.3.1. Hence, the above argument
indicates that even substituting terms which are necessarily co-referring
109. I avoid the maybe more obvious seeming conclusion, that being collective in an
argument place amounts to being intensional in that argument place. The reason for this
is that, as we will see next, there are predicates that are collective in an argument place
and hyperintensional, i.e. not intensional, in that argument place.
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may not preserve truth. In other words, the predicate ‘being born in that
order’ is hyperintensional in its only argument place, (see Nolan 2014: 151).
This leads to two questions: Is there are principled way to identify pred-
icates that are hyperintensional in an argument place? Can we use – and
if we can, under what conditions – substitution when dealing with pred-
icates that are hyperintensional in an argument place.
With respect to the first question, I think, we might have to rely on
some of the hints that are provided by natural language. It seems that we
can identify predicates that are hyperintensional in an argument place
from natural language due to the occurrence of phrases such as ‘in that
order’ or ‘in reverse order’. Yet, there are predicates, which are hyperin-
tensional in an argument place and no expressions seems to immediately
indicate this, as the following example shows:110
1. Anne and Bill, and Claire and Dan are married
2. Anne and Bill and Claire and Dan are identical to Anne and Dan,
and Claire and Bill
3. Anne and Dan, and Claire and Bill are married
Therefore, we are not able to give a principled way to distinguish be-
tween predicates being intensional in an argument place and predicates
being hyperintensional in an argument place. This is an unfortunate di-
agnosis, but in lack of further evidence we have to rely on our common
sense intuitions here and be satisfied with the thumb-rule that predicates
that exhibit a sensitivity to order in an argument place are hyperinten-
sional in that argument place. I hope further investigations may help us
to find a more reliable way to draw this distinction, but let’s move on to
my suggestion for how substitution should be restricted in these cases.
110. One could argue that the substitution here fails, because we cannot change the
order of the terms that are used to refer to the two couples. Yet, whether this is an
appropriate answer under the assumption that plural terms are ontologically innocent
is to be doubted.




‘the authors of PM’
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Figure 6.1: Articulated Reference
6.3.4 Substitution and Articulated Reference
My restriction of substituting terms, which occur in predicates that are
hyperintensional in an argument place, is based on Ben-Yami’s theory
of “Articulated Reference” (Ben-Yami 2013). The basic idea of the artic-
ulation of reference is that some plural terms refer to their referents in
virtue of containing expressions which refer only to some, but not all,
of the term’s referents. For instance, the term ‘Russell and Whitehead’
refers to Russell and Whitehead because it contains the terms ‘Russell’
and ‘Whitehead’, whereby both terms refer only to some and not all of
the plural terms referents. In such cases, the reference of the term is said
to be articulated. This does not hold for any plural term, as can be see
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Figure 6.2: Articulating Reference in the same Way
Now, if we have two terms where their reference is articulated, one of
two things can happen: Either their reference is articulated in the same
way, or their reference is articulated in different ways. Here is where I
again rely on the Black’s metaphor of reference as an act of pointing from
section 4.5: The reference of two terms is articulated in the same way, if
they “point” to their referents in the same way, see figure 6.2 for illustra-
tion. The reference of the two terms ‘Russell and Frege’ and ‘the author
of OD and the author of Grundgesetze’ is articulated in the same way.
Compare these two terms to the term ‘Frege and Russell’. It’s reference
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is articulated in a different way than the referents of the two other terms,
since ‘Frege and Russell’ refers to Russell and Frege over-cross, as figure
6.3 indicates. If the reference of ‘Frege and Russell’ were to be articulated
in the same way as the reference of ‘Russell and Frege’, or ‘the author of
OD and the author of Grundgesetze’, then ‘Frege’ would refer to Russell,







Figure 6.3: Articulating Reference in different Ways
The notion of articulated reference can now be used to do justice to
the sensitivity to order we have encountered previously, since articula-
tion of reference itself is sensitive to order. Hence, I suggest that when
we encounter predicates that are hyperintensional in an argument place,
then only terms whose reference is articulated in the same way can le-
gitimately be substituted. I have to point out that this way of restricting
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substitution is not the one suggested by Ben-Yami (2013). His suggestion
is to restrict plural substitution in general to those terms whose reference
is articulated in the same way. Without getting into too much detail, I




Figure 6.4: Not articulated Reference
Ben-Yami’s restriction does not allow substitution in cases where the
reference of the term is not articulated:
[T]he substituted terms need not only be co-referential, but
they also need to articulate reference in the same way.
(Ben-Yami 2013: 92)
Hence, if we assume that ‘Annie’ is a nickname for Anne, then Ben-Yami
cannot allow for the following inference
1. Anne is identical to Anne and Annie
2. Anne and Annie are identical to Annie and Anne
3. Anne is identical to Annie and Anne
because the reference of the substituted terms, ‘Anne and Annie’ and
‘Annie and Anne’ is not articulated: Both terms contain only expressions
that refer to all of the referents of the terms, i.e to Anne, as illustrated in
figure 6.4.
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Contrary to that, my suggestion allows for this inference. ‘Being iden-
tical to’ is intensional in both of its argument places. Hence, we can sub-
stitute the two rigid designators, (see Nolan 2014: 151), from the second
premise above. In a nutshell, we can see that the here suggested account
is to be preferred over Ben-Yami’s because it allows for more intuitively
valid inferences, while it manages to avoid the same troublesome infer-
ences.
6.3.5 Composition as Identity without Mereological
Essentialism
Let’s now turn back to the criticism from section 2.4 that Composition
as Identity entails mereological essentialism. With the above analysis of
some plural terms being non-rigid designators, and the claim that if a
predicate is collective in an argument place then it is non-extensional in
that argument place, we can address this point. Let’s illustrate the argu-
ment against Composition as Identity from section 2.4 in a slightly mod-
ified way: Suppose a composite object is identical to its parts. Then, the
completed puzzle x is identical to the puzzle pieces uu it is composed of.
x is necessarily identical to itself. By substitution, x is necessarily iden-
tical to the uu, i.e. necessarily x is not identical to the vv, if the vv are
not identical to the uu. From that follows under the assumption of Com-
position as Identity, necessarily, x is not composed of the vv, or in other
words, x could not have other parts than the ones it actually has.
We can see that a restriction of substitution avoids the above deriva-
tion which relies on the inference from necessarily, x is identical to itself
to necessarily, x is identical to the uu. Previous reflections about substi-
tution failures in other contexts and the lessons we can learn from the
observations of these failure can be applied to the substitution failure in
plural contexts and provide us with a sound explanation for why the
above inference is invalid. We said that some plural terms are non-rigid
designators and that these cannot be substituted in sentences, where a
predicate is intensional in the relevant argument place. When we think,
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for instance, about a puzzle and its parts, as well as the parts it could
have, or the parts it could lack, then it emerges that ‘the parts of the puz-
zle’ is a non-rigid designator, referring to different objects uu and vv in
different possible worlds w1 and w2, although each one of the objects
which are among the uu and the vv exists in both worlds.
Although our restriction on substitution avoids this way of deriving
mereological essentialism from Composition as Identity, one might be
worried that the appeal to non-rigidity is not able to exclude other ways
of showing that mereological essentialism follows from Composition as
Identity. Prima facie, the term ‘the actual parts of x’ appears to be a rigid
designator. Just like ‘the actual author of OD’ may be taken to refer to
Russell in any possible world where Russell exists,111 ‘the actual parts
of x’ refers to the same objects in all possible worlds where these exist.
Thus, it is a rigid designator. Yet, if x is a rigid designator, say, ‘Jig’, Jig
being identical to its actual parts leads us again to mereological essen-
tialism since Jig is necessarily identical to Jig, and we cannot avoid the
substitution of the rigid terms. It follows that Jig is necessarily identical
to its actual parts and we seem to be left with mereological essentialism
again.
However, whether the above line of reasoning, which aims to reestab-
lish the connection between Composition as Identity and mereological
essentialism, is correct, can be doubted. There are good reasons to think
that phrases such as ‘the actual author of OD’ and ‘the actual parts of x’
are non-rigid designators. I agree with Lewis, (see also Lewis 1970: 184-
7), that the terms ‘actually’ and ‘actual’ are indexical terms:
[T]he meaning we give to ‘actual’ is such that it refers at any
world i to that world i itself. ‘Actual’ is indexical, like ‘I’ or
111. This might be taken to follow from the stipulation of keeping the use of our lan-
guage fixed. As Kripke (1980: 102-9, see in particular fn.51) notes, we can describe other
possible worlds only with our language and we cannot adopt, for the sake of consis-
tency, the language that might be used at that possible, non-actual, world we are talk-
ing about. Hence, when we claim that Anne could have been Beth, then this does not
amount to the claim that at a possible world, Anne is identical to Beth.
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‘here’, or ‘now’: it depends for its reference on the circum-
stances of utterance, to wit the world where the utterance is
located. (Lewis 1973: 85-6)
Thus, expressions such as ‘the actual author of OD’, or ‘the actual parts
of x’ must be indexical as well, and whether, for instance, it is true to say
that Russell is identical to the actual author of OD will depend upon the
circumstances under which this sentence is uttered. It is true, when we
are talking about our actual world, but it may be false when we are talk-
ing about another possible world. But then, if these terms are indexical,
then they are arguably non-rigid designators, since these terms do not
have the same referents in all possible worlds, where their actual refer-
ents exist. For instance, when we use the term ‘the actual author of OD’,
then it refers to Russell. But, if the very same term is used at a possible
world where, say, Whitehead wrote OD, then the term refers to White-
head, even if Russell exists at that world. Furthermore, we should note
that the fact that Whitehead is the actual author of OD at this possible
world is expressed in our language. Hence, Kripke’s restriction that we
can describe other possible worlds only with the help of our language,
mentioned in the previous footnote, is met. This means that substituting
this non-rigid designator may not be a legitimate inference. What’s more,
this applies also to plural terms which contain the notion of actuality. In
particular, we should consider the term ‘the actual parts of x’ as a non-
rigid designator and substituting it for ‘x’ should not be considered as a
valid inference.
Yet, this reply to the worry that our account of Composition as Iden-
tity leads to mereological essentialism can be challenged. Whether the
notion of actuality is indeed an indexical notion is doubted, (van Inwa-
gen 1980), as is the claim that indexical terms are non-rigid designators,
(Kaplan 1989). Nevertheless, I would also like to point out that the above
line of reasoning is a viable option to argue that Composition as Identity
does not necessarily lead to mereological essentialism. There is an on-
going dispute in the literature on how to deal in a proper way with the
notion of actuality and with indexical terms in modal discourse, (Davies
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and Humberstone 1980, Humberstone 2004, Ninan 2013, Rabern 2013,
Soames 2005, Yalcin 2015). Moreover, it remains to be seen whether a
commitment to mereological essentialism is after all worrisome, if the de-
bate on the notion of actuality turns out in such a way, that our account
of Composition as Identity entails mereological essentialism. However,
since it cannot be our aim here to give a final answer to these questions,
we have to content ourselves with the more moderate claim that although
the above way of separating mereological essentialism from Composition
as Identity can be challenged, it is a live option.
All things considered, we can see that the intensional character of
non-rigid plural designators and how it relates to the identity predicate
being intensional in its argument places has important consequences for
Composition as Identity. Its core claim, that a composite object is iden-
tical to its parts, with the non-rigid designator ‘its parts’ – which may
refer to different objects in different possible worlds – opposes an ex-
tensional view of reality. Thereby, since Composition as Identity is built
upon non-extensional considerations, criticisms of it asking it to be ex-
tensional dissolve. With this central thought about the status of Compo-
sition as Identity, let’s move on to consider the different kinds of identity
relations.
6.4 The Varieties of Identity
Let’s turn back to the two questions from above: What are the different
kinds of identity relations, and how can we distinguish them from each
other? From what we have seen, there seem to be at least two good can-
didates for the kinds of identity relations: one that obeys substitution,
and one that does not. However, it is good to have a more fine-grained
distinction to begin with. I suggest two criteria, one syntactical and one
semantical. This distinction brings together and elaborates two traditions
to distinguish between different kinds of identity relations.
On the one hand, we can find in the literature on plural logic ap-
proaches that make a syntactical distinction between identity relations.
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The idea there is to distinguish between singular and plural identities,
depending on whether singular or plural terms are used to express the
idea that an identity relation holds.112 In addition to restricting plural
identity to plural terms, McKay and Yi even introduce a special symbol
to make the distinction between the two kinds of identity clear:
[T]he plural “identity” (≈) functions fully like singular =. Sin-
gular identity can be defined as a special case [. . . ]
(McKay 2006: 128-9)
[. . . ] the plural (viz. neutral) cousin of the identity predicate
“=”, which is the refinement of the singular from of the pred-
icate “to be ” [. . . ] (Yi 2005: 487)
On the other hand, we have in the literature on Composition as Identity
a semantical distinction of identity relations. This distinction categorizes
identity relations according to the number of objects which the terms
entering the argument places of the identity predicate refer to. Conse-
quently, we can find three different kinds of the identity relation: one-
one, many-one and many-many:
So we need some other semantic treatment of many-one iden-
tity, preferably one that describes some more generally phe-
nomenon that has many-many and one-one identity as special
case. (Cotnoir 2013a: 301)
So striking is this analogy that it is appropriate to mark it by
speaking of mereological relations – the many-one relation of
composition, the one-one relations of part to whole and of
overlap – as kinds of identity. (Lewis 1991: 84)
In chapter 1 as well as in section 3.3, we have seen that this view, or ver-
sions of it, are already discussed to some extent in the literature. For
our purposes it will be helpful to make a more fine-grained distinction
112. Oliver and Smiley’s plural logic does not distinguish between a singular and a
plural identity relation, though they define a second identity predicate, called “weak
identity” for empty terms, (Oliver and Smiley 2013: 109-10, 191, 212).
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of identity relations, instead of relying on either one of the above distinc-
tions. Both attempts on their own seem not to be able to do fully justice
to the variety of identity. Therefore, we will first spell out the two ways
of distinguishing between the kinds of identity relation and then, in a
second step, combine them with each other.
6.4.1 Two Criteria to Distinguish Identity Relations
We begin the elaboration of the aforementioned approaches with a re-
finement of the syntactical distinction. The general idea is that we can
discriminate the identity relations on the basis of which kinds of terms
are used to express that an identity holds. Since we have two kinds of
terms, singular and plural, and the identity predicate has two argument
places, we have four different possibilities: We can have two singular
terms, or two plural terms in both argument places; Or, we can have a
singular term in the first and a plural term in the second, or a plural term
in the first and a singular term in the second argument place. It seems
that a distinction between the last two possibilities is superfluous and we
could ignore one of them. In fact, it will turn out that they reduce to each
other. However, it would be a dodgy move to assume that right from the
beginning, since we would then beg the question and presuppose that this
relation is symmetric, which has to be shown.
Let’s turn to the semantic distinction. The basic idea here is that we
can distinguish the various identity relations on the basis of how many
objects the terms, which are used to express an identity, refer to. We made
a twofold distinction of terms according to the number of objects they re-
fer to – one object, and more than one object, i.e. many objects – so we
get again four possibilities: Both terms refer to one object, or both terms
refer to many objects; Or, the term in the first argument place refers to
one object and the term in the second argument place refers to many ob-
jects, or the term in the first argument place refers to many objects and the
term in the second argument place refers to one object. As with the syn-
tactic distinction, we will see that the symmetry of our general identity
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One- Many- One- Many-
One One Many Many
Singular x = y − − −
Plural uu ∼ vv uu 'vv uu '∗vv uu ≈ vv
Plural-
Singular uu
∼= x uu ' x − −
Singular-
Plural x
∼=∗ uu − x '∗ uu −
Table 6.1: The Varieties of Identity
relation makes considering both of the last two possibilities separately a
superfluous exercise, though we will keep them apart for now.
Combining the above two ways to distinguish the different kinds of
identity relations gives us 16 different combinations for our general iden-
tity relation ≡, out of which nine are possible due to our definition of
singular terms. Nine different identity relations might strike one as an
odd and big number. Yet, as we have seen the number of the different
identity relations simply results from the two different ways we distin-
guish the identity relations: the kinds of terms which enter the argument
places of the identity predicate, and whether these terms are able to refer
to more than one object or not. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the sug-
gested kinds of identity relations and introduces a bit of notation, which
will be introduced officially in chapter 8.
Let’s introduce some terminology to keep things manageable from
here on. I shall call sentences, which state that an identity relation is sup-
posed to hold, and contain two singular terms “singular identities”. If
§6.4 THE VARIETIES OF IDENTITY 181
two plural terms are used to express the thought that an identity holds,
we shall call the sentence a “plural identity”. A “plural-singular identity”
is a sentence where a plural term enters the first and a singular term the
second argument place of the identity predicate, and a “singular-plural
identity” where a singular term enters the first and a plural term the sec-
ond argument place of the identity predicate. Moreover, we shall call
sentences, where the terms used to express that an identity holds both
refer to exactly one object “one-one identities”. If two terms each refer
to more than one object in a sentence which claims that an identity rela-
tion holds, then we shall call it a “many-many identity”. Furthermore,
a “many-one identity” is a sentence which expresses the thought that an
identity holds and where the first argument place of the identity predi-
cate is occupied by a term which refers to more than one object and the
second argument place by a term which refers to one object. Finally, a
“one-many identity” is a sentence which claims that an identity relation
holds, and the first argument place of the identity predicate takes a term
which refers to one object while it takes a term which refers to more than
one object in its second argument place.
With the use of this terminology, we can now explain why out of the
16 different combinations only nine are possible. Why are all singular
identities one-one identities? There can be no singular identity that is also
a many-one identity, since that means there is a singular term, namely the
one occupying the first argument place of the identity predicate, which
refers to more than one object. However, we have excluded this pos-
sibility by our definition of ‘singular term’: A singular term is a term
which cannot refer to more than one object. Due to the same reason, there
cannot be a singular identity which is a one-many identity, since then the
singular term in the second argument place were to refer to more than one
object. Moreover, there are no singular identities which are many-many
identities, since then we would have two singular terms each referring
to more than one object. Similarly, no plural-singular identity is a one-
many, or a many-many identity, since the singular term in the second
argument place of the identity predicate cannot refer to more than one
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object. Finally, there is no singular-plural identity that is also a many-one
or a many-many identity because the singular term entering the first ar-
gument place of the identity predicate is not able to refer to more than
one object.
It will be one of our main tasks in chapter 8 to spell out the differences
between these nine relations. That these relations are indeed identity re-
lations, will be discussed at the end of this chapter. Before we come to
that, we have a look at some examples to get an initial idea about the
differences of these relations.
6.4.2 Some Examples of the Variety of Identities
We have already seen a few identity claims in the previous chapters.
Most of them belong to a kind of identity we are relatively familiar with,
for instances, singular one-one and plural many-many identity, or are
already extensively discussed in the literature, for instance singular one-
one, plural many-many, or plural-singular many-one identity. We have
less acquaintance with singular-plural one-one identities, which we al-
ready met in section 5.5.1:
(7) Anna is identical to the wives of Frege
(8) Russell is identical to the authors of OD
In order to get a better idea of the different kinds of identity relations
which result from the just suggested distinction, some examples might be
helpful for us. I will give two groups of examples, each group consisting
of nine sentences, each sentence being a different kind of identity claim.
Those examples will then be used in chapter 8 where the different kinds
of identity relations will be defined.
(9) Russell is identical to the author of OD
(10) The authors of OD are identical to the authors of Marriage and
Morals
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(11) The authors of OD are identical to Russell
(12) Russell is identical to the authors of OD
(13) Russell and Whitehead are identical to the pairs of men who wrote
PM
(14) Russell and Whitehead are identical to the pair of men who wrote
PM
(15) The pairs of men who wrote PM are identical to Russell and White-
head
(16) The pair of men who wrote PM is identical to Russell and White-
head
(17) Russell and Whitehead are identical to the authors of PM
Here we have again some sentences, notably (11), (12), (15) and (16),
which will sound odd to many people. However, as I have remarked
in section 5.5.1 with respect to the worries about the sentence (11), which
equally apply to (12), and maybe their plural counterparts (15) and (16),
one has good reasons to think that these sentences are not problematic, or
meaningless constructions, although they may sound unnatural to many
people.
According to our distinction of identity relations, each of the above
sentences expresses a different kind of identity relation, as displayed in
table 6.2. Why did we categorize these sentences as we did? Have a look
at the terms which are used in the sentences (9) to (17) and ask the follow-
ing two questions: What kinds of terms, i.e. how many objects can each
term refer to, are used in a sentence? How many objects does each term
actually refer to? The answers to these questions will automatically tell
us what kind of identity we are dealing with. (9) is a singular one-one
identity, because we have two singular terms, ‘Russell’ and ‘the author
of OD’ , each referring to exactly one object, Russell. (14), on the other
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One- Many- One- Many-
One One Many Many
Singular (9) − − −
Plural (10) (13) (15) (17)
Plural-
Singular (11) (14) − −
Singular-
Plural (12) − (16) −
Table 6.2: The Varieties of Identity: Example I
hand, is a plural-singular many-one identity, because ‘Russell and White-
head’ is plural and ‘the pair of men who wrote PM’ is singular, and the
former refers to more than one object, Russell and Whitehead, and the
latter refers to exactly one object, the pair. In (17), we have the two plural
terms, ‘Russell and Whitehead’ and ‘the authors of PM’, which each refer
to more than one object, Russell and Whitehead. Hence, we have a plural
many-many identity.
One might here of course raise the objection that I am begging the
question. Whether, for instance, the term ‘the pair of men who wrote
PM’ refers to one or many objects is debatable:
‘The pair’ and ‘the suit’ are not genuinely singular terms [. . . ]
‘Whitehead and Russell were a pair of logicians’ is a straight-
forward plural identity (Oliver and Smiley 2013: 274)
Or, one may worry whether we are here not resting too much weight on
the accidents of the grammar and syntax of the English language.
This first dissent with the above categorization is warranted. How-
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ever, since it is not my intention here to justify the above categorization,
but merely to give some initial hint of where we will be going in the
next chapters, we may flag this concern for now. A proper response to
this worry will then be given in section 7.1. The second dissent is un-
warranted. I do not claim that grammar tells us how many objects a term
actually refers to. My observation is that the English grammar gets it right
here and mirrors the logical structure of the sentences, unlike in the cases
of singularia tantum nouns.
Hence, let’s examine a second group of examples that illustrates the
distinction of identity relations. For the sake of the example, imagine the
following scenario: You are showing a magic trick to your niece. For that
you need 26 cards. Thirteen of them are Spades, from 2 to Ace. Thirteen
of them are Diamonds, from 2 to Ace. You have marked the Queen of
Spades, which is all the magic behind the card trick. You put the marked
card face down on the table and, Abracadabra, you know what card is on
the table. Then, the following identities hold:
(18) The card on the table is identical to the Queen of Spades
(19) The marked cards are identical to the cards on the table
(20) The cards on the table are identical to the Queen of Spades
(21) The Queen of Spades is identical to the cards on the table
(22) The 13 black cards are identical to the suits of Spades
(23) The 13 black cards are identical to the suit of Spades
(24) The suits of Spades are identical to the 13 black cards
(25) The suit of Spades is identical to the black cards
(26) The 26 cards are identical to the two suits
The explanation for why these sentences match with the different kinds
of identities as the above table suggests, can be seen from the way we
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One- Many- One- Many-
One One Many Many
Singular (18) − − −
Plural (19) (22) (24) (26)
Plural-
Singular (20) (23) − −
Singular-
Plural (21) − (25) −
Table 6.3: The Varieties of Identity: Example II
justified the assignment of the examples from the first group. The cate-
gorization is illustrated in table 6.3.
In chapter 8, we will develop our system LI, which is able to capture
the idea of the varieties of identity relations and serves as our basis for
our theory of composition. We will now address two objections against
the project lying ahead of us: the worry that identity is undefinable and
the suspicion that the above relations are not identity relations.
6.5 On Defining Identity
The aim of chapter 8 is to present a formal system which takes singular
one-one identity, ‘=’, and inclusion, ‘≺’, as primitive relations. On the ba-
sis of these two relations, we will define the other eight kinds of identity
relations. As I have mentioned earlier, some of these definitions will be
revised in the light of the counterexamples to many-one identities based
on rearrangement. However, we shall ignore these counterexamples in
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the next two chapters and regard our definitions as a provisional starting
point for an account that is able to meet these criticisms. Eventually, our
definitions of the kinds of identity relations together with the primitive
singular one-one identity relation will allow us to define the general iden-
tity relation, ‘≡’, disjunctively: It is that relation which holds between α
and β iff one of the nine kinds of identity relations holds between α and
β.
Yet, defining identity is often regarded with suspicion. The view the
identity relation is “[. . . ] too simple a notion to admit of logical definition
[. . . ]” (Reid 1850: 229), predates the development of modern formal logic.
Frege (1884: §65) initially broke with this tradition, only to change his
views about these matters later, (see his 1972; 1879; 1903). He argues that
identity cannot be defined adequately because any definition of identity
would turn out to be circular:
Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equal-
ity itself. (Frege 1972: 327)
Frege takes a definition to be a statement that claims an identity between
two concepts. Hence, any definition already uses the concept of identity.
Therefore, a definition of identity can only be circular. More recently,
similar arguments for the indefinability of the identity relation have been
put forward by McGinn (2000: 7-9) and Bueno (2014: 328-9).
Are these worries justified and what does that mean for our enter-
prise of defining identity? I think these worries are to some degree well-
grounded. However, this does not mean that we are heading in the
wrong direction. Remember, Frege, McGinn, and Bueno are working
within a singular language. Therefore, their worries apply only to the
indefinability of singular one-one identity, i.e. the predicate ‘being identi-
cal to’ where it is flanked by two singular terms. Since we will not define
that relation, but take it as one of our primitive relations, we are not ig-
noring the doubts about the indefinability of singular one-one identity.
What we are defining is the general identity relation and the other eight
non-primitive kinds of identity relations. Hence, the worries raised here
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are relevantly similar to the objections raised against my suggestion to
restrict substitution. Since all these objections are made from the stand-
point of a singular language, they can only be directed against the claim
that singular identity is indefinable and obeys substitution. We can agree
with that, since we will take ‘=’ as one of our primitive relations and
hold on to unrestricted substitution in singular contexts. Therefore, we
can reject this objection against the following attempt to define identity
because it does not apply to the general identity relation.
6.6 Schmidentity Relations?
Some further critical reflections on our project of bringing together the
above-presented kinds of identity relations to define general identity are
necessary. One worry which might arise in connection with what was
outlined in section 6.4 is that these relations are “not really” identity re-
lations, but “schmidentity relations”, i.e. relations that look like, but are
in fact not identity relations, similar to the improper parthood relation
or the improper subset relation. These may mistakenly taken to be kinds
of identity relations. However, they are not identity relation, but include
identity as a limiting case. So, the question we have to answer is: What
makes each of our kinds of identity relations a genuine identity relation?
The answer to that question can be found in the identity principles
we discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Our nine kinds of identity
relations are proper identity relations because they collectively obey the
first four principles:
(=1) If two terms ‘α’ and ‘β’ refer to the same object(s), then ‘α is/are
identical to β is true ’
(=2) α is/are identical to α
(=3) If α is/are identical to β, then β is/are identical to α
(=4) If α is/are identical to β and β is/are identical to γ, then α is/are
identical to γ
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The last three principles might be regarded as merely necessary condi-
tions for a relation to be an identity relation. There are a lot of equivalence
relations, i.e. relations that are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive rela-
tions: ‘having the same hair color as’ on the set of all human beings, ‘be-
ing congruent to’ on the set of all triangles, ‘being from the same breed’
on the set of dogs. Yet, these relations are not identity relations.
However, the central point is that all our nine kinds of identity rela-
tions obey the principle (=1). To show this, note first that the conditional
in (=1) holds in the other direction, too:
If ‘α is/are identical to β is true ’, then the two terms ‘α’ and ‘β’ refer
to the same object(s)
This is obviously as trivially true as (=1): An identity claim ‘α = β’ can
only be true, if ‘α’ and ‘β’ refer to the same object(s). Hence, (=1) really
amounts to a biconditional:
(=1) Two terms ‘α’ and ‘β’ refer to the same object(s) iff ‘α is/are identical
to β is true ’
This biconditional allows us to see why the nine relations we distin-
guished from each other are in fact identity relations: First, if one of these
relations holds between α and β, then the terms ‘α’ and ‘β’ refer to the
same objects. Hence, α and β is/are identical to each other, by (=1). Sec-
ond, if α and β is/are identical to each other, then the terms ‘α’ and ‘β’
refer to the same object(s). Hence, one of the nine relations holds be-
tween α and β. Therefore, we can see that our kinds of identity relations
capture the variety of identity: Collectively, they give us necessary and
sufficient conditions for an identity relation to hold. Hence, contrary to
the improper parthood and improper subset relation, the above kinds of
identity relation do not have identity as the limiting case, but they are the
limiting case, identity, themselves. Thereby they will allow us to define
the general identity relation.
As I outlined in section 6.2, I will eventually suggest that there are sev-
eral kinds of identity relations and only one of them obeys substitution
190 THE VARIETIES OF IDENTITY §6.6
unrestrictedly.113 Surely, this will raise red flags, despite the evidence
I have offered for our kinds of identity relations being genuine identity
relations. As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, the com-
mon view on identity is that it obeys substitution unrestrictedly. Hence,
someone might object, if only singular one-one identity obeys substitu-
tion unrestrictedly, and the other eight relations do not, then the latter
are not identity relations, because obeying substitution is a characteristic
property of identity.
This view on identity is wide-spread and the wish to defend the claim
that some kinds of identity relations do not obey substitution unrestrict-
edly may seem to many a fairly radical, if not even an impossible move.
According to orthodoxy, any relation which does not obey substitution is
not an identity relation. However, I do not share this conviction and think
it is based on an overly confident view on what we know about identity.
Many take it that identity is already well-understood and that we are
familiar with its properties. But, how can it then be that “[i]dentity is a
popular source of philosophical perplexities” (Quine 1950: 621)? If iden-
tity is really so well-understood, why are we still struggling with many
of the ancient puzzles, such as the Sorites paradox, the Ship of Theseus,
or the Statute and the Clay? These paradoxes show that we do not yet
have a complete understanding of identity, since they arise from ques-
tions about identity: How can the removal of one grain from a heap not
make a difference whether it is the same heap, if we eventually end up
with no heap at all? Is the ship of Theseus identical to the original or the
reassembled ship? How can the statue be identical to the piece of clay, if
the piece of clay already existed at a time when the statue did not exist?
If we had a full grasp of the concept of identity, then these puzzles about
identity should already be solved. Since this is not the case, I think we
should not bump our fists on the table and insist that identity must obey
substitution unrestrictedly. Rather, we should take these puzzles seri-
113. Strictly speaking, even singular one-one identity does not obey substitution unre-
strictedly, as we have seen in section 6.3. However, for the sake of exposition, I shall
assume that there are no issues with substitution for singular terms.
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ously and consider the possibility that by working on solutions on them
we might gain some new insights about identity. Therefore, we should
be open to revise our cherished views on which properties are character-
istic for identity. Moreover, and this relates back to some of my remarks
in section 6.5, we should acknowledge that by adopting plural logic, we
have just entered new territory and that some of the rules of FOL= might
have to be left behind. Hence, I think we should be a bit more modest
about our knowledge of identity and consider the possibility that there
are still things to learn about this puzzling relation.
I am aware that these arguments may not be accepted without protest.
Nevertheless, I hope that the reasons for why I think that a relation can be
an identity relation, even if it does not obey substitution unrestrictedly,
have become clear. This will at least make it possible to have a fruitful
discussion on whether obeying substitution unrestrictedly is a character-
istic feature of identity or not, and should help to avoid to end up in a
merely verbal dispute or a discussion where both parties are begging the
question. So, let’s take the next step, which will be to reconsider and
clarify some concepts and principles for a logic that is able to capture the




Principles for a Logic of Identities
Before we come to the presentation of the system for a logic of identities
LI, we have to tighten some loose ends from the previous chapters and
make some important decisions. We will clarify the status of those terms
which are, as we have seen in section 5.6 mistakenly, considered to be su-
perplural terms. I will argue that they are singular terms. Secondly, I will
suggest that although, sentences where a singular term enters the second
argument place of the inclusion predicate undoubtedly go against an ini-
tial understanding of our everyday use of the predicate ‘being among’,
there are cases where it makes sense to say that an object, or some ob-
jects, are among another object. Thirdly, we will introduce and discuss
a new concept, “bottom objects”, i.e. objects which do not have any ob-
ject among them. We will see that this concept is not as contentious as it
looks at first sight and we can postulate the existence of bottom objects
without being at risk to smuggle in ontological presuppositions about
the ultimate structure of reality. Since we will allow for the inclusion sign
to take singular terms on either side, we will investigate whether an ob-
ject x being among some object y entails that there is a further object z
among y. This will be a further assumption we shall adopt. Finally, we
will re-examine FOP’s axiom (A10), the transitivity of inclusion. After
discussing some of the problems this principle causes for FOP and some
more general worries that arise from it, I will suggest that the axiom has
to be revised.
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Each of these claims I am about to argue for in the following sections
might be considered troublesome. However, I think they are legitimate
assumptions to make from where we are now. They will eventually allow
us to elaborate a formal system which enables us not only to capture the
varieties of identity, and so to avoid the derivations of the contradictions
from section 5.5, but also to address the criticisms against Composition
as Identity from the sections 2.1 and 2.2, i.e. the paradox for Composition
as Identity and the derivation of Collapse.
Prior to tackling the above questions, I introduce two further technical
concepts. It will be convenient for the following discussions to have the
concepts of improper and proper pluralities at hand. An improper plurality
is a plurality that contains only one object, as for instance, the plurality
of the authors of OD. A proper plurality is simply the opposite of an
improper plurality, i.e. one among which there are at least two objects.
(D11) IP(uu) =d f ∀x∀y(x ≺ uu ∧ y ≺ uu→ x = y)
(D12) PP(uu) =d f ¬IP(uu)
It might seem that the distinction between proper and improper plurali-
ties cannot be drawn, since pluralities are no more than a façon de parler,
see the remarks at the end of section 4.5. We could have defined two
other predicates in order to draw this distinction: ‘being many’ and ‘be-
ing one’, or Oliver and Smiley’s ‘being singular’ and ‘being a strict plu-
rality’ (Oliver and Smiley 2013: 110-1). These pairs of predicates are very
similar to each other. However, the two latter pairs take singular as well
as plural terms as arguments, while we defined the above two for plural
terms only. This is an important feature of this technical notion and will
turn out to be useful for us.114
The distinction between proper and improper pluralities, which hap-
pens at the ontological level, mirrors the distinction between proper and
114. We can explicate the above two notions with the help of some modal terminology:
Some uu are an improper plurality iff the uu are actually one, but possibly many. Some
uu are a proper plurality iff the uu are actually many.
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improper plural terms from section 4.4: A plural term ‘uu’ is a proper
plural term iff ‘uu’ refers to a proper plurality. A plural term ‘uu’ is an
improper plural term iff ‘uu’ refers to an improper plurality. We will rely
on this connection between proper plural terms and proper pluralities on
the one side, and between improper plural terms and improper plurali-
ties in the next subsection.
7.1 Not Superplural but Singular Terms
Let’s turn back to the terms which are, in my view, mistakenly under-
stood to be superplural terms by the friend of the conservative strategy.
In section 5.6, we have seen that terms, as for instance, ‘the pair of men
who wrote PM’ or ‘the suit of cards’, due to the fact that the distinction
between singular and plural terms is exhaustive, cannot be superplural
terms. The immediate question arising from this is the following: If those
terms are not superplural terms, are they singular or plural terms? My
answer to this question is that they are singular terms. Let’s have a look
at the other option first and see where it leads us.
Oliver and Smiley (2013: 273-5) suggest that terms such as ‘the
pair’,115 or ‘the suit’ are plural terms because
[. . . ] the pair really is the men, and the suit really is the cards,
but ‘the pair’ and ‘the suit’ are not what they seem.
(Oliver and Smiley 2013: 273)
I agree with the first part of the above sentence, but disagree with the
second half. The pair is indeed the two men. However, I think that the
terms ‘the pair’ and ‘the suit’ are really what they seem to be at a first
sight, namely singular terms. Yet, Oliver and Smiley take these terms to
be “pseudo-singular” (2013: 274). Pseudo-singular terms have a singular
grammatical form but are, from a logical point of view, plural terms – ca-
115. Here and for the remainder of this section, the term ‘the pair’ is used, for the ease
of exposition, occasionally instead of the term ‘the pair of men who wrote PM’. When it
is used in the ordinary sense, I will highlight this.
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pable of denoting many objects. In the words of the terminology we have
just introduced: The pair is a proper plurality. Hence, the above claim
ultimately comes down to assuming that a pair of men is many, and not
one. This is one way we could go. But I reckon, it is not the best way to
choose.
The above justification for taking the term ‘the pair’ to be a singular
term looks problematic. Recall, the paradox for Composition as Identity.
There we ended up with two contradictions which followed from the
assumptions that a composite object is one, its parts are many, and ‘being
one’ is the opposite of ‘being many’. We noted that abandoning one of
these premises suffices to avoid the derivation of the two contradictions.
If what Oliver and Smiley say in the above quote is correct, a solution
to the paradox looks to be at hand and we can defend Composition as
Identity: The first premise of the argument is false. A composite object is
not one, but many. The composite object is not what it seems. After all, it
is really its parts, and its parts are many.
By relating back to the paradox for Composition as Identity, we can
see what is going wrong in the above line of reasoning. Taking the term
‘the pair’, and similar terms such as ‘the suit of cards’, or ‘the six-pack’,
to be plural terms comes with strange consequences. Let’s focus on ‘the
pair’ in the general sense and suppose Oliver and Smiley are correct.
Then, it strikes me that in principle anything we might take to be one,
is in fact many. Take, for instance, a broom. We think of a broom as being
one. The broom has a stick and a brush. Yet, isn’t the broom the pair
consisting of the stick and the brush, just as Russell and Whitehead are
really the pair of men who wrote PM? But then, we were wrong in as-
suming that the broom is one and it turns out, from our assumption, that
it is many. Or take another object, we think of as one, an apple. It has a
left and a right half. If the pair of the two halves are many, then the apple
turns out to be many as well, since it simply is the pair of the two halves.
Does this suggest that we should rather consider ‘the pair’ to be a
singular term? I think a lot speaks for that. However, one may object
that this is due to intuitions coming from a sympathy for Composition
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as Identity. Yet, I think that the above examples illustrate that taking ‘the
pair’ to be a plural term, referring to many objects, is not that straightfor-
ward as Oliver and Smiley suggest. In any case, it is not a viable option
for us.
Is there another way to hold on to the claim that ‘the pair’ is a plu-
ral term? There seems to be only one option left, if we do not want to
follow the above line of thought. If ‘the pair’ is a plural term, yet not a
proper plural term, then it refers to an improper plurality, i.e. exactly one
object. What are the possible candidates for that object? Presumably, we
have only three answers that seem to be sensible: Russell, Whitehead, or
the pair. However, neither of them is a suitable candidate after a closer
analysis. It cannot be Russell. There is no reason why the term should
only refer to Russell, and not to Whitehead, or only to Whitehead and not
to Russell. So, if ‘the pair’ refers to Russell, then it refers to Whitehead;
and if it refers to Whitehead, then it refers to Russell. However, if the
term refers to an improper plurality, i.e. there is only one object among
the things it refers to, then we end up contradicting the irreflexivity of
inclusion. Here is why: Having excluded Russell and Whitehead as the
objects which are among the pair, we are left with the pair as the only
option. But then the pair is among the pair and that contradicts the ir-
reflexivity of ‘≺’. The worse for (T1), you might think, then it has to go,
together with the asymmetry of inclusion!
This is of course another option here. Though it is not a very attrac-
tive one. Although it solves this problem, it leads only to further com-
plications. Let’s assume, for the sake of the argument, that ‘the pair’
is an improper plural term, referring to the improper plurality the pair.
Then, what kind of term is ‘the pairs (of men who wrote PM)’? Since
we unmasked the notion of superplural terms and given the above line
of argument, the term is presumably also an improper plural term. Yet,
that is counterintuitive. The terms ‘the pair’ and ‘the pairs’ are not on a
par. Rather, it seems that they stand in a similar relation to each other
as ‘Russell’ and ‘the authors of OD’: Both terms refer to the same object,
Russell. However, the authors of OD is an improper plurality and Russell
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is among the authors of OD. This analogy is undeniable and it shows that
abandoning the irreflexivity and asymmetry of ‘≺’ is not a very attractive
solution to resolve this problem either.
In conclusion, assuming that such terms as ‘the pair’ and ‘the suit’
are plural terms leads to several undesirable consequences. Therefore, I
suggest we should consider the possibility of grammar getting it right in
these cases: The pair is really one, and the suit is really one.
7.2 The Relata of ≺
The next decision to make concerns the inclusion predicate, to be precise
its relata. We introduced ‘≺’ in section 5.1 without specifying what its
relata are, in other words, we did not answer the question What kinds of
terms can enter the argument places of the predicate? We have to get clear
about that now. The examples considering ‘≺’ and the inclusion relation,
which we have considered thus far, divide into three groups: First, we
have sentences where the inclusion predicate takes a singular term in its
first and a plural term in its second argument place, as for instance in
(1) Russell is among Russell and Whitehead
(2) Russell is among the logicians
Second, we had sentences where the inclusion predicate takes plural
terms in both of its argument places:
(3) Russell and Whitehead are among Russell, Whitehead, and
Wittgenstein
(4) PM and Grundgesetze are among my books
Some authors do not allow plural terms to enter the first argument place
of the inclusion predicate. Linnebo (see his 2014: §1.1, point 2 of the defi-
nition of well-formed formulas) restricts ‘≺’ such that “α ≺ β is a formula
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when α is a singular term and β a plural term”.116 This way of limiting
‘≺’ is counterproductive for the idea of plural logic. After all, the project
of taking plural terms as logically relevant starts with the assumption
that predicates are not sensitive to number, i.e. can take plural terms as
arguments, if they can take singular terms as arguments. Hence, we need
a justification for limiting ‘≺’ in this way since natural language suggests,
as the above examples show, that it takes plural terms in its first argument
place. Without such a justification, the restriction is unwarranted.
Third, we encountered sentences where, in each case, one singular
term entered both of the inclusion predicate’s argument places:
(5) Russell is among Russell
(6) My logic books are among my logic books
However, we agreed in section 5.3.2 that these sentences are false. On
what assumption was this claim based? The two sentences each contra-
dict the irreflexivity of ‘≺’, following from the asymmetry of ‘≺’, which
in turn we have identified as one of the central axioms of plural logic.
Though, we have not yet considered the possibility that two different sin-
gular terms might flank the inclusion predicate or that a plural term en-
ters the first and a singular term the second argument place. Can such
sentences be true?
At a first glance, it seems counterintuitive to accept sentences of the
form ‘x ≺ y’ or ‘uu ≺ y’ as true. It looks like our use of the predicate
‘being among’ does not allow for a singular term in its second argument
place. However, let’s have a closer look at these possibilities by exam-
ining sentences where an inclusion predicate is flanked by two singular
terms first. Consider the two sentences
(7) Some object is among Russell
(8) Some object is among Whitehead
116. I substituted our metalinguistic variables ‘α’ and ‘β’ for Linnebo’s ‘t’ and ‘T’, re-
spectively.
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Those immediately follow, if we accept the truth of sentences, where sin-
gular terms – in that particular case, the terms ‘Russell’ and ‘Whitehead’
– enter the second argument place of inclusion. Yet, (7) and (8) may
not immediately be acceptable. When we hear one of these sentences,
then the feeling might arise that the person uttering the sentence has not
completely finished expressing her sentence. The question Some object is
among Russell and what? seems to come up immediately when we hear or
read (7). It looks like those sentences make, at a first sight, no sense.
However, we can make sense of examples, if we take different singu-
lar terms. Namely those terms which are sometimes, as I just suggested,
mistakenly taken to be superplural terms, for instance ‘the pair of men
who wrote PM’ and ‘the suit of Spades’:
(9) Some object is among the pair of men who wrote PM
(10) Some object is among the suit of Spades
Those sentences do not immediately seem objectionable, although they
might seem odd. However, if we accept them as true, what terms are
possible candidates for entering the first argument place of ‘≺’ when we
have ‘the pair of men who wrote PM’ in the second? If any term at all
is suitable, then surely the terms ‘Russell’ and ‘Whitehead’ are. If any-
thing is among the pair of men who wrote PM, then surely Russell is,
and Whitehead is. Therefore, I think it is legitimate, if we utter the fol-
lowing sentences:
(11) Russell is among the pair of men who wrote PM
(12) Whitehead is among the pair of men who wrote PM
In addition to that, we get also an answer to our second question, whether
we can accept sentences of the form ‘uu ≺ x’. If we assume that Russell
is among the pair of men who wrote PM, and Whitehead is among the
pair of men who wrote PM, then
(13) Russell and Whitehead are among the men who wrote PM
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follows from that. Hence, I propose that we should not only accept sen-
tences where we have singular terms in both argument places of the in-
clusion predicate, i.e. sentences which can be adequately formalized as
‘x ≺ y’ in the language of FOP, but also such sentences as (13), whose
formalization is ‘uu ≺ x’. Permitting an inclusion predicate which takes
singular terms in its second argument place, brings us to two further
questions: Firstly, are there any objects that do not have any object among
them? Secondly, can an object x have only one object y among it? Or must
there be some other object z that is also among x? We shall consider these
two questions next.
7.3 Bottom Objects
The non-emptiness axiom of FOP makes sure that there are no empty
pluralities. It stipulates that for any objects uu there is at least one object
x which is among them. Should we postulate a similar axiom for singular
terms, making sure that for any object x, there is an object y which is
among x? That is to say, should we take
∀x∃y(y ≺ x)
as one of LI’s axioms? The question whether there are any objects having
no objects among them arises only due to the fact that we just allowed
for the possibility of singular terms entering the second argument place
of ‘≺’. Had we not allowed for that, the above formula would, trivially,
turn out to be false. I suggest that we do not add the above formula to
the axioms of our formal system and allow there to be objects not having
any objects among them. I will call these objects “bottom objects”, and
they are defined as follows:
(D13) B(x) =d f ∀y¬(y ≺ x)
The above question, whether it is reasonable to assume that there are any
bottom objects, resembles the discussions about similar concepts from
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set theory and mereology. The set theoretical counterpart to bottom ob-
jects are urelements117 and their cousins in mereology are atoms.118 It
is important for us, that the assumptions we make about bottom objects
will not force us to take a stance on whether there are atoms or gunky
objects. Fortunately, we can achieve this by relativizing the notion of bot-
tom objects to theories. We shall say that an object x is a bottom object of
a theory t iff there is no object y such that according to t, y is among x.
Thereby, we can avoid taking sides in the dispute about atoms by assum-
ing that according to any (non-empty) theory t, there are some bottom
objects. Strong and weak atomists can embrace this principle without
any doubts. They can take bottom objects simply to coincide with mere-
ological atoms in atomistic theories – nothing is among an atom. Given
this definition of bottom objects, the principle can – or to be precise must
– even be accepted within theories that postulate a gunky universe, i.e.
a world where every object is a gunky object. The reason is that even in
such a theory there have to be some bottom objects.
The following line of thought explains how we get to this conclusion.
Any non-empty theory t has to contain at least one singular term ‘x’.
Here is why: t contains at least one term ‘α’ because it is a non-empty
theory. ‘α’ is either singular or plural. If ‘α’ is not singular, then it can be
shown with the axiom of non-emptiness (A13) that t entails that there is
an object x which is among α. Hence, t will contain at least one singular
117. Urelements are objects that do not have any objects as members. Sometimes, for
instance in (Zermelo 2010: 402), the empty set is taken to be an urelement. For Zermelo,
urelements played a central role, (Zermelo 2010: 551). Fraenkel (1922), on the other
hand, explicitly banned urelements from set theory.
118. In mereology, there are three possible answers with respect to the question of the
existence of atoms, (Simons 2003: 41-2). On the one hand, “strong atomism” takes atoms
to be the basic constituents of reality, claiming that any object is either an atom or has
at least one atom as proper part. Van Inwagen (1990: 5) is one of the contemporary
defenders of strong atomism. On the other hand, we can find the idea that any material
object has at least a proper part, (see Zimmerman 1996a; 1996b), i.e. any object is a
gunky object, see footnote 9 in chapter 1. The third alternative, “weak atomism”, claims
that there are atoms and gunky objects. However, this “[. . . ] hybrid position [. . . ] has
rarely been seriously entertained” (Simons 2003: 42). Hudson (2007) gives an excellent
overview of the present discussion on atoms and gunk, while Pyle (1995) investigates
the history of the dispute.
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term ‘x’. From the definition of bottom object, it follows that if x is not a
bottom object in t, then there is an object y which is among x. y is either
a bottom object or not. By assumption, it is not. Therefore, there is an
object z which is among y. z is either a bottom object or not; and so on.
Now there are three possibilities: First, the chain of inclusion relations
goes on ad infinitum. This might not seem to be a problem for the gunk
theorist inasmuch as she does not worry about another infinite chain, the
one of the parthood relation. Yet, it seems that the infinite regress of the
inclusion relation is something she has to avoid. At some point, even the
gunk theorist has to start her theory with some primitive terms. A par-
ticle physicist who believes that leptons and quarks are not mereological
atoms but have proper parts, which in turn have again proper parts, and
so forth, has to admit at some point, that she cannot name any further
objects. Or think about it in a different way: Take a list of all the names
– to keep things simple, let’s focus on singular names only – the gunk
theorist is using in her theory. Next, find out which names can be used to
express truthfully that an inclusion relation holds between two objects.
Surely this is not an impossible task, even if we assume that our world is
gunky. The reason for this is that even when we assume the existence of
gunky objects, it remains impossible for us to use infinitely many names.
Whether we assume the existence of gunky objects or not does not affect
that our abilities of reasoning and expressing ourselves are limited. This
surely hints at a more complex problem for any theory that assumes the
existence of gunky objects, or more generally, for any theory that assumes
the existence of infinitely many objects: If the ontological commitments
of a theory t is a list of those objects which have to exist for the theory
to be true, and according to t, there exist infinitely many objects, then we
will end up with an infinitely long list of ontological commitments. Al-
though this is an issue we must not resolve here, let me point out that in
the case of a gunky theory and its ontological commitments, this prob-
lem can be resolved, if Composition as Identity is assumed. It is not only
the case that given the ontological commitment to the parts of a compos-
ite object, there is no additional commitment to the composite object. In
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addition, it holds that given the ontological commitment to a compos-
ite object, there is no additional commitment to the existence of its parts.
Hence, with Composition as Identity, the friend of gunky objects gets the
existence of infinitely many objects without any additional commitment
over and above the commitment to the composite object they are parts of.
But let’s turn back to our question whether the notion of bottom ob-
jects is compatible with theories of gunk. My suggestion, that there
cannot be an infinite chain of inclusion relations, even if the existence
of gunky objects is assumed, is a pragmatic move: Although the gunk
theorist believes in an infinite chain of the parthood relation, she cannot
hold on to the claim of an infinite inclusion relation, because she has to
use some primitive, singular terms.This is a linguistic limitation we have
to face and which cannot be avoided. Even if we believe that there are
infinitely many objects, we do not have the capacity to use all of their
names. Since the notion of bottom objects is primarily intended to reflect
a linguistic feature of a theory, it does not force us to beg the question
against theories which postulate the existence of gunky objects.
Second, the chain of inclusion relations might be circular. We start
with x not being a bottom object in t, which has y among it. Then, y is
not a bottom object, and so forth, until we reach an object z which has
x among it. This picture of reality is inconsistent with the principles we
have agreed upon thus far, too. It contradicts our axioms (A9) and (A10),
the asymmetry and transitivity119 of ‘≺’: If there are some objects x, y1,
y2, . . . , yn, z, such that there is chain of inclusion relations, y1 ≺ x ∧ y2 ≺
y1 ∧ . . . ∧ z ≺ yn ∧ x ≺ z, then it follows from (A10) that x is among z
and z is among x. However, this is inconsistent with the asymmetry of
the inclusion relation. Thus, there cannot be a circular inclusion-chain.
This leaves us with the third possibility; the chain of inclusion rela-
tions comes eventually to an end with some object z. In that case, z is
119. Although we will reject (A10) at the end of this chapter, we will hold on to a
restricted form which states that ‘≺’ is transitive when flanked by singular terms on ei-
ther side. Hence, the restriction of ‘≺’ will still allow for the inference which is sketched
above.
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a bottom object in t. Hence, our assumption that there are no bottom
objects led us to its negation. Thereby, we have not only shown that a
theory of gunk is consistent with the assumption that there are bottom
objects, but even more, that it is impossible for a gunk theorist to avoid
accepting bottom objects. The gunk theorist might regard them merely as
fictitious objects, assuming their existence solely due to practical reasons.
The particular details do not matter for us here. Important for us is only
that a theory of a gunky universe is compatible with the view and that
we are not presupposing an answer to the question of atomism.
Before we move on, let’s pause for a moment and try to clarify the
notion of a bottom object a bit further. At first sight, it might seem that
the concept of a bottom object collapses with the mereological notion of
an atom. Yet, I should stress two points. First, the introduction of the
concept of bottom objects is mainly due to instrumental considerations
and the fact that it gives our theory an algebraically neat structure, as we
will see in chapter 8. In this respect, my considerations here are similar
to the ones that are often taken into account when the notion of an empty
individual, which is an object that is an improper part of any object, is
postulated, (see, for instance, Carnap 1988: 35-9, and in particular Martin
1979: 82).
Second, the concept of mereological atoms is used to mark an onto-
logical distinction, while the concept of bottom objects marks, first and
foremost, a linguistical, and only in a derivative way an ontological, dis-
tinction. Unlike mereology, plural logic is primarily a theory that is based
on a logico-linguistical distinction – the distinction between singular and
plural terms. Naturally, this carries over to the basic relation, the inclu-
sion relation, of plural logic and also to the concept of a bottom object,
which is defined with the help of the inclusion relation. Hence, with the
notion of a bottom object, I intend to capture a linguistical phenomenon
of theories: a theory t uses a term x, which names an object y, and t does
not use any term x′, which names an object y′, and y properly includes
y′. With this in mind, let’s move on to introduce a further concept which
we will need in the next chapter.
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The concepts of urelements and atoms can be used to introduce a fur-
ther relation. In set theory, x is called a minimal element of a set y iff x is
an element of y which does not have itself any elements. For set theories
which are based on urelements, this means, trivially, that some object x is
an urelement of a set y iff x is a minimal element of y. Similarly, we have
in mereology the notion of an atomic part of an object, which is defined
as follows: x is an atomic part of y iff x is a part of y and x is an atom.
Interestingly, we can use our notion of being a bottom object to define a re-
lation that is analogous to ‘being a minimal element of a set’ and ‘being
an atomic part of an object’.
This relation will be important for the next chapter, where we will
use it to define several kinds of identity relations. Its central idea is the
following: A bottom object x of an object or some objects α is a bottom
object which we encounter, if we start with α and keep asking What’s
among that? until we get the answer Nothing. You can imagine this as a
dialogue between two people, A and B. A asks What is among these two
decks of cards? B answers – Well, the red deck and the blue deck. Then, A asks
the rather odd sounding question And what is among the blue deck? Now,
B seems to be in a position where several answers appear to be equally
legitimate: The four suits of cards, the two red suits and the two black suits,
The cards from 2 to 9 and the cards from 10 to Ace, The 2 of Spades, the 3 of
Spades, . . . , and so on. But let’s suppose. B replies The the two red suits and
the two black suits. A keeps on asking And what is among the black suit? B
answers The Queen of Spades. And what is among the Queen of Spades? B
finally says Nothing. According to (D13), the Queen of Spades is (for B) a
bottom object. Moreover, the notion of being a bottom object of tells us that
the Queen of Spades is a bottom object of the two decks of cards, but also
of the blue deck, the four suits of the blue deck, and the two black suits
of the blue deck for B.
In our formal language, we can define the relation ‘being a bottom
object of’ as follows:
(D14) BO(x, α) =d f B(x) ∧ ∃y(x  y ∧ y  α)
§7.4 BOTTOM OBJECTS 207
Thus, x is a bottom object of some object or some objects α means that x is
a bottom object and there is some y such that x is improperly among y and
y is improperly among α. The above definition might seem unnecessarily
complicated, especially the use of a second singular variable ‘y’ in the
definiens. The reason for this lies in the partial transitivity of inclusion,
which we will discuss in the next section. Eventually, we might want to
say that a bottom object is a bottom object of itself. Thus, since we use the
improper inclusion predicate in the definiens, the worst that can happen
is the following: x and y turn out to be identical, hence, the definiens
simply collapses to ‘x is a bottom object and x is improperly among y ’,
in that case. This is not a disturbing outcome.
Before we move on to discuss the question whether the inclusion re-
lation is transitive, note the following theorems that can be derived from
(D14). First, ‘being a bottom object of’ is an antisymmetric, transitive,
and not reflexive, i.e. neither reflexive nor irreflexive, relation. Second,
every bottom object, and only they, are bottom objects of themselves.
Since postulating the existence of bottom objects does not exclude the
existence of atoms or gunky objects, we can be reassured that we are
not presupposing any answer to the question of atomism. Moreover, it
emerged from our considerations on why the existence of bottom objects
is consistent with theories of gunky objects that it is advisable to add a
principle that states the existence of bottom objects. Hence, I think we
should avoid adding a non-emptiness axiom for singular terms to our
principles but should instead consider the following:
∀α∃y(BO(y, α))
Given what we have observed thus far about bottom objects, it strikes me
that the claim, represented by the above formula, that any object either
is a bottom object or has a bottom object among it, is acceptable. Hence,
it will be one of the axioms of LI. This concludes our discussion about
bottom objects and we turn back to the second question raised before we
introduced this: Can an object x have only one object y among it?
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7.4 Supplementation
By allowing for singular terms to enter the second argument place of the
inclusion relation and motivating the thought that in some cases it can
be true to say that there is an object x properly among an object y, the
question arises whether it is possible that some object has only one object
properly among it. A similar question arises in mereology, where one
reflects whether it is possible for an object x to have one object y as proper
part only, (see Casati and Varzi 1999: 38-42, Simons 2003: §1.5 and Varzi
2016: §3.1-3.3).
Given the idea of bottom objects and the thought that any object is
either a bottom object or has a bottom object among itself, it appears odd
to think that there can be only one object y properly among an object
x. In that case, it seems difficult to distinguish between x and y in the
first place. However, x cannot be identical to y, if the latter is among the
former. That is excluded by the asymmetry of the inclusion predicate.
Hence, we should adopt an axiom that avoids this odd outcome. We
shall adopt the term ‘supplementation axiom’ for this principle, which is
also used in mereology.
Let’s consider the two candidates for supplementation axioms dis-
cussed by Casati and Varzi (1999: 38-42),120 and label them accordingly as
“weak supplementation” and “strong supplementation”. An analogous
version to the weak supplementation principle from mereology amounts
in the terms of plural logic to the following claim: If x is properly among
y, then there is a z such that z is improperly among y and there is no
w such that w is improperly among z and z is among x. On the other
hand, the version based on the strong supplementation from mereology
amounts to, if x is not improperly among y, then there is a z1 such that z1
is improperly among x and there is not z2 such that z2 is among z1 and z2
is among y. In formal terms:
120. Further possible ways to spell out the above idea might be based on considering
other principles discussed in (Casati and Varzi 1999: 38-42), (Simons 2003: §1.5) and
(Varzi 2016: §3.1-3.3).
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(WeS) x ≺ y→ ∃z1(z1  y ∧ ¬∃z2(z2  z1 ∧ z2  x))
(StS) ¬(x  y)→ ∃z1(z1  x ∧ ¬∃z2(z2  z1 ∧ z2  y))
I shall consider taking the strong supplementation as one of the prin-
ciples on board. Analogous to its mereological counterpart, it has the
advantage of capturing the idea that if some object x is not among an
object y, then there must be remainder, some object z which makes the
difference between x and y, (see Varzi 2016: §3.2). On the other hand, the
weak supplementation principle tells us only that if x is properly among
y, then there is some object z which makes the difference between the for-
mer two. It does not tell us anything about the objects x and y, which are
absolutely distinct, i.e. if there is no object z which is among both, or if
some, but not all objects which are among x are among y. It seems natu-
ral to assume in both cases that there is some remainder which makes the
difference between x and y. Since (StS) is able to cover these cases, while
(WeS) is not, the former is more natural to choose.
7.5 The Partial Transitivity of Inclusion
Finally, the last question we have to answer before we are prepared to
develop our formal system concerns FOP’s axiom (A10), the transitivity
of the inclusion predicate. Within the standard systems, this axiom does
not cause any harmful troubles. Yet, the standard conception of plural
logic makes the transitivity of ‘≺’ an odd axiom and this suggests that
we might have a closer look at it. I will suggest that the revision of our
view on plural logic includes rephrasing the transitivity of ‘≺’. Hence,
we should consider that the inclusion predicate is transitive only if it op-
erates between singular terms, but that it fails to be transitive when a
plural term enters one of its argument places.
Let’s first have a look at the oddities that arise from (A10) within the
standard conception of plural logic. These arise from the conservative
strategy from section 5.6: If an infinite hierarchy of terms, with infinitely
many inclusion relations ‘≺1’, ‘≺2’, ‘≺3’, . . . is postulated, one wonders
210 PRINCIPLES FOR A LOGIC OF IDENTITIES §7.5
what is the point of having an axiom that postulates the transitivity of
inclusion.121 The idea of the transitivity of inclusion can be cashed out in
two different ways in the standard framework. Both of them come with
major shortcomings.
First, a transitivity axiom gets postulated for each inclusion rela-
tion:122
α1 ≺1 β2 ∧ β2 ≺1 γ3 → α1 ≺1 γ3
β2 ≺2 γ3 ∧ γ3 ≺2 α4 → β2 ≺2 α4
...
In that case the axioms become pointless. They are vacuously true be-
cause their antecedents are necessarily false. Recall, the hierarchical so-
lution is based on the claim that only sentences where an inclusion pred-
icate takes a term from level n in its first and a term from level n + 1 in
its second argument place can be true. This implies that any sentence,
which is adequately represented by an instance of an antecedent of the
above formulas, is false. Whenever ‘αn ≺n βn+1’ represents a true sen-
tence, ‘βn+1 ≺n γn+2’ cannot represent a true sentence. If ‘βn+1’ is a term
from the level that can enter the second argument place, i.e. the first con-
junct can be true, then ‘βn+1’ cannot also be from the right level to go into
the first argument place of the predicate, i.e. the second conjunct cannot
be true.
Since the traditionalist might not want to blow up her theory with un-
necessary axioms, she might try a different approach in the light of the
above problem. She may revise the axioms of transitivity in such a way
that the antecedent of the implication contains inclusion predicates from
121. See for that also the worries expressed by McKay (2006: 135-9).
122. The subscripts of the variables and constants in the formulas above have a twofold
purpose: First, they indicate the level of the terms over which the variables range. Sec-
ond, their use allows us to construct several distinct terms by the use of the same Greek
letter.
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different, neighboring levels. Hence, the antecedent of the first transitiv-
ity axiom might be ‘α1 ≺1 β2 ∧ β2 ≺2 γ3’. Thereby, the above problem of
triviality can be avoided.
Nevertheless, this modification of the axioms comes with other prob-
lems. Although we can save the antecedents of the transitivity axioms
from being trivially true, we cannot come up with the right consequents
for them. If we have ‘α1 ≺1 β2 ∧ β2 ≺2 γ3’ as the antecedent of the first
transitivity axiom, what inclusion predicate shall go into the consequent?
It cannot be ‘≺1’, since ‘γ3’ is not one of the terms that can be on its right
side. Neither, can it be ‘≺2’, because ‘α1’ cannot be found on the level
where the terms which can enter the first argument place of ‘≺2’ are lo-
cated. In this context, one might be tempted to increase the number of
inclusion relations. Given ‘α1 ≺1 β2 ∧ β2 ≺2 γ3’ and that among the
infinitely many inclusion predicates, ‘≺1’, ‘≺2’, ‘≺3’, . . . , which operate
along the hierarchy of terms, there is not a single one that can connect ‘α1’
and ‘γ3’, the traditionalist might stipulate that there is a further infinity of
inclusion predicates, ‘≺1′ ’, ‘≺2′ ’, ‘≺3′ ’, . . . , such that they can take a term
from level n in their first and a term from the level n + 2 in their second
argument place.123 Thus, the transitivity axioms can be rephrased in the
following way:
α1 ≺1 β2 ∧ β2 ≺2 γ3 → α1 ≺1
′
γ3




Be that as it may, the traditionalist has still not enough inclusion pred-
icates at her disposal, if she wants to keep the unrestricted version of
(A10). Her predicates cannot represent the inclusion relation that holds
between ‘α1’ and ‘α4’, which given the idea that the transitivity of ‘≺’ is
123. Note, that adding different inclusion predicates to the vocabulary has the conse-
quence that not only different versions of the transitivity axiom have to be postulated,
but in addition to that different versions of the asymmetry of inclusion, as well as of the
comprehension, extensionality and the non-emptiness axiom.
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unrestricted, should follow from ‘α1 ≺1 β2 ∧ β2 ≺2
′
α4’. To put things
short, we can see – already from the traditional picture of plural logic –
that the transitivity of ‘≺’ is problematic. The traditionalist will unavoid-
ably run into problems with (A11) due to the postulation of an infinite
hierarchy of terms and an infinite number of inclusion predicates. Al-
though we can avoid these problems, since we deny the existence of an
infinite hierarchy of terms, we have to face another problem, which has
its origin in the transitivity of ‘≺’.
As we have seen in section 5.3.2, certain contexts suggest that the in-
clusion relation is transitive:
(14) If Russell is among the logicians and the logicians are among the
philosophers, then Russell is among the philosophers
(15) If PM is one of the logic books and the logic books are some of the
philosophy books, then PM is one of the philosophy books
However, we should resist concluding that ‘≺’ is transitive:
(16) If Rogers is among Rogers, Hammerstein, and Hart, and Rogers,
Hammerstein, and Hart are among the people who wrote a musical,
then Rogers is among the people who wrote a musical
(17) The Queen of Spades is among the 52 cards, the 52 cards are among
the objects which weigh more than 50 grams, the Queen of Spades
is among the objects which weigh more than 50 grams
The problem with assuming the transitivity of inclusion is then the fol-
lowing. Although the antecedents of (16) and (17) are true, their con-
sequents are false. If their consequents were true, then the following
sentences could be derived from them together with the comprehension
axiom:124
124. (18) follows from the consequent of (16) and the comprehension axiom, since if
someone wrote a musical, then x is among the people who wrote a musical iff x wrote a
musical. An analogous derivation for (19) from (17) is at hand.
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(18) Gilbert wrote a great comic opera
(19) The Queen of Spades weighs more than 50 grams
These sentences are false: Gilbert never wrote a great comic opera alone,
but only in collaboration with Sullivan. Rogers only wrote musicals to-
gether with Sullivan. A card does (usually) not weigh more than ten
grams. Hence, we can see that postulating the transitivity of inclusion is
problematic. In particular, if we have cases that fit one of the following
two descriptions: First, an object, z, is among some objects, uu, and those
are among some further objects, vv. The problem that can arise in those
cases is that the latter mentioned plurality, vv, is a plurality of objects
having a certain property Φ. The former mentioned plurality, uu, might
be among the vv, because they are collectively Φ. Yet, that does not guar-
antee that each one of the objects among uu is Φ. Second, some objects
uu, are among some objects, vv, and furthermore, the latter are among
some other objects, ww. Now again, ww is a plurality of objects having
a certain property Φ. Although uu is among the objects which are Φ, be-
cause they are collectively Φ, it is not the case that each one of the objects
among uu is Φ. The following examples illustrate the problem:
(20) If the Italians are among the Europeans, and the Europeans are
among the ethnic groups which have a population that exceeds 500
million people, then the Italians are among the ethnic groups that
exceed 500 million people
(21) If 2 and 4 are among the even numbers, and the even numbers are
among the numbers whose sum exceeds 10, then 2 and 4 are among
the numbers whose sum exceeds 10
As the examples and the previous analysis suggest, the obvious problem
with the transitivity of the inclusion relation arises in connection with
predicates that are collective in some of their argument places. So, it
seems that we have two options: Either we reject the transitivity of ‘≺’
altogether, or we restrict it in such a way that the problematic cases can
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be avoided. The first option may be the safer option, yet I suspect that it
is too radical. We might try to keep at least a restricted version. But, how
can we restrict (A10) in order to avoid the above-mentioned counterex-
amples?
Since the counterexamples to (A10) only arise in connection with col-
lective argument places, we have the option to restrict the axiom to sin-
gular terms only. By doing so, we can make sure that we will never run
into a situation where some objects uu have collectively a property Φ,
i.e. are among vv which is the plurality of Φs, while each one of uu does
not have said property, i.e. is not among the Φs. Thus, we will have a
restricted version of the transitivity of the inclusion relation LI, which
adheres to the thought that ‘≺’ is transitive only in purely singular con-
texts, and may be non-transitive, i.e. neither transitive nor intransitive, if a
plural term enters one of its argument places. Hence, we will reject (A10)
from FOP and replace it with the following axiom, containing singular
terms only:
x ≺ y ∧ y ≺ z→ x ≺ z
We have now cleared the ground for the system LI, a logical framework
that will be able to capture the idea that identity is a relation which comes
in a variety of forms. At the beginning of this chapter, I argued for the
claim that terms such as ‘the pair of men who wrote PM’, or ‘the suit of
cards’, are singular terms. The former is not able to refer to more than one
object, but refers at most to one object, the pair. With respect to the relata
of the inclusion predicate, I suggested that we should be tolerant and al-
low for any term to enter each one of its argument places. Although this
sounds counterintuitive at first, our decision to consider such terms as
‘the pair of men who wrote PM’, or ‘the suit of cards’ as singular terms
makes this step easier to take. ‘Russell is among the pair of men who
wrote PM’ or ‘Russell and Whitehead are among the pair of men who
wrote PM’ are sensible sentences to utter. After introducing the predi-
cates ‘being a bottom object’ and ‘being a bottom object of’, I provided
reasons to assume that for any object x, x is either a bottom object or has
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a bottom object among it. Although this might look like a disguised form
of mereological atomism, taking this principle as an axiom for our logic
(LI) has been justified. The concept of being a bottom object is first and
foremost a pragmatic notion, relative to a theory. What is a bottom ob-
ject in one theory, must not be a bottom object in another theory. Finally,
we formulated a supplementation axiom, which guarantees that objects,
which are not bottom objects, have at least two different objects among
them, and motivated a principle stating that the inclusion predicate is
transitive only when it connects two singular terms. These principles




A Logic for Identities: LI
The goal of this chapter is to construct a formal system, LI, which allows
us to capture the idea that identity comes in different varieties, whereby
this assumption results from our analysis of the derivations of the con-
tradictions from section 5.5. This system is an elaboration of FOP. The
language of FOP and LI are the same, but given our previous consider-
ations about identity, a different interpretation of ‘=’ is intended. While
in the former system, ‘=’ is taken to represent the identity relation, which
is what we have identified as the source of the contradictions, it is in-
terpreted as representing a kind of identity relation, namely the singular
one-one identity relation, in LI. Using the same symbol in the two differ-
ent systems, yet interpreting them differently, allows us to carry over the
inference rules and definitions, as well as some of the axioms and theo-
rems of LI. However, since the symbol ‘=’ is intended to be interpreted
differently in the two systems some of the derivations of the theorems of
FOP will not be possible in LI.
After spelling out the basis of LI, i.e. its language and inference rules,
as well as the definitions and axioms, some of which carry over from
FOP, while others are based on the considerations from the last chapter,
we will define the predicates representing the different kinds of identity
relations. These will then be used to define the predicate for the general
identity relation ‘≡’ simply as the disjunction of the nine kinds of identity.
Moreover, we will show that the reflexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity
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of ≡ are theorems of LI, and sketch the proof for the derivations of these
theorems and other lemmata. Eventually, we will show that LI can be
used as a formal framework to provide us with a solution to the paradox
from Composition as Identity and to avoid the derivation of Collapse.
However, we are not yet able to reply to the second group of criticisms
Composition as Identity has to face. These will be discussed in the next
chapter. The appendix to this chapter contains some formal proofs for
the theorems and lemmata of LI.
8.1 The Basis of LI
The object- and metalanguage of LI are the object- and metalanguage of
FOP, see the introduction to chapter 5 and section 5.1. Please note again,
that the primitive predicate ‘=’ is intended to represent the singular one-
one identity relation, as discussed in section 6.4. As a result of our discus-
sion in chapter 6, we shall restrict substitution accordingly in a twofold
way: If a predicate is intensional in an argument place, only rigid desig-
nators can be substituted in the relevant argument place. If a predicate
is hyperintensional only terms whose reference is articulated in the same
way can be substituted. Any terms can be substituted, if a predicate is
extensional in the relevant argument place. Given the observations from
section 6.3, I take it that these restrictions are justified, even if, as I have
already remarked in section 2.1 and 6.1, this challenge to Leibniz’s Law
may be considered to be a big bullet to bite.
Since ‘=’ represents singular identity, we can hold on to the inference
rules of FOP, i.e. modus ponens, universal generalization, and a singular-
ized version of substitution. I shall ignore, for the ease of exposition, that
even in purely singular contexts, there may occur failures of substitution,
as we have seen in section 6.3. We may assume, for simplicity’s sake, that
any singular term is a rigid designator. Thus, in singular contexts, substi-
tution will be considered to be applicable without restrictions and we can
hold on to the singularized version of substitution from section 5.2:
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(SI) If ` x = y and ` Φ(x), then ` Φ(y)
We hold on to the definitions (D1) to (D10) of FOP, and add the defini-
tions of ‘being an improper plurality’, ‘being a proper plurality’, ‘being a
bottom object’, and ‘being a bottom object of’ from chapter 7 to LI:
(D11) IP(uu) =d f ∀x∀y(x ≺ uu ∧ y ≺ uu→ x = y)
(D12) PP(uu) =d f ¬IP(uu)
(D13) B(x) =d f ∀y¬(y ≺ x)
(D14) BO(x, α) =d f B(x) ∧ ∃y(x  y ∧ y  α)
Apart from (A10), the unrestricted version of the transitivity of inclusion,
which is replaced by the partial transitivity axiom (T≺), and (A13), the
extensionality axiom, which we abandon altogether, we can rely in LI on
the axioms of FOL. (L=) is intended to represent the singular version of
the law of identity, claiming that any object is singularly one-one identical
to itself, and has to be kept apart from FOL’s (A4). Additionally, we
have (BO), which guarantees that there is at least one bottom object for
any object; (StS), the supplementation principle; and ( 6=), which says that
no objects uu are singularly one-one identical to themselves, or to some
object x, and allows for the syntactical distinction of our kinds of identity
relations. This claim does not follow from the axioms or the definitions
of the different kinds of identity relations.125
(L =) x = x
(T≺) x ≺ y ∧ y ≺ z→ x ≺ z
(BO) ∃y(BO(y, α))
125. Since we define the different kinds of identity relations with the variables ‘α’ and
‘β’, standing for singular and plural variables of the object language, we have to make
sure to include this axiom to keep track of the syntactical distinction we want to make.
This will be done by with the help of (L=) and ( 6=), since the former guarantees that any
formula where ‘=’ takes the same singular variable in its argument places is true, while
a formula where it is flanked by the same plural variable is false.
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One- Many- One- Many-
One One Many Many
Singular α = β − − −
Plural α ∼ β α 'β α '∗β α ≈ β
Plural-
Singular α
∼= β α ' β − −
Singular-
Plural α
∼=∗ β − α '∗ β −
Table 8.1: The Varieties of Identity: Generalized
(StS) ¬(x  y)→ ∃z1(z1  x ∧ ¬∃z2(z2  z1 ∧ z2  y))
( 6=) ¬(α = uu)
The only theorem of FOP which can be adopted here, given the deriva-
tions from section 5.7, is the irreflexivity of inclusion:
(I≺) ¬(α ≺ α)
This is the basis from where we start our task to work out a formal system
that captures the idea of a variety of identity relations. As a semantics of
LI, we can use the semantics for FOP from section 5.4, with the only
difference that the valuation of ‘=’ for LI is the singular one-one identity
relation and not, as in the semantics for FOP, the identity relation.
As I argued in chapter 6, there are – besides the general identity rela-
tion – nine different identity relations which are distinguished according
to the kind of terms that are used to express that an identity holds, and
the number of objects the used terms refer to. As a reminder of what lies
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ahead of us consider table 8.1, which is a modified version of table 6.1,
whereby the former uses the variables ‘α’ and ‘β’.
From a dialectical point of view, it is nice to group our definitions
along the lines of the semantical distinction of the kinds of identities,
though this is simply a matter of convenience. Hence, we shall begin
our series of definitions with the one-one identity relations.
8.2 One-One Identities
Let’s start our series of identity definitions with defining some of the one-
one identities. We are already familiar with our primitive relation, ‘=’,
and a few remarks about what differentiates it from the other kinds of
identities should suffice here. First, a singular identity ‘α = β’ is true iff
‘α’ and ‘β’ are co-referring singular terms. Second, ‘=’ is the only identity
relation obeying substitution:
(=′5) If it is derivable that α = β and α has the property Φ, then it is
derivable that β has Φ
Given that this relation is already well-studied in the literature, there is
nothing much left for us to add here. So, we shall move on to define the
other one-one identity relations.
The above examples for the three kinds of one-one identities give us
already a first impression of their definitions. Recall the examples for
plural one-one identities:
(1) The authors of OD are identical to the authors of Marriage and
Morals
(2) The marked cards are identical to the cards on the table
What makes (1) a plural one-one identity? First, it is a plural identity be-
cause the two terms used to express the identity are plural. Second, it is a
one-one identity because the two terms refer to the same object, Russell.
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How can we capture this within plural logic? The answer is straightfor-
ward: A plural one-one identity is true iff it holds for the referents, uu
and vv, of the two plural terms, ‘uu ’ and ‘vv ’, which flank the iden-
tity predicate that anything that is among uu is among vv, and vice versa.
More generally, we can define a plural one-one identity in the language
of LI as:
(D15) α ∼ β =d f ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ IP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ x ≺ β)
Similarly, we can easily come up with a definition of plural-singular one-
one identities by considering the above examples
(3) The authors of OD are identical to Russell
(4) The cards on the table are identical to the Queen of Spades
(3) is a plural identity because we have a plural term, ‘the authors of OD’
in the first and a singular term ‘Russell’ in the second argument place
of the identity predicate. Furthermore, it is a one-one identity because
both terms refer to the same object, Russell. Since both terms have the
same referent, (3) is true. Hence the definition of a plural one-one iden-
tity states that a plural-singular one-one identity holds iff we have an
improper plurality uu and x is among uu:
(D16) α ∼= β =d f ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ IP(α) ∧ β ≺ α
The definition of singular-plural one-one identities simply changes the
arguments of the above definition: A singular-plural one-one identity
holds iff x is among the improper plurality uu:
(D17) α ∼=∗ β =d f α = α ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(β) ∧ α ≺ β
Since our conjunction commutes, we will be able to show that a plural-
singular one-one identity holds between uu and x iff a singular-plural
one-one identity holds between x and uu. This is our first lemma:
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(L1) uu ∼= x ↔ x ∼=∗ uu
These are all the one-one identity relations we need and we move on to
the many-one and one-many identities.
8.3 Many-One and One-Many Identities
The definitions of the various kinds of one-one identities are pretty
straightforward. Things are a little bit more difficult with the many-one
identity and one-many identity relation, which we are about to define.
However, our definition (D14) gives us the necessary means to overcome
these difficulties.
We shall first have again a look at some of the examples from the pre-
vious chapters, before we give a formal definition of the different kinds
of relations.
(5) Russell and Whitehead are identical to the pair of men who wrote
PM
(6) The 13 black cards are identical to the suit of Spades
Here again, we have to ask what makes, for instance, (5) a true plural-
singular many-one identity? First, it is a plural-singular identity because
we have a plural term, ‘Russell and Whitehead’, in the first, and a singu-
lar term, ‘the pair of men who wrote PM’ in the second argument place of
the identity predicate. Second, the identity which according to (5) holds
is a many-one identity because the term in the first argument place refers
to many objects, while the term in the second argument place refers to
one object. Finally, why is (5) true? We can explain its truth with the re-
lation being a bottom object of : The referents of the two terms ‘Russell and
Whitehead’ and ‘the pair of men who wrote PM’ share their bottom ob-
jects. Whatever is a bottom object of Russell and Whitehead, is a bottom
object of the pair of men who wrote PM, and vice versa.
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Since the definition of plural-singular many-one identity is a central
element of LI and the remaining definitions of this section will piggy-
back on it, let’s have a look at (6) as well. There, we have a plural term,
‘the 13 black cards’, which refers to many object, and a singular term,
‘the suit of Spades’, referring to one thing. The 13 black cards and the
suit of Spades share all their bottom objects, because if some object is a
bottom object of the cards, then it is a bottom object of the suit, and if it is
a bottom object of the suit, then it is a bottom object of the cards.
Finally, before we come to the formal definition, let’s have a look at a
negative example. ‘The seven cans’ is a plural term that refers to many
objects, and ‘the six-pack’ is a singular term referring to only one object.
Nevertheless, the sentence
(7) The seven cans are identical to the six-pack
is not a true plural-singular many-one identity because there is at least
one object which is a bottom element of the seven cans and not of the
six-pack, for instance, the seventh can, or its pull tab, or one of the atoms
of can number seven.
Our formal definition of plural-singular many-one identity goes as
follows:
(D18) α ' β =d f ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ PP(α) ∧ ∀y(BO(y, α)↔ BO(y, β))
The examples we gave for plural many-one identities, for instance
(8) Russell and Whitehead are identical to the pairs of men who wrote
PM
(9) The 13 black cards are identical to the suits of Spades
give us already a hint at the fact that the concept of plural-singular iden-
tity will be used in the definition of plural many-one identity: A plural
many-one identity holds, if we have two plural terms ‘uu’ and ‘vv’ con-
nected by the identity predicate, whereby ‘uu’ refers to many objects and
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‘vv’ refers to one object. Hence, we have a proper plurality referred to
by the first, and an improper plurality referred to by the second term. A
sentence meeting these criteria is true iff the object x, which is among the
improper plurality vv, stands in a plural-singular many-one identity to
the ‘uu’.
(D19) α 'β =d f ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ PP(α) ∧ IP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ β↔ α ' x)
In the case of our example (8), the last criteria mentioned above is met
because the only object that is among the pairs of men who wrote PM
is the pair of men who wrote PM and this stands in a plural-singular
many-one identity to Russell and Whitehead. Hence, we can conclude
that Russell and Whitehead stand in a plural many-one identity to the
pairs of men who wrote PM.
The next two definitions are then pretty straightforward. Analogous
to the plural-singular many-one identity, we will say that a singular-
plural one-many identity holds between x and uu iff uu is a proper plu-
rality and uu and x share all their bottom elements with each other.
(D20) α '∗ β =d f α = α ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ PP(β) ∧ ∀y(BO(y, β)↔ BO(y, α))
Finally, similarly to (D19), we will stipulate that a plural one-many iden-
tity holds between uu and vv iff uu is an improper plurality, vv is a proper
plurality, and the only object that is among uu stands in a plural-singular
many-one identity relation to vv.
(D21) α '∗β =d f ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ PP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ β ' x)
We note from these four definitions that the concepts defined form two
pairs of, in principle, interdefinable relations: uu and x stand in a plural-
singular many-one identity to each other iff they stand in a singular-
plural one-many identity relation; and, uu and vv stand in a plural many-
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one identity to each other iff they stand in a plural one-many identity re-
lation. As we defined them in a different way, these interrelations can be
demonstrated and are reflected by the following two lemmata:
(L2) uu ' x ↔ x '∗ uu
(L3) uu 'vv↔ vv '∗uu
8.4 Many-Many Identities
Finally, we come to the definition of our last kind of identity relation,
before we can define the general identity relation. Prior to coming to the
formal definition, I would like to discuss some examples of plural many-
many identities, which might raise the suspicion that it is not possible to
come up with an adequate definition of plural many-many identity such
that all of them turn out to be plural many-many identities. Consider the
following three sentences:
(10) Russell and Whitehead are identical to the authors of PM
(11) The 26 cards are identical to the two suits
(12) The five suits and the 39 cards are identical to the two decks
Given the formal apparatus developed thus far, we may note that al-
though the above sentences qualify as plural many-many identities, in
each case we have two plural terms which both refer to more than one
object, they all seem to be true in virtue of facts which suggest structural
differences: (10) straightforwardly qualifies as true, due to the extension-
ality axiom; (11) will turn out to be true, due to the plural-singular many-
one identities that hold between the first sixteen cards and the first suit
and the second sixteen cards and the second suit; similarly, (12) will have
to be explained, though not only, on the basis of a plural-singular many-
one identity.
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Although it is possible to distinguish between different kinds of plural
many-many identity relations, it does not seem that this has an important
advantage. Hence, since we have the possibility to define this relation in a
way that the sentences (10) to (12) will turn out to fulfill the requirements
to be a plural many-many identity, we might as well spare the troubles
to come up with several definitions. The key concept of the definition is
again the relation of being a bottom object of an object: A plural many-
many identity holds between uu and vv iff both are proper pluralities and
share their bottom objects:
(D22) α ≈ β =d f ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ PP(α) ∧ PP(β)∧
∧∀x(BO(x, α)↔ BO(x, β))
It can be seen that our above examples qualify as plural many-many iden-
tities, since Russell and Whitehead, the 26 cards, and the five suits and
the 39 cards share their bottom elements with the authors of PM, the two
suits, and the two decks, respectively. This is a nice feature of (D22) and it
shows in addition that there is no need to invoke a variety of many-many
identities. Now that we have our nine kinds of identity relations defined,
we can move on to the general identity relation.
8.5 General Identity
We have now a clearer picture of what the variety of identity looks like
and we can define the general identity relation, which we represent with
‘≡’. Already at the beginning of this chapter, I indicated that this will be
done disjunctively on the basis of the different kinds of identity relations:
(D23) α ≡ β =d f α = β ∨ α ∼ β ∨ α ' β ∨ α '∗ β ∨ α '∗β ∨ α ' β∨
∨α '∗ β ∨ α 'β ∨ α ≈ β
Let’s turn to the logical properties of the general identity relation. As it is
to be expected, it is an equivalence relation, i.e. it is reflexive, symmetric,
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and transitive. Since we have an unrestricted form of substitution only
for ‘=’, it cannot be applied unrestrictedly for ‘≡’.
The reflexivity of ‘≡’ is shown in two steps. The first step simply con-
sists in bringing together (L=), the law of identity, with (D23). Thereby,
we can conclude that each x stands in the general identity relation to it-
self. Secondly, we show that this holds for all any objects uu as well. This
is done by arguing by cases: uu is either a proper or an improper plu-
rality. If uu is an improper plurality, then it stands in the plural one-one
identity relation to itself. If uu is a proper plurality, then it stands in the
plural many-many identity relation to itself. In both cases, it follows from
(D23) that uu is generally self-identical.126 Hence, we conclude that ‘≡’
is reflexive:
(R≡) α ≡ α
To show the symmetry of ‘≡’, we argue by cases. Thereby, we rely on the
lemmata (L1) to (L3), as well as on the following lemmata
(L6) ∀x∀y(x ≡ y↔ x = y)
(L7) ∀uu∀vv(uu ≡ vv↔ uu ∼ vv ∨ uu 'vv ∨ uu '∗vv ∨ uu ≈ vv)
(L8) ∀uu∀x(uu ≡ x ↔ uu ∼= x ∨ uu ' x)
(L9) ∀uu∀x(x ≡ uu↔ x ∼=∗ uu ∨ x '∗ uu)
which can be derived from ( 6=) together with the definitions (D15) to
(D23), and help us keeping track of the syntactical distinction for iden-
tity relations. In a first step, we use the latter four lemmata to show that
there are only nine possible ways – the nine kinds of identity relations
– for ‘α ≡ β’ to be true. Our lemmata (L1) to (L3), together with (D23),
cover already six of these cases: If α is singular-plural one-one, plural-
singular one-one, singular-plural one-many, plural-singular many-one,
126. Moreover, we notice that the remaining cases of plural identity, i.e. plural many-
one and one-many identity, are impossible because uu cannot be both a proper and an
improper plurality, which is what they presuppose.
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plural one-many, or plural many-one identical to β, then β is generally
identical to α. We are left with three cases to prove.
The first case, singular one-one identity, is itself symmetric, which is
shown in the usual way with the help of substitution and the singular-
ized law of identity. Secondly, we show with (D15) that a plural one-one
identity between uu and vv entails the plural one-one identity between vv
and uu because our conjunction commutes. Finally, a similar line of argu-
ment works for plural many-many identity. Hence, the three remaining
cases entail general identities, and we have thereby shown the symmetry
of ≡:
(S≡) α ≡ β→ β ≡ α
Ultimately, we come to the transitivity of ‘≡’ . With two different kinds
of terms and nine different kinds of the identity relation, there is a large
number of cases for ‘α ≡ β ∧ β ≡ γ’ we have to take into account. How-
ever, we can save us a lot of work, since each identity predicate can only
be true if it is flanked by the right kind of terms, as the lemmata (L6) to
(L9) show. This leaves us with 45 cases, see the tables 8.2, 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5
in the appendix. Eighteen of these are trivial, since they involve a contra-
dictory antecedent.127 Hence, we have twenty-five cases to prove. These
are still too many to sketch them all here. But let me briefly outline the
general procedure that underlies the proof of (T≡).
After using the lemmata (L6) and (L9) to exclude cases where we have
identities like ‘uu = vv’, or ‘x 'uu’, we proceed with excluding the cases
where we have a contradictory antecedent. Then, we group the contin-
gent cases according to the types of names that enter the argument places
of the identity relations. We make a first rough distinction by grouping
them into cases where we have only singular, only plural, one singular
127. Consider, for instance, case 1. from table 8.2, where we have ‘uu 'vv ∧ vv 'ww’. It
is false, since vv cannot be both a proper and an improper plurality, and it has to be the
former in order for the second conjunct to be true, and the latter for the first conjunct to
be true. Similarly, ‘uu ∼ vv ∧ vv 'ww’ is excluded, since it would only hold, if vv were
a proper as well as an improper plurality.
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and two plural, and one plural and two singular terms. The first group
consists of one case only, since if ‘α’, ‘β’, and ‘γ’ are all singular terms,
then we can only have singular one-one identities holding between α and
β, and β and γ, due to (L6). In the usual way, we show then that α stands
in the singular one-one identity relation to γ with the help of the substi-
tution of singular terms, and derive then from (D23) that they also stand
in the general identity relation to each other.
The second group of cases comprises eight, the third group twelve,
and the fourth group six cases. In all cases, we can show that if α stands
in the general identity relation to β and β stands in the general identity
relation to γ, then α stands in the general identity relation to γ, which
means that we can prove the transitivity of ≡:
(T≡) α ≡ β ∧ β ≡ γ→ α ≡ γ
Some of the cases are quite interesting, although it looks at first that it
is not easy to find an instance of them from natural language. Let’s have
a look at one of them:
#11 uu 'vv ∧ vv ∼= z
We can find out which kind of identity relation holding between uu and z
is entailed by the above by simply looking at the first and the last term of
the formula, as well as considering the kinds of identity relations which
hold between the objects to which they refer and the objects referred to
by ‘vv’: First, ‘uu’ is plural and ‘x’ is singular. So the identity relation that
holds between them is one of the two plural-singular identities. Second,
uu stands in a many-one identity relation to vv. So it is a proper plurality.
z stands in a one-one identity relation to vv. Hence, the identity relation
between uu and z must be a plural-singular many-one identity. Indeed,
this follows from the above conjunction in LI and we can therefore con-
clude with (D23) that if the above holds, then the uu and z stand in a
general identity relation to each other.
Can we find an example that applies to the real world matching up
with the above case? Here is one: Russell and Whitehead are many-one
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identical to the pairs of men who wrote PM. The pairs of men who wrote
PM are one-one identical to the pair of men who wrote PM. Therefore,
Russell and Whitehead are many-one identical to the pair of men who
wrote PM.
Before we move on to see how we are now in a position to address
the criticisms from the sections 2.1 and 2.2, I would like to draw your at-
tention to three particular cases which are involved in the proof of (T≡).
Showing that these cases are derivable within LI is not that straightfor-
ward, and we have to make use of the full resources of the system. A brief
discussion of the derivation of these cases allows us to note a particular
feature of the system LI. It turns out that LI is “[. . . ] hyper-extensional
in Goodman’s sense: things built up from exactly the same [objects] are
identical” (Casati and Varzi 1999: 49).
The above-mentioned cases are #15, #16, and #25, see tables 8.4 and
8.5:
#15 uu ∼= y ∧ y '∗ ww→ uu '∗ww
#16 uu ' y ∧ y ∼=∗ ww→ uu 'ww
#25 x '∗ vv ∧ vv ' z→ x = z
They represent the following English claims:
#15′ If some uu are one-one identical to y and y is one-many identical to
the ww, then the uu are one-many identical to the ww
#16′ If some uu are many-one identical to y and y is one-one identical to
the ww, then the uu are many-one identical to the ww
#25′ If x is one-many identical to the vv and the vv are many-one identi-
cal to z, then x is one-one identical to z
Consider #25 first. From the definitions of LI it follows that if x is one-
many identical to the vv, and the vv are many-one identical to z, that x
and z share all their bottom objects – that is, it holds for any y that y is
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a bottom object of x iff it is a bottom object of z. This entails that x is
one-one identical to z, which is the lemma (L12) below, derivable from
the two lemmata (L10) and (L11):
(L10) ∀x∀y(BO(x, y)→ x  y)
(L11) ∀x∀y(∀z(BO(z, x)↔ BO(z, y))→ x  y)
(L12) ∀x∀y(∀z(BO(z, x)↔ BO(z, y))→ x = y)
According to (L10), any bottom object x of y is improperly among y. This
follows from the restricted transitivity of ‘≺’ and the definition of ‘being
a bottom object of’. (L11) tells us that if two objects x and y share their
bottom objects, then x is improperly among y. This follows from (L10),
the supplementation axiom and the axiom (BO), which guarantees that
for any object there is at least one bottom object. Finally, we use two
instances of (L11) and the antisymmetry of ‘’ to show that if x and y
share their bottom objects, then they are one-one identical.
Case #25 can then be used to show that #15 holds: First we show
that if uu is one-one identical to y, and y is one-many identical to ww,
with substituting for the singular term ‘y’, that any object among the uu is
many-one identical to ww.128 Then we assume for an arbitrary x that it is
many-one identical to ww. With #25 it follows then from the assumption
that x is one-one identical to y, so that we can conclude with the previ-
ously shown that it holds for any x that x is among uu iff x is many-one
identical to ww. It follows from the assumption that all the other condi-
tions for a plural one-many identity between uu and ww hold. Finally,
case #16 follows from #15 because the antecedents of both cases, as well
as their consequents are logically equivalent according to the lemmata
(L2) to (L4).
Before we move on to address two of the criticisms put forward
against Composition as Identity, I would like to point out that it would
128. This follows immediately from the assumption together with the definition of
plural-singular one-one identity and (L2).
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be possible to define the notion of general identity and the different kinds
of identity in (LI) with the notion of sharing bottom objects: α and β are
identical to each other iff α and β have the same bottom objects. How-
ever, if we define the different kinds of identity in this way, it will be
impossible for us to address the counterexamples from rearrangement
put forward against Composition as Identity. The central issue with these
counterexamples is that two distinct objects share all their bottom objects.
Hence, to spare the trouble of redefining general identity and the kinds
of identity, I decided to use the definitions just presented.
8.6 Meeting two Criticisms
LI finally allows us to reconsider two of the criticisms put forward
against Composition as Identity: the paradox for Composition as Iden-
tity and the derivation of Collapse. As we have seen in the discussion
of these two criticisms in the sections 2.1 and 2.2, both make use of an
unrestricted version of substitution. Let’s rehearse the paradox in some
detail first, and observe how we are now in a position to avoid the con-
tradictory conclusions. Then we shall go on to see that LI allows us to
avoid the derivation of the Collapse principle by the use of substitution,
but that the transitivity of the general identity relation makes things not
that straightforward as they might seem.
8.6.1 Solving the Paradox for Composition as Identity
The paradox for Composition as Identity concludes that a composite ob-
ject is many and a composite object’s parts are one. These two claims
contradict two premises of the paradox: A composite object is one and a
composite object’s parts are many. The derivation of the two conclusions
is made by assuming, besides these two premises, that ‘being one’ is the
opposite of ‘being many’, and Composition as Identity’s core claim that
a composite object is identical to its parts.
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The system LI provides us with a framework that gives us the means
to formalize and address the paradox for Composition as Identity. What
remains to be done is to introduce predicates representing the composi-
tion relation, as well as the relations ‘being one’ and ‘being many’. In the
spirit of Composition as Identity, we shall define ‘composing’ as a plural-
singular many-one identity. Some objects uu compose an object x iff the
uu are plural-singular many-one identical to x:
(D24) C(uu, x) =d f uu ' x
(D24) gives us only a partial definition of composition, since there are also
cases where many objects compose many objects, for instance, twenty-six
cards composing two suits of cards. As explained in the preface, I think
that tackling the concept of plural composition goes beyond our scope
here. However, the inability to explain plural composition is not a gen-
uine feature of Composition as Identity and other accounts of compo-
sition will struggle with the same problem. So, let’s set the concept of
plural composition aside and turn back to the solution for the paradox
for Composition as Identity.
By taking ‘being one’ and ‘being many’ as opposites of each other,
they turn out to be interdefinable. Hence, taking either one of them as
a primitive predicate would suffice. However, the resources of LI allow
us to define ‘being one’ already. We shall say that an object x or some
objects uu, for short, a thing α, is one iff α is one-one identical to α, or α
is an improper plurality. ‘Being many’ amounts then for some α to not
being one-one identical to α or being a proper plurality.
(D25) O(α) =d f α = α ∨ IP(α)
(D26) M(α) =d f ¬O(α)
Given these three definitions, we cannot only formalize the paradox of
Composition as Identity, we can also see that its premises follow from
extending LI with these three definitions:
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1. ∀x∀uu(C(uu, x)↔ uu ' x)
2. ∀x(∃uu(C(uu, x))→ O(x))
3. ∀uu(∃x(C(uu, x))→ M(uu))
4. ∀α(O(α)↔ ¬M(α))
Premise 1. is our definition of composition written as a universally closed
formula. From the definition of ‘being one’ and the Law of Identity,
any object is identical to itself, it follows that any object is one. This en-
tails trivially the second premise, any composite object is one. The third
premise, any objects which compose some object are many, follows from
the definitions of composition (D24), plural-singular many-one identity
(D18), and the definition of ‘being many’: If some objects uu compose an
object x, then they are many-one identical to it. The uu being many-one
identical to x implies that the uu are a proper plurality. Hence, they are
not an improper plurality. Moreover, since they cannot be one-one iden-
tical to themselves, it follows that they are not one, i.e. they are many.
The final premise 4. follows from the definitions just given.
In order to get to the conclusions of the paradox, a composite object is
many, and a composite object’s parts are one
5.a ∀x(∃uu(C(uu, x))→ M(x))
5.b ∀uu(∃x(C(uu, x))→ O(uu))
we have to use an unrestricted version of substitution, which allows us
to substitute a singular term for a plural term and vice versa. In section
2.1, we inferred 5.a from 1. and 3. However, this inference is not valid in
LI since it would involve substituting the singular term ‘x’ for the non-
rigid designator ‘uu, ‘x’s parts’. This is not legitimate, since the predicate
‘being many’ is obviously collective – it does not hold that some things uu
are many iff any object among the uu is many – and thus, non-extensional
in its only argument place.
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Similarly, we cannot derive 5.b from 1. and 2. in LI, since that would
have to be done by substituting the non-rigid designator ‘uu’ for the
singular term ‘x’. This is not allowed either, since the predicate ‘being
one’ is, and that might strike as a surprise, collective and hence, non-
extensional in its only argument place. Intuitively, one may think that
‘being one’ is a distributive predicate. However, that is not the case. If
‘being one’ were distributive, then it would follow for any uu, the uu are
one iff it holds for any object x, if x is among the uu, then x is one. Now,
since we agreed that every object is one, it is trivial that any object that is
among the uu is one. This would then lead us, together with the above
biconditional, to the conclusion that any plurality of objects uu is one.
However, that would lead plural logic ad absurdum. Thus, we the predi-
cate ‘being one’ must be non-extensional in its only argument place, (see
also Oliver and Smiley 2013: §7.4, for more on numerical predicates being
collective in their argument places).
Hence, we can see that our system LI allows us to hold on to Compo-
sition as Identity and to show that the derivation of the paradox of Com-
position as Identity can be blocked: A composite object being identical
to its parts does not entail that the composite object is many or its parts
are one. Although the composite object is one and its parts are many, the
paradoxical conclusions cannot be derived, since substitution can only be
applied in singular contexts, i.e. in cases where we have an identity claim
stating that an object is identical to an object. Therefore, we can hold on
to the claim that a composite object is identical to its parts, and moreover,
that any object is one.
8.6.2 Avoiding Collapse
We have seen in section 2.2 that within the traditional framework of Clas-
sical Extensional Mereology and the standard account of plural logic,129
129. Although we have not officially the mereological concepts, which are necessary in
order to derive Collapse, at hand in LI, we shall use Sider’s framework for the sake of
exposition, as we did in section 2.2. We will see in section 10.6.2 how, given the account
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Composition as Identity entails Collapse. The Collapse principle states
that an object is improperly among some objects iff it is an improper
part of the fusion of these objects. For instance, an object x is improp-
erly among the plurality of logic books iff it is an improper part of the
fusion of the plurality of logic books. This is problematic, since the fu-
sion of the plurality of logic books has at least one improper part, for
instance itself, which is not a logic book. Therefore, the derivation of Col-
lapse puts pressure on Composition as Identity. It suggests that there are
fewer pluralities than the comprehension axiom from plural logic tells
us. Thus, we need a way to avoid the conclusion of this principle. By
restricting the use of substitution as suggested in section 6.3 and chapter
8, we can avoid Sider’s derivation of the principle, because it relies on a
substitution inference, which is not legitimate in LI.
Let’s briefly follow some of the steps of the derivation of Collapse
we have encountered in section 2.2 to see where the principles of our
new framework come into effect, and how it eventually help us to avoid
Collapse: Suppose, x is the fusion of some uu. Then, it follows from the
definition of ‘fusion’, that any y which is among the uu is an improper
part of x. This is one direction of the biconditional we have to show. Next,
assume that y is an improper part of x. With plural covering, we can
deduce from this that there are some objects vv, such that x is the fusion
of the vv, and y is one of the vv. First, this gives us, with Composition
as Identity, that x is identical to the vv, since it is the fusion of the vv.
Because we started with the assumption that x is the fusion of the uu, we
get additionally, again with Composition as Identity, that x is identical to
the uu.
Here is where our restriction comes into play for the first time. In
Sider’s original derivation from section 2.2, substitution is then used to
conclude from the identity between x and the uu and the identity be-
tween x and the vv that the uu are identical to the vv. However, in LI this
of Composition as Identity we develop there, an introduction of mereological notions
might be done. Such a mereological system will be able to avoid Collapse, since it will
be non-extensional because it is based on a non-extensional notion of identity.
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inference is only valid, if the substituted terms are rigid designators, since
identity is a predicate that is intensional in both of its argument places, so
that substituting either the plural term uu for x, or the plural term vv for
x may not be legitimate. For now, we shall not worry whether one of the
two plural terms is a non-rigid designator – though we will come back to
it soon – since a derivation of the above identity can be done in another
way.
From the assumption that x is identical to the uu and to the vv, it
follows that the uu are identical to the vv. This is case #15 in the proof
for the transitivity of ‘≡’, and it shows us that within LI we can deduce
that the uu are many-many identical to the vv, if the uu are many-one
identical to x and x is many-one identical to the vv, without substituting
one of the plural terms. Therefore, our restriction on substitution does
not help us to avoid deriving this line of the proof and it looks like we
end up with Collapse after all. But we are not yet there.
The derivation of Collapse makes use of substitution for a second
time. From the above identity between uu and vv, so the proof goes,
we can conclude that y is among the uu, since y is among the vv. How-
ever, this means that a plural term uu is substituted for a plural term vv
in the second argument place of the inclusion predicate. Again, since the
inclusion predicate is collective, and hence, intensional in its second ar-
gument place, this inference is only legitimate, if both of the plural terms
are rigid designators. Because the derivation of Collapse is done in a
purely formal manner, we have no prima facie evidence whether this is
the case or not. However, since Collapse is a universally quantified for-
mula, it suffices to show that there is only one counterexample in order
to undermine the principle.
This can be done easily. We simply take a plural, non-rigid designa-
tor, say, ‘the authors of PM’, and another plural term, ‘Russell and White-
head’. Then, we simply follow the steps of the alternative derivation from
above, until we reach the plural identity from above, the uu are identi-
cal to the vv, and the claim that states that y is among the vv. In the
case of our example, the identity holds between the authors of PM and
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Russell and Whitehead, and the second claim is that y is among Russell
and Whitehead. However, we also see that we cannot substitute the two
plural terms in that sentence because, as we have already pointed out
previously, inclusion is collective in its second argument place, and since
‘the authors of PM is a non-rigid designator, substitution is not a legiti-
mate inference. Thus, we have shown that Collapse is not a consequence
of Composition as Identity within the system LI. Consequently, a lot of
pressure can be taken from Composition as Identity because we are able
to avoid this worrisome principle.
Although the reason why Collapse does not follow form our account
of Composition as Identity are formal, namely the restriction on substitu-
tion, there is a philosophical lesson we can draw that might be worth to
highlight again, since it will still seem difficult to get use to it. As I have
already emphasized at several occasions in chapter 6, one of the motiva-
tions to restrict substitution is that by including plural terms, and thereby
the phenomenon of predicates being collective in argument places, into
our logical framework, we have to consider that some of the lessons we
learned in singular contexts may fail. In particular, I think, we have seen
that there are good reasons to think that predicates which are collective
in some of their argument places, such as identity in both, or inclusion in
its second argument place, may behave differently than expected.
The aim of this chapter was to develop a formal system capable of
incorporating the idea that identity is a relation that comes a variety
of ways. We spelled out the basic framework at the beginning of this
chapter, which was followed by the definitions of the different kinds of
identity relation in the sections 2 to 4. After defining the general iden-
tity relation disjunctively, we proved that it is a reflexive, symmetric and
transitive relation. Eventually, we saw that LI allows us to solve the para-
dox for Composition as Identity and to avoid the derivation of Collapse.
Thereby, two of the criticisms we have discussed in chapter 2 can be met.
However, we are still not in a position to address the counterexamples
based on rearrangement. The system LI represents, as we will see in the
next chapter, a view which is based on a picture of reality that is based
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too much on extensional considerations. We shall make some first steps
towards overcoming this view in order to be able to avoid being com-
mitted reverse mereological essentialism and thereby addressing another
criticism against Composition as Identity.
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8.7 Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Consider the remarks preceding the proofs for FOP in section 5.7. The
proof for the irreflexivity of ≺
(I≺) ¬(α ≺ α)
can be carried out in LI in the same way as in FOP. Moreover, we can
derive the singularized versions of the FOP theorems (T3), (T4), (T6) and
(T7), the asymmetry and the transitivity of ,
(S=) ∀x∀y(x = y→ y = x)
(T=) ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z→ x = z)
(A) ∀x∀y(x  y ∧ y  x → x = y)
(T) ∀x∀y∀z(x  y ∧ y  z→ x  z)
by mimicking parts of the derivations from section 5.7 and using the cor-
responding singularized versions of the axioms of (LI).
(L1) ∀uu∀vv(uu ∼ vv↔ vv ∼ uu)
1. ∀α∀β(α ∼ β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ IP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ x ≺ β)) [D15]
2. dd ∼ ee [SC1]
3. ee ∼ dd [SC2]
4. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ¬(ee = ee) ∧ IP(dd) ∧ IP(ee)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ ee) [1., 2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
5. ∀x(x ≺ ee↔ x ≺ dd) [4.; PL, UE, UG
√
]
6. ¬(ee = ee) ∧ ¬(dd = dd) ∧ IP(ee) ∧ IP(dd)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ ee↔ x ≺ dd) [4., 5.; PL]
7. ee ∼ dd [1., 6.; α-EX, PL, UE]
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8. dd ∼ ee→ ee ∼ dd [2.-7.; CI]
9. ¬(ee = ee) ∧ ¬(dd = dd) ∧ IP(ee) ∧ IP(dd)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ ee↔ x ≺ dd) [1., 3.; α-EX, PL, UE]
10. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ ee) [9.; PL, UE, UG
√
]
11. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ¬(ee = ee) ∧ IP(dd) ∧ IP(ee)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ ee) [9., 10.; PL]
12. dd ∼ ee [1., 11.; UE, PL]
13. ee ∼ dd→ dd ∼ ee [3.-12.; CI]
14. ∀uu∀vv(uu ∼ vv↔ vv ∼ uu) [8.-13.; PL, UG
√
]
(L2) ∀uu∀x(uu ∼= x ↔ x ∼=∗ uu)
1. ∀α∀β(α ∼= β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ IP(α) ∧ β ≺ α) [D16]
2. ∀α∀β(α ∼=∗ β↔ α = α ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(β) ∧ α ≺ β) [D17]
3. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ a = a ∧ dd ∼= a↔ IP(dd) ∧ a ≺ dd [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
4. a = a ∧¬(dd = dd)∧ IP(dd)∧ a ≺ dd↔ a ∼=∗ dd [2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
5. ∀uu∀x(uu ∼= x ↔ x ∼=∗ uu) [3., 4.; PL, UG
√
]
(L3) ∀uu∀x(uu ' x ↔ x '∗ uu)
1. ∀α∀β(α ' β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ PP(α)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, α)↔ BO(y, β))) [D18]
2. ∀α∀β(β '∗ α↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ PP(α)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, α)↔ BO(y, β))) [D20]
3. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ a = a ∧ dd ' a↔ PP(dd)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, dd)↔ BO(y, a)) [1.;α-EX, PL, UE]
4. a = a ∧ ¬(dd = dd) ∧ a '∗ dd↔ PP(dd)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, dd)↔ BO(y, a)) [2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
5. ∀uu∀x(uu ' x ↔ x '∗ uu) [3., 4.; PL, UG
√
]
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(L4) ∀uu∀vv(uu 'vv↔ vv '∗uu)
1. ∀α∀β(α 'β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ PP(α) ∧ IP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ β↔ α ' x)) [D19]
2. ∀α∀β(α '∗β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ PP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ β ' x)) [D21]
3. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ¬(ee = ee) ∧ dd 'ee↔ PP(dd) ∧ IP(ee)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ ee↔ dd ' x) [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
4. ¬(ee = ee) ∧ ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ee '∗dd↔ IP(ee) ∧ PP(dd)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ ee↔ dd ' x) [2.; α-EX, PL, UE]
5. ∀uu∀vv(uu 'vv↔ vv '∗uu) [3., 4.; PL, UG
√
]
(L5) ∀uu∀vv(uu ≈ vv↔ vv ≈ uu)
1. ∀α∀β(α ≈ β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ PP(α) ∧ PP(β)∧
∧∀x(BO(x, α)↔ BO(x, β))) [D22]
2. dd ≈ ee [SC1]
3. ee ≈ dd [SC2]
4. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ¬(ee = ee) ∧ PP(dd) ∧ PP(ee)∧
∧∀x(BO(x, dd)↔ BO(x, ee)) [1., 2.; UE, PL]
5. ∀x(BO(x, ee)↔ BO(x, dd)) [4.; PL, UE, UG
√
]
6. ¬(ee = ee) ∧ ¬(dd = dd) ∧ PP(ee) ∧ PP(dd)∧
∧∀x(BO(x, ee)↔ BO(x, dd)) [4., 5.; PL]
7. ee ≈ dd [1., 6.; α-EX, PL, UE]
8. dd ≈ ee→ ee ≈ dd [2.-7.; CI1]
9. ¬(ee = ee) ∧ ¬(dd = dd) ∧ PP(ee) ∧ PP(dd)∧
∧∀x(BO(x, ee)↔ BO(x, dd)) [1., 3.; UE, PL]
10. ∀x(BO(x, dd)↔ BO(x, ee)) [9.; PL, UE, UG
√
]
11. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ¬(ee = ee) ∧ PP(dd) ∧ PP(ee)∧
∧∀x(BO(x, dd)↔ BO(x, ee)) [9., 10.; PL]
12. dd ≈ ee [1., 11.; α-EX, PL, UE]
13. ee ≈ dd→ dd ≈ ee [3.-12.; CI2]
14. ∀uu∀vv(uu ≈ vv↔ vv ≈ uu) [8., 13.; PL, UG
√
]
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(R≡) ∀α(α ≡ α)
1. ∀x(x = x) [L =]
2. ∀uu(PP(uu)↔ ¬IP(uu)) [D12]
3. ∀α∀β(α ∼ β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ IP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ x ≺ vv)) [D15]
4. ∀α∀β(α ≈ β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ PP(α) ∧ PP(β)∧
∧∀x(BO(x, α)↔ BO(x, β))) [D22]
5. ∀α∀β(α ≡ β↔ α = β ∨ α ∼ β ∨ α ∼= β ∨ α ∼=∗ β∨
∨α ' β ∨ α '∗ β ∨ α 'β ∨ α '∗β ∨ α ≈ β) [D23]
6. a ≺ dd↔ a ≺ dd [LT]
7. BO(b, dd)↔ BO(b, dd) [LT]
8. ∀x(BO(x, dd)↔ BO(x, dd)) [7.; UG
√
]
9. PP(dd)→ dd ≈ dd [4., 8.; α-EX, PL, UE]
10. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ dd) [6.; UG
√
]
11. IP(dd)→ dd ∼ dd [3., 10.; α-EX, PL, UE]
12. dd ∼ dd ∨ dd ≈ dd [2., 9., 11.; UE, PL]
13. dd ≡ dd [5., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
14. ∀uu(uu ≡ uu) [13.; UG
√
]
15. ∀α(α ≡ α) [1., 14.; PL, α-IN]
(L6) ∀x∀y(x ≡ y↔ x = y)
1. ∀x(x = x) [L =]
2. ∀α∀β(α ∼ β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ IP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ x ≺ vv)) [D15]
3. ∀α∀β(α ∼= β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ IP(α) ∧ β ≺ α) [D16]
4. ∀α∀β(α ∼=∗ β↔ α = α ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(β) ∧ α ≺ β) [D17]
5. ∀α∀β(α ' β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ PP(α)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, α)↔ BO(y, β))) [D18]
6. ∀α∀β(α 'β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ PP(α) ∧ IP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ β↔ α ' x)) [D19]
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7. ∀α∀β(β '∗ α↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ PP(α)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, α)↔ BO(y, β))) [D20]
8. ∀α∀β(α '∗β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ PP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ β ' x)) [D21]
9. ∀α∀β(α ≈ β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ PP(α) ∧ PP(β)∧
∧∀x(BO(x, α)↔ BO(x, β))) [D22]
10. ∀α∀β(α ≡ β↔ α = β ∨ α ∼ β ∨ α ∼= β ∨ α ∼=∗ β∨
∨α ' β ∨ α '∗ β ∨ α 'β ∨ α '∗β ∨ α ≈ β) [D23]
11. a = b→ a ≡ b [10.; α-EX, PL, UE]
12. a = a ∧ b = b [1.; UE, PL]
13. a ≡ b→ a = b ∨ a ∼ b ∨ a ∼= b ∨ a ∼=∗ b ∨ a ' b ∨ a '∗ b∨
∨a 'b ∨ a '∗b ∨ a ≈ b [10.; α-EX, PL, UE]
14. ¬(a ∼ b) [2., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
15. ¬(a ∼= b) [3., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
16. ¬(a ∼=∗ b) [4., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
17. ¬(a ' b) [5., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
18. ¬(a '∗ b) [6., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
19. ¬(a 'b) [7., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
20. ¬(a '∗b) [8., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
21. ¬(a ≈ b) [9., 12.; α-EX, PL, UE]
22. a ≡ b→ a = b [13.-21.; PL]
23. ∀x∀y(x ≡ y↔ x = y) [11., 22.; PL, UG
√
]
(L7) ∀uu∀vv(uu ≡ vv↔ uu ∼ vv ∨ uu 'vv ∨ uu '∗vv ∨ uu ≈ vv)
1. ∀uu¬(uu = uu) [ 6=]
2. ∀α∀β(α ∼= β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ IP(α) ∧ β ≺ α) [D16]
3. ∀α∀β(α ∼=∗ β↔ α = α ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(β) ∧ α ≺ β) [D17]
4. ∀α∀β(α ' β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ PP(α)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, α)↔ BO(y, β))) [D18]
5. ∀α∀β(α ≡ β↔ α = β ∨ α ∼ β ∨ α ∼= β ∨ α ∼=∗ β∨
∨α ' β ∨ α '∗ β ∨ α 'β ∨ α '∗β ∨ α ≈ β) [D23]
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6. dd ∼ ee ∨ dd 'ee ∨ dd '∗ee ∨ dd ≈ ee→ a ≡ b [5.; α-EX, PL, UE]
7. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ¬(ee = ee) [1.; UE, PL]
8. dd ≡ ee→ dd = ee ∨ dd ∼ ee ∨ dd ∼= ee ∨ dd ∼=∗ ee ∨ dd ' ee∨
∨dd '∗ ee ∨ dd 'ee ∨ dd '∗ee ∨ dd ≈ ee [5.; α-EX, PL, UE]
9. ¬(dd ∼= ee) [2., 7.; α-EX, PL, UE]
10. ¬(dd ∼=∗ ee) [3., 7.; α-EX, PL, UE]
11. ¬(dd ' ee) [4., 7.; α-EX, PL, UE]
12. ¬(dd '∗ ee) [5., 7.; α-EX, PL, UE]
13. dd ≡ ee→ dd ∼ ee ∨ dd 'ee ∨ dd '∗ee ∨ dd ≈ ee [8.-12.; PL]
14. ∀uu∀vv(uu ≡ vv↔ uu ∼ vv ∨ uu 'vv ∨ uu '∗vv ∨ uu ≈ vv)
[6., 13.; PL, UG
√
]
(S≡) ∀α∀β(α ≡ β→ β ≡ α)
1. ∀x∀y(x = y→ y = x) [L0]
2. ∀uu∀vv(uu ∼ vv↔ vv ∼ uu) [L1]
3. ∀uu∀x(uu ∼= x ↔ x ∼=∗ uu) [L2]
4. ∀uu∀x(uu ' x ↔ x '∗ uu) [L3]
5. ∀uu∀vv(uu 'vv↔ vv '∗uu) [L4]
6. ∀uu∀vv(uu ≈ vv↔ vv ≈ uu) [L5]
7. ∀x∀y(x ≡ y↔ x = y) [L6]
8. ∀uu∀vv(uu ≡ vv↔ uu ∼ vv ∨ uu 'vv ∨ uu '∗vv ∨ uu ≈ vv) [L7]
9. ∀uu∀x(uu ≡ x ↔ uu ∼= x ∨ uu ' x) [L8]
10. ∀uu∀x(x ≡ uu↔ x ∼=∗ uu ∨ x '∗ uu) [L9]
11. a ≡ b→ a = b [7.; UE, PL]
12. a = b→ b = a [1.; UE, PL]
13. b = a→ b ≡ a [7.; UE, PL]
14. ∀y(a ≡ y→ b ≡ y) [11.-13.; PL, UG
√
]
15. a ≡ ee→ a ∼=∗ ee ∨ a '∗ ee [10.; UE, PL]
16. a ∼=∗ ee→ ee ∼= a [3.; UE, PL]
17. a '∗ ee→ ee ' a [4.; UE, PL]
18. ee ∼= a ∨ ee ' a→ ee ≡ a [9.; UE, PL]
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19. ∀vv(a ≡ vv→ vv ≡ a) [15.-18.; PL, UG
√
]
20. ∀x∀β(x ≡ β→ β ≡ x) [14., 19.; PL, α-IN]
21. dd ≡ b→ dd ∼= b ∨ dd ' b [9.; UE, PL]
22. dd ∼= b→ b ∼=∗ dd [3.; UE, PL]
23. dd ' b→ b '∗ dd [4.; UE, PL]
24. b ∼=∗ dd ∨ b '∗ dd→ b ≡ dd [10.; PL, UG
√
]
25. ∀y(dd ≡ y→ y ≡ dd) [21,-24; PL, UG
√
]
26. dd ≡ ee→ dd ∼ ee ∨ dd 'ee ∨ dd '∗ee ∨ dd ≈ ee [8.; UE, PL]
27. dd ∼ ee→ ee ∼ dd [2.; UE, PL]
28. dd 'ee→ ee '∗dd [5.; UE, PL]
29. dd '∗ee→ ee 'dd [5.; UE, PL]
30. dd ≈ ee→ ee ≈ dd [6.; UE, PL]
31. ee ∼ dd ∨ ee 'dd ∨ ee '∗d ∨ ee ≈ dd→ ee ≡ dd [8.; UE, PL]
32. ∀vv(dd ≡ vv→ vv ≡ dd) [26.-31.; PL, UG
√
]
33. ∀uu∀β(uu ≡ β→ β ≡ uu) [25., 31.; PL, α-IN]
34. ∀α∀β(α ≡ β→ β ≡ α) [20., 33.; PL, α-IN]
(L10) ∀x∀y(BO(x, y)→ x  y)
1. ∀x∀y∀z(x  y ∧ y  z→ x  z) [T]
2. ∀x∀α(BO(x, α)↔ B(x) ∧ ∃y(x  y ∧ y  α)) [D14]
3. BO(a, b) [SC]
4. ∃y(a  y ∧ y  b) [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
5. a  c ∧ c  b [4.; EE
√
]
6. a  c ∧ c  b→ a  b [1.; UE]
7. a  b [5., 6.; MP]
8. ∀x∀y(BO(x, y)→ x  y) [3.-7.; CI, UG
√
]
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(L11) ∀x∀y(∀z(BO(z, x)↔ BO(z, y))→ x  y)
1. ∀α∃y(BO(y, α)) [BO]
2. ¬(x  y)→ ∃z1(z1  x ∧ ¬∃z2(z2  z1 ∧ z2  y)) [StS]
3. ∀x∀y(BO(x, y)→ x  y) [L10]
4. ∀x∀α(BO(x, α)↔ B(x) ∧ ∃y(x  y ∧ y  α)) [D14]
5. ∀z(BO(z, a)↔ BO(z, b)) ∧ c  b [SC1]
6. ∀z(BO(z, a)↔ BO(z, b)) [SC2]
7. ∃y(BO(y, c)) [1.; α-EX, PL, UE]
8. BO(d, c) [7.; EE]
9. d  c [3., 8.; UE, MP]
10. ∃y(d ≺ y ∧ y  b) [5., 9.; PL, EG]
11. BO(d, c)↔ B(d) ∧ ∃y(d ≺ y ∧ y  c) [4.; α-EX, PL, UE]
12. B(d) [8., 11.; PL]
13. B(d) ∧ ∃y(d ≺ y ∧ y  b) [10., 12.; PL]
14. B(d) ∧ ∃y(d ≺ y ∧ y  b)→ BO(d, b) [4.; α-EX, PL, UE]
15. BO(d, b) [13., 14.; MP]
16. BO(d, a) [5., 15.; UE, PL]
17. d  a [3., 16.; UE, MP]
18. ∃z2(z2  c ∧ z2  a) [9., 17.; PL, EG]
19. ∀z(BO(z, a)↔ BO(z, b)) ∧ c  b→ ∃z2(z2  c ∧ z2  a) [5.-19; CI]
20. ¬(c  b ∧ ¬∃z2(z2  c ∧ z2  a)) [6., 19.; PL]
21. ¬∃z1(z1  x ∧ ¬∃z2(z2  z1 ∧ z2  y)) [20.; UG
√
, PL]
22. a  b [2., 21.; UE, PL]
23. ∀z(BO(z, a)↔ BO(z, b))→ a  b [6., 22.; CI1]
24. ∀x∀y(∀z(BO(z, x)↔ BO(z, y))→ x  y) [6., 22.; CI2]
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(L12) ∀x∀y(∀z(BO(z, x)↔ BO(z, y))→ x = y)
1. ∀x∀y(x  y ∧ y  x → x = y) [A]
2. ∀x∀y(∀z(BO(z, x)↔ BO(z, y))→ x  y) [L11]
3. ∀z(BO(z, a)↔ BO(z, b)) [SC]
4. a  b [2., 3.; UE, PL]
5. BO(c, b)↔ BO(c, a) [3.; UE, PL]
6. ∀z(BO(z, b)↔ BO(z, a)) [5.; UG
√
]
7. b  a [2., 6; UE, PL]
8. a  b ∧ b  a→ a = b [1.; UE]
9. ∀x∀y(∀z(BO(z, a)↔ BO(z, b))→ x = y) [3.-8.; CI, UE]
Due to the large number of cases we have to prove to show the transitiv-
ity of the general identity relation
(T≡) ∀α∀β∀γ(α ≡ β ∧ β ≡ γ→ α ≡ γ)
a complete proof accounting for all cases cannot be given. Most of the
cases are trivial exploitations of the definitions. Since these exhibit a re-
peating pattern, it does not provide much insight to have them included
here. The following tables give an overview of the cases which are to
prove for (T≡). The first columns in the tables indicate what kind of
terms can be found in the identity claims of the antecedent. The third dis-
plays the antecedent whereby the acronyms ‘OOI’, for one-one identity,
‘MOI’, for many-one identity, ‘OMI’, for one-many identity, and ‘MMI’,
for many-many identity are used as a means to facilitate the paraphrase
of the formulas. The fourth column in table 8.2 explains why the an-
tecedent in a given line is contradictory, while the fourth columns in the
other tables shows the kind of identity relation which is entailed by the
antecedent in a given line. I conclude the appendix by providing the first
steps for the complete proof, which relies on the individual cases and
shows how the underlying strategy works.




'vv ∧ vv 'ww IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)MOI & MOI
2. uu
'∗vv ∧ vv '∗ww PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)OMI & OMI
3. uu ∼ vv ∧ vv
'ww IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)OOI & MOI
4. uu
'vv ∧ vv ≈ ww IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)MOI & MMI
5. uu
'vv ∧ vv ≈ ww IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)MOI & MMI
6. uu
'∗vv ∧ vv ∼ ww PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)OMI & OOI
7. uu ≈ vv ∧ vv ∼ ww PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)MMI & OOI
8. uu ≈ vv ∧ vv
'∗ww PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)MMI & OMI
One singular
9. uu ∼ vv ∧ vv ' z IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)OOI & MOI
10. uu
'vv ∧ vv ' z IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)MOI & MOI
11. uu
'∗vv ∧ vv ∼= z PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)OMI & OOI
12. uu ≈ vv ∧ vv
∼= z PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)MMI & OOI
13. x
∼=∗ vv ∧ vv 'ww IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)OOI & MOI
14. x
∼=∗ vv ∧ vv ≈ ww IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)OOI & MMI
15. x '
∗ vv ∧ vv ∼ ww PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)OMI & OOI
16. x '
∗ vv ∧ vv '∗ww PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)OMI & OMI
One Plural
17. x
∼=∗ vv ∧ vv ' z IP(vv) ∧ PP(vv)OOI & MOI
18. x '
∗ vv ∧ vv ∼= z PP(vv) ∧ IP(vv)OMI & OOI
Table 8.2: Cases for (T≡) with contradictory antecedent
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Antecedent Consequent
All singular
x ≡ y ∧ y ≡ z
#1 x = y ∧ y = z x = zOOI & OOI OOI
All plural
uu ≡ vv ∧ vv ≡ ww
#2 uu ∼ vv ∧ vv ∼ ww uu ∼ wwOOI & OOI OOI
#3 uu ≈ vv ∧ vv ≈ ww uu ≈ wwMMI & MMI MMI
#4 uu ∼ vv ∧ vv
'∗ww uu '∗ww
OOI & OMI OMI
#5 uu
'vv ∧ vv ∼ ww uu 'ww
MOI & OOI MOI
#6 uu
'vv ∧ vv '∗ww uu ≈ ww
MOI & OMI MMI
#7 uu
'∗vv ∧ vv 'ww uu ∼ ww
OMI & MOI OOI
#8 uu
'∗vv ∧ vv ≈ ww uu '∗ww
OMI & MMI OMI
#9 uu ≈ vv ∧ vv
'ww uu 'ww
MMI & MOI MOI
One singular
(a) uu ≡ vv ∧ vv ≡ z
#10 uu ∼ vv ∧ vv
∼= z uu ∼= z
OOI & OOI OOI
#11 uu
'vv ∧ vv ∼= z uu ' z
MOI & OOI MOI
#12 uu ∼ vv ∧ vv ' z uu ' zOOI & MOI MOI
#13 uu ≈ vv ∧ vv ' z uu ' zMMI & MOI MOI
Table 8.3: Cases for (T≡) with contingent antecedent I
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Antecedent Consequent
One singular
(b) uu ≡ y ∧ y ≡ ww
#14 uu
∼= y ∧ y ∼=∗ ww uu ∼ ww
OOI & OOI OOI
#15 uu
∼= y ∧ y '∗ ww uu '∗ww
OOI & OMI OMI
#16 uu ' y ∧ y
∼=∗ ww uu 'ww
MOI & OOI MOI
#17 uu ' y ∧ y '
∗ ww uu ≈ ww
MOI & OMI MMI
(c) x ≡ vv ∧ vv ≡ ww
#18 x
∼=∗ vv ∧ vv ∼ ww x ∼=∗ ww
OOI & OOI OOI
#19 x
∼=∗ vv ∧ vv '∗ww x '∗ ww
OOI & OMI OMI
#20 x '
∗ vv ∧ vv 'ww x ∼=∗ ww
OMI & MOI OOI
#21 x '
∗ vv ∧ vv ≈ ww x '∗ ww
OMI & MMI OMI
Table 8.4: Cases for (T≡) with contingent antecedent II
(#1) is the above theorem (T =).
(#2) ∀uu∀vv∀ww(uu ∼ vv ∧ vv ∼ ww→ uu ∼ ww)
1. ∀α∀β(α ∼ β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ IP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ x ≺ vv)) [D15]
2. dd ∼ ee ∧ ee ∼ f f [SC]
3. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ¬(ee = ee) ∧ IP(dd) ∧ IP(ee)∧
∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ ee) [1., 2.; UE, PL]
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Antecedent Consequent
One plural
(a) x ≡ y ∧ y ≡ ww
#22 x = y ∧ y
∼=∗ ww x ∼=∗ ww
OOI & OOI OOI
#23 x = y ∧ y '
∗ ww x '∗ ww
OOI & OMI OMI
(b) x ≡ vv ∧ vv ≡ z
#24 x
∼=∗ vv ∧ vv ∼= z x = z
OOI & OOI OOI
#25 x '
∗ vv ∧ vv ' z x = z
OMI & MOI OOI
(c) uu ≡ y ∧ y ≡ z
#26 uu
∼= y ∧ y = z uu ∼= z
OOI & OOI OOI
#27 uu ' y ∧ y = z uu ' zMOI & OOI MOI
Table 8.5: Cases for (T≡) with contingent antecedent III
4. ¬(ee = ee) ∧ ¬( f f = f f ) ∧ IP(ee) ∧ IP( f f )∧
∀x(x ≺ ee↔ x ≺ f f ) [1., 2.; UE, PL]
5. a ≺ dd↔ a ≺ ee [3.; PL, UE]
6. a ≺ ee↔ a ≺ f f [4.; PL, UE]
7. ∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ f f ) [5., 6.; PL, UG
√
]
8. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ ¬( f f = f f ) ∧ IP(dd) ∧ IP( f f )∧
∧∀x(x ≺ dd↔ x ≺ f f ) [3., 4., 7.; PL]
9. dd ∼ f f [1., 8.; UE, PL]
10. ∀uu∀vv∀ww(uu ∼ vv ∧ vv ∼ ww→ uu ∼ ww) [2.-9.; CI, UG
√
]
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(#25) ∀x∀vv∀z(x '∗ vv ∧ vv ' z→ x = z)
1. ∀uu∀x(uu ' x ↔ x '∗ uu) [L3]
2. ∀x∀y(∀z(BO(z, x)↔ BO(z, y))→ x = y) [L12]
3. ∀α∀β(α ' β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ PP(α)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, α)↔ BO(y, β))) [D18]
4. a '∗ ee ∧ ee ' c [SC]
5. ee ' a [1., 4.; UE, PL]
6. ee ' a→ ∀y(BO(y, ee)↔ BO(y, a)) [3.; α-EX, PL, UE]
7. ee ' c→ ∀y(BO(y, ee)↔ BO(y, c)) [3.; α-EX, PL, UE]
8. BO(b, ee)↔ BO(b, a) [5., 6.; PL, UE]
9. BO(b, ee)↔ BO(b, c) [4., 7.; PL, UE]
10. ∀y(BO(y, a)↔ BO(y, c)) [8.-9.; PL, UG
√
]
11. a = c [2., 10.; UE, PL]
12. ∀x∀vv∀z(x '∗ vv ∧ vv ' z→ x = z) [4.-11.; CI, UG
√
]
(#15) ∀uu∀y∀ww(uu ∼= y ∧ y '∗ ww→ uu '∗vv)
1. ∀uu∀x(uu ' x ↔ x '∗ uu) [L3]
2. ∀x∀vv∀z(x '∗ vv ∧ vv ' z→ x = z) [#25]
3. ∀uu∀y∀z(uu ' y ∧ y = z→ uu ' z) [#27]
4. ∀uu(IP(uu)↔ ∀x∀y(x ≺ uu ∧ y ≺ uu→ x = y)) [D11]
5. ∀α∀β(α ∼= β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ IP(α) ∧ β ≺ α) [D16]
6. ∀α∀β(β '∗ α↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ β = β ∧ PP(α)∧
∧∀y(BO(y, α)↔ BO(y, β))) [D20]
7. ∀α∀β(α '∗β↔ ¬(α = α) ∧ ¬(β = β) ∧ IP(α) ∧ PP(β)∧
∧∀x(x ≺ α↔ β ' x)) [D21]
8. dd ∼= b ∧ b '∗ f f ∧ f f ' a [SC1]
9. dd ∼= b ∧ b '∗ f f [SC2]
10. dd ∼= b→ b ≺ dd [5., 9.; α-EX, PL, UE]
11. b ≺ dd [9., 10.; MP]
12. b '∗ f f ∧ f f ' a→ b = a [2.; UE]
13. b = a [8., 12.; MP]
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14. a ≺ dd [11., 13; SI ]
15. dd ∼= b ∧ b '∗ f f ∧ f f ' a→ a ≺ dd [CI1]
16. f f ' a→ a ≺ dd [10., 15.; MP]
17. ¬(dd = dd) ∧ IP(dd) ∧ b ≺ dd [5., 9.; α-EX, PL, UE]
18. a ≺ dd→ b = a [4., 17.; UE, PL]
19. f f ' b ∧ b = a→ f f ' a [3.; UE]
20. f f ' b↔ b '∗ f f [1.; UE]
21. ∀y(y ≺ dd↔ f f ' y) [9., 16., 18., 19., 20.; PL, UG
√
]
22. ¬( f f = f f ) ∧ PP( f f ) [6., 9.; α-EX, PL, UE]
23. dd '∗ f f ↔ (¬(dd = f f ) ∧ ¬( f f = f f ) ∧ IP(dd) ∧ PP( f f )∧
∧∀y(y ≺ dd↔ f f ' y)) [7.; α-EX, PL, UE]
24. dd '∗ f f [17., 21., 22., 23.; PL]
26. ∀uu∀y∀ww(uu ∼= y ∧ y '∗ ww→ uu '∗vv) [9.-25.; CI2, UG
√
]
(T≡) ∀α∀β∀γ(α ≡ β ∧ β ≡ γ→ α ≡ γ)
1. ∀x∀y(x ≡ y↔ x = y) [L6]
2. ∀uu∀x(x ≡ uu↔ x ∼=∗ uu ∨ x '∗ uu) [L9]
3. ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z→ x = z) [#1]
4. ∀x∀y∀ww(x = y ∧ y ∼=∗ ww→ x ∼=∗ ww) [#22]
5. ∀x∀y∀ww(x = y ∧ y '∗ ww→ x '∗ ww) [#23]
6. a ≡ b ∧ b ≡ c↔ a = b ∧ b = c [1.; UE, PL]
7. a ≡ b ∧ b ≡ c→ a = c [3., 6.; UE, PL]
8. ∀z(a ≡ b ∧ b ≡ z→ a ≡ z) [1., 7., 8.; UE, PL, UG
√
]
9. a ≡ b→ a = b [1.; UE, PL]
10. a = b ∧ b ∼=∗ f f → a ∼=∗ f f [4.; UE]
11. a = b ∧ b '∗ f f → a '∗ f f [5.; UE]
12. b ≡ f f ↔ b ∼=∗ f f ∨ b '∗ f f [2.; UE, PL]
13. a ≡ b ∧ b ≡ f f → a ∼=∗ f f ∨ a '∗ f f [9.-12.; PL]
14. ∀ww(a ≡ b ∧ b ≡ ww→ a ≡ ww) [2., 13.; UE, PL, UG
√
]







Many-One Identity and the
Arrangement-Condition
Although the system presented in the previous chapter, and the princi-
ples it represents, allows us to avoid the derivations of the paradox for
Composition as Identity and Collapse, it is not yet able to help us meet-
ing the criticisms discussed in section 2.3. The counterexamples against
Composition as Identity discussed there are based on the rearrangement
of the parts of a composite object and are still in need of being resolved.
In this chapter, I will outline a way to modify our system such that
these counterexamples can be met. As explained earlier, I think the only
way to address these issues is to take the arrangement of objects as an
additional condition for composition. Since my aim is to defend Compo-
sition as Identity, this amounts to taking arrangement as a condition for
identity.130 This will sound like a quite extreme move and maybe cause
some incredulous stares. However, as it is the case with the restriction
of substitution, our fine-grained notion of identity allows us to relativize
the previously said, that identity is a relation which is sensitive to ar-
rangement, and it will hopefully help to see how an initial reluctance of
understanding the identity relation as being sensitive to arrangement can
130. To my knowledge, Abaelardus is the only who agrees with me on both points, that
an object is identical to its parts taken collectively, and that the arrangement of objects
has to be taken into account when we ask what object they compose, (see Abaelardus
1970: 343-5, 550-1).
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be overcome: One-one identities will remain unchanged. Thus, the frag-
ment of the system which corresponds to FOL= will not be affected by
the revisions I will suggest in what follows. The only kinds of identity
relations which I take to be sensitive to arrangement are many-one, one-
many and many-many identities. Hence, identity being sensitive to ar-
rangement may be seen as another consequence of extending our frame-
work by allowing for the use of plural terms.
The idea of composition as depicted in this chapter may seem to sug-
gest that the arrangement of some objects corresponds to the structure the
parts of an object must have in order for the object to exist. However, this
is a misleading impression. Arrangement is a collective relation and it is
relevant with respect to the question what object some objects compose,
or are identical to. Hence, it will eventually be the key to achieve one of
the goals set out at the beginning of chapter 1, i.e. to avoid the need of
taking an object as something over and above its parts, and the mysticism
that usually comes with the notion of the structure of composite objects.
However, in a sense, it seems that this chapter leaves us with some
loose ends, which I will pick up in the next chapter. The definition of
many-one identity I will suggest, does not tell us under what condi-
tions, some objects uu are identical to an object, or if some objects uu
arranged motorbike-minus-the-frontwheel-wise are identical to a motor-
bike or not. We will deal with the first question, i.e. the Special Composi-
tion Question, in the first three sections of the next chapter, where I will
suggest that once we embrace Composition as Identity, it is only natural
to take the next step and to claim that any objects compose some object.
In section 10.5, I will suggest that the question which object some objects
compose is not necessarily a metaphysical question and thus, it need not
be answered by our metaphysical theory.
9.1 Problems with the Transitivity of ≡
We have seen in the previous chapter that the general identity relation
turns out to be transitive: If α is identical to β, and β is identical to γ,
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then α is identical to γ. When we discussed some of the commonly held
principles about identity in section 6.1, we agreed that being transitive
is one of the defining characteristics of identity, although this is not be-
yond dispute, see the references at the end of sections 6.1.2 and in 6.1.4.
However, the transitivity of ‘≡’ is problematic. In order to hold on to
the transitivity of the general identity relation, we shall therefore mod-
ify our definition of many-one and one-many identity. This will be done
by adding a third condition to the definiens which aims to capture the
thought that the arrangement of the many things determines to which
object they are identical to. Please note that this is not an ad hoc move
to avoid the problems that arise from the counterexamples of rearrange-
ment. On the contrary, I think that these examples show us that when we
are dealing with many-one identities, ignoring the arrangement of the
many leads to mistakes. This thought will be further underpinned at the
end of this chapter when we will carry out our case study from chemistry.
The transitivity of ‘≡’, as defined in the previous chapter, is problem-
atic. It shows us that Composition as Identity is “blind” to the rearrange-
ment of parts and thus is prone to the counterexamples based on rear-
rangement: By reducing the identity of composite objects to the identity
of their parts, Composition as Identity is not able to distinguish between
a completed puzzle and a heap of puzzle pieces, if we ignore the distinct-
ness of the puzzle pieces which compose the two. As I pointed out in
section 2.3, this puts even more pressure on the friend of Composition as
Identity, once modal notions are introduced, since it leads Composition
as Identity to the implausible view that objects necessarily compose the
object they compose.
To illustrate the problem of ‘≡’ in formal terms, consider case # 25 of
the proof for the transitivity of ‘≡’:
#25 x '∗ uu ∧ uu ' y→ x = y
The above formula illustrates what underlies the argument from rear-
rangement: If the completed puzzle is one-many identical to the puzzle
pieces, and the puzzle pieces are identical to the heap of puzzle pieces,
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then the completed puzzle is identical to the heap of puzzle pieces.
Therefore, we can see that LI does not help to address the arguments
from rearrangement.
My suggestion is to modify the definition of plural-singular many-
one, and singular-plural one-many identity – whereby the modification
of the latter will simply rehearse the one of the former, so that we may ig-
nore it from here on – in such a way that we can do justice to the idea that
arrangement is relevant for composition by adding an “arrangement-
condition” for many-one identity. Please note that our primitive singular
one-one identity, ‘=’, and the definitions of mixed and plural one-one
identities, (D15) to (D17), will remain as presented in the previous chap-
ter. ‘Being arranged in a certain way’ is like ‘surrounding’ a predicate
whose first argument place is collective, asking for a plural term to enter
it. Hence, there is no need to think that one-one identities are sensitive to
arrangement. After all, we can hardly make sense of a sentence claiming
that an object, say my chair, is arranged in a certain way. Furthermore, our
definitions of plural-plural many-one and plural-plural one-many iden-
tity, (D19) and (D21), will remain unchanged as well. We defined them
with the help of plural-singular many-one identity, and changing this
definition will suffice to give us the intended results for (D19) and (D21).
In the previous chapter, we defined many-one identity as the relation
that holds between a proper plurality uu and an object x which share
all their bottom objects. Besides these two conditions, a third condition
reflecting the idea that the arrangement of the uu matters with respect to
which object they are identical to is needed. In other words, our aim is
to find an appropriate third condition to fill the blank in the definition
below:
(D18’) uu ' x =d f
(i) PP(uu)∧
(ii) ∀y(BO(y, uu)↔ BO(y, x))∧
(iii)
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9.2 The Arrangement-Condition for Many-One
Identity
Let’s approach the question what might be good candidates for this con-
dition with the help of our example of Jig and Saw from section 2.3. Re-
call, the problem in this example is the following: Jig and Saw are com-
posed out of the same puzzle pieces, uu. However, Jig and Saw are not
identical because the former is a completed puzzle while the latter is a
heap of puzzle pieces. How can we do justice to the idea that the way the
puzzle pieces are arranged is what makes the difference whether they
compose Jig or Saw?
A first attempt to answer this question is simply to say that what
makes the difference to whether the puzzle pieces compose Jig or Saw
is whether they are arranged jig-wise or saw-wise. If they are arranged
jig-wise, then they compose Jig; if they are arranged saw-wise, then they
compose Saw. In formal and more general terms, this amounts to the
following third condition for many-one identity
(iii) A(uu, x)
whereby the predicate ‘A’ is paraphrased as ‘are arranged . . . -wise’. With
the above as the third condition for many-one identity, the uu are many-
one identical to x iff the uu are a proper plurality sharing bottom objects
with x, and the uu are arranged x-wise.
Although this appears the straightforward and easiest answer for us,
it is not very useful because I cannot see how we should make sense of it.
What does it mean for some puzzle piece to be arranged jig-wise, or saw-
wise? Or to give a further example, what does it mean for some pieces
of wood to be arranged this-chair-wise? Please note, that the above con-
dition (iii) does make use of a general term. These questions do not ask
what it means for some puzzle pieces to be arranged completed-puzzle-
wise, or heap-wise, or for pieces of wood to be arranged chair-wise. They
are asking for the condition or conditions which must hold for some ob-
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jects to be arranged this-completed-puzzle-wise, this-heap-wise, and this-
chair-wise. Thereby, the question amounts to a question when some ob-
ject are arranged like a particular object, not a kind of object. I do not know
of any way to answer the former of these questions, and think that the
second way of accounting for the importance of the arrangement of ob-
jects with respect to them being identical to some object is more promis-
ing.
So, let’s turn to a second attempt to develop condition (iii) for our def-
inition of many-one identity by making this condition less specific. Here
is a further suggestion: If the puzzle pieces are a proper plurality and
share their bottom objects with Jig, then we shall say that they are many-
one identical to it, if the following holds: The puzzle pieces are arranged
completed-puzzle-wise iff Jig is a completed puzzle. This allows us to
meet the criticisms put forward against Composition as Identity which
are based on the rearrangement of parts, since this condition makes it
possible for us to distinguish between Jig and Saw, even though both
of them share all their bottom objects with the puzzle pieces. When the
puzzle pieces are arranged completed-puzzle-wise, then they compose
Jig, which is a completed puzzle, and when they are arranged heap-wise,
then they compose Saw, which is a heap of puzzle pieces. As we see,
there is no danger that our theory identifies Jig and Saw, as other theories
of Composition as Identity will, since our account of many-one identity
reduces the identity of composite objects to the identity of their parts in
a way that the arrangement of the parts is relevant with respect to what
object they are identical to.
Although this looks like a promising way to modify our definition of
many-one identity, a bit of reflection shows that the discussed example
of Jig and Saw leads us to a difficult question: Why are ‘being arranged
completed-puzzle-wise’ and ‘being a completed puzzle’, as well as ‘be-
ing arranged heap-wise’ and ‘being a heap of puzzle pieces’ the relations
which make the difference in the above case of Jig and Saw? In other
words, since these predicates will only suffice to resolve the issues in the
discussed example, what is the general form of our condition (iii)? As
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far as I can see, there are two possible ways we can choose here and
they are, I think, equally suitable candidates for a generalization of the
above example and qualify, therefore, as possible formulations for con-
dition (iii). Firstly, we might want to say that it holds for any property
Φ, that x is Φ iff the uu are arranged Φ-wise. This is what I will take as
the arrangement-condition for our theory. Given the assumption of Com-
position as Identity, this arrangement condition follows what one might
think is a rather naive thought: Surely, the parts of, say, a book, must be
arranged book-wise. How could some object be a book, if its parts are,
say, arranged car-wise? Alternatively, one might as well limit this condi-
tion only to sortal predicates, such that for any sortal predicate Φ, x is Φ
iff the uu are arranged Φ-wise. I will embrace the first generalization, but
I cannot see that there are major difficulties with the second alternative.
Hence, the restriction I suggest is best imposed on many-one identity
in asking for a correspondence between any property Φ which is had by
x and the arrangement of the uu:
For any Φ, x is Φ iff the uu are arranged Φ-wise
This is, I think, the straightforward way to generalize the thought that un-
derlies our above discussion of the example with Jig and Saw: Given that
the puzzle pieces, as well as Jig and Saw share all their bottom objects,
it should hold that if the puzzle-pieces are arranged completed-puzzle-
wise, they compose a completed puzzle; and if the puzzle pieces are ar-
ranged heap-wise, they compose a heap of puzzle pieces. Furthermore,
we can show that the counterexample to Composition as Identity from
section 2.3, can be met: A definition of many-one identity which contains
the above restriction on many-one identities gives us the means to dis-
tinguish between a heap of motorbike parts and a motorbike in running
conditions, since the motorbike parts are identical to the former, only if
they are arranged heap-wise, and they are identical to the latter, only if
they are arranged motorbike-wise. Since the parts cannot be both, ar-
ranged heap-wise and arranged motorbike-wise, we can show that the
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heap of motorbike parts is not identical to the motorbike in running con-
ditions.
In formal terms, adopting the above restriction on many-one identities
gives us the following revised definition of many-one identity
(D18’) uu ' x =d f PP(uu) ∧ ∀y(BO(y, uu) ↔ BO(y, x)) ∧ (Φ(x) ↔
ΦA(uu))
whereby ‘ΦA’ represents the collective property being arranged Φ-wise.131
(D18’) would best be formulated with the help of a second-order logic,
since the intention behind the second conjunct of the definition is to claim
that if x and the uu share all their bottom objects, then it holds for any
property Φ, x is Φ iff the uu are arranged Φ-wise. Since we do not have a
second-order logic at our disposal but use the second-order variable ‘Φ’
only as a schematic letter, we have to bear in mind that it is here used as
a bound variable.
Yet, one might think that the property of being arranged Φ-wise does
only exist for particular Φs, and not for any Φ. For instance, any ob-
ject has the property of being self-identical. So, if x is identical to some
uu, what does it mean for the uu, to be arranged self-identical-wise? As
it is the case with the property of being self-identical, being arranged
self-identical-wise is a property had by any objects uu: the property of
being arranged self-identical-wise is a universal property. Any plurality
of objects is arranged self-identical-wise. There is nothing particularly
interesting about some objects having this collective property, as there is
nothing special about an object being self-identical. Hence, I think it is
plausible to assume that the collective property of being self-identical, i.e.
the many-many identity relation (≈), is the collective property of being
arranged self-identical-wise.
Note also that the above arrangement-condition (D18’) is, within our
logical framework, logically equivalent to the following claim:
131. Also, given the strength of the second conjunct in the universally quantified for-
mula of the definition, the first conjunct of the definiens is very likely redundant.
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For any vv, x is among the Φs, and vv is the plurality of Φs iff the
uu are arranged Φ-wise
Hence, we can deduce
(QU) uu ' x ↔ PP(uu) ∧ ∀y(BO(y, uu) ↔ BO(y, x)) ∧ ∀vv(x ≺ vv ∧
vv ≡ JΦ(y)K↔ ΦA(uu))
which is an immediate corollary of (D18’).
Yet, adding this arrangement condition raises the question how we
can make sense of the “barbarism” (Unger 2014: 12), ‘being arranged Φ-
wise’. Ways to elucidate this notion are already discussed within the lit-
erature. I shall discuss some of them in the next section by distinguish-
ing between two questions we can ask about arrangement, which I think
have not yet been distinguished with sufficient clarity. Distinguishing
between these two questions will help us to evaluate answers we might
suggest to either one of the questions more appropriately and relate them
to our account of composition.
9.3 Two Arrangement Questions
The modification of our definition of many-one identity with the help of
the notion ‘being arranged Φ-wise’ is in need of explication. I would like
to shed some light on this notion by distinguishing between two ques-
tions from the literature, which have not been kept apart. On the one
hand, we have the Special Arrangement Question (SAQ) raised by Tal-
lant (2014: 1513), asking under what condition some objects are arranged
Φ-wise, for some Φ. On the other hand, Brenner (2015) is dealing with
a different question, though he aims to be dealing with Tallant’s SAQ,
when he asks the following: For any Φ, under what conditions are there
objects arranged Φ-wise? The two questions obviously come apart, since
the quantifiers are shifted. The former asks for any objects uu when there
is a Φ such that they are arranged Φ-wise. The latter asks for any Φ, when
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are there some objects uu such that they are arranged Φ-wise. Let’s have
a look at the two questions in reverse order.
In order to be able to keep the two questions apart, we refine them
by borrowing a bit of notation from second-order logic and labeling the
question discussed by Brenner with ‘BAQ’ for “Brenner’s Arrangement
Question”. Hence, we can pose it as follows:
BAQ For all Φ, when is it true that ∃uu such that the uu are arranged
Φ-wise?
I agree with Brenner (2015: 1297) that there is no way to give a general an-
swer to this question. There are many answers to this question, depend-
ing upon the predicate we choose for ‘Φ’. For instance, the conditions
under which there are some objects arranged hydrogen-molecule-wise,
are different from the conditions under which there are some objects
arranged heart-wise, or under which there are objects arranged planet-
wise. In like manner, the conditions under which there are some objects
arranged heart-wise are different from the conditions under which there
are objects arranged planet-wise. Does that mean that BAQ is not a sen-
sible question to ask?
In a sense, that is correct. We cannot expect to be able to answer such a
question in a general way. However, that is not the end of the story. More
specific versions of BAQ can be answered individually in different ways.
If we take a particular predicate ‘Φ’, say, ‘being a hydrogen-molecule’
and ask under what conditions some objects are arranged hydrogen-
molecule-wise, then an answer to this question can be found. However, I
think it becomes apparent that these questions do not fall within our area
of competence, but have to be dealt with in other disciplines, namely
those who are dealing with the study of the particular Φs the specific
version of BAQ is concerned with. Hence, I reckon that it will be the
chemist who answers the question under what conditions some objects
are arranged hydrogen-molecule-wise, the anatomist who tells us when
some objects are arranged heart-wise, and the astronomer who is looking
for the conditions under which some objects are arranged planet-wise.
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Hence, we may give different answers for different predicates, when
we ask under what conditions some objects uu are arranged Φ-wise. In
other words, we will come up with a list of answers, BAA1, BAA2, BAA3,
. . . , to specific versions of BAQ which ask for particular predicates, ‘Φ’,
‘Ψ’, ‘Σ’, . . . , under what conditions are there some objects uu arranged
Φ-wise, Ψ-wise, Σ-wise, . . . , respectively:132
BAA1 ∃uu such that the uu are arranged Φ-wise iff p
BAA2 ∃uu such that the uu are arranged Ψ-wise iff q
BAA3 ∃uu such that the uu are arranged Σ-wise iff r
However, we can then use this list to formulate an answer to BAQ itself
by connecting these answers disjunctively:
BAQ For all Φ, it is true that ∃uu such that the uu are arranged Φ-wise iff
(p ∨ q ∨ r ∨ . . .)
Setting this possible way of answering BAQ, let’s compare it to Tallant’s
Special Arrangement Question:
SAQ [For all uu,] when is it true that ∃Φ the uu are arranged Φ-
wise?133 (Tallant 2014: 1513)
Tallant asks under what condition some objects are arranged Φ-wise, for
some Φ. He uses this question to show that standard nihilism fails, since
it relies on an answer to this question, yet is not able to answer it in a
satisfactory way. The SAQ arises for us as well, since we might want to
know under what conditions some objects are arranged, say, table-wise,
132. I use here ‘p’, ‘q’, and ‘r’ as variables for sentences.
133. I made the above quote consistent with the notation of LI for the ease of exposition.
The original formulation of Tallant (2014: 1513) “[W]hen is it true that ∃xx the xs are
arranged F-wise?”, is likely to contain a slip which can be spotted from the kind of the
answers he discusses in §3 and his hint that the SAQ is modeled after van Inwagen’s
SCQ.
270 MANY-ONE IDENTITY AND THE ARRANGEMENT-CONDITION §9.3
in order to be in a position to tell whether they are many-one identical
to a certain table. Although Tallant asked the SAQ only quite recently,
answers to it predate the question. Rosen and Dorr, as well as Merricks
present a similar point of view when they defend the following claims:
If we put some things arranged house-wise on the corner, they
would look and feel and act just like a house [. . . ]
(Rosen and Dorr 2002: 158)
Atoms are arranged statuewise if and only if they both have
the properties and also stand in the relations to microscopic
upon which, if statues existed, those atoms’ composing a statue
would non-trivially supervene.
(Merricks 2001: 4, [italics in original])
I agree with Tallant’s conclusion that Rosen and Dorr’s nihilism, as well
as Merricks’ biological anti-reductionism need different answers to the
SAQ than the one above.134 Yet, we can sidestep this discussion. Impor-
tant for us is whether we can adopt these answers within our theory of
composition. As you might already suspect, we cannot. Adopting the
above answers to the SAQ would make our theory circular: Composi-
tion is already defined with many-one identity and many-one identity,
in turn, is defined with the help of the arrangement-condition. Hence,
answering the SAQ, which asks under what conditions the arrangement-
condition is fulfilled, cannot be done with the help of the notion of com-
position. So, we cannot just simply take the above answers, but have to
look elsewhere.
Another answer to the SAQ can be reconstructed from van Inwagen’s
line of thought:
The uu are arranged chair- (table-) wise if they fill a chair-
(table-) receptacle and satisfy certain other conditions [. . . ]
(van Inwagen 1990: 109)
134. Alternatively, defending one of the above answers while holding on to nihilism
or biological antireductionism requires the use of a counterpossible conditional. For a
discussion of counterpossible conditionals, (see Bjerring 2014, Jago 2013, Mares 1997,
Nolan 1997).
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Chair-receptacles are, so van Inwagen (1990: 104-5), “[. . . ] those regions
of space that, according to those who believe in the existence of chairs,
are occupied by chairs“. We can see that this account is not suitable for
us either, since it would again make our theory circular.
Other answers to the SAQ can be modeled on answers to the Special
Composition Question. Mimicking the brute answer to the latter, devel-
oped by Markosian (1998), one might think that it is simply a brute fact
when there is a Φ such that some objects are arranged Φ-wise. Alterna-
tively, we can use an organicist answer to the SAQ, modeled after van
Inwagen (1990), and claim that if the activity of some objects constitutes
a life, then there is a Φ such that the uu are arranged Φ-wise.
In my view, the best answer we can give to the SAQ is one that re-
sembles the universalist answer to the SCQ, (see Tallant 2014: 1518), and
it will eventually turn out to be one of the key elements to implement
universalism within our account of composition:
For any objects uu there is a Φ such that the uu are arranged Φ-wise
This way of answering the SAQ has a lot going for it, since the SAQ is
just another way of asking under what conditions some objects are ar-
ranged in some way. Surely, any objects are arranged in some way. Hence,
I think a universalist answer to SAQ is the most natural way to reply to
Tallant’s question. However, the above answer does not yet legitimize
the claim that any objects compose some object. In order to arrive at this
claim, we have to show that for any objects uu there is some object x such
that they share all their bottom objects with x. Although it is not neces-
sary for us to embrace this claim, given the thus far developed position,
I think it is only natural to do so. I will come back to this point in the
next chapter where I will motivate this claim and defend universalism
against arguments from counterexamples. I will now go on to discuss a
case study from chemistry where I will not only show how our account
of composition can be applied, but also that the insights gained in scien-
tific research suggest that arrangement matters for composition, before
we shall conclude this chapter.
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9.4 Isomers: A Case Study
It might seem that the following case study is merely an accumulation
of more or less interesting observations, but does not really contribute
to our overall project. After all, the name of the entities we are about
to discuss, ‘isomers’, translates into English as ‘same parts’. Hence, the
scientific terminology already reflects that we have here distinct objects
with the same parts. However, the aim of this section is not to argue that
there are objects which have the same parts. Rather, it serves to show
that the account of Composition as Identity we have developed here can
allow for such entities. I think this is a remarkable feature of the theory,
since these objects usually pose problems for theories of Composition as
Identity. A second, and probably more important aim of this section, is to
illustrate the degree of precision we can achieve with respect to spelling
out certain notions of being arranged Φ-wise. Due to the fact, that ar-
rangement already plays an important role in chemistry, and in particular
in the study of isomers, as we will see soon, they are an ideal candidate
to illustrate that the apparently vague notion of being arranged Φ-wise
can be explicated in a very precise way for certain Φs.
Isomers are chemical molecules composed out of the same kinds and
number of chemical atoms,135 but differing from each other only with re-
spect to the way the atoms are arranged, (see Chauhan 2008: 43-7, Crowe
and Bradshaw 2010: 257-89, and Johnson 2013: 154). They provide us
with a scientific counterpart to the counterexamples of rearrangement.
Suppose the two molecules x and y are isomers of each other. Further,
disregard the distinctness of the atoms uu, and the atoms vv which com-
pose x and y, respectively. Then this does not entail the identity of x and
y, since if the uu and the vv are arranged appropriately, then x and y turn
out to be different kinds of molecules with different properties:
135. From here on, I will simply talk about molecules and atoms instead of chemical
molecules and chemical atoms, since the context avoids that misunderstanding might
arise. Please note, that I do not want to suggest that chemical atoms are mereological
atoms, i.e. objects with no proper parts.
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If two or more substances have the same percent composi-
tion, they must have the same empirical formula, but this
does not make them identical substances. To be identical they
also must have identical structures and properties. Many sub-
stances called isomers, have the same formulas but differ in
their geometrical structures and in their properties.
(Petrucci and Harwood 1993: 879)
Chemists call such compounds–with the same overall formula
but different atomic arrangements–isomers of each other.
[. . . ] Two chemicals can differ, even when all the same atomic
linkages are present, if the spatial arrangements are different.
(Breslow 1997: 8)
To give an example, take the chemical compounds which have the for-
mula C3H8O, i.e. are composed by an oxygen atom, o, three carbon atoms,
c1, c2, c3, and eight hydrogen atoms, h1, . . . , h8. They can compose three
different kinds of molecules: n-propyl alcohol (left), isopropyl alcohol
(right), or methoxyethane (below), depending upon the way the atoms
are arranged. Figure 9.1, based on the figures in (Johnson 2013: 153), il-
lustrates this point.136
Isomers are of particular interest for us because molecules that are iso-
mers of each other have different properties, which is a result of the dif-
ferent ways their atoms are arranged, (see Petrucci and Harwood 1993).
In the case of the three molecules in our example, the different arrange-
ment of the atoms results, among other things, in different boiling points:
n-propyl alcohol and isopropyl alcohol have a boiling point around 89
◦C, but methoxyethane boils at 7 ◦C, (Crowe and Bradshaw 2010: 282).
Another pair of isomers are fumaric acid and maleic acid. They have
different melting points. “[F]umaric acid has a melting point of 300 ◦C,
while maleic acid has a melting point of 240 ◦C” (Crowe and Bradshaw
2010: 282). As a final example, consider the different melting points of n-
136. Figure 9.1 differs from the way molecules are depicted by scientists, since it is
common to use capital letters to represent chemical atoms of the same kind. However,
we need a way to discriminate the different chemical atoms from each other, which
makes a deviation from scientific orthodoxy necessary.
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Figure 9.1: Isomers: Propanol
butane and isobutane. The former melts at -0,5 ◦C, while the latter melts
at -10.2 ◦C, (Chauhan 2008: 43).
Our account of composition allows us to capture the phenomenon
that the different arrangements of the atoms leads to the composition of
different objects. Hence, we see that our version of Composition as Iden-
tity is able to meet the criticisms based on rearrangement. We can dis-
tinguish between the three molecules above although they are composed
out of the same atoms because we reduce the identity of composite ob-
jects not only to the identity of their parts, but also to the way the parts
are arranged. On the other hand, the naive version of Composition as
Identity presented in chapter 8 identifies the three molecules. We shall
first see how the latter theory ends up identifying the n-propyl alcohol
molecule and the methoxyethane molecule, before we show that our just
developed system can keep them apart.
For the sake of simplicity, let’s take the atoms o, c1, c2, c3, h1, . . . , and h8
to be bottom objects of our theory. Recall, for an object x to be a bottom-
object simply means that within our theory there is no object y which is
among x. Hence, our supposition does not entail that the atoms under
consideration are mereological atoms. If we wished, we could, in agree-
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ment with the results of science, allow that there are some objects, for
instance, protons, neutrons, and electrons, among each atom. However,
we shall make this pragmatic decision to keep things manageable.
Then, the atoms o, c1, c2, c3, h1, . . . , and h8 are a proper plurality,
since there is more than one object among them. Let’s call this plurality
‘the atoms’, or simply ‘dd’. By definition, each one of the atoms o, c1, c2,
c3, h1, and . . . h8 is among the atoms dd. This is illustrated in figure 9.2,
where upward lines should be read as inclusion. Now, consider the two
molecules isopropyl alcohol, a, and methoxyethane, b. Neither of them
is a bottom object within our theory since there are objects, the atoms,
which are among them. However, each one of them shares all its bottom
objects with dd, since the atoms are the only candidates we have as being
bottom objects for the two molecules. Hence, the atoms are many-one
identical to the isopropyl alcohol molecule, and they are many-one iden-
tical to the methoxyethane molecule – represented by the arrow in the
figure below – because they are a proper plurality and share all their bot-
tom objects with each one of them. From these two many-one identities,
the naive theory allows us to conclude that the two molecules are iden-
tical, due to the transitivity of identity, whereby this derivation relies on
the use of case #25 for the proof of the transitivity of ‘≡’. Yet, the identi-
fication of the two molecules has to be avoided, since the two molecules
have different properties and have to be distinguished from each other.
Let us now turn to our account and see how it makes it possi-
ble for us to keep the two molecules apart by relying on the con-
cepts of ‘being arranged n-propyl-alcohol-molecule-wise’ and ‘being ar-
ranged methoxyethane-molecule-wise’ and how these two concepts can
be spelled out. From what we have said in our example thus far, our
definition of many-one identity does not tell us that the atoms dd are
many-one identical to either one of the molecules, since we have not
yet said anything about the arrangement-condition. However, what has
been said up until now is that the first two conditions – the atoms are
a proper plurality and they share all their bottom objects with either
one of the two molecules – are given. Given that the molecule a is
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Figure 9.2: Identifying Isomers
an n-propyl alcohol molecule, the atoms are many-one identical to a,
if they are arranged n-propyl-alcohol-molecule-wise. Since molecule b
is a methoxyethane molecule, the atoms are many-one identical to b, if
they are arranged methoxyethane-molecule-wise. As we will see next,
the atoms cannot be both arranged n-propyl-alcohol-molecule-wise and
arranged methoxyethane-molecule-wise. Hence, we can distinguish be-
tween the two molecules and will never end up in a situation as we have
seen it previously, but rather with either one of the situations as depicted
in figure 9.3 – if we ignore for a moment that our atoms can also be many-
one identical to another object, if they are neither arranged n-propyl-
alcohol-molecule-wise, nor methoxyethane-molecule-wise – whereby the
broken arrows indicate that not both many-one identities can hold.
It remains for us to show how the relevant notions of ‘being arranged
n-propyl-alcohol-molecule-wise’ and ‘begin arranged methoxyethane-
molecule-wise’ are spelled out and that no objects are both, arranged
n-propyl-alcohol-molecule-wise and methoxyethane-molecule-wise. One
of the central predicates we shall use to define these notions is ‘x is con-
nected with y’, which we in turn define with the topological notion ‘the
distance between x and y is z ’. For the ease of exposition, we shall simply
use a placeholder n for the distance between two atoms, since we might
want to allow that the condition for when two objects are connected with
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each other might differ with respect to the kind of objects considered.
We could avoid this by not taking atoms as bottom objects, but protons,
neutrons or electrons and define the connection for atoms as sharing an
electron. However, in order to keep things simple, we shall avoid com-
plicating matters further and settle for the universal placeholder n. Thus,
we can define ‘being arranged n-propyl-alcohol-molecule-wise’ and ‘be-
gin arranged methoxyethane-molecule-wise’ as follows:
o, c1, c2, c3, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7 and h8 are arranged n-propyl-
alcohol-molecule-wise iff
(i) o is an oxygen atom, c1, c2, and c3 are carbon atoms, and h1, h2,
h3, h4, h5, h6, h7 and h8 are hydrogen atoms; and
(ii) c1 is connected to h1, h2, h3 and c2; and
(iii) c2 is connected to h4, h5, and c3; and
(iv) c3 is connected to h6, h7 and o; and
(v) o is connected to h8.
o, c1, c2, c3, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7 and h8 are arranged
methoxyethane-molecule-wise iff
(i) o is an oxygen atom, c1, c2, and c3 are carbon atoms, and h1, h2,
h3, h4, h5, h6, h7 and h8 are hydrogen atoms; and
(ii) c1 is connected to h1, h2, h3 and c2; and
(iii) c2 is connected to h4, h5 and o; and
(iv) o is connected to c3; and
(iv) c3 is connected to h6, h7, and h8.
Having spelled out the definitions in this way, we can see that
no objects can be both arranged n-propyl-alcohol-molecule-wise and
methoxyethane-molecule-wise. If some objects are arranged n-propyl-
alcohol-molecule-wise, then the oxygen atom is connected to one car-
bon atom and one hydrogen atom. If some objects are arranged
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Figure 9.3: Distinguishing Isomers
methoxyethane-molecule-wise, then the oxygen atom is connected to
two carbon atoms. Since the oxygen atom cannot be both, it is impossi-
ble for some objects to be arranged n-propyl-alcohol-molecule-wise and
methoxyethane-molecule-wise. Hence, the two properties exclude each
other and we can be reassured that our theory will help us to distin-
guish the n-propyl alcohol molecule from the methoxyethane molecule,
although either one of them may be identical to the same plurality of
atoms. Therefore, we have shown that our account of composition is
able to meet the counterexamples based on rearrangement from section
2.3 and allows us to counter the criticisms which have been put forward
against Composition as Identity.
9.5 Final Remarks on Arrangement and
Composition
We conclude this chapter with some brief concluding remarks about ar-
rangement and composition, which I locate somehow beyond the scope
of our investigation here, yet think that they are noteworthy. On the one
hand, I would like to reflect about cases where the rearrangement137 of
137. As I already pointed out in section 2.3, the concept of rearrangement, and I think
the concept of arrangement too, is vague. Yet, this seems to be an issue that is more
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parts does not make a difference with respect to composition. Sometimes
things stand differently from the way we have just seen and it is worth to
think a bit more about these matters. On the other hand, it appears that
by taking arrangement to be a condition for composition that we made it
to be an external relation. Although we suppressed the thought that the
way some objects uu are arranged might depend upon their relations to
objects vv that are distinct from uu, this sounds like a plausible thought.
I will argue that we can hold on to both views, relying on a distinction
we will make in section 10.4, the one between the question whether some
objects compose an object and what object they compose. The former is
an internal question, i.e. whether some objects uu compose an object x
depends solely upon the uu. Yet, the question what object x some objects
uu compose can be influenced by objects distinct from the uu.
With some objects, it appears that some of their parts uu can be rear-
ranged in ways such that the uu still compose the same object x as they
did before they have been rearranged. In other words, sometimes rear-
rangement does not matter. Take a liter of water, and the H2O molecules
that compose it. We can rearrange the H2O molecules in a way such that
they still compose the liter of water: If we simply stir the water, then the
molecules still compose the liter of water. I think this is an interesting ob-
servation. Yet, it always depends upon which parts are rearranged and in
which way they are rearranged. For instance, if we were not to rearrange
the molecules but the individual atoms of the liter of water by putting all
oxygen atoms on one side and all hydrogen atoms on the other side, then
we would not end up with a liter of water, but with an object consisting
of two parts, whereby one of them consists entirely of oxygen atoms, and
the other entirely of hydrogen atoms. This composite object is not a liter
of water, since it does not have the same properties the liter of water has.
The latter is potable while the former is not. Given that I put previously
quite some weight on arrangement, I think it is at least noteworthy to
observe that there are cases where arrangement does not matter.
pressing for the opponents of Composition as Identity, than it is for its supporters.
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A closely related point I would like to touch on briefly, is the worry
that we made composition an external relation. By taking arrangement to
be a condition for composition, it appears that we added a feature to com-
position which makes it look like an external relation, i.e. that whether
some objects uu compose an object x, does not only depend upon the uu
(and x), but also on objects which are not among the uu (or different from
x). Van Inwagen (1990: 104-6) noted that the arrangement of some ob-
jects uu depends upon the way they are related to other objects, namely
those objects with which they are in immediate contact. This led him
to the conclusion that, for instance, some atoms – we can add arranged
wood-wise – filling a chair-receptacle are not arranged chair-wise if they
are surrounded by other atoms – arranged wood-wise. To make the point
more succinctly, if there are some atoms vv arranged tree-wise, then there
cannot be any objects uu among the vv which are arranged chair-wise.
Trees do not have chairs as parts. Given our account of composition, one
may think that this is a sensible restriction to adopt for us. After all, if
the uu are arranged chair-wise, then they compose a chair. But one can
sit or stand on a chair, or (usually) move it. So if the uu were to compose
a chair, then they should be arranged being-able-to-be-sit-on, which they
are not if they are among atoms arranged tree-wise.
I am confident that we can, contrary to van Inwagen, claim that the
objects uu he is describing are arranged chair-wise without contradicting
our account of composition. This can be done because we have to dis-
tinguish the question whether some objects uu compose an object x, and
what object x they compose. We will do this in the next chapter, but let
me show how this relates to the above worry that composition is an ex-
ternal relation. The picture of composition I defend here is not one that
takes composition to be an external phenomenon in some sense, but it
does in another. It is an external relation, insofar as the question what
object x is composed by some objects depends upon the way they are ar-
ranged. Hence, it may depend upon the relation they bear to other ob-
jects, distinct from uu. Yet, whether some objects uu compose an object is
an absolutely internal matter. Any objects uu compose some object, no
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matter the relations they bear to other objects. Hence, we can see that we
can allow for arrangement to be an external relation, while holding on to
arrangement being relevant for composition and composition being an
internal relation.
The aim of this chapter was to outline a strategy for how LI may be
modified in order to be able to address the counterexamples based on
rearrangement. We saw that LI is still prone to these counterexamples
due to the transitivity of the general identity relation as defined in the
previous chapter. Hence, we modified the definition for plural-singular
many-one identity by adding an arrangement-condition. Next we distin-
guished Tallant’s SAQ from Brenner’s question and motivated a univer-
salistic answer to the former question: Any objects are arranged Φ-wise,
for some Φ. We engaged then in a case study from chemistry, where
the concept of isomers was used to illustrate how an account of com-
position with an arrangement-condition can be applied and was further
motivated. Eventually, I concluded with some remarks on arrangement,
which are beyond our present scope.

CHAPTER TEN
Composition as Identity and Answers
to the SCQ
I have repeatedly emphasized that mereological universalism does not
follow from Composition as Identity. This has already been highlighted
by other authors, for instance, Cameron (2012) and McDaniel (2010).
However, we have also seen that Composition as Identity is often accom-
panied by universalism, see section 1.4.1. Given our system LI, it is only
a small step to universalism. I shall now outline how these steps towards
universalism can be done.
Although we will eventually talk briefly about the relation between
our account of Composition as Identity and mereological nihilism, the
step to universalism marks the actual endpoint of our discussion here.
This is, I think, suitable. Once we accept the previously presented ac-
count of composition, it is hard to argue that there are some objects which
do not compose an object. After all, the composition relation is charac-
terized as an ontologically flyweight: A composite object does not come
with any additional ontological given the commitment to its parts. Re-
stricting the composition relation cannot be justified by relying on some
mysterious account of composition, which makes the composite object
something “greater” than the parts taken collectively. Yet, I would like to
emphasize again that Composition as Identity makes universalism only
plausible, but it does not necessarily lead to it. Figuratively speaking,
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once we embrace Composition as Identity, we can feel a pull towards
universalism, but we are not pushed over to it.
When we discussed Bricker’s and Cotnoir’s accounts of weak Com-
position as Identity, we flagged Bricker’s E Pluribus Unum, the claim that
any objects are identical to some object, and Cotnoir’s observations about
our ability to singularize plural terms. What we need to get to universal-
ism from LI is Bricker’s principle. In what follows, I will argue for E
Pluribus Unum on the basis of our ability to singularize plural terms and
by exploiting some of the considerations from the sections 7.1 and 7.2.
Before we come to this argument, we shall first have a more detailed look
at the relation between answers to van Inwagen’s General and Special
Composition Question, and in particular at the relation between Compo-
sition as Identity and universalism. Moreover, a defense of universalism
against Korman’s arguments from counterexamples will be presented,
which relies on the distinction between the Special Composition Ques-
tion and what I call the “Particular Composition Question”. The former
asks for the conditions under which some objects compose. The latter
asks what object, or what kind of object some objects compose. These ques-
tions are not separated in the literature and it can be shown that by keep-
ing these two questions apart arguments form counterexamples can be
undermined. I reckon that the Particular Composition Question is, like
Brenner’s Arrangement Question, not a question, which can or should be
answered by metaphysics.
10.1 From Composition as Identity to
Universalism
Composition as Identity is an answer to van Inwagen’s “General Com-
position Question” (GCQ):
GCQ What is composition? (van Inwagen 1990: 39)
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This question asks for a definition of composition. Hence, an answer to
GCQ will be of the form
For all x and for all uu, the uu compose x iff
Composition as Identity has the correct logical form in order to qualify
as an answer to the GCQ:
CAI For all uu and for all x, the uu compose x iff the uu are many-one
identical to x
Interestingly, van Inwagen (1990: 46) points out that “any answer to the
General Composition Question will “automatically” yield an answer to
the Special Composition Question”. The Special Composition Question
(SCQ) asks for the condition under which some objects compose an ob-
ject, or in other words:
SCQ When is it true that ∃x the uu compose x?138
We can see that the SCQ can indeed be answered in two logical steps,
universal elimination and existential introduction, once an answer to the
GCQ is at hand. Therefore, Composition as Identity entails the following
answer to the SCQ:
C-I There is some object x which the uu compose iff there is an x such
that the uu are many-one identical to x
However, we can also see that this answer is not universalism. Univer-
salism is the claim that for all objects uu there is an object y such that
the uu compose y. In order to get from C-I to universalism, we have to
assume Bricker’s “E Pluribus Unum”, from section 3.3.2, which says that
any objects uu are identical to some object x, or in formal terms:
138. Van Inwagen (1990: 30) uses ‘y’ as a singular and ‘xs’ as a plural variable. I changed
the above passage from van Inwagen in order to conform with the formalism we intro-
duced previously.
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EPU ∀uu∃x(uu ' x)
The difference between C-I and EPU cannot be neglected and it does not
come as a surprise that MU does not follow from Composition as Identity:
You can derive from your theory only what you have previously put in it
and the universalist’s claim has not yet been put into the Composition as
Identity-package. Hence, we cannot derive it.
Universalism puts its focus on the first argument place of the com-
position relation. It is a theory about those objects which compose some
object. Composition as Identity puts the focus on the second argument
place of the composition relation. It is a theory about composite objects,
i.e. those objects which are composed. If we give a list with the names of
some objects, say the Eiffel Tower, the moon, and Frege’s Grundgesetze, to
a universalist, she will tell us that they compose an object. But she will
not tell us anything about the relation these objects have to their parts.
On the other hand, if we give the same list to a defender of Composition
as Identity, she will only tell us that these objects are identical to their
parts, and nothing about whether they compose some object. The only
thing she can say is that if they compose some object, then it is identical
to them.
However, I have pointed out that some authors, for instance, Harte
(2002: 114) and Merricks (2005: 629-33), think that there is indeed such a
close logical connection. And indeed, the two theories are often found
together, see section 1.4.1. Therefore, I think if we want to take the road
from Composition as Identity to universalism, then we have to be aware
that it is not the only option there is for us. In other words, we have to
supplement our account of composition with arguments to support the
assumptions that are needed in order to adopt universalism. But let us
first take a step back and reflect what might be the source for the false
belief that Composition as Identity entails universalism.
I think the source for the mistaken view Composition as Identity to
entail universalism has to be located in the fact that we are used to deal
with singular one-one identity only. In FOL=, we have the theorem that
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every object x is identical to some y. This can be shown to follow from
the law of identity, x = x, in a few steps. A pluralized version of this
theorem can be shown in LI or more generally in systems of plural logic:
Any objects uu are identical to some vv. However, it is easy to assume
then that mixed versions of this theorem, any objects uu are identical to
some x, and any object x is identical to some objects uu,139 should also
be theorems of plural logic. However, they are not. Neither the standard
systems of plural logic, nor our system LI has one of these two claims as
a theorem.
Yet, accepting the claim that any objects are identical to one object,
and hence universalism, “[. . . ] is natural, if not inevitable for a defender
of [Composition as Identity]” (Sider 2007: 62). We have already discussed
some points which can be used to show that our version of Composition
as Identity clears the ground for holding on to EPU in the chapters 1 and
7. Let me briefly rehearse the latter in the next section and elaborate on
how they lead us to EPU.
10.2 E Pluribus Unum
In the sections 7.1 and 7.2, I argued that, given the problems of the con-
servative strategy, terms which are standardly taken to be superplural
terms, should be understood as singular terms. Let me briefly reiterate:
‘the pair of men who wrote PM’ is not a superplural term, but a singular
term. It is not a plural term, since ‘the pairs of men who wrote PM’ is
already a plural term, and since the pair is properly among the pairs, the
two cannot be identical (in the standard sense). Once we accept these
terms as singular terms, we might want to allow such singular terms to
enter the second argument place of the inclusion relation. Eventually, I
concluded that Russell is among the pair of men who wrote PM, and so
is Whitehead.
139. The latter is a consequence of Composition as Identity together with the assump-
tion of a gunky universe, see fn.9 in chapter 1.
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Given the account of composition we developed, we can now ask the
following: Is there any proper plurality140 of objects uu, which do not
compose, i.e. are there any objects uu such that the uu are a proper plu-
rality and there is no object x such that the uu and x share bottom objects
and x is Φ iff the uu are arranged Φ-wise? Or again in other words: Are
there any objects uu such that there is no object x to which the uu are
many-one identical?
Suppose, there were two objects, say, the Eiffel Tower and the moon,
and there is no object x such that they compose it. Then, the claim
(1) The Eiffel Tower and the moon do not compose any object
is true. For the sake of the argument, assume for a moment that any other
objects compose some object. Hence, imagine that – maybe contrary to
your present intuition – say, the Eiffel Tower and your car, as well as
the moon and your car, compose some object. Under this assumption,
the truth of (1) entails that the Eiffel Tower and the moon are the only
two objects, the only pair of objects, which do not compose any object.
Therefore, we might as well hold on to the following:
(2) The Eiffel Tower and the moon are the pair of objects which do not
compose any object
Within our theory, (2) amounts to the claim that the Eiffel Tower and
the moon are not many-one identical to the pair of objects which do not
compose any object. It follows from the definition of many-one identity
that at least one of the following three claims is false:
(3) The Eiffel Tower and the moon are a proper plurality
(4) The Eiffel Tower and the moon share their bottom objects with the
pair of objects which do not compose any object
140. I take the claim of universalism to be that any proper plurality composes some
object. If an improper plurality uu were to compose some object, then it would be a case
of self-composition, since there is only one object x among uu and x appears to be the
best candidate for which object is composed by the improper plurality uu.
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(5) The pair of objects which do not compose any object is Φ iff the
Eiffel Tower and the moon are arranged Φ-wise
(3) is true by supposition, so one of the other two sentences must be false.
Let’s analyze the terms, which appear in the above sentences, with the
help of our plural logic. The term ‘the Eiffel Tower and the moon’, which
is used in both sentences, is a plural term because it refers to, hence is able
to refer to, more than one object. In (2), we have further an apparently
superplural term, ‘the pair of objects which do not compose any object’.
Since I argued that such apparently superplural terms are best under-
stood as singular terms, I take ‘the pair of objects which do not compose
any object’ to be a singular term. The justification for not taking it to be a
plural term follows again the same line of thought as above: ‘the pair . . . ’
is singular, because ‘the pairs . . . ’ is a plural term, capable of referring to
more than one object.
But then, if ‘the pair of objects which do not compose any object’ is a
singular term, there must be an object to which the term refers to. The
best candidate we have for being this object is the pair of objects which do
not compose any object. Now, things stand similar as in our example from
section 7.2 with Russell, Whitehead and the pair of men who wrote PM.
Russell, as well as Whitehead, are the only objects which are among the
pair of men who wrote PM. Analogously here, the Eiffel Tower and the
moon are the only objects which are among the pair of objects which do
not compose any object. The framework LI entails that an object inherits
the bottom objects of the objects which are among it and has no bottom
object which is not a bottom object of one of the objects which is among
it.141 Hence, the pair of objects which do not compose any object shares
its bottom objects with the Eiffel Tower and the moon. Hence, (4) is true
as well which means that (5) has to be false.
Although it is difficult to show the truth of (5), since it suffices to come
across one property Φ such that either the pair of objects is Φ and the
Eiffel Tower and the moon are not arranged Φ-wise, or the Eiffel Tower
141. This follows from the definition of ‘being a bottom object of’, (StS) and (T≺).
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and the moon are arranged Φ-wise and the pair is not Φ, we have good
reasons to think that it is indeed true. In the previous chapter, we said
that any objects uu are arranged in some way, i.e. for any objects uu there
is a Φ such that the uu are arranged Φ-wise. In the case of the Eiffel Tower
and the moon, what could such a property Φ be?
When we think about spatial properties, ‘being located in our solar
system’ or ‘being partially located in Paris’, might come to our mind.
Hence, we can say that the Eiffel Tower and the moon are arranged
located-in-our-solar-system-wise and partially-located-in-Paris-wise. If
we accept these sentences as true, and I think one is inclined to do so
even without a precise definition of these predicates,142 we can see that
the appropriate properties which the pair of objects which do not com-
pose must have in order to verify (5) are instantiated by it: The pair is
located in our solar system, it occupies a region of space which fully lies
within the region of space occupied by our solar system, and it is par-
tially located in Paris, since the region it occupies lies within the region
of space occupied by Paris, but it also occupies a region which does not
lie within that region.
What other properties Φ are there such that we can agree on the Eiffel
Tower and the moon being arranged Φ-wise? I think there is quite a num-
ber of such properties: They are arranged heavier-than-ten-tons-wise,
been-walked-by-humans-wise, orbiting-the-sun-wise, and so on. The ap-
propriate properties Φ to these arrangement properties are all instanti-
ated by the pair of objects which do not compose any object: It is heavier
than ten tons, has been walked by humans, and orbits the sun. Con-
versely, for any property Φ which is had by the pair of objects which do
not compose any object, there is a corresponding arrangement-property
142. We can hint at how to arrive at a precise definition of the predicates in question:
Some objects uu are arranged located-in-our-solar-system-wise iff each one of the uu
is located within our solar system. Some objects uu are arranged-partially-located-in-
Paris-wise iff there is at least one object x among the uu which is located in Paris and
there is at least one object y among the uu which is not located in Paris. We can leave the
task to formulate definitions for the predicates ‘is located in our solar system’ ‘is located
in Paris’ to the astronomers and geographers.
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ΦA, such that the Eiffel Tower and the moon instantiate it: The pair is
not spatially connected, the Eiffel Tower and the moon are not arranged-
spatially-connected-wise; the pair has a volume bigger than one cubic
kilometer, the Eiffel Tower and the moon are arrange having-a-volume-
being-more-than-one-cubic-kilometer-wise; and so on.
We see from this that there are good reasons to expect that it holds
for any property Φ, the pair of objects which do not compose any object
are Φ iff the Eiffel Tower and the moon are arranged Φ-wise. However,
if that is true, then all of the above three sentences are true which means
that (2) is false and, contrary to our supposition, the Eiffel Tower and the
moon are many-one identical to some object.
We can apply the same line of reasoning to any objects whatsoever,
no matter how different from each other they are, how big the distance
between them is, how numerous they are, or how arbitrary they appear to
be chosen: the Eiffel Tower, the moon, and your car; your car, the piano
in Anne’s living room, the first ten pages of my copy of Simons’ Parts,
and the mushrooms in Ben’s fridge. In my view, we have good reasons
to assume – and it is an assumption, it does not follow from our account
of composition – that any objects are many-one identical to some object,
and therefore, compose some object because as we have seen previously,
any objects uu share their bottom objects with some object x. Moreover,
as I argued in the previous paragraph, we have good reasons to think
that it holds for uu and some x with which the uu share all their bottom
objects, that for any property Φ, x is Φ iff the uu are arranged Φ-wise.
At least, we have not come across any examples which point towards the
contrary. Hence, we can rely on the evidence we get from these examples
and assume that any objects are many-one identical to some object, until
our opponents can present a counterexample.
As I said previously, the claim that any objects are many-one identical
to some object does not follow from our theory. It rests on two key as-
sumptions: Any objects uu share their bottom objects with some object x,
and for any property Φ, x is Φ iff the uu are arranged Φ-wise. These two
assumptions can be held or rejected from the point of view we have de-
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veloped in the previous chapters. Yet, as I argued above these two claims
fit nicely into the bigger picture of our theory and, if in doubt, it seems
we should rather accept than reject them.
Finally, one might suspect that EPU brings back the problems of sin-
gularism discussed in chapter 4: Is EPU when it claims that for any uu
there is an x such that the uu are many-one identical to x not a disguised
form of singularism? This worry seems unnecessary. The problems for
the singularist arise from her inability to paraphrase sentences contain-
ing plural terms with the means of singular terms in an adequate way.
Although we use EPU, which functions in a way as a singularizing de-
vice, providing us with a singular term that is co-referring with a plural
term, it does not “cancel-out” our plural terms. When needed or wanted,
we can of course still rely on the use of plural terms and there is no need
for us to paraphrase away, like the singularist does, the plural terms from
natural language. Hence, we can use EPU without being afraid that we
have to deal with the problems of singularism.
Setting this worry aside, we shall devote the rest of this chapter to try-
ing to set your mind at ease about the connection between our account of
Composition as Identity. Someone might still be worried about the con-
vergence of our theory towards universalism and may regard it as a bad
outcome for us that we end up that close to universalism. Thus, I will go
on and argue that we can counter Korman’s arguments from counterex-
amples against universalism, which seems to be one of the main threats
we have to be worried about at this point.
10.3 Arguments from Counterexamples
Mereological universalism claims that any objects compose some object.
The immediate reply universalists have to face is that their position can
shown to be false due to counterexamples to their main claim. This view
can be found in several places in the literature where authors aim to mo-
tivate a rejection of universalism due to the intuition that some objects
do not compose. After stating that universalism entails that “[t]here is
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an object composed of (i) London Bridge, (ii) a certain sub-atomic parti-
cle located far beneath the surface of the moon, and (iii) Cal Ripken, Jr.”
(Markosian 1998: 228), Markosian tells us the following:
My intuitions tell me that there is no such object, and I suspect
that the intuition of the man on the street would agree with
mine on this point. (Markosian 1998: 228)
A similar line of “critique” is presented by Elder, Berto and Plebani, and
Koslicki:
Thus, on the assumption that the microparticles of physics are
genuine objects, the doctrine holds that there is an object com-
posed of seventeen microparticles in my left elbow, forty-three
microparticles at the bottom of the Marianas Trench, one mi-
croparticle in the star Sirius, and the entirety of the Navy’s
latest Ohio-class submarine. Neither folk theories nor learned
theories about how the world works find any need or use for
such randomly assembled “objects”– to put it mildly.
(Elder 2004: x)
[U]niversalism ontologically commits us to implausible
things: scattered objects composed of disparate, unrelated
things of different kinds, like the mereological sum of the right
half of Lewis’ left shoe plus the Moon plus the sum of all Her
Majesty’s ear-rings. (Berto and Plebani 2015: 187)
[I]t would follow that the material world is far more densely
populated than we ordinarily assume it to be, with all manner
of gerrymandered and intuitively bizarre mereological sums
(such as the notorious “trout-turkey”, whose parts are the, still
undetached, upper half of a trout along with the, still unde-
tached, lower half of a turkey). (Koslicki 2008: 40)
One might think these “arguments” show that universalism can be eas-
ily dismissed. Yet, that is a hasty conclusion to draw. After all, the just
quoted passages merely pump intuitions against universalism and do not
provide us any argument to show that the universalist is wrong. It was
not until Korman spelled out his “Arguments from Counterexamples”
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that the above intuition-pumps have been used to argue against unre-
stricted composition in a more systematic way, (see Korman 2015: §4).
The argument from counterexamples against universalism goes as fol-
lows, (Korman 2015: 27):143
1. If universalism is true, then there are trogs144
2. There are no trogs
3. So, universalism is false
The argument is valid by modus tollens. But is it sound too?145 Korman
(2015: 28-90) puts the focus of his defense of the argument on premise
2. and on how universalists might try to argue against it. We shall have
a brief look at how an attempt to undermine premise 2. in the spirit of
Lewis’ thoughts about quantifier restrictions might go and I will con-
clude that it is not an advisable strategy to defend universalism.
Following the idea of Lewis (1986c: 213; 1991: 79-80), which gained
quite some popularity, (see Jubien 2001: 1-2, fn.2, Sider 2001: 218;
2004: 680-1, Sosa 1999: 142-3, Richard 2006: 173, and Rosen and Dorr
2002: 156-7), we might think the best way to reply to the argument from
counterexamples is to claim that the argument equivocates and uses two
different existential quantifiers. According to Lewis, we use – in every-
day conversations – restricted quantifiers, which range only over a lim-
ited domain of all the objects there are:
143. Korman (2015: 28) presents a similar argument from counterexamples against ni-
hilism. Roughly put, it goes as follows: Nihilism denies the existence of tables. There
are tables. Hence, Nihilism is false.
144. Korman (2015: 27) introduces trogs as objects composed of a dog and a tree trunk
of a tree.
145. There is an obvious problem with premise 1. because universalism per se does not
tell us that trogs exist. From the context within which Korman presents the argument,
it becomes apparent that he presupposes that at least one tree and at least on dog exists.
But universalism does not assume that a dog or a tree trunk exists. Nevertheless, since
this is a rather innocuous assumption, we shall grant it. Given this assumption, premise
1. simply appears to follow from the definition of universalism.
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I am restricting my quantifiers [. . . ] when I look in the fridge
and say that there is no beer. I do not deny that there is beer
outside the fridge, but I ignore it in my speech.
(Lewis 1986c: 136-7)
We could defend universalism in a similar vein: In premise 1., an exis-
tential quantifier is used unrestricted, or “wide open”, quantifying over
everything there is. In premise 2., another existential quantifier is used,
a restricted quantifier. This quantifier does not range over all the objects
there are, but is limited to a domain which contains only some of the ob-
jects there are, leaving out others. Hence, when the universalist claims
that trogs exist, she is not contradicting the person on the street who
claims that there are no trogs. The apparent contradiction disappears,
once we realize that the two speakers use different quantifiers.
This line of defense is not advisable. It not only begs the question in
favor of universalism – it relies on the claim that the universalist’s quanti-
fiers is unrestricted, and her opponent does not quantify over all the objects
there are – but also raises the suspicion that “[. . . ] disputes regarding the
ontology of physical objects are verbal” (Hirsch 2011: 144). The nihilist
has a similar strategy at hand: When she claims that there are no tables,
she uses the “real” existential quantifier, and does not contradict common
sense, because common sense uses an existential quantifier which quan-
tifies over merely possible, or even impossible objects. Or, what amounts
in my view to the same, the tension between the premises 1. and 2. might
be denied by following Sider, who states that the universalist is talking
a language which is different from the natural language we use in our
daily conversations:
[. . . ] perhaps my book, and other works of ontology, should
not be interpreted as English, but rather as “Ontologese”, a
language distinctive to fundamental ontology, in which the
quantifiers are stipulated to mean something new.
(Sider 2004: 680)
However, the nihilist has the same option to rescue her position, she
might want to speak “Tarskian” (van Inwagen 2014: 1), and point out that
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premise 1. in the argument against her position is uttered in Tarskian. But
then the interesting question becomes which language is the correct lan-
guage to use when we want to talk about what object there really are. Yet,
it remains unanswered and universalists and nihilist have ridiculed the
whole discussion on composition. I think this is the wrong way to reply
to the argument from counterexamples for both parties, universalists as
well as nihilists. Hence, I shall develop my own defense of how we can
best defend universalism against these arguments. So let’s again have a
closer look at the argument and see where we can tackle it.
10.4 The Particular Composition Question
The problem with the argument from counterexamples against univer-
salism is that it is based on wrong expectations towards answers to the
SCQ. Recall, the SCQ asks for conditions under which some objects uu
compose an object x. Universalism tells us that any objects uu compose.
However, universalism does not tell us what object, say, my dog and the
trunk of the tree outside my office window compose. In other words, we
have to distinguish the SCQ from what I call the “Particular Composition
Question”:
SCQ When is it true that ∃x the uu compose x?
PCQ What object x do the uu compose?
To clarify the difference between the two questions, compare it to the fol-
lowing, structurally similar questions a set-theorist might ask, the Spe-
cial, and Particular Intersection Question:
SIQ When is it true that ∃x the uu have x as their intersection?
PIQ What set x is the intersection of the sets uu?
We know the answer to SIQ. For any sets uu, there is an x which they have
as their intersection iff there is at least one object which is an element of
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each one of the uu. For instance, the set of blue objects and the set of
wooden objects have an intersection, because there is at least one object
which is an element of the set of blue objects and an element of the set of
the wooden objects. Even the correct answer – sharing at least one object
as an element – to the General Intersection Question
GIQ What is it for some x to be an intersection of the uu?
which mimics the GCQ does not suffice to answer PIQ for us. Surely, they
imply a trivial answer to PIQ, the intersection of some uu is that set which
contains all and only those objects which are elements of each one of the
uu. Similarly, we can deduce a trivial answer to PCQ from answers to
the SCQ and GCQ. Even if we know the conditions under which compo-
sition occurs, and what composition is, we are not in a position to know
anything about composite objects, apart from the trivial facts that they
are composite objects and have the objects which compose them as parts.
Assume, our answer to the SCQ tells us that two atoms y and z compose
some object x. All we know about x is that it is a composite object and
has two atoms as parts. Moreover, even if we had besides the answer to
the SCQ an answer to the GCQ, we could not give an answer to the PCQ.
To give a further example, consider the following three questions
lawyers might ask:
SFQ When is it true that ∃x the uu have x as father?
GFQ What is it for the uu to have x as father?
PFQ Whom do the uu have as father?
Lawyers will tell us that they can spell out the answers to the first two
questions: For any uu, there is an x such that the uu have x as father,
if each one of the uu has the same male legal parent. Having a father
is having a male legal parent. Yet, we cannot infer on the basis of those
two answers, an answer to PFQ. Knowing the conditions under which
some people have the same person as father, and knowing what having
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a father means, does not tell us who is the father of some people. Simi-
larly, knowing the conditions under which there is an object x which is
composed by some uu and what composition is, does not suffice to know
what object the uu compose.
By distinguishing the SCQ from the PCQ, we can see where the argu-
ment from counterexamples goes wrong. Universalism does not tell us
what object x some objects uu compose, although it tells us under what con-
ditions they compose some object. Hence, the counterexample misses the
point. Universalism does not entail the existence of trogs but only that
given the existence of a dog and a tree trunk, there is some object which
they compose. Therefore, we can defend universalism against Korman’s
argument by dismissing its first premise.
The opponent of universalism will try to defend the argument from
counterexamples against this critique. To use the famous example from
Lewis (1991: 7-8), she might reply in the following way: Although uni-
versalism does not tell us what particular object the undetached upper
half of a trout x, and the still undetached lower half of a turkey y com-
pose, it entails the existence of a certain kind of object, a trout-turkey.
So, universalism entails nonetheless that trout-turkeys exist. Yet, there
are no trout-turkeys; so, universalism is false. If this line of thought un-
derlies the argument from counterexamples, then we have to reconsider
whether premise 2. is acceptable and on the basis of what the universal-
ist’s opponent can claim that there are no trout-turkeys. The answer to
this question will depend upon what kind of object trout-turkeys are. So,
let’s try to find out what we can know about trout-turkeys and whether
this shows that they do not exist.
Supposedly, one may want to defend the argument from counterex-
amples by claiming that there is another important composition question
we have to consider besides the GCQ, SCQ, and PCQ:
What kind of object Φ do the uu compose?
It is the answer to this question, so she might continue, which becomes
a problem for universalism. According to universalism, the undetached
§10.4 THE PARTICULAR COMPOSITION QUESTION 299
upper half of a trout x and the still undetached lower half of a turkey
y compose an object z, and z is a trout-turkey. However, there are no
trout-turkeys, which is why universalism is false.
We can see that this way of undermining universalism differs from the
one discussed in the previous section. The point of critique raised here
is not that some objects compose an object, or what particular object they
compose, but what kind of object they compose. Hence, this reply hinges
on what kind of object trout-turkeys are. But does the universalist tell us
anything about that? What can we deduce from the universalists position
about the kind of object trout-turkeys are? Indeed, there is not much we
can know about the kind of objects trout-turkeys are, given what univer-
salist have told us about them. Trivially, trout-turkeys are composite ob-
jects, but we cannot reject the existence of trout-turkeys because they are
composite objects. Such a rejection would lead us straightforwardly to
nihilism and that is not what is the intention of the argument from coun-
terexamples. Therefore, I will offer two possible answers to the question
what kind of object trout-turkeys are. It will turn out that neither of these
justifies the premise that is needed for the argument from counterexam-
ples.
Firstly, trout-turkeys are “scattered objects”, i.e. “[. . . ] the region of
space it occupies is disconnected” (Cartwright 1975: 175). By definition, a
trout-turkey has two parts, the upper half of a trout and the lower half of
a turkey. Even without a precise definition of ‘occupying a disconnected
region of space’, we can see that a trout-turkey is a scattered object. One
of its halves, the trout-half, occupies a region which is located close to,
say, the region occupied by Motueka River, and the turkey-half occupies a
region which is located close to the region occupied by Kiraka, the giraffe
from Auckland’s zoo. However, we cannot agree with Korman that our
everyday intuitions about which macroscopic objects exist are most of
the time correct and reject the existence of trout-turkeys because they are
scattered objects. These very same intuitions tell us that there are scattered
objects, for instance, bikinis, suits, coin collections, copies of PM, solar
systems, and so forth. Note further, Cartwright’s observation that if the
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findings of science are correct, then all macroscopic material objects are
scattered:
That there are scattered material objects seems to me beyond
reasonable doubt. If natural scientists are to be taken at their
word, all familiar objects of everyday life are scattered.
(Cartwright 1975: 175)
It is evident that we cannot justify premise 2. by claiming that trout-
turkeys do not exist because they are scattered objects. This would rule
out the existence of other material objects which conservatives want to
preserve and is therefore not an option.
A second attempt to hold on to the claim that there are no trout-
turkeys may be based on the reason that the kind of objects trout-turkeys
are is somewhat “gerrymandered” (Koslicki 2008: 40). The very details
of this reservation against universalism can be spelled out in different
ways. Yet, I think they all are based on the same line of thought, no
matter whether the objection against such objects as trout-turkeys is that
they belong to an “extraordinary” (Korman 2015: 1), “arbitrary” (Husserl
1901: 275-6), “implausible” (Berto and Plebani 2015: 187), “bizarre”
(Markosian 1998: 229), or “randomly assembled” (Elder 2004: x), kind
of objects. The driving force behind the argument from counterexamples
relying on these reservations is the view that if there is no “ordinary”,
non-arbitrary, plausible, . . . , concept of Φs, then there are no Φs. With
respect to trout-turkeys, the idea becomes that trout-turkeys do not ex-
ist because the concept trout-turkey is not an ordinary, but arbitrary and
implausible concept.
This line of putting pressure on universalism runs into problems. For
instance, the notion of an ordinary object, and hence its opposite, being a
gerrymandered object, is troublesome. On the one hand, what concepts
count as ordinary changes over time. The concept of a smartphone be-
came an ordinary concept only quite recently. A little bit less recently, the
concepts of a nuclear reactor, a neutron or a strand of DNA became or-
dinary concepts. But how are such inventions and discoveries possible?
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How can then people invent and discover objects that belong to a kind of
objects for which we do not yet have an ordinary concept? That would be
impossible, if objects which belong to a kind of objects for which we have
no ordinary concept cannot exist. Thus, this way of justifying premise 2.
should be dismissed.
We have equally good reasons to reject a defense of premise 2. which
is aimed to be justified by the thought that trout-turkeys are objects which
belong to an arbitrary kind of objects. What counts as arbitrary is a rela-
tive issue. If I were to name (and maybe I will do that indeed) my three
future pets Ruth, Nelson, and Gottlob, it might seem arbitrary to you. But
it is not. The three names are the authors’ names of the first three books
from the left on the shelf in the room next door. Maybe the ordering of
these books on the shelf sounds arbitrary to you. But it is not. They are
ordered according to their height. As you see, what is considered arbi-
trary is relative to our point of view. Hence, I think that arguing against
the universalist and the existence of trout-turkeys because they belong to
a kind of objects falling under an arbitrary concept does not work either.
More generally, I think we have good reasons to suspect that all of the
previously mentioned reasons to reject the existence of trout-turkeys will
fail, due to similar reasons: What counts as a notion which represents im-
plausible, bizarre, or randomly assembled objects is relative and changes
over time. Hence, an argument which aims to show that trout-turkeys
do not exist cannot rely on the above line of reasoning because the an-
cient idea of Plato that we should divide “[. . . ] into species according to
the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad
carver might” (Plato 1892b: 266a) – nowadays famous as “[to] carve real-
ity at the joints” (Lewis 1983b: 346; see also Sider 2011: 8) – fails. As I just
suggested, where we suspect these alleged joints to be is a relative matter
and may change over over time. Hence, we do better without them and
should not use them in our ontological arguments.
The failure of this line of defense for the second premise shows us that
the opponent of universalism cannot reject the view by relying on the
argument from counterexamples. From universalism, nothing follows
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which suggests that there is something wrong with those objects which
some consider to be extraordinary or arbitrary objects. Surely, they seem
quite unlike chairs, tables and rocks, but chairs and tables are, in some
sense, quite unlike rocks. Hence, unless we can find some further reasons
to believe in the truth of premise 2. of the argument from counterexam-
ple, it should be rejected. Let’s turn back to the PCQ and reflect briefly on
whether it is a metaphysical question what object or what kind of object
some objects compose. I will argue that it cannot be the metaphysician’s
task to answer the PCQ because it is a question which does not allow for
a uniform answer and composition is a relation which happens “at dif-
ferent levels”. In the final section of this chapter, we will then compare
our account of Composition as Identity with mereological nihilism.
10.5 Who answers the PCQ?
Like the intersection-relation, composition is a very general relation, i.e.
the extension of the predicate ‘composing’ is a very heterogeneous group
of objects. For instance, oxygen atoms, as well as, pieces of metal, or rocks
are good candidates to enter the composition relation. That is, from a
common-sense point of view, it looks as if two oxygen atoms compose an
oxygen molecule, pieces of metal the Eiffel Tower, and rocks Mount Ever-
est. Oxygen atoms, pieces of metal, and rocks, on the one hand, and oxy-
gen molecules, the Eiffel Tower and Mount Everest, on the other hand,
form heterogeneous groups. In the sciences, these objects are studied
by different disciplines: Chemists consider oxygen atoms and molecules,
architects pieces of metal and the Eiffel Tower, and geologists rocks and
Mount Everest as objects of the domain of their field of enquiry. This sug-
gests that when we ask What do these oxygen atoms compose?, the person to
answer this question is not the metaphysician, but the chemist. Similarly,
it will be the architect and the geologist who answer the questions what
some pieces of metal and what some rocks compose, respectively, and
not the metaphysician. This suggestion can be reinforced, if we consider
the duals to the SCQ, GCQ and PCQ by introducing the predicate ‘de-
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composing’. Let’s define x decomposes into the uu with the uu compose
y. Then, we can ask analogous to the SCQ, GCQ, and PCQ, the following
three questions:
SDQ When are there some uu such that x decomposes into the uu?
GDQ What is it for an object x to decompose into the uu?
PDQ Into what objects uu does x decompose?
The answers to the SDQ and the GDQ follow trivially from our answers
to the SCQ and the GCQ, whereby the argument places are simply re-
versed: The answer to the GDQ is the answer we give to the GCQ with
reversed argument places. Since an object decomposes into some objects
iff it is not an atom, and our answer to the SCQ will tell us under what
conditions some object is not an atom, the answer to the SCQ entails an
answer to the SDQ. But I would like to discuss the PDQ, the dual to PCQ,
which asks what objects enter the second place of the decomposition re-
lation, given that some object enters its first.
It is important to note that there are at first glance different, equally
legitimate answers to the PDQ, if we take some composite object x in the
first argument place of the decomposition relation. Take, for instance, the
Eiffel Tower. It decomposes into a top and a lower half, but also into a
left and a right half, pieces of metal, mereological atoms, and so forth. Or
take a liter of water. It does not only decompose into two half liters of
water, but also into (roughly) 3.345 ∗ 1025 water molecules, or (roughly)
3.345 ∗ 1025 oxygen atoms and 6.69 ∗ 1025 hydrogen atoms.146 But these
answers are not answers which will be provided by a metaphysician. On
the contrary, nobody will turn to a metaphysician in order to find out
whether a liter of water decomposes into oxygen and hydrogen atoms.
Conversely, we might doubt that it is reasonable to ask the metaphysi-
146. Water has a density of 1g/l and the atomic mass of water is 18g/mol. Hence, one
liter of water contains 55.56mol of water. Since there are 6.022 ∗ 1023 molecules in a mole,
there are roughly 3.345 ∗ 1025 water molecules in a liter of water.
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cian for an answer to the PCQ. To illustrate this, let’s consider another
example.
Although we might ask the metaphysician whether some rocks com-
pose, it is not sensible to ask the metaphysician what object, or what kind
of object they compose. For instance, assuming that we believe in the ex-
istence of some atoms located in the Kuiper belt, and that they compose
an object, let’s call it ‘Pluto’. Then, it does not seem to be a reasonable
thing to ask the metaphysician whether these objects compose a planet
or a dwarf planet. The person we should ask is the astronomer, not the
philosopher. Hence, I agree to a large degree with the following reflection
of Koslicki:
The question of which kinds there are I take to be one that is
not answered by the mereologist proper, but by the ontologist
at large, in conjunction with other domains, such as science
and common sense, which turn out to contribute to the ques-
tion, “What is there?”, or, more specifically, to the question,
“What kinds of objects are there?” (Koslicki 2008: 171)
However, one might wonder about the consequences which follow from
delegating the PCQ to other departments: If we agree that the PCQ does
not necessarily fall into the metaphysician’s area of competence, are we
thereby not taking away the SCQ from her too? After all, how can it be
possible that the metaphysician can not tell us what some objects com-
pose, yet she is supposed to tell us whether they compose an object. If
composition is indeed such a general relation, might we not rather ask
the specialist to tell us about the conditions under which the objects from
her domain of research compose? In other words, should we ask the
chemist, architect, and geologist about the conditions under which oxy-
gen atoms, pieces of metals, and rocks compose?
It may seem that delegating the PCQ to the individual sciences ul-
timately means that the SCQ will be answered by them as well. Let’s
suppose that were true. This would only make sense, if the SCQ would
be answered in different ways by the different sciences: The chemist tells
us the conditions for chemical composition, the architect for architectural
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composition, and the geologist for geological composition. Yet then, we can
ask for the conditions under which any objects, no matter of what kind
they are – oxygen-atoms, pieces of metal, rocks – compose some object.
This brings us again back to the original SCQ we encountered previously
and it falls into the philosopher’s area of competence. Therefore, we can
see that even if the PCQ has not to be answered by metaphysics, but will
rely on the special insights gained by people working in other areas of
research, the SCQ will still remain a metaphysical question.
We have seen that our account of Composition as Identity provides
a suitable starting point for universalism. The assumption that any ob-
jects are identical to some object, i.e. the principle “E Pluribus Unum”,
can be motivated within our theory on the basis of the considerations
about the singularization of plural terms we discussed at the beginning
of chapter 7. The examples we discussed in this context support the truth
of this principle, since they suggest that we will find for any objects uu
some object x with which they share all their bottom objects, and x is
Φ iff the uu are arranged Φ-wise. After presenting Korman’s argument
from counterexamples against universalism and rejecting a reply which
aims to explain away the contradiction between universalism and conser-
vatism, I argued that the argument is based on mistaken expectations to-
wards universalism and metaphysics more generally. Universalism tells
us only whether, not what object some objects compose. By spelling out
the difference between these two questions and introducing the PCQ, I
tried to make this point more tangible. In addition, we observed that
rejecting the existence of those objects, which according to universalism
exist, by claiming that they belong to a gerrymandered kind of objects
cannot be maintained, because what is conceived as a gerrymandered
kind of object is relative and changes over time. Eventually, I concluded
by proposing the idea that the PCQ will be answered with the help of the
insights from research which is done outside of philosophy departments.
Since we have discussed the relation between Composition as Identity
and mereological universalism at length, let’s now turn to see how our
account of composition relates to another answer to the SCQ.
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10.6 Composition as Identity and Nihilism
Composition as Identity and nihilism are usually located on opposite
ends of the spectrum of theories on composition we can choose from.
Yet, Calosi (2016) argues that strong Composition as Identity is equiva-
lent to nihilism. It is not my intention to investigate the relation between
strong Composition as Identity and nihilism. Rather, I would like to ask
whether the account of Composition as Identity I developed in the previ-
ous chapters ends up being in a similar close relation to nihilism as Calosi
claims strong Composition as Identity is. I think one may indeed get the
impression that my account of Composition as Identity is in fact boiling
down to nihilism. My view on composition shares certain features with
the nihilist’s view; but they come apart. I will next discuss two points
which might mistakenly lead to the conclusion that my understanding of
composition is nihilism in a disguised form, before I present four reasons
which show that I am not selling nihilism under a different label here.
10.6.1 What Composition as Identity shares with
Nihilism
There are two features that, on a first glance, may lead one to think
that my account of composition is mereological nihilism in universalist’s
clothes. Both theories are based on the use of plural logic and stress the
importance of arrangement. Although we can show why both theories
rely on the use of plural logic and why this does not mean that the theo-
ries come down to the same position, the central importance of arrange-
ment within both theories cannot be neglected. Let’s have a look at the
two points in turn, before discuss some reasons, which give us sufficient
evidence that the theory of composition we have seen in the previous
chapters is not a version of nihilism.
The first commonality between my theory and nihilism is obvious.
My account of composition cannot be expressed without plural logic.
I identify the composition relation with a kind of the identity relation,
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whereby I claimed that some objects compose an object iff they are iden-
tical to it. This many-one identity was defined within the framework of a
plural logic. Standard nihilists employ the notions of plural logic within
their paraphrase strategy. It tells us that ordinary sentences, which ap-
pear to be committed to the existence of composite objects, are adequately
paraphrased by sentences, which are committed to the existence of atoms
only. For instance, (1) gets paraphrased by (2), and (3) by (4):
(1) The Eiffel Tower exists
(2) Some atoms arranged Eiffel-Tower-wise exist
(3) The Eiffel Tower is heavier than the Piscatory Ring
(4) The atoms arranged Eiffel-Tower-wise are heavier than the atoms
arranged Piscatory-Ring-wise
Without the use of plural logic, nihilism becomes untenable since ni-
hilism without the paraphrase strategy amounts to strict atomism: The
only things there are, are mereological atoms. The strict atomist does
not have any further claims to offer which can tell us anything about the
world. She is limited to claims about the existence of atoms and their
distributive properties. Without plural logic, she cannot tell us anything
about reality by the means of claims, which contain predicates with col-
lective argument places. This makes the project of strict atomism an im-
possible enterprise. Although it trumps most of its rival theories when it
comes to ontological parsimony, it cannot compete with their explanatory
power. Even standard nihilism has more explanatory power than strict
atomism. However, the principle of parsimony asks us to choose the
more parsimonious of two theories only under the condition that they are
otherwise equal. A difference in explanatory power shows us that standard
and strict nihilism are not otherwise equal, which suffices for abstaining
from choosing the more parsimonious theory. Hence, we see that the
nihilist better invokes the paraphrase strategy, and thereby, builds her
theory on the use of plural logic.
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Yet, that Composition as Identity and nihilism both rely on the use of
plural logic should not lead us to confuse the two theories. As seen in
section 4.3, any competitive theory on composition will make use of plu-
ral logic, since composition is collective in its first argument place and
plural logic is the right framework to deal with such predicates. Com-
position as Identity and nihilism share the need for plural logic with any
other theory that can be taken as a serious contestant to shed light on the
question what composition is or under what conditions composition oc-
curs. Therefore, the use of plural logic should not suggest that theory of
composition I have presented here and nihilism cannot be kept apart.
Secondly, both contain the idea of arrangement as a central feature.
As we have just seen, nihilists paraphrase talk about composite objects
with talk about the arrangement of atoms. My account of composition
identifies composition with identity, whereby I argued that the kind of
identity that is the composition relation is sensitive to arrangement. Con-
sider again (D18’):
Some objects uu are many-one identical to x iff the uu are a proper
plurality, the uu share their bottom objects with x, and x is Φ iff the
uu are arranged Φ-wise.
Due to the criticisms against Composition as Identity based on the rear-
rangement of parts, we introduced the third condition in the definition
of many-one identity as a means to get hold of the idea that arrange-
ment matters with respect to the question to which object some objects
are many-one identical. Together with the claim that some objects com-
pose an object iff they are many-one identical to it, we made arrangement
a central feature for composition and also a central part of our theory on
composition. I think there is no way to explain away that arrangement
plays a central role in both theories. But identifying the two theories on
the ground of this shared common feature is too hasty. I think there are
sufficient reasons that speak for keeping them apart. So let’s see what
these are.
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10.6.2 Why Composition as Identity is not Nihilism
Next, I will lay out why it is a mistake to think that the version of Com-
position as Identity discussed previously amounts to nihilism. The main
reasons for distinguishing between the two positions are the following:
Nihilism claims that parthood and composition are empty relations, is
committed to mereological atomism, and is pushed by considerations of
parsimony. Composition as Identity can define the parthood and com-
position relation, does not rely on mereological atomism, and shows us
why we do not have to be nihilists to be ontologically parsimonious.
One major difference between my version of Composition as Identity
and nihilism relies on the fact that the former is able to define the part-
hood and the composition predicate, while the latter claims that they are
empty. As we have seen, the predicate ‘the uu compose x’ is defined in
our theory. A definition of parthood is straightforward: x is a proper part
of y iff there are some uu such that the uu compose y and x is among the
uu.
In comparison, the nihilist does not offer us a definition of parthood or
composition, but eliminates them from the stock of non-empty relations,
when she claims that ‘x is a part of y’ and ‘the uu compose x’ are always
false. Surely, there is some prima facie reason to think that the nihilist is
here making a similar move as we do: Neither we, nor the nihilist uses the
composition or the parthood relation as a primitive relation. However, I
am not entirely sure whether nihilists can really do without one of these
predicates as a primitive. I cannot see how they can define either on of
the predicates without the other. Yet, when the nihilist utters her central
claim, no object has a part, or there are no composite objects, she needs
these predicates. Please note that claiming the only things which exists
are atoms does not work either, since ‘being an atom’ is defined as not
having any proper parts and trading the two predicates for the predicate
‘being an atom’ is no good trade. But let’s grant that nihilists have a
way to formulate their central claim without either taking parthood or
composition to be a primitive relation.
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The difference between the two positions can nevertheless not be ne-
glected: On the one hand, composition is defined. On the other hand,
composition is claimed to be an empty relation. The difference between
defining a predicate and taking it to represent an empty relation is clear.
We can define ‘is left-handed’ in a theory where we use ‘is right-handed’
as a primitive predicate, or vice versa. However, this does not mean that
we thereby claim that there are no left-handed people, i.e. that ‘is left-
handed’ is an empty relation. If that were the case, then not only would
Anselm’s ontological proof have to conclude that God does not exist be-
cause he defines the concept of God, but the value of any definition might
be doubted, if defining a relation amounts to the claim that there is no
object which satisfies the property of the definiendum. Hence, since we
should not confuse a definition of a predicate ‘Φ’ with the claim that the
relation represented by ‘Φ’ is an empty relation, we should not relate our
account of Composition as Identity to the nihilist’s view on composition.
Furthermore, nihilism depends upon the truth of mereological atom-
ism, i.e. that any object is either an atom, or has an atom as proper part
– whereby the second disjunct will always considered to be false by the
nihilist. To put it the other way round, nihilism cannot be true, if there is
at least one gunky object. If there were a gunky object, then it would have
a proper part, which is what the nihilist denies. On the other hand, my
version of Composition as Identity can work with a pragmatic version of
atomism. By introducing the concept of bottom objects and claiming that
any object is a bottom object or has a bottom object among it, we made
a claim which appears to come dangerously close to atomism. Yet, as I
stressed in section 7.3, bottom objects should not be confused with mere-
ological atoms. What counts as a bottom object is relative to the theory
within which we are working and depends upon the linguistic choices
we make there. What counts as an atom, or not, is not relative, but an ab-
solute, ontological fact. In no way, does this depend upon our linguistic
choices. Hence, when I claim that any object is a bottom object or has a
bottom object among it, this does not amount to the atomistic claim that
any object is an atom or has an atom as proper part.
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In addition, nihilism is pushed by the principle of parsimony. Due
to the desire of not postulating the existence of more objects than neces-
sary, nihilists think the existence of composite objects has to be denied.
As we have seen with Composition as Identity at hand, Occam’s Razor
does not force us to shave off composite objects from our ontology. Com-
posite object just are their parts taken collectively. Given the ontological
commitment to the existence of the parts, there is no additional ontolog-
ical commitment to the existence of the composite object, and vice versa.
Hence, postulating the existence of the composite object amounts to pos-
tulating the existence of the parts, and denying the existence of the com-
posite object is denying the existence of its parts. As you see, when the
nihilist uses the principle of parsimony, then Occam’s Razor cuts in two
ways: Not only does it shave off the composite object, but also its parts.
Moreover, if atomism is true, then the nihilistic view amounts to one
particular way of dividing up reality besides the other possibilities we
have according to Composition as Identity. The nihilists claim that only
atoms exist is simply the strictest way of drawing up an inventory of the
world. However, that does not mean that there are not other ways such
an inventory can be drawn, and a fortiori, it does not amount to the claim
that there are no composite objects. Finally, the nihilist seems to think
of composition as an ontologically heavily loaded relation, which is dif-
ficult for me to make sense of. It might be that composition is thought
to be some relation which ‘adds something to reality’. However, I think
the picture of composition we developed understands composition as an
“ontological flyweight”, which ultimately turns out to be what van In-
wagen denied, namely a “[rearrangement of] the furniture of the earth
without adding to it” (van Inwagen 1990: 124).

Conclusion
Although Composition as Identity provides us with a plausible interpre-
tation of our intuitions about the close relation between a material object
and its parts, the criticisms which have been put forward against this
view are challenging. Problems which arise for Composition as Identity
such as the Paradox for Composition as Identity and the derivation of
Collapse, as well the theory’s tight connection to mereological essential-
ism and reverse mereological essentialism are difficult to overcome for
the versions of Composition as Identity which can be found in the litera-
ture. I argued that these challenges can be met, if we take composition to
be a relation which comes in a variety of forms and add an arrangement-
condition to the definition of many-one identity.
The problems of conservative strategies to resolve inconsistencies
within the standard systems of plural logic suggest that identity is best
understood as a relation which comes in different kinds, whereby only
one of them obeys substitution. The view that identity is a unitary rela-
tion which always allows for substitution is a consequence of mistakenly
paraphrasing away plural terms by singular terms, and hence avoiding
plural logic altogether, or of the assumption that there are other non-
singular terms besides plural terms. I argued against both views and
showed that they are flawed. Once we abandon the narrow-minded view
of singularism and part ways with the conservative views on plural logic,
we are in a position to see that the singular one-one relation which allows
for substitution, whereby I assumed for the sake of the argument that any
singular term is a non-rigid designator, is the exception to the norm and
that other kinds of identity relations do not obey this rule of inference
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unrestrictedly.
I suggested that the lesson we can learn from the substitution failures
in plural logic are analogous to the lessons that have been learned from
its failures in modal and epistemic contexts: When dealing with pred-
icates that are non-extensional in an argument place, substituting non-
rigid designators in that argument places is not a legitimate inference. I
argued further that predicates which are collective in an argument place
are non-extensional in that argument place. After distinguishing between
predicates that are intensional and predicates that are hyperintensional in
an argument place, I proposed two revisions for when substituting plu-
ral terms is legitimate in cases where we encounter such predicates. In
the case of predicates that are intensional in an argument place, plural
terms can be substituted if they are rigid designators. On the other hand,
with predicates that are hyperintensional in an argument place, we can
substitute plural terms only, if their reference is articulated in the same
way.
Further, I showed that criticisms against Composition which are
based on the idea of rearrangement can be met, if an arrangement condi-
tion is added to the definition of many-one identity. Hence, it turns out
that we have to acknowledge that identity is a relation which is more
complex than commonly thought. Yet, the complexity of this notion
of identity allows us to provide a fruitful theory of composition which
makes an assumption of universalism natural. Worries about the impli-
cations which come with the view that composition is unrestricted have
been dispelled by distinguishing between the questions whether some
objects compose an object from the question what object or what kind
of object some objects compose. Eventually, I drew a clear distinction
between the account of Composition as Identity defended here and ni-
hilism. Although they appear to have some common ground, several
reasons show that identifying the two theories is a mistake.
I reckon that radical skeptics of Composition as Identity might remain
relatively unmoved by the arguments I provided. Nevertheless, I am
confident that they will agree with me on the point that Composition as
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Identity can be defended against the challenging criticisms we have dis-
cussed and that further arguments are needed in order to undermine the
it. Surely, one might be tempted to ask at what cost has Composition
as Identity been defended. As we have seen, it is necessary to reject the
view that identity is a unitary relation. This will strike some as a price
which is too high to pay. However, I think the benefit outweigh the cost.
Moreover, by extending our formal language in order to allow for the use
of plural terms, the idea of a variety of identity relations becomes neces-
sary. That these relations are in fact identity relations, and not merely like
identity relations, is grounded on the first of the identity principles we
discussed: If two terms ‘α ’ and ‘β’ are co-referring, then ‘α is/are identi-
cal to β’ is true.
The ones who might have been undecided on questions about compo-
sition, even if not fully convinced by my arguments, will hopefully have
seen that Composition as Identity is a position which deserves to be taken
seriously. Finally, I hope that the friends of Composition as Identity will
have experienced pressure as well as relief. On the one hand, I suppose
they agree with me on the seriousness of the criticisms which are raised
against Composition as Identity. On the other hand, I think their mind
could be set at ease by developing a framework which gives us a way to
reply to these criticisms. Thus, I hope that I succeeded in presenting one
way for interpreting and defending the claim that an object is identical to
its parts.
We have to concede that the account of Composition as Identity we
developed here makes the view a far more complicated position than it
looks at first glance. The simplicity of the claim that a composite object
is just identical to its parts taken collectively sounds attractive. Yet, by
taking identity to be a relation which comes in a variety of ways and
making it sensitive to arrangement, we have shown that Composition as
Identity is a far more complex theory than one may initially think. How-
ever, to think that identity is a simple relation is naive. The puzzles about
parthood and composition concern identity already in the first place: Is
the ship which results from substituting new planks for all the original
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planks identical to the original ship? Is a heap of grains the same heap af-
ter one of the grains is removed? How can a piece of clay be identical to a
statue if the former exists prior to the latter? People have been puzzled by
these lines of reasoning for ages and to think that they can be solved with
a simple theory is naive. Yet, as we have seen, Composition as Identity
can provide us with a fruitful and coherent basis to resolve these puzzle,
if we do justice to the complexity of identity.
What are the next steps to take from here? Underpinning this account
of composition with a modal and/or temporal framework promises to
lead to interesting insights and to strengthen the theory. Our account
is build upon a modal distinction between singular and plural terms.
Whether and how this can brought in line with a theory of transworld
identity seems a worthwhile inquiry. Similarly, turning back to our
discussion on four-dimensionalism I wonder whether the step to four-
dimensionalism from the just presented framework is as straightforward
as the step to universalism. Also, since we used at some points the tools
of second-order logic, it might be worthwhile to consider rephrasing our
theory with the use of a second-order logic.
With respect to plural logic, there are several questions which arise.
First and foremost, it would be interesting to see whether it is possible to
provide some sort of model theoretic semantics for our account of Com-
position as Identity. This would not only facilitate communicating the
theory but also provide us with the means to provide counterexamples
to arguments, such as the Paradox from Composition as Identity, in order
to show that they are invalid and not only that a certain derivation of the
paradox can be blocked.
From a methodological standpoint, we could investigate several ques-
tions. As I have already pointed out in the preface, the question what
counts as success for a metaphysical theory is a rather difficult one to ask.
Also, although there a lot of work has already been done on the princi-
ple of parsimony and the simplicity of theories as a theoretical virtue, it
seems that further investigations, in particular with respect to Composi-
tion as Identity, would be promising.
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Finally, from a historical point of view and turning back from where
we started our discussion, it would be interesting to see whether our ac-
count can be seen as a link to bring together the views, often regarded
as opposites, on composition of Plato and Aristotle. Yet, I think an even
more interesting project consists in a reexamination of Abaelardus’ views
on composition. His ideas on the importance of arrangement are un-
usual. I think they are even more surprising given his inclination to em-
brace mereological essentialism.
The different nature of these questions shows that a one-dimensional
analysis of composition, identity, and parthood has to fall short. In order
to clarify these concepts, we have to engage in questions and problems
from various philosophical disciplines and make use of the different tools
they offer us. I hope our discussion has been a step towards this.
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